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From a Pre-Colonial Order to a Princely State: Hyderabad in Transition, c.1748-1865. 
Sunil Chander, Magdalene College. Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of History, 
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SUMMARY 
This dissertation is about the fortunes and role of the centre in Hyderabad in the 
transition of the Hyderabad Deccan region from a pre-colonial political order to a princely 
state, within the nexus of the British empire. Chapters One and Two argue that eighteenth 
century-Hyderabad was not a typical post-Mughal successor state with a dominant centre 
presiding over a bureaucratic administration. It was, on the contrary, a regional political 
order in which the centre was weak and, although aspiring to 'Mughal'-style authority, 
moulded in practice by an interplay of local, supra-local and regional factors. The 
zamindars and nawabs of the Hyderabad countryside represented the local factor. They 
were small independent kings, whose quest for scarce labour and resources, and methods 
of social legitimation, involved them in a criss cross pattern of alliances and conflicts. 
'Intermediaries' with military and revenue assignments represented the supra-local factor 
in the region. They exploited the zamindars' and nawabs' local rivalries profitably, but 
taking sides in local conflicts affected their own internal dissensions. They were divided 
into mutually hostile factions at the Asaf Jahi court. These rival factions attached 
themselves to rival foreign powers, of neighbouring regions, pursuing conflicting interests 
in the Hyderabad region. When the British emerged supreme from inter-foreign power 
rivalries in the 1790s, their resident found himself in the driving seat in the Asaf Jahi 
court. Chapters Three and Four discuss British efforts to introduce centralization into 
Hyderabad's old political order in the period c.1798-1850. They explore the motives 
behind centralization, - mainly military fiscalism, - and its impact: political protest, 
economic decline and financial crisis. The Epilogue suggests that the period c.1850-65 
saw a change in the priorities of imperial intervention, which were related to industrial 
Britain's need for organizing India as an exporter of raw materials and food grains, and 
an importer of manufactured goods. A corresponding change also occurred in the 
character of centralization in Hyderabad. The outlines of the familiar princely state were 
in fact established in this period. 
PREFACE 
This thesis grew out of some dissatisfaction I began to experience in the course of 
earlier work on 20th century India. The broad parameters within which I had read 
'modem' Indian history, - nationalism, colonialism and communalism, for example, -
seemed inadequate for understanding breaks and continuities from the 'medieval' period 
into the 'modem' period, or the transition from pre-colonial to colonial India. Nor did the 
newly emerging historiography of the 18th century offer any satisfaction with respect to 
Hyderabad, the area I was particularly interested in. So, despite well-meaning advice to 
the contrary, I decided to write about the Hyderabad region myself. 
But, alas, plausibility was one thing and feasibility quite another. The first lesson I 
learnt was about sources. When one does a study of the late 19th or the 20th century, one 
tends to assume that sources will not be an impossible problem. If one wanted to write an 
introductory 'Land and People' chapter on some British administered area, for example, 
one might consult an abundant supply of gazetteers; statistical reports; survey and 
settlement reports; maps; official and unofficial records; and secondary works. For further 
chapters, one might reasonably expect to find the usual series of official records; 
collections of party and private papers; runs of newspapers and journals; official 
publications; and secondary works. If one still wanted to seem more original, one might 
unearth a hitherto unknown collection of records or private papers, and possibly even dip 
into Indian language sources. For Hyderabad from the mid-18th to the mid-19th century, 
there was a great scarcity of such regular sources. For what approximates to the 'Land 
. and People' chapter in this dissertation, for example, I had to comb through the records of 
the earliest military, geological, route and trigonometrical surveys, in the National 
Archives of India, and through the early issues of the Asiatic Society journals. I had to 
supplement these fragmentary materials with piece-meal information from all manner of 
manuscripts in the Mackenzie Collection at the India Office and the Historical Collection 
at the Salar Jang Museum, Hyderabad. 
The materials on which this thesis is based presented many special problems, in other 
words. The Indo-Persian of 18th century records and n:ianuscripts was difficult to learn. 
The variations of its Perso-Arabic script were impossible, given that my time and 
resources were limited. Reliance on translators and transliterators was unavoidable to 
some extent in such circumstances, and even that was curtailed . by limited time and 
resources. Another problem was the practical inaccessibility of some sources. Only a 
small fraction of the theoretically voluminous Asaf Jahi records in the Andhra Pradesh 
State Archives had been catalogued or put in order. The manuscripts in another 
department of the state government, the Oriental Manuscripts Library, were inaccessible in 
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practice. Yet another problem was the fragmentary nature of almost all the various types 
of source used. If the qualitative evidence about economic activity was not absent in 
colonial and pre-colonial sources, for example, the quantitative evidence was negligible in 
both. If the pre-colonial sources were, despite their patchiness, rich on aspects of 
indigenous society and culture, the colonial sources were, despite their continuity, almost 
dry in this respect. Still, the fragmentary nature of the sources may have been a blessing 
in disguise. If a particular theme or problem could not be pursued beyond a certain point 
in its socio-cultural aspect, one was forced to explore it further in its socio-economic or 
political aspect, if possible. So, though this thesis makes no claims to being a 'total 
history', it is not too narrowly specialized either: different chapters highlight different 
aspects of social, economic or political history. The spelling of Indian words follows a 
rough Anglo-Indian convention. The words are underlined when they occur for the first 
time. They are all listed and explained separately in the glossary. 
I incurred many debts in the course of my work. It would not have been possible 
without the financial support I received from Magdalene College, Cambridge; Cambridge 
Commonwealth Trust, Cambridge; Smuts Memorial Fund, Cambridge; E.G. Browne 
Memorial Fund, Cambridge; Board of Graduate Studies, Cambridge; and the Charles 
Wallace India Trust, London. I would like to thank all these bodies. I would also like to 
thank the staffs of the following libraries and archives: University Library, Cambridge; 
Centre of South Asian Studies, Cambridge; Oriental Faculty Library, Cambridge; Seeley 
(History Faculty) Library, Cambridge; India Office Library and Records, London; British 
Museum Library, London; National Archives of India, New Delhi; Andhra Pradesh State 
Archives, Hyderabad; Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi; and Salar Jang 
Museum, Hyderabad. 
Dr Basudeva Chatterji first planted the idea of working on Hyderabad in my head, and 
continued to be a valuable source of inspiration and ideas later. Dr Tapan Raychaudhuri 
guided my first attempts at research and graciously commented on a portion of this work 
after I had ceased to be his student. Dr Chris Bayly, who supervized my research for this 
dissertation, gave valuable and unstinting support from beginning to end. This thesis 
would never have been possible without his inspiration and ideas. Dr M.L.K. Murty, Dr 
Susan Bayly, Dr Neeladri Bhattacharya, Mr Ajay Pratap and Dr Parhan Nizami made 
valuable comments on particular portions. Mr Peter A v¥ry taught me elementary Persian. 
Dr Zaibunissa Begum and Mr Tajamul Husaini helped with the translation and 
transcription of Persian sources. 
My personal debts are also many. I would like to thank the following individuals for 
their generosity and help: Mrs Shakuntala Rani Sanghi, Mr Jagdish Prasad, Mrs Sheela 
Rani Sanghi, Mr Trilok Kumar, Mr Ambika Prasad, Miss Mona Khanna, Mr Subhash 
Chander, Mr Sharad Chander, Mr S. Mahajan, Dr (Mrs) R. Mahajan, Mr Tripurari Sharan, 
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-Mr Praveen Jha, the 'Poorvanchal Gang', Mr Rahmat Ali Khan, Dr Dharrnendra Pershad, 
Mr Tulja Raj, Mr Guru Pratap, Mr J. Rameshwar Rao, Dr S.K. Khanna, Mrs P. Khanna, 
Mr Naresh Patwari, Mrs Manju Patwari, Miss Ranjana Khanna, Miss Nandini Rameshwar 
Rao, Mr Guy Norton, Mr Ajith Kumar, Dr Rima Hooja, Mr and Mrs Qutub Yar Jang, 
Mrs Anees Khan, Mr Stuart Fraser, Mr Ricky Churchill, Mr Kurdukar and Mr Mark 
Robinson. 
This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the 
outcome of work done in collaboration. It has not previously been submitted, either in 
part or in whole, to this or to any other University, for any degree. 
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GLOSSARY 
a law court 
a village granted to Brahmans or temples in charity 
the holder of an agraharam 
a contractor or sub-contractor of revenues; a revenue 
farmer's assistant 
a king, an emperor 
a merchant or trader 
a horseman of the cavalry who does not own his horse 
a professional singer of ballads in praise of a family or 
community 
Indian bread 
Maratha revenue demand on territory not ruled directly by 
them 
a Mughal administrative division corresponding to the first 
sub-division of a suba 
a principal record-keeper or bureaucrat in the revenue 
department 
court 
the tomb of a sufi saint; a sufi shrine 
the principal landlord and/or revenue official at village or 
extra-village level in parts of Rayalseema and Marathwada 
the principal landlord and/or revenue official at the extra-
village level in parts of Rayalseema, Marathwada, Telangana, 
Andhra and Berar 
the allowances, rights and privileges of a deshmukh; a 
deshmukh's domain; Maratha imposition on the revenues of 
areas not ruled by them 
the principal revenue accountant and/or landlord at the extra-
village level in parts of Rayalseema, Marathwada, Telangana, 
Andhra and Berar 
a dwelling place for travellers, especially pilgrims, 
maintained by charitable endowments 
a washerman 
a clan or kinship group of peasant proprietors (or khel 
leaders) in parts of Marathwada and Berar 
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diwan 
diwankhana 
doab 
dubash 
dukandar 
faqir 
Jarman 
fatwa 
faujdar 
fitna 
fotedar 
gajrath 
ghadi 
gotra 
gauda 
gramam 
guru 
havaldar 
imam 
inam 
iqrarnama 
jagir 
jagirdar 
jaidaddar 
jamadar 
jihad 
kambli 
the principal minister of a king 
that portion of the palace where the ruler transacts business 
publicly 
the land between two rivers 
translator attached to European official 
a shopkeeper or trader 
a wandering holyman, a mendicant; a beggar 
a royal deed or order 
an elaboration of religious duties by the cleric leading a 
Muslim congregation 
a regional troop commander 
political dissent or rebellion 
an official in the administrative hierarchy of a revenue 
farmer's, or collector's, establishment 
a temple chariot drawn by elephants 
a small fort 
genealogy or ancestry within a sub-caste 
the principal village level landholder and/or revenue official 
in parts of Rayalseema and Karnataka 
a village 
a teacher, or the leader of a sect 
an official in the administrative hierarchy of a revenue 
farmer's, or collector's, establishment 
a Muslim cleric; the leader of a Muslim congregation 
a land grant which is not assessed for revenue, or assessed 
only at a concessionary rate 
a deed of solidarity 
a military fiscal assignment, usually at the top end of a 
Mughal style administrative/political hierarchy; a rent free, or 
concessionary, land grant 
the holder of a jagir 
a military fiscal assignee at the bottom end of a Mughal style 
administrative/political hierarchy 
a military fiscal assignment at the bottom end of a Mughal 
style administrative/political hierarchy 
the holy war in defence of the Islamic realm 
a coarse blanket 
viii 
karnam 
katchahari 
kavilkar 
khalifa 
khalisa 
khanqa 
khazanchi 
khel 
khillat 
khutba 
kotla 
kotwal 
madrasa 
mahajan 
mahsuldar 
mandap 
mansab 
maqtawala 
math 
maulvi 
mirasi 
mirasidar 
the principal revenue accountant and/or landholder at village 
level in parts of Andhra and Telangana-Rayalseema 
the principal government office for transacting public 
business at district or taluq/pargana level; a court of law 
a 'law and order' official at village level in parts of 
Telangana-Rayalseema 
a spiritual and organizational leader of the Mujahiddin at 
regional or sub-regional level 
the land held or administered directly by the king, or the 
state 
a Sufi hospice 
an official connected with the treasury of a revenue farmer's, 
or collector's, establishment 
the principal proprietor of land at village level in parts of 
Marathwada and Berar 
a robe of honour 
the proclamation in which the cleric leading a Muslim 
congregation names the ruling emperor 
an aristocratic mansion 
the head of the police in a 'law and order' (or police) district 
a Muslim school 
a trader, merchant, financier or banker 
a revenue collecting and policing agent at the bottom end of 
a revenue farmer's, or collector's, administrative hierarchy 
a square platform covered by a canopy, often in front of a 
temple, for conducting Hindu ceremonies 
a military fiscal assignment at the top end of a Mughal style 
administrative/political hierarchy; a rent free grant of land, or 
a pension, given by a Mughal style authority 
a 'law and order' official at village or extra-village level in 
Telangana-Rayalseema 
the seat of the head of a Hindu sect; a religious shrine 
a Muslim cleric and/or man of learning; a Muslim teacher 
a rent free grant of land, or a grant of land assessed at a 
concessionary rate, usually enjoyed by members of powerful 
clans or kin groups at village or extra-village level 
the holder of a mirasi 
ix 
mufti 
mujahiddin 
munshi 
muqaddam 
murid 
musafirkhana 
mutsaddi 
naib 
naik, nayak 
nargauda 
naikwari 
nawab 
nazar, nazrana 
padah 
paigah 
palampore 
palas 
pargana 
parikrama 
patel 
patelki 
a judge in the Muslim legal system 
Muslim holy-warriors 
a clerk or administrative assistant 
a revenue official and/or principal landholder at village (and 
sometimes extra-village) level 
the follower or disciple of a Muslim (usually a Sufi) spiritual 
leader or teacher 
a rest house for travellers 
an accountant, clerk, paymaster or minor official 
an assistant to a governor, official or revenue fanner; a sub-
contractor of revenues 
the principal landlord at supra-village level; a small king; the 
principal rebel leader at supra-village level; the head of a 
Banjara band; the head of a pastoralist, or hill or forest 
group 
the principal village or extra-village level revenue official 
and/or landholder in parts of Rayalseema 
the principal 'law and order' official at village or extra-
village level in parts of Telangana-Rayalseema 
a small king, usually originating in the upper echelons of the 
Qutub Shahi or Mughal military fiscal elite 
a gift or payment, usually by a lower official to a higher 
one, or by an employee to his employer, or by revenue 
fanners and military creditors to Hyderabad 's di wan 
a measure of land 
the Nizam 's household cavalry 
the cloth made in a locality/village of Masulipatnam called 
Palampur 
a red flower 
a Mughal administrative division 
the circumambulation of a temple (or its sanctum), or of the 
ceremonial fire, by Hindus during worship, or at a special 
religious occasion 
the principal landholder and/or reven.ue official at village 
level 
the allowances, emoluments, rights and privileges attached to 
the office of patel 
X 
patti 
patwari 
peshkar 
peshkash 
petta 
pir 
pirzada 
poliam 
poligar 
pujari 
qasba 
qaul 
qazi 
qiladar 
raiyyat, ryot 
raja 
risala 
risaladar 
rusoom 
ryotwari 
sadr taluqdari 
sahukar 
sajjda-nashin 
samasthanam 
a special imposition levied by a landlord or revenue fanner 
the principal accountant and/or landholder at village level 
the holder of one of the two most important ministerial 
offices at the Asaf J ahi darbar; the plincipal secretary of any 
major office bearer 
the tribute paid by small kings to more powerful neighbours; 
the annual payment due from the British to the Nizam for 
the Northern Circars 
a settlement with a market, usually protected by a fort 
a Sufi saint; a spiritual guide, teacher or leader in the lndo-
Muslim tradition 
the son/heir of a pir 
the domain of a small king in Rayalseema 
the principal landholder at extra-village level and/or small 
king in Rayalseema 
a Hindu priest 
a district level centre of trade and/or manufacture with a 
significant non-indigenous population as compared to its 
hinterland 
a revenue deed 
a judge in the Muslim judicial system 
a fort commander; a military fiscal assignee 
a cultivator/owner of land at village level; a peasant 
a (Hindu) king 
a troop of horsemen 
the commander or military fiscal assignee of a risala 
the revenue shares, fees. rights and privileges of a small king 
or extra-village level landlord on lands not directly held or 
owned by him 
a revenue settlement with ryots; matters pertaining to such a 
settlement 
the office of the immediate superior of the taluqdars 
appointed by the centre in Hyderabad 
a banker, financier and/or merchant 
the principal custodian of a Sufi shrine 
the royal establishment at the heart of a small king's domain; 
a religious charity endowed by a small king 
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samasthanik 
sanad 
sardar 
sardesai 
sardeshmukh 
sardeshmukhi 
sa,f-i-khas 
sarqf 
sarkar 
sarkari 
serishtadar 
shetsundi 
sibundi 
silladar 
sisila 
sir 
suba 
subadar 
swarajya 
takia 
talari 
taluq 
taluqdar 
a small king; the holder of a religious charity endowed by a 
small king 
a royal order or deed 
a troop commander 
a principal landholder and/or revenue official at extra-village 
level 
a principal landholder and/or revenue official at extra-village 
level 
a Maratha imposition on the revenues of territories not ruled 
by them 
the lands comprising the personal estate of the Nizam 
a money dealer or banker 
Government; an honorific; the first sub-division of the 
Mughal administrative category the suba 
pertaining to that which is directly connected with, or 
administered by, the government 
a military fiscal assignee at the top end of a Mughal style 
administrative/political hierarchy 
a 'law and order' official in Rayalseema at village or extra-
village level 
troops appointed to assist in the revenue collection process 
a horsemen of the cavalry who owns his horse 
a network of Sufi disciples; Sufi descent 
the rent shares, fees, rights and privileges of a small king in 
villages or lands not held by him 
the first administrative sub-division of the territory 
administered by a Mughal style government 
the administrative head of a suba; a military fiscal assignee 
operating at suba level 
self rule, independence 
the seat of a Sufi pir or sajjda-nashin 
a 'law and order' official at village or extra-village level in 
Rayalseema 
the first sub-division of the Mughal administrative category -
the pargana 
the head of a taluq; a military fiscal assignee operating at the 
taluq level 
xii 
taluqdari 
taqqavi 
thana 
tusar 
ulama 
vahana 
vakil 
watan 
zamindar 
zamindari 
zilla 
zilladar 
that which is held by, or pertains to, a taluqdar 
revenue or rent remissions and grants to cultivators hit by 
poor seasons 
a police post 
a kind of natural silk 
the collective for Islamic clerics 
a vehicle or conveyance 
a diplomatic representative or intermediary; an ambassador 
a rent free grant of land, or a grant of land assessed at a 
concessionary rate, in Marathwada and Berar villages 
a small king; the principal landholder, the head of the 
principal landholding clan, and/or the principal revenue 
official at extra-village level 
the holdings of a zamindar; that which pertains to a zamindar 
or his holdings 
an administrative sub-division associated with the reforms 
initiated in Hyderabad in the mid-nineteenth century 
the administrative head of a zilla 
xiii 
INTRODUCTION 
A recent colonial past is one of the most significant legacies of modem India and 
features extensively in debates about the nature of the Indian economy, society, politics 
and culture today. It is even more pervasive in historical writing on the period of British 
rule. Nor is its influence absent in writings on the pre-colonial period, as the concepts, 
categories, paradigms and assumptions of the the colonial and post-colonial periods are 
projected backwards. This process is explained in part by the fact that history-writing as it 
is known in the west first grew in India only during the colonial period, and was affected 
by the ideological and intellectual context of its writing. It can also be explained by 
suggesting that history-writing in India has not fully outgrown its formative influences yet. 
Historians of India have long taken the view that the 'medieval' period of Indian history 
ended with the decline of the Mughal empire and the 'modem' period began with the 
establishment of British rule. The intervening time between the two periods has been 
regarded as a transitional period. Such periodization may at one level be taken simply as 
a matter of arbitrary chronological convenience. But at another level it may be taken as a 
statement of certain assumptions that are conventionally made about the three periods. It 
may be taken, for instance, to represent the view that the medieval and modem periods 
were periods of relative political and economic stability when compared to the decline of 
the transitional period. Or, it may be taken to represent the view that the 'modernity' of 
British rule was superior to what preceded it. This latter view began to be challenged by 
nationalists as early as the mid-19th century in fact. Some of them looked for a golden 
age of Indian history in the medieval or ancient past. Others raised important questions 
about the supposed benefits of British rule. The latter trend has continued in Indian 
historiography to the present day, but the debates it has sparked off have often been 
constrained by inadequate statistical evidence or partisan polemics. This has happened to 
some extent because both imperialist and nationalist historians have held on to the old 
assumption that the transitional period was marked by anarchy and decline, and the 
modem (colonial) period was one of relative peace and prosperity. But such an 
assumption has been seriously challenged in recent years. One of the most important 
findings of recent work on the 18th century is that this was not a period of disaster for 
the Indian sub-continent as a whole. Indeed, the 'transition' was a period of new levels of 
economic dynamism, political stability and social co-operation for some parts, and its 
achievements here were undermined in fact during the heyday of British rule. 
Nevertheless, the new work does not test the old assumption about the transitional 
periods for other parts of India. It does not raise doubts about the view that 'states' were 
the most congenial, if not the only viable, forums for economic dynamism, political 
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stability and social co-operation in pre-colonial India. Conversely, it sustains the view, at 
least implicitly, that areas without states, and with pervasive conflict and warfare, were 
areas of decline. Hyderabad seemed a good case for testing such notions. It had been seen 
by historians and officials as a stagnant backwater since the early 19th century; but even 
the preliminary research suggested such a description was not valid for the pre-colonial 
18th century. Further research suggested that its vibrant pre-colonial economy could not 
be put down to the emergence of a segmentary or successor state: evidence of pervasive 
conflict was obvious even upon scratching slightly beneath the Asaf Jahi surface. How 
was one to reconcile the evidence of a weak and fragile Asaf Jahi centre/state and 
pervasive political conflict with the vibrant economy of the region, which attracted 
numerous foreign powers and elements throughout the 18th century? On the other hand, 
the emergence of a strong centre/state in the colonial period seemed to be accompanied 
with economic stagnation and decline. Could this be attributed to the nature of imperial 
intervention? It seemed worthwhile in these circumstances to construct a hypothesis which 
would accomodate three levels of the region's pre-colonial order, - the local, supra-local 
and inter-regional, - and see what happened to them in the transition to colonial rule. The 
local level consisted of powerful zamindars and nawabs, who were virtually small kings 
in their own right. The small kings affected the fortunes of supra-local intermediaries 
through a criss cross pattern of local alliances and conflicts. The supra-local level 
consisted of numerous military and fiscal elements of non-indigenous origin, the 
intermediaries, who mediated between local and inter-regional alliances and conflicts. The 
inter-regional level consisted of foreign powers, - the Marathas, the Mysore Sultans, the 
French and the British, - who were interested in Hyderabad for fiscal and strategic 
reasons, and who found the alliances and conflicts of its supra-local intermediaries a 
convenient means for playing out their own interests in the region. 
The first chapter dwells on the 'local' level of Hyderabad's pre-colonial order. It 
identifies zamindars and nawabs, or 'small kings', as the key political actors at this level. 
The small kings' realms were built in ecologically favourable 'core areas' and they 
competed with each other for scarce labour and resources. This was done partly by 
providing kingly 'protection' and 'patronage', and partly by the use of 'legitimating 
rituals', 'consensus building devices' and 'incorporating legends'. The pattern of criss 
cross alliances and conflicts that developed between the small kings also affected the 
'supra-local' level of the pre-colonial order. 
The second chapter deals with the 'supra-local' and 'inter-regional' levels of 
Hyderabad's pre-colonial order. The economic activity of its core areas had attracted a 
variety of non-indigenous elements and foreign powers to the region since the 16th 
century. But despite the trappings of a Mughal style bureaucratic and military fiscal state, 
the 'supra-local intermediaries' of the Asaf Jahi period were in reality unable to establish 
2 
a 'successor state' in the 18th century. They were drawn into the criss cross alliances and 
conflicts of its small kings on the one hand, and into those of inter-regional foreign 
powers, - the Marathas, Mysore Sultans, French and British, - on the other. 
The third chapter dwells on the changes caused in Hyderabad's pre-colonial political 
order by the emergence of the British as .the sole inter-regional power in its affairs from 
the end of the 18th century. The British strengthened the position of the centre and 
attacked the traditional independence, privileges and powers of the region's intennediaries 
and small kings. This was partly a result of their policy of maintaining subsidiary 
alliances with 'native states'. But it was also a function of the extension and 
intensification of military fiscalism: supplying intennediary factions with military services 
in return for lands and revenues. While such policies did strengthen the centre and the 
state in Hyderabad, they also unleashed severe economic pressures, which were intensified 
by agricultural depression and poor seasons. 
The fourth chapter deals with two kinds of response to the British military fiscal 
presence in Hyderabad in the first half of the 19th century: collaboration and protest. 
Although the centre's military fiscal policies encroached upon the traditional 
independence, powers and privileges of intermediaries and zamindars, the British could 
not have been effective without some degree of co-operation from within these elements 
themselves. As the collaborators of imperial rule gained at the expense of their traditional 
rivals, in practice, they introduced new kinds of social and political tension into the 
Hyderabad region, in which were also contained the seeds of latter-day 'communalism', 
'casteism' and 'landlord-peasant conflict'. Another kind of response to British policies 
was, of course, protest. Mobilization against the foreigner in Hyderabad took the form of 
calls for the restoration of older figures, like the Peshwa and the Mughal Emperor, well 
before the 'mutiny' of 1857-59. The quest for an alternative order to British rule was to 
some extent informed by motifs from the pre-colonial period; but it also contained new 
elements. 
The protest did not succeed, however. But nor did imperial fortunes improve, and 
Hyderabad's ec::onomy was declining, the centre was indebted, and there was little 
political peace in the first fifty years of British rule. The way out was found by 
harnessing Hyderabad to industrial Britain's imperial economy from the mid-1850s. 
Military fiscalism was now abandoned and Hyderabad was developed instead as a 
exporter of food grains and raw materials, and as an importer of manufactures. The 
'boom' in cotton and grain production in the mid-19th century helped these processes. 
Hyderabad acquired the familiar contours of the Princely State by the mid-1860s. 
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1. SMALL KINGS IN THE PRE-COLONIAL ORDER 
1.1 Introduction 
States and empires tend to dominate the imagination of historians writing on pre-
colonial and colonial India, and the 18th century is no exception. An older generation of 
historians viewed it as a battle ground between four empires: the failing Mughal empire 
and the aspiring Maratha, French and British empires.1 A new generation of historians 
emphasizes stable regional states with vibrant economies.2 Nevertheless, one old notion 
seems to persist through the old and the new historiography: that empires, kingdoms or 
states were somehow the most congenial, if not the only viable, settings for political 
order, social stability and economic growth in India. Behind this notion lies the 
assumption that the centres or capitals of the states were the key arbiters in the fortunes 
of the areas and populations they commanded, though some might rule with an iron hand, 
- like the Mysore Sultans, - and others might seek to incorporate various powerful 
regional or local groups into their strategies of revenue appropriation, public expenditure 
and legitimation, - like Awadh, Banaras or the Maratha kingdoms. Some scholars of 
South India, - Dirks and Ludden,3 - might object to the inclusion of their writings in 
generalizations of this nature, and it is true that those broadly sympathetic to the notion of 
a segmentary and symbolic/sacral state4 concede autonomous status even to very small 
entities, which might appear to the classic Mughal scholar as nothing more than oversized 
zamindari-s. Nevertheless, these scholars would be at one with their Mughal detractors in 
one respect. They view their 'small kingdoms', - such as Puddukottai and Tirunelveli, - as 
the exceptional fragmentary remains of once larger segmentary medieval states with 
symbolic/sacral centres. The centres of these states might well have been only symbolic, 
and their component segments often quite independent in the very concerns which the 
central authorities of the Mughal or British empires regarded as being essential to their 
rule, but once they were gone, small kingdoms like Puddukottai, now bereft of a macro-
regional order, · ~ontinued to operate in their image. They were able to create and sustain 
2 
3 
4 
See, for example: I. Prasad, India in the Eighteenth Century, (Allahabad, 1973); G.S. Sardesai, New History of the Maratha People, 2 Vols, (Bombay, 1946-8); Jadu Nath Sar~ar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, 4 Vols, (Calcutta, 1932-50); Jagdish Narayan Sarkar, A Study of Eighteenth Century India, (Calcutta, 1976). 
· See, for example: R.B. Barnett, North India Between Empires, Awadh, the Mughals and the British, 1720-/801, (Berkeley, 1980); C.A. Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870, (Cambridge, 1983); J.P. Richards (Ed.), Kingship and Authority in South Asia, (Madison, 1978); S.N. Gordon, 'The Slow Conquest: Administrative Integration of Malwa into the Maratha Empire, 1720-60', MAS, 11, 1(1977), pp.1-40; P.B. Calkins, 'The Formation of a Regionally Oriented Rulirig Group in Bengal, 1700-1740', JAS, 29(August, 1970), pp.799-806; A. Sen, 'A Pre-British Economic Formation irl India of the Late Eighteenth Century: Tipu Sultan's Mysore' irl B. De (Ed.), Perspectives in Social Sciences, I, Historical Dimensions, (Calcutta, 1977). 
D. Ludden, Peasant History in South India, (Prirlceton, 1985); N. Dirks, The Hollow Crown: Ethnohistory of a Little Kingdom in South India, (Cambridge, 1987, forthcomirlg). 
On the symbolic sacral state, see: B. Stem, Peasant, State and Society in Medieval South India, (Delhi, 1980); D.D. Shulman, The King and the Clown in South Indian Myth and Poetry, (Princeton, 1985). 
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in their own localized domains centres similar to, or perhaps even more true to ideal type 
than, the Chola or Vijayanagara centres. When the British finally incorporated the small 
kingdoms into their new imperial order, these were transformed fundamentally, as they 
were now subject to a rather different imperial centre than the sacral/symbolic one of the 
medieval segmentary state. 
This thesis borrows many ideas from the recent writings on 18th century states in 
India. In particular, it finds it useful to treat the zamindaris, samasthanam-s and nawab-
doms of the Hyderabad countryside as small kingdoms in the image of Vijayanagara. But 
it rejects at the same time the emphasis of recent writings on the importance and power 
of the centre. It does not see the decline of the Chola or Vijayanagara empires, states or 
symbolic/sacral centres, - which in any case did not pertain to the whole of the region 
under examination here, - as resulting in the decline of regional order itself, leaving only 
small isolated nayak-doms or poligar-doms in its place as remnants of its lost glory. On 
the other hand, it does not see the Asaf Jahi 'centre' of Hyderabad either as the classic 
symbolic/sacral centre of the Chola or Vijayanagara empire, or as the powerful 
bureaucratic and military fiscal centre of the Mughal empire or its 'successor states'.5 
What was the Asaf Jahi 'centre'? Who were the Nizams, and what was their dynasty 
about? Briefly, to anicipate some of the arguments in Chapter Two below, the Asaf Jahi 
centre in the 18th century was shifting and weak, and often barely recognizable or 
credible, centre with 'Mughal' bureaucratic and military fiscal aspirations. But it was 
moulded in practice by a criss-cross pattern of alliances and conflicts between small kings 
at the local level, 'intennediaries'6 at the supra-local level, and foreign powers at the 
inter-regional level. How such a centre eventually came to be the powerful and 
commanding capital of a 'princely state' is the underlying concern of this thesis. 
This chapter is about the 'local' zamindari and nawabi alliances and conflicts of the 
Hyderabad countryside, which in relationship with supra-local and inter-regional alliances 
and conflicts, affected the fortunes of the Asaf Jahi centre.7 To say that the local alliances 
and conflicts of small kings affected supra-local politics is to say that the small kings had 
something to c_ollaborate and quarrel about, as well as the means to do so. One of the 
concerns of this chapter, therefore, is to establish a working knowledge of the socio-
6 
On the Mughal empire and its 'successor states', see: Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars; Barnett, North India Between Empires; M. Alam, The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India : Awadh and the Punjab, 1707-48, (Delhi, 1986); S. Chandra, Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, /707-1740, (Delhi, 1982); Z. Malik, The Reign of Muharruned Shah, 1719-/748, (Bombay, 1977); I. Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal India (1556-1707), (Bombay, 1963); M.H. Khan, History of Tipu Sultan, (2nd edn, Calcutta, 1971); J.F. Richards, Mughal Administration in Golconda, (Oxford, 1975); S.N. Sen, Administrative System of the Marathas, (Calcutta, 1928); Moreland, The Agrarian System of Moslem India: a Historical Essay with Appendices, (Delhi, 1929); Z. Malik, 'Chauth -collecting in the Subah of Hyderabad, 1726-1748', /ESHR, 8, 4(1971), pp. 395-414; M.A. Nayeem, 'The Working of the Chauth and Sardeshmukhi System in the Mughal Provinces of the Deccan, (1707-1803 AD)', IESHR, 14, 2(1977), pp. 153-206; M.A. Nayeem, Mughal Administration of Deccan under Nizamul Mulk Asaf Jah (172048 AD), (Bombay, 1985). 
See discussion of 'intermediaries ' as a socio-politcal category in Chapter Two below. 
Supra-local and inter-regional alliances and conflicts are discussed in Chapter Two below. 
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economic conditions of the Hyderabad 'region'. It seems best to conceive of the 'region' 
as being composed of four broadly dissimilar but internally coherent 'sub-regions', in 
terms of soil fertility, population, agriculture, manufacture, trade and banking. These help 
us understand why the interests of supra-local intermediaries and foreign powers 
intervening in the Hyderabad countryside . for financial profit lay where they lay, and the 
implications of their being displaced from a relatively prosperous sub-region to a 
relatively unprosperous one. The basic argument is that core areas of productivity were 
differentially dispersed within the different sub-regions. The competition between these 
core areas for labour and resources formed the key element in their mutual alliances and 
conflicts. The core areas added up to sub-regions, and a region of vibrant economic 
activity, mainly around local centres of varying size, population and political power. This 
picture is in sharp contrast to the latter day stereotype of Hyderabad, dating from perhaps 
the late 19th century, that it was a backward region and, an economically impoverished 
political backwater. 8 It also helps us understand why all manner of non-indigenous fortune 
seekers, - including the Mughals, who gave rise to the Asaf J ahis as well as a large 
number of intermediaries, - were attracted to Hyderabad in the 18th century, not to 
mention earlier periods. 9 Another of Hyderabad's attractions lay, of course, in its strategic 
location on the route of northern armies with an interest in gaining access to the 
economically lucrative regions further south.10 The second theme in this chapter is related 
to the first: who controlled the productive core areas, and how that control was articulated 
and legitimated in local society. The interpretations here owe a considerable debt to 
several recent works on South India which explore the incorporative character of kingship 
in the small kingdoms of the post-Chola and post-Vijayanagara periods.11 The main focus 
here is on the construction and maintenance of the small king's 'domain' and 
. 'community' through legitimation rituals, consensus building devices and incorporating 
legends. 
8 H.G. Briggs, The Nizam. History and Relations with the British Government, 2 Vols, (London, 1861); H. Fraser, Our Faithful Ally, the Nizam, (London, 1865); J.D.B. Gribble, History of the Deccan, 2 Vols, (London, 1896); R.P. McAuliffe, The Nizam; the Origin and Future of the Hyderabad State, (London, 1901); Moulvi Syed Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, 11 Vols, (Hyderabad, 1881-). 
See, for example: Richards, Mughal Administration; Nayeem, Mughal Administration of Deccan; J. Scott (trans.), Firishta, History of Deccan, (London, 1794); H.K. Sherwani, History of the Qutb Shahi Dynasty, (Delhi, 1974); K.I. Leonard, 'The Hyderabad Political System and its Participants', JAS, 30(1971), pp.569-82; K.I. Leonard, The Kayasthas of Hyderabad: Social History of an Indian Sub-Caste, (Berkeley, 1978); S.H. Bilgrami and C. Willmott, Historical and Descriptive Sketches of H.H. the Nizam's Dominions, (London, 1883); Mir Ghulam Ali Bilgrami Azad, Khazana-i-Amirah, (Hyderabad, 1310 A.H.) [Persian] . 
10 See, for example: J.F. Richards, 'The Hyderabad Karnatik, 1687-1707', MAS, 9, 2(1975), pp. 241-60 
11 See, for example: Stein, Peasant, State and Society; Ludden, Peasant History; Shulman, The King and the Clown; A. Appadurai, Worship and Conflict under Colonial Rule: A South Indian Case, (Cambridge, 1981); Dirks, The Hollow Crown. 
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1.2 Ecology and Economics 
The idea of the importance of geography to history is an old one. Its systematic 
application dates from at least the days of Braudel and his contemporaries of the Annales 
school in France earlier this century.12 As far as India, and especially south India, is 
concerned, several historians have recently found it useful to apply the concepts of the 
'macro ' and 'micro' regions to understand links between the economy, society and state.13 
There is, however, as yet no clear cut consensus on the definition of 'regions'. The term 
'region' refers here to an aggregate of its component ' sub-region'. Its boundaries are 
loosely defined. It is contained by natural features, such as mountain ranges or the sea, 
and by neighbouring regions. Hyderabad 's neighbouring regions14 were more distinctive in 
their internal linguistic, political and, to a lesser extent, ecological coherence than 
Hyderabad was itself. The Hyderabad region represented, to put it negatively, which is 
easier, the limits of the geographical framework within which its political order was 
confined by the operation of superior political powers in the surrounding regions. 
Hyderabad's sub-regions were Telangana-Rayalseema, Andhra, Marathwada, and Berar. 
These are easier to define than the region. They represented a significant internal overlap 
between soil type, settlement density, language area and nature of economic activity: 
agriculture, manufacture and trade. At its largest extent, Hyderabad was made up of all 
four of the aforementioned sub-regions, but first Andhra and parts of Marathwada and 
then Berar were lost to foreign powers in the period c.1751-1853. The four sub-regions of 
the mid-18th century varied in their environments and this was to some extent reflected in 
their economies. This was of threefold significance. First, the Hyderabad region as a 
whole attracted supra-local intermediaries of non-indigenous origin and foreign powers. 
Second, the supra-local elements, including the Asaf Jahis, and the foreign powers were 
more interested in some sub-regions than in others. Their fiscal priorities gave the sub-
regions the following order of importance: Marathwada, Andhra, Berar and Telangana-
Rayalseema. Third, the core areas of productivity were more dispersed in some regions 
than in others. Together with the general scarcity of labour, and the specifities of politics, 
society and culture in the core areas, this dispersal of resources in the latter helped shape 
a criss-cross pattern of alliances and conflicts between the local kings of the core areas. 
1.2.1 Telangana-Rayalseema 
Telangana coincided with the Krishna on its south and roughly with the Godavari on its 
north. The eastern ghats formed its eastern boundary, and the waving frontier between the 
12 See, for example: F.Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 2 Vols, (London, 1972(73); also: S. Clark, 'The Annales Historiaris ', in Q. Skinner (Ed.), The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences, (Cambridge, 1985). 
13 Stein, Peasant, State and Society. 
14 These were Poona, Nagpur, Mysore and the Coromandel. 
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black cotton soil of Marathwada and its own red granite soil formed its western boundary. 
1.2.1.1 Cultivation 
Telangana was by and large a plateau of uneven height marked by granite hills and 
ranges. Numerous depressions and valleys were present in and it made it possible to 
collect water by putting bunds across them. The level of the water thus collected 
depended, of course, on the seasonal rainfall. When the water supply was good, the 
reservoirs could irrigate two rice crops on the lower ground annually. An additional crop 
of dry grain was possible where the red soil was mixed with black cotton soil. The 
principal rivers also inundated or irrigated their lower ground. The fertility of the 
Telangana tableland was generally in inverse ratio to its height above sea level. The 
amount of arable land depended not only on the water supply, but also on the extent of 
hills or woodland in any particular core area. The northern, eastern and southern 
extremities of Telangana were, thus, mountainous and wooded, and from the 
agriculturist's point of view wastes.1s The same was also true for parts of the northern, 
north eastern and south western tablelands, which were broken throughout by granite hills 
and low jungle.16 About 35 per cent of the total surface area of Telangana appears to have 
been cultivated in the early nineteenth century, twenty-five per cent under dry grains and 
ten under wet grains, or rice. Dry grains occupied a little over 71 per cent of the 
cultivated area and rice under 29. The proportion of rice cultivation was higher in three 
pockets, however,17 where it occupied just under thirty-nine per cent (38.6%) of the 
cultivated area, while dry grains occupied a little over sixty-one per cent (61.4%).18 
Rayalseema corresponded with what are the modem Andhra Pradesh districts west of the 
ghats and south of the Krishna, as well as the districts of Raichur and Moodgal, and parts 
of the Kamataka districts of Chittaldrug and Bijapur. Rayalseema resembled Telangana in 
its general semi-aridity, rocks and low jungle breaking the red soil throughout. A few 
is But see the discussion on pastoralists, shifting cultivators, hunter gatherers, and mobile and hill and forest groups below. 
16 Fifty per cent or more of the surface area of the districts of Devarkunda and Ghanpura, in the south east; of Yadgiri, Kovilkunda and Malkhed, in the south west; of Nalgonda, Khammamett, Warangal and Chinnoor, in the east; and of Malangoor, Yelgundel and Medak, in the north was covered with hills, woods or rocky wastes. 
17 These were, Medak, inlmediately to the north and north west of Hyderabad; Nalgonda, Ghanpura and Pangal, to the south and south east; and Y elgundel and Malangoor, to the north east. 
18 The total cultivated area in these districts was, at under thirty per cent, lower than the average for Telangana as a whole. 
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patches of fertile black cotton soil were particularly productive, however. 19 
The implication of Telangana-Rayalseema's ecological outline can be best appreciated 
in conjuction with two other factors. The plateau and the doab were both marked by 
semi-aridity, granite hills and scrubland, or low jungle, as we have already noted, and 
only about 35% of the surface area was cultivable. But this area was not all in one place; 
it was dispersed in numerous core areas of producivity. The first factor to be considered, 
then, is that the productive cores were dispersed, and usually co-incided with areas of 
good water supply capable of supporting rice cultivation. The margins of the cores were 
more suited to dry crops. Beyond the margins lay semi-arid stretches, until other core 
areas were encountered. The second factor was the scarcity of labour in the Deccan as a 
whole, which meant that, after taking into account fluctuating seasonal water supply and 
the limits of agricultural technology, not all the core areas could exploit their fullest 
potential in any given agricultural season. The implications of the sub-region's ecology, 
taken together with the two additional factors referred to above, were that core areas 
tended to concentrate labour, capital, manufacture, trade and political power in the 
Hyderabad countryside. The chief crops of the sub-region were rice and dry grains. Grain 
was exported to Madras, Poona, Nagpur and Andhra. The chief manufactures were 
blankets; cotton and silk carpets; cotton cloth and thread; and silk cloth and thread. These 
were exported from the principal trading and manufacturing centres of the core areas. 
1.2.1.2 Manufacture and Trade 
An interesting feature of Telangana's trading and manufacturing centres was their 
higher density in country where more rice was grown than dry grain, or where specialist 
goods were manufactured for export.20 57.8 per cent (213) of Telangana's trading centres 
were located in wet hinterlands. 63.1 per cent (233) were concentrated in the three 
19 The material on which this paragraph and the subsequent paragraphs in this sub-section are based has been culled from various fragmentary sources: NAI, SIR, FB and M, M-158, Hyderabad Register and Descriptive Memoir, c.1816; M-163, Route from Hyderabad to Nagpur, 1782; M-47, Memoir of Gurramkonda, 1810-12; M-227, Memoir on route from Amravati to Ellichpur, 1808; M-34, Memoir of Gooty and Bellary, 1812; M-17, Memoir of Adoni, 1805-10; M-161, Remarks on the Frontier Roads and Military Posts between the Kistna and Hyderabad, 1796; M-182, Memoir of Raichur, 1817; M-176, Memoir of Moodgal Circar, 1816-17; M-153, Memoir of Bhongir, 1835-7; M-178, Memoir of Pangal and Ghanpura, 1824-7; IOLR, Mack Gen, 44, Deccan Statistics from the Daftar-i-Asafiyah, c.1789-1809; 60, Deccan Surveys, c.1794-1803; G. Twemlow, 'On Irrigation and Inland Navigation, as applicable to the Dek,han', Gleanings in Science, 3(1831), pp. 164-6; B. Heyne, Tracts, Historical and Statistical, on India, (London, 1814), pp. 247-325; H. H. Voysey, 'Report[s] on the Geology of Hyderabad', JASB, 2(1833), pp.298-305, 392-405; 'Extracts from Dr Voysey's Private Journal when attached to the Trigonometrical Survey in Southern and Central India', JASB, 9(1850), pp. 189-212, 269-302; J. G. Malcomson, 'Notes explanatory of a Collection of Geological Specimens from the Country between Hyderabad and Nagpur', JASB, 5(1836), pp.96-121; A. M. Walker, 'On the Geology etc. of Hunumkoonda', JASB, 10,1 (1841), pp.471-5; Walker, 'On the Natural Products about the Pundeela River', JASB, 10,2(1841), pp.509-17; Walker, 'Tour in H.H.The Nizam's Territories', Ibid., pp.725-33; Walker, 'Report on Productions and Manufactures in the District of Hunumkoondah', JASB, 10, 1(1841), pp. 386-93; Capt. Newbold, 'Summary of the Geology of Southern India', ]RAS, 8(1846), pp. 138-249; Newbold, 'Notes, chiefly geological, across the Peninsula from Masulipatnam to Goa', JASB, 13, 2(1844), pp. 984-1004; Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, I, 70-156, 173-9, 186-200, 214-58, 308-20; A.R. Choudhary, Andhra Pradesh, (Delhi, 1979), pp. 1-7. 
20 Rice was a more valuable crop than dry grains and appears to have been grown chiefly for export. At home, it was consumed by the wealthier elements of local society, the poor usually eating cheaper grains like jawar and bajra. 
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principal rice producing tracts. 71. 7 per cent of the trading centres within the latter tracts 
were located in wet country. The average size of the hinterland of a trading centre located 
in wet country was 77.5 sq miles in terms of total area and 29.8 sq miles in terms of the 
cultivated area, for Telangana as a whole. The comparable figures for centres with dry 
hinterlands were 105.8 sq miles and 40.7 sq miles. Within the three principal rice 
producing tracts, the two figures were 61.6 sq miles and 18.2 sq miles for centres located 
in wet country and 155.8 sq miles and 46.1 sq miles for those in dry.21 Zamindari capitals 
usually coincided with trading centres with wet hinterlands.22 
Their relative size and the composition of their produce appear to be the best 
indicators of the character of the trading centres in the Hyderabad countryside, in the 
absence of data on the volumes and values of trade. The major trading centres of 
Telangana, those of district or supra-district -level significance, may be classified as small, 
medium sized or large centres. A small centre had between one hundred and two hundred 
houses, a medium sized one between two hundred and four hundred, and a large one, 
above four hundred, though rarely exceeding five hundred.23 There were 180 small, 140 
medium sized and 49 large centres in eleven of the thirteen Telangana districts for which 
we have information. Only 14 of these, all of them large, were involved in the export 
trade. 88 centres, 49 of them large, including the 14 export centres, and 39 medium sized 
ones were involved in trade at the district level. The remainder, the vast majority, 73.1 
per cent, were usually weekly markets for their hinterlands. Rice and dry grains formed 
the backbone of Telangana's exports, which were sent mainly to Nagpur, Poona, 
Hyderabad, Adoni, Gooty, Kurnool, Cuddapah or Walajahpet, depending on the location 
of the particular exporting centre. Some centres also exported their manufactures. 
There were broadly three kinds of principal trading centre in Telangana. The first 
served as a grain clearing depot for the district or supra-district trade of its hinterland. It 
was typically a larger version of the interior village barring the presence of a few non-
indigenous merchants, sahukar-s, administrators and military men. Sometimes, it was the 
home of the landed and military elites of the area, and was likely to be a zamindari 
capital in this case. Palmoor, Wanaparthy and Maktal, three of southern Telangana's four 
principal export .centres, all specialised in grain export, trading chiefly with Hyderabad to 
the north, and Bellary, Kurnool and Cuddapah to the south. Palmoor and Wanaparthy 
were also the fortified seats of Reddy zamindar-s based in fertile wet and dry grain 
country. Khammamet, Nellapalli, Somawaram, Nattigutri and Mullangur were all fortified 
centres in eastern Telangana based on fertile patches of agricultural country. Khammamet 
21 Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, I, 173-9, 186-200, 219-58, 308-20. 
22 The wet country was more thickly populated than the dry, rice being a more labour intensive crop than dry grains. It was also a more valuable crop, fetching higher revenues than dry grains. 23 Late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century surveyors usually ascribed four members to the individual household. 
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was described as a 'large town with a fort', and Nellapalli as 'a large and populous place 
on the high road from Cummumet to Hyderabad' by a route surveyor in the last years of 
the eighteenth century. 24 
The second type of trading centre bore all the characteristics of the first, but was a 
centre of specialist manufacture in addition. It had a larger community of artisans and 
middlemen than usual, including, sometimes, non-Telugu elements from northern or 
western India. Siddipet in central Telangana was an exporter of grain as well as a centre 
of specialist manufacture. Its products included brass pots, coarse cloth and blankets, and 
toddy and arrack. Its population was about 4000. Narayanpet, in southern Telangana, was 
known for its mint and its manufactures, which included fine and coarse cotton, and silk, 
cloth and garments.25 It was also a fortified zamindari seat with a population of about 
4000. Jaktial in northern Telangana was known for its exports of fine and coarse cotton 
cloth. It was 'usual' for the merchants here 'to make advances of money to the 
manufacturers', in whose products they carried on 'a profitable trade'. Jaktial was based 
on a patch of fertile wet country and was a well fortified centre.26 The tusar, or jungle 
silk, for the famed silk manufactures of northern Telangana centres like Yelgundel, 
Yamulwada and Koratla came mainly from the hill forests of Chinnoor district, which 
was under the Yelgundel zamindar's sway. Tusar was the main product of the district, in 
fact. It was manufactured by 'Telongoos of low caste' in centres like Chilpur, Chinnoor 
and Madhopur, the last of which had 70 tusar breeding families, and by Gonds throughout 
the hills. 'Their life' in the .breeding season was 'one of the most unremitting toil' and 
roused the Telangana breeder into eloquence 'when he recounts what privations he 
undergoes, what pleasure he derives himself and what incessant labour he incurs while 
watching the rearing of the worm and the perfecting of its work'. There were three 
harvests of cocoons each year. These were bought from the breeders by weavers or bania-
s at the rate of 500 per rupee. A further sum of 3.5 rupees was paid to craftsmen to 
extract and wind thread from each lot of 500 cocoons. The latter process took 10 days. 
Silk thread was dyed red with the palas flower, or golden yellow with turmeric.27 Some of 
the Chinnoor si)k also went to Warangal in eastern Telangana, where it was used in the 
manufacture of carpets. There were about 200 carpet weaving looms in and around 
Warangal, and 'a good many ' in Hasanparti were employed in weaving the jungle silk. 
The remainder wove cotton carpets. The carpetmakers were predominantly, if not 
exclusively, Muslim. The carpet weaving art itself was not indigenous, but was brought to 
Warangal by West Asian immigrants, probably sometime in the 16th or 17th century. One 
of the features of carpet making was the employment of children in executing the more 
24 IOLR, Mack Gen, 60. 
25 See also, IOLR, Mackenzie General, 14/5. 
26 Hyderabad Affairs, I, 241 -51. 
27 A.M. Walker, 'On the Natural Products around the Pundeelah River', JASB, 10, 2(1841), pp. 509-17. 
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intricate and delicate parts of the work, 'it being averred that their more limber finger joints are best suited to the finer parts of the work'.28 
- The third kind of trading centre in Telangana was an exporter of grain, as well as specialist manufactures, and also a prominent district or supra-district level bazar. Yamulwada in northern Telangana was, thus, 'a large and populous town situated on the high road from Hyderabad to Jaktial' . Covering an area of 16 sq furlongs, it was based on 'an extensive sheet of paddy cultivation'. It also exported 'various and excellent manufactures of coarse and fine cloths, plain and chequered kambli-s, bangles, quilted counterpanes, silks etc.' to Hyderabad and other places. Besides a garrison of troops and a body of revenue collecting personnel, the inhabitants of Yamulwada were 'chiefly Telinga of trading and manufacturing castes, with a few brahmins and low castes'. Its various temples, but, especially the one dedicated to Rajeshwara, attracted a 'large' number of devotees during a four day annual festival. Muslims also figured among the pilgrims, as the body of a Sufi pir was popularly believed to be interred within the temple walls. The main crops of Rayalseema were rice, dry grains and cotton, but, unlike Telangana, cotton thread and cloth, not food grains, were its principal exports. The density of trading centres was also higher in Rayalseema. The data on the two doab districts of Raichur and Mudgal, and the fragmentary information on Kumool, Cuddapah, Chittoor, Anantapur and Chittaldrug south of the doab, across the Tungabhadra, point in such a direction, at any rate. There were 134 trading centres in the two doab districts. At least 8 of them were large. Alampur exported 'a great quantity' of cotton cloth, and some silk, to Hyderabad, Kurnool, Cuddapah and Walajahpet. The 'large and populous' Gadwal was the seat of a 
zamindar. The agents of 'many opulent sahukars of the Deccan' exported fine and coarse cotton cloth; muslin; silk; cotton and gold thread; and gold and silk embroidery from here to many parts of the Deccan, and elsewhere. Raichur, another large centre, exported grain, jaggery and garden produce (mainly coconuts and betel-leaf) to Hyderabad, and other northern destinations, as well as cotton thread to Walajahpet in the south. While Alampur, Gadwal and Raichur were in the Raichur district, the remaining large centres in the doab, 
- Moodgal, Lingsur, Gurgunta, Kopal, and Sindnoor, - were in the other doab district, Moodgal. They were all known for their exports of cotton thread and cloth. Rajampet in the Cuddapah district, for example, exported coarse cloth, dry grains, coconuts and some spices to Hyderabad and the Andhra coast. Its hinterland ,appears to have contributed to its manufactures through localised specialist activity. Hublumpet, for example, consisted of 200 families of dyers who specialised in dyeing cotton thread red. Cuddapah was known for its cotton and muslin exports. Adoni was known for its sarees and chintzes. 
28 A.M. Walker, 'Report on the Productions and Manufactures in the District of Hunumkoondah', JASB, 10, 1(1841), pp. 386-93. 
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Kurnool and Bellary were known for their cloth and carpet manufactures.29 
1.2 .2 Andhra 
The Andhra region was made up of the long strip of Telegu speaking country between 
the eastern ghats and the Bay of Bengal. Its most fertile parts were those watered by the 
rivers Godavari and Krishna. The plains of Rajamundry, Guntur and Masulipatnam were 
particularly productive. The districts of Nellore, Ongole and Srikakulam were relatively 
unprosperous. The Andhra coast was famous for its textiles. Some European Companies 
involved in the textile trade employed thousands of weavers in their factories.30 The 
industry was scattered all along the coast, and different centres specialised in their 
particular brand or type of product. Thus, Behrampur was known for its silks, Srikakulam 
for its muslins, Elluru for its carpets, and Masulipatnam for its palampores and chintzes. 
The other principal exports of Andhra were rice, fish and teak wood. This last item was 
used chiefly in shipbuilding. 31 
1.2.3 Marathwada 
Marathwada coincided roughly with the Painganga flowing between the Ajanta hills 
and the Nanded plain on the north, and with the Krishna flowing between Bijapur and 
Shorapur, on the south. On the east, its waving frontier extended from the Nanded plain 
in the north, and passing through Bidar and Gulbarga, to the Raichur doab in the south. 
Its western boundary was another waving frontier, extending from the Ajanta hills in the 
north, and passing through Ellora, Patan and Sholapur, to Tallikota in the south. 
Marathwada was covered mostly with black soil formed from decomposed basaltic trap. It 
was broken by ridges of iron clay in its middle and southern portions. About sixty five 
per cent of its surface area appears to have been cultivated in the early nineteenth 
century, with the exception of the hilly and jungly Nanded district, where only thirty 
seven per cent of the surface area was arable. 32 
29 Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, I, pp. 70-156; NAI, Survey of India Records, Field Books and Memoirs - M-47 (Gurramkonda, 1810 -12), M-34 (Chittaval, c.1812), M-17 (Adoni, 1805-10), M-182 (Raichur, 1816-17), M-176 (Mudgal, 1816-17); P.R. Rao, History of Modern Andhra, p. 22; IOLR, Mackenzie General, 14/7. 
30 Masulipatnam had 5000 families of weavers during Dutch days, for example. 
31 Newbold, 'Summary of the Geology of Southern India'; Newbold, 'Notes from Masulipatnam to Goa'; Newbold, 
'Mineral Resources of Southern India', JRAS, 7(1843), pp. 150-60; Choudhary, Andhra Pradesh, pp. 1-7; NAI, FB and M, M-87, Memoir on Amravati, 1817; IOLR, Mack Gen, 44; 60; 59, Report on Waterworks, c.1793; 15, An (Andhra) Brahman Woman's Travels, c.1790-1802; Mack Unbound, VIl/45, Nellore, Seaports, towns and 
export-import trade, c.1790; VIl/8, Forts, Markets, Towns in Condaveed country, c.1800; Voysey, 'Private Journal'; W. Roxburgh, 'Method of Cultivating Sugar Cane and Manufacturing Sugar and Jagary, Rajahmundry', AAR, (1802), pp. 7-13; P.R. Rao, HistorJof Modern Andhra, (Delhi, 1978), p. 21. 
32 This paragraph and the subsequent ones in this sub-section are based on the following sources: IOLR, Mack Gen, 44; 60; 14/5, Description of Daulatabad, 1806; 13/2, Description of Paithan, etc., c.1802; NAI, FB and M, M-155, Memoir of Daulatabad; M-170, Memoir of Paithan, 1842-3; M-177, Memoir of Nanded, 1821-40; Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad A.ffairs, I, 186-218, 259-78, 284-95, 303-7; Twemlow, 'On Irrigation and Inland Navigation'; Newbold, 'Notes from Masulipatnam to Goa'; Summary of the Geology of Southern India'; Voysey, 'Report on Hyderabad'; A. Gibson, 'Notes on Indian Agriculture, as practised in the Western or Bombay Provinces of India' , JRAS, 8(1846), pp. 93-103; Reprint from Bombay Gazette, 17 July 1874, 'Bidar' , in /A(May 1874), p. 149; G. Smith, 'Description of the Manufacture of Biddery Ware', MJLS, (New Series), 1(1856), pp. 81-4; W.H. Sykes, 'Some Account of the Kolisurra Silk-Worm of the Deccan', Bombay Transactions(1832), pp. 541-7. 
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Marathwada was by far the most productive and prosperous of all of Hyderabad's sub-
regions. One indication of this was the higher proportion of cultivated land here than 
anywhere else: sixty five per cent. The moisture retaining black cotton soil did not require 
as much investment as the red soils of Telangana and Rayalseema either.33 Marathwada's 
manufactures and trade also found a naturally more favourable setting thus. Information 
regarding the density of trading centres and the composition of their trade are the best 
indicators for Marathwada in the absence, once again, of data on the volumes and values 
of trade. There were 224 principal trading centres in the districts, approximately half of 
the total, for which we have information.34 There was one trading centre to every 80.45 sq 
miles of total area and 32 sq miles of cultivated area in these districts. It seems 
reasonable to expect similar figures in the districts for which there are no detailed figures, 
as the information that is available suggests the presence in them of at least one dozen 
prominent grain or manufacture exporting centres, such as Ankalkote, Bid, Parenda, 
Sholapur, Junair, Gulbarga, Suggur and Naldrug. Since the ecological environment these 
districts was not substantially different from the remainder, and there do not appear to 
have been any special factors inhibiting agriculture, trade or manufacture, the actual 
number of trading centre must have been considerably higher than the one dozen of 
which we know of. The number of large centres among the 224 in half the Marathwada 
districts was 104 (46.4 per cent), while 98 (43.8 per cent) were medium sized and 22 (9.8 
per cent) small. Almost all the large and medium sized centres participated in district 
level trade if they were not also involved in supra-district level exports. A proportion of 
the small centres were also involved in district level trade. A higher density of principal 
trading centres, as well as a higher incidence of district level centres, and supra-district 
level export centres distinguished Marathwada from the other sub-regions. 
Marathwada's exports could be divided into three broad categories: agricultural 
produce, - including dry grains, oil seeds, sugar cane, cotton, garden poducts (fruit and 
spices), opium and tobacco; - manufactures, - including oil, coarse and fine sugar, toddy 
and arrack, horse furniture, coarse blankets, coarse and fine carpets, coarse and fine cotton 
cloth, silks, gold and silver thread and embroidery, coarse and fine paper, brass and 
copper utensils, and agricultural implements; - and cattle and horses. The export centres 
could also be divided into three categories, each reflecting a particular combination of 
landed, manufacturing, trading, banking, military, administrative and religious elites. 
Centres exporting agricultural produce could be sub-divided into the qasba and 
ordinary categories, the presence of a significant Muslim population distinguishing the 
former from the latter. Chidgosa in the Bidar district was an example of the latter type of 
agricultural produce exporting centre. It was the fortified headquarters of a zamindar and 
33 Even in the most valuable crop of the latter region, and of Andhra as well, rice, irrigation and labour were major investments. 
34 These districts covered 18,020.80 sq miles of the total surface area of Marathwada. 
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reflected to a large extent the power relations of the Marathwada interior. The non-
indigenous element in its poulation of 8000 was small, comprising only a handful of 
traders and financiers who invested in the cultivation and trade of dry grains, opium, 
sugar cane and betel nuts. The twin settlements of Tuljapur and Chota Tuljapur in 
northern Marathwada were located in a large patch of fertile agricultural country.35 The 
proportion of qasbas was higher in the second type of export centre, the exporter of 
manufactures, accounting for about 40 per cent of them. Their main distinguishing 
characteristic was the presence of specialist communities of Muslim artisans. Aurangabad 
was an outstanding example, though there was more to its large Muslim population than 
simply artisans. It was also the home of literary, administrative, military and clerical 
Muslim families, some of whom were famous even outside Aurangabad. Aurangabad's 
most notable exports were its high quality gold embroidered silks.36 Qandahar, Indur and 
Baswanthnagar in the Nanded district of northern Marathwada were other examples of 
qasbas that exported specialist manufactures. The Muslim artisanal community of 
Qandahar, which made up about half its population of 12,000, specialised in making 
coarse paper and cloth. Indur had a population of 12,000 and 50 coarse cloth looms. 
Baswanthpur had a population of 16,000 and produced coarse cloth, coarse paper, and 
brass and copper utensils. The final category of Marathwada export centre did not so 
much send out its own manufactures as it re-export the products of other centres. 
Malgaon thus hosted a celebrated two part annual fair, horses being sold during the first 
part, and cotton cloth, silks and jewellery during the second. 
Marathwada was potentially the key to the financial viability and political success of 
any supra-local power with regional ambitions in the Deccan. Maratha and Mughal forces 
in the seventeenth century, and Maratha and Asaf Jahi forces in the eighteenth century 
fought continually and fiercely for a lion's share of its revenues. But military success 
against supra-local rivals was by itself no guarantee of financial success in the sub-region. 
That also depended on the supra-local power's ability to coerce the local landed, military 
and commercial elites, or to win their confidence and co-operation. It was not mere 
coincidence that the first, second and fourth Nizams tried to found their capital cities in 
Marathwada. 37 Nor was it anything short of a retreat when the fourth Nizam retired from 
Marathwada altogether in order to make Hyderabad, in the heart of semi-arid Telangana, 
35 IOLR, Mackenzie General, 60. 
36 IOLR, Mackenzie General, 14/7. 
37 Nizam ul Mulk tried to base himself in Aurangabad, as did Nasir Nasir Jang after him. Salabat Jang failed to consolidate his grip over Aurangabad and moved to Bidar in the last days of his reign. The third Nizam, Muzaffar Jang, was killed before he could reach the Deccan after his victory over Nasir Jang with French support in the Carnatic. 
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his capital. 38 
1.2.4 Berar 
The Berar region was demarcated roughly by the rivers Tapti, Painganga and Wardha, 
on the north, south and east, respectively. The Ajanta hills and the district of Khandesh 
lay to its west. Less than forty per cent (40%) of Berar's total surface area appears to 
have been cultivated in the early nineteenth century. Most of the fertile land was in the 
diamond shaped Berar plain, which was marked by Gawilgarh, Akola, Amravati and 
Malkapur, to the north, south, east and west respectively. The valleys of the Poorna, 
Painganga and Wardha rivers, and of their tributaries, were fertile, but heavily wooded for 
the most part. 39 
The typology of Berar's trading centres was similar to Marathwada's, except that 
Berar had historically witnessed the formation of alliances between indigenous and non-
indigenous elements in almost all of its productive tracts.40 Almost all the leading centres 
of Berar could be classified as qasbas. The principal ones were Ellichpur, Patheri, Akola, 
Amravati, Maiker, Mahur and Namala. These were all based on rich agricultural 
hinterlands, manufactures or advantageous location along major trading routes. The main 
group that linked Berar's commerce to other regions, mainly through their bulk carrying 
capacity and trade in raw materials and salt, were the Banjaras. The Banjaras could also 
be, until almost the close of the 18th century, the decisive allies of supra-local powers 
engaged in warfare for supremacy in the Deccan, owing to their unparalleled carrying 
capacity. 
1.2.5 Scarce Population and Resources 
The first comprehensive quantitative estimates of population in Hyderabad are not 
available until the late 19th century and even these are probably not as reliable as later 
figures. One official source in 187941 gives the population density as 119/sq. mile and 
another in 188142 gives it as 114.74/sq. mile. If one averages out the two sources, one can 
estimate that the population density in 1880 was 116/sq. mile. If one calculates the values 
for 1855 and 1830 by projecting Guha's findings for the rates of population growth in the 
38 Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, I, pp. 202-4, 284-308; W. H. Sykes, 'Some Account of the Kolisurra Silk-worm of the Deccan', TBRAS, pp. 541-7; G. Smith, 'Description of the Manufacture of Biddery Ware', MJLS, 1(1856), pp. 81-4; Bombay Educational Record, 'Hill or Aboriginal Tribes in the Deccan', JA, Oct 1872, p. 322; H. H. Voysey, 'Reports on the Geology of Hyderabad', JASB, 2(1833), pp. 298- 304, 392-405. 
39 This and the subsequent paragraphs of this sub-section are based on: IOLR, Mack Gen, 44; 60; 13/2; H. Misc, H{707, On Berar, c.1821 -2; NAI, FB and M, M-163, Hyderabad to Adilabad, c.1800; M-227, Amravati to Ellichpur, 1808; M-170, Memoir of Jalna, 1842-3; Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, I, 279-83, 296-302; Voysey, 
'Private Journal'; Newbold, 'Summary of Geology' ; Malcolmson, 'Country between Hyderabad and Nagpur'; Heyne, Tracts, pp. 328-32; Twemlow, 'On Irrigation and Inland Navigation'. 
40 Even though no supra-local power could dominate the sub-region as a whole for any decisive length of time at any period in the eighteenth century itself. 
41 NAI, For, Nov 1879, 12-13 A, Mily B. 
42 Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, VII, 1-30. 
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western Deccan43 backwards, one gets a value of 52.88/sq. mile for 1830 and 88.90/sq. 
mile for 1855. If one further allows for the fact that the rate of population growth was 
exceptionally high in the first quarter of the 19th century,44 and assumes that it must have 
been significantly lower in the early 19th and late 18th centuries, then it becomes possible 
to appreciate the force of the qualitative evidence for low population and resources in the 
Hyderabad Deccan in the pre-colonial period. It was one of the features of the small 
kingdoms in the core areas of the Hyderabad countryside that their rulers always sought 
to project themselves as more generous patrons and more capable protectors than their 
neighbours, in the constant competition for labour and capital.45 The same competition 
was also reflected in the emphasis that was placed in the core areas on the maintenance 
of one's own community, as opposed to the community of another core area, through 
consensus building devices and incorporating legends.46 Yet another indication of scarce 
population and resources was the price that some core areas inevitably paid, in terms of 
loss of population and resources, for the expansion, creation or re-creation of others. The 
expansion and building activity in a core area, on the other hand, was characteristically 
linked to its success over rivals in attracting labour, artisans, investors, traders, bankers 
and holy men. The counterpart of such attraction local warfare consisted typically of 
raiding a rival core area for cattle, or to undermine the authority of its ruler as a worthy 
patron and capable warrior-protector, with a view to seduce population and resources into 
one's own domain.47 Not only was a scarcity of population and resources an endemic 
feature of the pre-colonial order, it was also reproduced to some extent by the way in 
which small kings constantly destroyed portions of each other's communities and 
resources in order precisely to cope with the problem of scarcity. This was also the 
reason why, in the ultimate analysis, we cannot talk of the pre-colonial economy of 
Hyderabad, despite its vibrancy and buoyancy, as tending towards developmental growth. 
1.2.6 An Economically Attractive Region 
The above description of Hyderabad's sub-regions would suggest that these were not 
economically stagnant backwaters. The latter day stereotype of Hyderabad, especially of 
the Telangana-R_ayalseema and Berar sub-regions, as a backward region was a product of 
developments that occurred there in the 19th century under British hegemony.48 In the 
43 The rate was c.2.1 per cent per annwn in the first quarter of the 19th century and c.1.1 per cent per annum in its second quarter.(S. Guha, 'The Agrarian Economy of the Bombay Deccan 1818-1941 ' , [Cambridge Univ. Ph.D. thesis, 19811). The rate of growth for the second quarter as suggested by Guha also accords with the first comprehensive estimate of the population and its growth rate for the Berar portion of Nagpur in 1822-3. (IOLR, H.Misc, H/707, pp. 30-4). 
44 Guha, 'The Agrarian Economy ' . 
45 See discussion in subsection 1.3.4 below. 
46 See discussion in subsection 1.3.3 below. 
47 See discussion above and below. 
48 D.A.Washbrook makes a similar point for the Northern Circars, or the Andhra coastal region, under British rule . 
18th century, one is still able to talk of vibrant economic activity in dispersed core areas; 
so much so that the core areas were in constant competition for scarce labour and 
resources, as is discussed below. There was also a cultural ingredient in this competition. 
Yet another dimension of the region's economic activity was the attraction it held for 
non-indigenous supra-local elements, including the Nizams themselves, and foreign 
powers. Although the configuration of zamindari and nawabi power in the countryside, 
their own internal rivalries and the challenge from foreign powers did not allow 
Hyderabad's supra-local elements to develop lasting bases in the core areas, - unlike in 
parts of North India, for example, - they continued to remain in the region, nevertheless. 
Their numbers were even augmented in the 18th century, by new 'Mughal' immigration, 
including elements from western, central and northern India; central and western Asia; 
eastern Africa; Europe; and Afghanistan. Other immigrants came independently, as 
merchants, bankers or traders, from the aforementioned areas, and from southern India. It 
would hardly have been worth their while and investment if these various supra-local 
elements had not expected to make profits in the Hyderabad region. 
Within the region, the target was Marathwada, which was the most prosperous of 
Hyderabad's four sub-regions. It is no coincidence that various Nizams, 'intermediary 
factions' and foreign powers fought for the revenues of Marathwada throughout the 18th 
century. Andhra was the next most lucrative area from the fiscal point of view, and this, 
too, remained a bone of contention between Hyderabadi and foreign elements throughout 
much of the 18th century. It is only when they were effectively excluded from both 
Marathwada and Andhra by their competitors that the Asaf Jahis settled in the relatively 
unprosperous Telangana-Rayalseema sub-region. Before this, they had re-located their 
capital several times in the Marathwada sub-region, - in Aurangabad, Gulbarga, Bijapur 
and Bidar, - in the period c.1724-58, in the face of supra-local and foreign competition. 
Telangana-Ralyalseema itself was not without its attractions, however. Even when most of 
the revenues of Marathwada and Andhra were effectively lost to the Asaf Jahis, and to 
Hyderabad's intermediaries, they were still quite willing to invest their fortunes in 
Telangana-Rayalseema and Berar, rather than migrate from Hyderabad altogether and seek 
greener pasture_s elsewhere. This again suggests that 18th century-Hyderabad was 
considered a worthwhile economic and political frontier by numerous non-indigenous 
military, political and commercial elements. 
1.3 Politics and Society in the Core Areas 
The dispersed cores of productivity in the Hyderabad countryside competed for scarce 
labour and resources, and herein lay potential for conflict between them. This might be 
construed as an unduly deterministic conclusion with respect to ecological and economic 
factors if it is not qualified by political and social analysis. This section and the following 
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ones will concentrate on the nature of politics and society in the core areas. The perspectives offered by some some recent works on South India form the starting point of 
the analysis. This thesis is not content with the segmentary state model (with its 
symbolic/sacral/ritual centre) as far as understanding the Hyderabad region's pre-colonial political order as a whole is concerned. But it does find it useful to draw upon the 
segmentary state hypothesis to understand the social and cultural articulation of the small king's authority in the core areas within the sub-regions. The concerns here are not the 
same as in other works on small kingdoms, as the emphasis here is not on a single small kingdom, but on gauging the relevance of some processes common to most of them in the 
shaping of the region's overall order. Though there is no attempt to write a history of particular kin or clan structures, or religious or ritual centres, some speculations are 
nevertheless offered which might be of interest to the local historian, sociologist and 
social anthropologist. 'Communal' identity is given primacy over caste, sectarian or 
religious identity for particular social and political purposes, for example.49 The threat of 
coercion and the forcible depression of internal conflict are, similarly, ranked alongside 
the more familiar devices of consensus building in the social construction of the 
community in the small king's domain. An elementary typology of legitimation, consensus 
and incorporation is also offered. 
1.3.1 The Political and Economic Capitals of the Core Areas 
The political capitals of the Hyderabad countryside usually co-incided with its principal trading centres. Local political powers in the shape of zamindars or, as in some 
cases, nawabs gave protection and patronage to agriculture, trade and manufacture in 
return for revenue, support, power and prestige. The conception and exercise of local political authority in the Hyderabad countryside went well beyond the performance of 
mere administrative functions and duties. Zamindars and nawabs were concerned, in practice, with the maintenance of a loyal community in a productive domain, in the 
context of external hostility and pressure. The mark of the patron-protector was almost 
always present in the leading trading centres of the Hyderabad countryside. Above all, it 
concerned the power that he could mobilize from his local base in the event of a 
confrontation or showdown with local rivals, or with supra-local authority. Bhalki was a grain exporting qasba in central Marathwada, for example, with a population of about 8000. It was the seat of the Nimbalkar family, local M,aratha landlords who wielded 
considerable influence at the Asaf Jahi darbar in the middle decades of the eighteenth 
century. Raja Nimbalkar was able to cause a coup in the darbar in c.1751 due to Bhalki's 
49 See also Chapter Four below. 
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strength as a major grain producer.50 Nimbalkar was here mobilizing, typically, his local 
power base in the fonn of the decisive politics of the moment, grain politics. The 
Nimbalkar family's main establishment consisted of a Brahman dominated revenue 
department, and a Muslim and Maratha .dominated military department. Brahman and 
bania grain traders, and Gujrati, Marwadi, Jain and Hindustani sahukars, fonned the other 
elite and influential groups in Bhalki.51 
In Telangana, too, the most powerful and prolonged opposition to Hyderabad's 
authority came from the zamindars of its most productive and prosperous tracts. The 
districts of Medak, in central Telangana; Malangur and Y elgundel, in northern Telangana; 
and Nalgonda and Khammamett, in eastern Telangana, were particularly notable in this 
respect. They were the three principal rice exporting areas of Telangana and home to a 
majority of its trading centres.52 
Sadashivpet in the Medak district was 'a large and populous trading town, surrounded 
by a strong wall and ditch, with several bastions and four entrances'. It had 'several 
merchant shops' and carried on 'a very extensive trade of grain of various kinds' with 
Hyderabad and Poona. A musafirkhana in the centre of town accomodated traders and 
travellers. Sadashivpet was located in prize wet and dry grain country and reflected to 
some extent the social groupings and power relations of its hinterland. It was the capital 
of one of the most powerful zamindars of the Hyderabad countryside, Sadashiva Reddy, 
in the late 18th century.53 Near and distant kin of the ruling Reddy house also dominated 
land control in the area and fonned its military elite. Hereditary revenue accountants 
seIVing the Reddys, mostly Brahmans, fonned another influential group. Other Brahman 
families derived status and influence through the control of temples, and yet others were 
weighty grain merchants and moneylenders. Local trading castes like the Komtis, and 
some Maharashtrians, Gujratis, Marwadis, banias of north Indian origin and Muslims also 
figured among the traders and financiers. It was the strong presence of merchants and 
military men, besides the ruling Reddys and their main establishment, that distinguished 
Sadashivpet from the interior. 54 There were other trading centres in Medak besides 
Sadashivpet. Rangampetta was the fortified residence of a zamindar, and Andole, 
50 The Nizam, his principal nobles and his army were camped in ,Bhalki at the time. They were on their way back, 
in fact, from a disastrous military campaign in the Poona territory. The army was in serious arrears of pay and 
the penniless soldiers clamoured for food, which was in very short supply. Raja Nimbalkar found this situation 
ideal to dissuade the leading sardar-s of the army from paying their allegiance to the commander, the Nizam's 
diwan Raja Raghunath Das, with whom he had an enmity. He offered them the prospect of grain supplies from 
Bhalki's well stocked granary if they would dispose of the diwan. The troops, who hardly needed an excuse in 
their desperate condition, fell upon Raghunath Das and murdered him upon the first signal from their sardars. 
The removal of the diwan from the scene opened up for Raja Nimbalkar the promotion prospects that he had 
been looking for. (IOLR, Mack Gen, 44; 41/13, Early Asaf Jahi Episodes; Pagdi, Eighteenth Century Deccan, [Bombay, 1963]). 
51 Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, I, 287-8; Pagdi, Eighteenth Century Deccan. 
52 Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, I, pp. 191-200, 214-58, 310-19. 
53 Sadashiva Reddy was the co-leader of a major rebellion in the Hyderabad countryside in 1795 which almost 
unseated the ruling Nizam. (See discussion in Chapter Two below). 
54 Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, I, 230. 
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Shankarreddypet, Jogipet and Papannapet were also 'enclosed by walls'. 'All these pettas ', 
furthermore, 'are very large and many wealthy traders live therein'. 55 
Palmoor and Wanaparthy, both leading grain export centres in southern Telangana, 
were also, like Sadashivpet, seats of Reddy power located in fertile wet and dry grain 
country. They were well fortified, and populated with soldiers, merchants, landlords, 
moneylenders and administrators.56 Yelgundel in northern Telangana was the single largest 
manufacturer of exports in the whole of Telangana. Its patron-protector, the Velama 
zamindar Kona Rao, defied the Nizam and his intermediaries for almost sixty years in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.57 But the Velama household's success went 
further than simply being able to defend a fertile wet and dry grain tract from external 
pressure. This was reflected in the presence of several bazars within Yelgundel's 
fortifications, and a population of about 2000, sustained by exports of grain and specialist 
manufactures, which included coarse cloth, saris, coarse blankets and quilted 
counterpanes. A sizable community of Muslim weavers was also present in Yelgundel and 
the zamindar had an Idgah built for their benefit. Koratla, another principal trading centre 
in the Yelgundel region, was also the fortified seat of a zamindar. Its outer perimeter wall 
enclosed an area of about 4 sq miles. Koratla exported rice as well as manufactures. Its 
artisans operated 8 silk looms, 34 coarse paper manufactories and even more numerous 
cloth and coarse blanket manufactories. 58 
The district of Yelgundel was divided into twenty one pargana-s, which contained 
1500 villages and normally yielded an annual revenue of Rs.11 Lakhs, though that sum 
was reduced to only Rs. 5 Lakhs by the famine of 1791-8, according to an account of 
1798. The district was carved up between three Velama zamindars, Kona Rao, Muna Rao 
and Jagpati Rao, and one Brahman, Rajanna Pantulu. These men had never been friendly 
with Hyderabad and had fought its intermediaries on several occasions in the recent past. 
Kona Rao and Muna Rao maintained a force of 8000 between them and were engaged in 
hostilities with an English revenue farmer, Finglass, as well as raiding contiguous 
Hyderabad and Nagpur districts in 1798. They operated from their numerous stone forts 
when on the offensive, and from the natural protection of hill and jungle retreats when on 
the defensive. Kona Rao was also zamindar of the neighbouring Chinnoor district, where 
he shared authoriy with another Velama zamindar, a man called Narsing Rao. Both the 
Chinnoor zamindars had been defying Hyderabad's intermediaries since the late eighteenth 
century and a force that had besieged them sometime in the 1790s was eventually 
'obliged to return with a small part of the original force'. Yet, so anxious was Hyderabad 
55 IOLR, Elliot Collection, Mss Eur F 48. 
56 Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, I, 191-200; 214-28; 310-19. 
57 His ancestors had similarly defied Asa£ Jahi and Mughal authority before him. It was not until 1819 that Hyderabad, with the powerful military backing of the British, was finally able to subdue Kona Rao. 58 Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, I, 241-51. 
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to tap the revenues of the rich core areas of this region that, 'the [Nizam's] sarkar is very 
friendly to them'. 59 
Amravati in eastern Telangana was built by the Kamma zamindar of Chintapalli, 
Vasireddy, in c. 1793. The zamindar had visited the temple of Amreshwar there while on 
a pilgrimage to Tirupati, and had been impressed by its location in an open plain, its 
nearness to the Krishna and the sanctity of the shrine. He decided to move his capital 
there upon his return from Tirupati. There was yet another reason for the move. 
Chintapalli had recently been occupied by British troops, sent out by Madras to coerce the 
zamindar into paying revenues and allegiance to the Presidency's government. But 
Vasireddy had vowed never to return to Chintapalli while British troops remained 
stationed there. So he set out to build a new capital in Amravati: 
'To effect his views he invited banias from Chintapalli, Pennagunchypoole, Nundigamah and Batavole, as well as brahmins and 
other settlers, to all of whom he made suitable advances of money to 
enable them to erect habitations'. 60 
The ruins of a Veerabhadra temple were found under an old mound being dug up to find 
bricks for Vasireddy's palace. The zamindar caused the excavated deity to be consecrated 
and incorporated in to the Amreshwar temple. Another find was a Jain mandap of four 
pillars. This too was installed in Amreshwar. The engraved stone slabs found under the 
mound were used to build a flight of steps from the temple to the Shivaganga tank. Other 
engraved stones were divested of all their carving and used to build a mosque. Many 
settlers were advanced loans on easy terms to induce them to make Amravati their home 
and to help them set up shop there: 
' ... settlers arrived from various places and established themselves. His 
acts ... of charity are said to have been such that...the place was the 
crowded resort of people of various descriptions, particularly Brahmans, great numbers of whom used to be entertained at a time and furnished 
with money and other presents' . 61 
The fertile plain in which the town was set soon supported vigorous agricultural activity 
and the town itself became a centre of manufacture and trade. The lay out of Amravati 
told its own story of economic activity. The Brahman quarter to the west was its most 
populous area. Its inhabitants were said to be 'rich from being in the Zamindar's employ'. 
Their houses were usually of two storeys, had tiled roofs and were set out in pleasant 
yards. The eastern quarter of town was occupied by 'merchants, artificers and others of 
this denomination'. Their houses were 'less showy' than the Brahman dwellings. Their 
shops in the bazar, too, were single storey affairs with mud roofs. 'The habitations of the 
59 IOLR, Walter Elliot Collection, Mss Eur F 48. 
6o NAI, FB and M, M-87. 
61 Ibid. 
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lower classes .. [including] .. washermen and day-labourers' were in two poor suburbs. The 
most impressive buildings in Amravati were the zamindar's own palaces, and the several 
temples and mosques that he patronized. The main residential palace was expensively furnished with carpets, divans, globes, looking glasses, European and Chinese pictures in gilded frames and silver plating, which covered the pillars of the enormous diwankhana.61 Local political authority was not exclusively a preserve of indigenous zamindari 
elements in the Hyderabad countryside. Sometimes nawabs and jagirdar-s of non-indigenous origins were also to be found performing that role, albeit in a manner that was 
consistent with local tradition and practice. The Qutub Shahi kings of late sixteenth 
century Golconda had attempted to offset the rise of rebellious and independent minded Telegu naik-s by responding favourably to the ambitions of mercenaries who had come to Hyderabad seeking prospects in military service and revenue farming. 63 The Mughals had later given further encouragement to such intermediary elements by practically relying 
upon them for effecting the Deccani conquest.64 Although the Mughal revenue farmers 
and military commanders did not generally win local friends or lasting bases in the core 
areas of the Hyderabad countryside,65 some, nevertheless, sought to establish country 
capitals and exploit local zamindari rivalries to advantage. They succeeded in their 
attempt to some extent, by consolidating alliances with financiers, on the one hand, and 
with at least one of two or more parties involved in local zamindari conflicts, on the 
other. The latter process appears to have won them allies among landed Brahmans in Rayalseema, southern Telangana and southern Andhra; Kammas in central Andhra; and Velamas in northern Andhra. Some intermediate elements developed their local alliances further in the 18th century, becoming sensitive to the local political culture of kingly protection and patronage for the community and domain. It was from among their ranks 
that hereditary nawabs like those of Kumool, Cuddapah, Ellichpur and Nirmal appear to have emerged. 
Since kingly local aspirations involved them in the protection and patronage of their domains, the nawabs were keen to attract the investment of merchants and financier into 
their tracts. The subadar of Cuddapah at the tum of the eighteenth century, Daood Khan, 
encouraged indigenous and foreign merchant financiers to farm out the revenues of his districts. 66 The practice was continued by his successor, Abdun Nabi, the first nawab of 
61 Ibid. 
63 See Chapter Two below. 
64 For a useful description -0f the numerous official titles and establishments of revenue farming military usurers in the period 1720-1748, see: M.A. Nayeem, Mughal Administration of Deccan. 65 J.F. Richards, Mughal Administration. 
66 Malapadu S. Chetty, for example, came from Mysore. Mahadeva Tamanji was a Maharashtrian revenue farmer. Seemarazu Pantulu was a Telegu. 
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Cuddapah, and by subsequent nawabs. 67 One of them, Nawab Abdul Majid Khan (1752-7 
A.D.), was indeed helped into his nawabi, at the expense of Abdul Mohsin Khan, his 
predecessor, by two powerful sahukars, Baqer Saheb and Panni Salim Khan. It was their 
hostility, too, which in the end was responsible for his undoing. Abdul Majid Khan 
incurred their wrath by contesting the sahukar-s' accounts of his debts, by being slow in 
his repayments to them and by not raising satisfactory revenues from his domain. They 
transferred their allegiance, in the event, to an invading Maratha force, which in 1757 
killed Abdul Majid Khan and helped re-instate his predecessor, Abdul Mohsin Khan, into 
the nawabi.68 The first Nawab of Nirmal, Ibrahim Beg Khan, also owed some of his 
initial, and foundational, success against zamindars in northern and north eastern 
Telangana, to the financial backing of sahukars.69 He continued to rely on them 
afterwards, to build up his army and forts, which were important not only from the point 
of view of conquest and defence, but also to project the image of a viable and credible 
patron-protector. 10 
The nawabs' specific attempts to build up links with sahukars can be seen as part of a 
wider concern to see economic growth in their domains. Sahukari investment provided an 
important boost to agriculture, manufacture and trade. 71 The first N awab of Cuddapah, 
Abdun Nabi Khan, encouraged the building of trading centres and participated directly in 
the expansion of Cuddapah and Neknampetta.72 The second Nawab of Kurnool, Ibrahim 
Khan Panni, supervised vigorous building activity in the second decade of the eighteenth 
century. New Pathan settlers arrived in Kurnool during his reign. Alif Khan, the third 
nawab, continued to encourage the expansion and growth of trading centres in Kurnool.73 
Elsewhere, Nirmal continued to be a celebrated manufacturer of exports under its nawab 
67 
68 
69 
IOLR, Mackenzie Unbound, VIIl/17. The Duvur taluq was given to revenue fanners between c.1748 and c.1775 under Abdun Nabi's successors, for example. (IOLR, Mackenzie Unbound, VIII/Sb). The jagirdars of Nellore, too, like the nawabs of Cuddapah, attempted to attract merchant and banker investment to their tracts. (J.A.C. Boswell, A Manual of the Nellore District, [Madras, 1873], pp. 482-95; G. Mackenzie, A Manual on the Kistna District, [Madras, 1883], pp. 152-3, 297-8). 
IOLR, Mackenzie Unbound, VIIl/42; Bh. Sivasankaranarayana, Anantapur District Gazetteer, (Hyderabad, 1970), p. 83. Locally based hereditary nawabs were, of course, not the only in-coming elements who wooed financiers; that need was felt by almost any military commander or revenue fanner with aspirations in the Deccan. The first Nizam hirns~lf made concerted overtures to merchants and bankers, for example. On his decisive march against Mubariz Khan in 1724, he sent an emissary, Ghiyas Khan, to Burhanpur to attempt to win over the governor there to his side by diplomacy. Ghiyas Khan himself failed, but the favourably inclined 'bankers and merchants' of Burhanpur 'placed Anwar Khan', the governor, 'in such embarrassment that he was obliged to make terms' . (E.B. Eastwick, The Kaisernamah-i- Hind, I, [London, 1877], Appendix, p. 7). A later Nizam, Salabat Jang, marched in the middle of a military campaign to Bidar in order to persuade the saraf-s there to give their financial backing to his plans for military conquest. (IOLR, Orme Collection, O.V./42). 
Ibrahim Beg first won decisive campaigns against the Reddys of Gopalpet and the Velamas of Palunsha in north eastern Telangana. Next he subdued the powerful Surya Rao family, as well as some smaller zamindars in the Nirmal region of northern Telangana. The latter was eventually to constitute the core area of his nawabi. 
70 Mohammed Imamuddin, Tazldra!Tarikh-i-Nirmal, (Hyderabad, 1327 A.H.), (Urdu), pp.77-112. 
71 IOLR, Mackenzie Unbound, VIIl/3. It was also with a view to encourage settlement and agricultural growth that Cuddapah nawabs, for example, periodically reviewed revenue settlements, granted revenue remissions in favour of irrigation works and made endowments to village temples. 
72 IOLR, Mackenzie Unbound, VIIl/42. 
73 The late eighteenth century chronicler Mir Husain credits Alif Khan (c.1724/5 - c.1747/8) with great building efforts. (Mir Husain cited in W. Kirkpatrick, Select Letters of Tipu Sultan, [London, 1811], Appendix). 
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Ibrahim Beg Khan in the 1760s and 1770s. Adoni, the jagir of the Nizam's brother 
Basalat Jang, was also a centre of manufacture and export on the Hyderabad-Gooty road 
until the 1780s.74 
1.3.1 Pastoralists, Mobile Groups, and Hill and Forest Groups 
The discussion of the political economy of the core areas of the Hyderabad 
countryside has so far concentrated on groups and settlements associated with settled 
agriculture. However, this is not to suggest that pastoralists, mobile groups, and hill and 
forest groups were not important in the Hyderabad region. Pastoralists like the Kuruvas, 
Golias, Boyas (or Bedars) and Dhangars controlled grasslands on which agricultural 
livestock depended. They also supplied manure to agriculture; wool to artisanal industry; 
and milk and animal products for consumption in villages and trading centres. Hill and 
forest groups like the Chenchus (or Chenchoowars), Bhils and Gonds also controlled 
pasture, as well as supplying raw materials and articles of consumption. Their supplies 
included wood (for fuel and building), silk, dyes, herbs, honey and fruit. Mobile groups 
like the Banjaras owned vast herds of draught-oxen and provided crucial carrying services 
across the region. They were well known for the bulk carriage of grain from Marathwada 
to Telangana, and of salt from the Andhra coast into the interior.75 
The importance of shifting cultivator, pastoralist, mobile, and hill and forest groups 
was not limited to economic functions. They were also politically powerful on the 
southern, northern and eastern borders of Telangana, and the northern and western borders 
of Berar. The groups outside settled agriculture in all these areas were at least as 
numerous, and economically as dominant, as the settled agriculturalists. They could swing 
the fortunes of war between local small kings one way or another. 76 Indeed, some of them 
emerged as small kings in their own right, like the Boya poligars of Deodrug and 
Shorapur. Others, like the Bhil and Gond naiks of Berar, would emerge as the leaders of 
communal domains in the rebellion against the British regime in Hyderabad in the period 
c.1811-53. The economic and political importance of non-settled groups in some areas of 
74 Adoni's fertile hinterland produced dry grains and cotton, and its manufactories produced cotton cloth, carpets 
and thread. (See, for example: NAI, SIR, FB and M, M-17). 
75 This paragraph and the remainder of this sub-section are base,d on: IOLR, C.P. Brown Collection, Mss Eur D 302, History of Surapuram, pp. 83-99, c.1814-15; Mack Gen, Boyawars in Chittaldrug District, 1800-01; 52, Account of Hill Peoples, 1798; Mack Unbound, VIll/5, Kaifiyat of Dasreepalapet, c.1811; 58, Kaifiyat of Voonavah; 34, Account of Pratikanda; 35, Kaifiyat of Dupaad Zamindars; 37, Tradition of Krishnagiri; 38, Account of Chenchoowars; Elliot Collection, Mss Eur F 48, On Shorapur, 1799; D 318, Aboriginal Caste Book II; Board's Collections, F/4/80/1771, On the Banjaras; H/253, pp. 163-4; NAI, HRR, 821, pp. 174-92; M.L.K. Murty and G.D. Sontheimer, 'Prehistoric Background to Pastoralism in the Southern Deccan in the Light of Oral Traditions and Cults of Some Pastoral Communities' , Anthropos, 75(1980), pp. 163-84; E. Balfour , 'On the Migratory Tribes of Natives in Central India', JASB, 13, 1(1844), pp. 1-23; J. Briggs, 'Account of the Origin, History, and Manners of the Race of Men called Bunjaras', Bombay Transactions, 1(1819), pp. 159-83; Reprint from Bombay Educational Record, 'Hill or Aboriginal Tribes in the Dekhan', IA (Oct 1872), p. 322; W.F. Sinclair, 'Notes on Castes in the Dekhan', /A(July 1874), pp. 184-90; J. Cain, 'The Bhadrachellam and Rekapalli Taluqas ' , /A(Aug 1879), pp. 215-21. 
76 By witholding strategic access to one party while granting it to another, or augmenting the forces of one against the other. 
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pre-colonial Hyderabad was also reflected in their ties of marriage , kinship and religion 
with settled agricultural groups. 
1.3 .2 The Social Articulation of the Small King's Authority 
The creation and sustenance of core areas of zamindari and nawabi power, in other 
words, depended on more than merely favourable ecological factors. In practice, 
zamindars and nawabs laid emphasis on protection and patronage. There was an 
intermingling of the strategic and the symbolic in their approach. The concentration of 
population, investment, production and trade in the core areas made obvious economic 
sense with respect to water supplies, resources, raw materials and markets. Fortification 
and military protection were also likely to be easier and more effective in localized 
settlements, rather than in a scattered settlement pattern. But together with temples, 
irrigation works, choultries, rituals and festivals such concentration was likely to have the 
maximum visual and symbolic impact on the inhabitants of the core areas. Nevertheless, 
forts, armies, temples, irrigation works, charities, rituals and festivals were only one part 
of the small king's legitimation, in a context where various small kings competed for 
labour and resources using similar strategies of protection and patronage. Another crucial 
dimension to the small king's legitimation was the elaboration of incorporating legends, 
legitimation rituals and consensus building devices, all of which contributed to the making 
and sustenance of a sense of community within the core domains. The role of festivals, 
oral traditions and royal ceremonies mediated by specialists, - such as Brahmans and 
bhat-s, - or conducted directly by commonfolk, cannot be overestimated in this context. 
The zamindar of Chintapalli participated in several annual public festivals.77 One of 
them, Navaratri, lasted nine nights, on each of which a different vahana of Vishnu was 
taken out in procession, to the accompaniment of music and dancing. The festival 
culminated on the tenth day with the celebration of Vijayadashmi. The patron deity of 
Amravati was on this occasion mounted on a brass horse and taken out in procession to a 
sacred tree near the Ramalingam temple in the afternoon. Here the God was made to 
shoot an arrow, which event was followed by a discharge of firearms on the part of the 
processionists themselves. The sacred tree near the Ramalingam temple might have been 
the Sumi tree. Telegus worshipped it elsewhere on the occasion of Vijayadashmi believing 
it to be 'efficacious in expiating their sins and destroying their enemies'.78 The discharge 
of firearms was a symbolic representation of the victory of Rama over Ravana in the 
Hindu epic Ramayana. It might also have represented a hopeful concern with Amravati's 
success against the attacks of enemy zamindars and British troops. The zamindar might 
77 For a brief but illuminating early nineteenth century account of Telegu and Tamil festivals, see, Venket Row, 'An Account of the Hindoo Holy Days and Festivals', MJLS, (Oct 1833), pp. 15-24; see also: IOLR, Mack Gen, 20/18, Sixty-three Telegu Festivals, c.1800. 
78 V. Row, 'An Account of Hindoo Holy Days and Festivals'. 
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have figured as a victorious leader in verses composed and sung in honour of 'its great 
men' on the occasion of Navaratri. The connection between his role as patron-protector 
and the community's welfare was certainly evident at the time of another annual festival, 
Mahashivaratri. The zamindar would take a collection from devotees on the last day of 
this five day festival and use its proceeds to make prescious ornaments for the deity or to 
'enrich the temple' in other ways. He also bore part of the cost of the festival himself, 
supporting its processions, for instance. The latter culminated with the taking out of the 
great gajrath, or elephant drawn chariot, on the final day, which was accompanied, as 
usual, with music, dancing, singing and a 'multitude of people of both sexes'. The gajrath 
was taken out in procession again at Sankaranti bearing the image of Amreshwar, the 
chief deity of Amravati. The zamindar made presents of cloth to his staff, to pujari-s and 
to Brahmans at this time. He made a liberal contribution to yet another festival, the 
Kartika Deepam, which lasted over a whole month. Public parikrama-s of the Amreshwar 
temple were conducted during this period and the town was illuminated with lights.79 
The local sovereign's virtues were not all realised until he was seen to give protection 
and patronage to the religious institutions of the community over which he ruled. Though 
they could not participate directly in Hindu festivals and rituals, nawabs supported 
temples and agraharam-s through grants.80 Similarly, they supported the religious 
establishments of their own faith, Islam. The pir Shah Mastan played an important role in 
the spiritual and political affairs of Kurnool in the time of its sixth nawab, Munawwar 
Khan, who was his principal murid, as well as patron. Shah Mastan played a leading role in Kurnool's war, and subsequent peace negotiations, with Hyder Ali of Mysore.81 The jagirdar of Adoni in the 1770s, Basalat Jang, confinned and instituted numerous grants to dargahs and agraharams. The grand mosque of Adoni was also built by him.82 
. The Mughal governors of Cuddapah in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
century are described in Telegu sources as destroyers of temples. Temple traditions of 
places other than Cuddapah also record the adverse effects of early Mughal invasions. 
The most famous temple of the Telegu region was, and is, Tirupati. Its 18th century 
tradition looked back with nostalgia upon pre-Mughal days, when grants were still 
considerable. Though later Muslim rulers re-instituted grants that the early Mughals 
79 NAI, SIR, FB and M, M-87. 
80 The second nawab of Kumool, Ibrahim Khan confirmed a royal grant to the temple of Srisailam in 1712, for example. The amount of the grant followed a Qutub Shahi sanad issued to the temple by the famous Brahman ministers Madanna and Akkanna in the late 17th century. (N.G. Chetty, A Manual of the Kurnool District, [Madras, 1866], p. 30). 
81 William Kirkpatrick implies in his Select Letters of Tipu Sultan ([London, 1811], Appendix) that the war and the peace negotiations in question took place sometime in the 1760s. Another source, N.G. Chetty, A Manual of the Kurnool District, ([Madras, 1886], pp.35-6), which calls the pir Miskeen Shah instead of Shah Mastan, however, places the events in 1775. For an account of kingly patronage for Sufi silsila-s and khanqa-s in the Deccan from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, and for dargah-s and sajjda-nashin-s in the seventeenth century, see, R.M. Eaton, The Sufis of Bijapur, 1300-1700, (Ann Arbor, 1977), pp. 82-145, 210-51. For the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see, D.Prasad, Saints of Telangana, (Hyderabad, 1969), pp. 8-17. s2 NAI, SIR, FB and M, M-17. 
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resumed, they did so only on a reduced scale. 83 British administrators, later still, did not 
increase the grants to pre-Mughal levels either.84 Daood Khan, subadar in the first decade 
of the early eighteenth century, is praised for his charity, however.85 Daood Khan's 
successor, the first nawab of Cuddapah, is also similarly praised. The third and fourth 
nawabs, Abdul Mohsin Khan and Abdul Majid Khan, are credited with confirming 
ex1stmg grants as well as with instituting new ones. 86 The nawabs' grants to Hindu 
religious institutions, it appears, amounted to more than individual acts of charity, every 
grant representing, in actual practice, the creation of a consensus between themselves and 
the elites of local society. The grant deeds were signed not only by the nawab's 
representative and the grantee, but also by the principal landed families of the locality in 
which the grant was to be located.87 The nawabs and the local elites were involved, it 
might be said, in the building up of a sacred shared domain.88 
The public affirmation of bonds between a ruler and his subjects through religious 
rituals, festivals and ceremonies had been known in south India since at least the days of 
the Vijayanagar sovereigns.89 Some recent works establish their importance in small 
kingdoms in the post-Vijayanagara days. The coronation ceremony of the Raja of 
Kalahasti in 1778 inspired a visitor to record his impression of the tremendous appeal it 
held for the local populace: 
'The silence of the multitude ... during all this was admirable. The awe and 
reverence with which they beheld the rites, and listened to the Brahmins 
was so great that...the voices of the Brahmins were distinctly heard of the fort, but the moment of adoration, which was ... when the last rite ... was 
completed, no sooner come, that a simultaneous shout burst from the 
83 IOLR, Mack Gen, 16. 
84 IA,. (June 1872), p. 192. 
85 Though there is no evidence of Daood Khan's having directly instituted temple grants, there are several examples of his Hindu bankers and revenue farmers repairing damaged temples and instituting fresh agraharams and other religious charities. 
86 IOLR, Mackenzie Unbound, VIII/3, 17, 42. 
87 
88 
89 
Thus when the agraharik of Bhairavasamudram, Ganjikotta taluq, Cuddapah district, Raghunath Somayya, was awarded a grant, the document was signed by an agent on the nawab's behalf, by the recepient of the grant and by the heads. of the fifteen dominant Reddy families of the Bhairavasamudram quarter of Ganjikotta taluq. (IOLR, Mackenzie Unbound, VIIl/3). For other examples of consensus-based religious grants by the Muslim nawabs to Hindu institutions, " in the Channoor, Siddhavatam, Nosum and Kamalapur taluqs, - see IOLR, Mackenzie Unbound, VIII/42. 
The religious charity of the Cuddapah nawabs was not exclusively directed at Hindu institutions. They were also responsible for instituting many Muslim religious charities. The latter process involved inviting Sufi pirs of some reputation to set up their takia-s in the Cuddapah region in some cases. An example was the setting up of a takia in the Tadparti qasba by a newly arrived pir. (IOLR, Mackenzie Unbound, VIIl/17). 
H. Krishna Sastri suggests in his South Indian Images of Gods and Goddesses [(Madras, 1916), pp.3 -7] that the principal ritual performed every day in temples dedicated to Shiva or Vishnu was the rajopchara, or 'the paying of royal honours', which brought into play gifts given by kings and chieftains. In the richer and more celebrated temples, thus, the paraphernalia of rajopchara included jewels, crowns, umbrellas, palanquins, elephants, camels, bodies of servants, and troupes of dancers and musicians. A ceremony similar to the rajopchara was also performed, though on a smaller scale, in non-Brahman, non-vedic temples dedicated to local village goddesses. (For this aspect, see also: J. Stevenson. 'On the Ante-Brahmanical Worship of the Hi.,dus in the Dekhan' , ]RAS, 5(1839), pp. 189-97; ]RAS, 6(1841), pp. 239-41) The relevance of religious ritual and festivals to the practice of kingship in south India since the early Vijayanagar days, c. early fifteenth century, is also brought out in C. Hayavadana Rao's scholarly study, The Dasara in Mysore, [(Bangalore,1936), pp. 3, 128-66, 195-200] . 
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whole'. 90 
The smallest of poligars in the Raichur doab was 'regularly installed with all the forms of 
a prince of extensive territory, and had his nominal officers of state subsisting on small portions of land'.91 Religious festivals like Vijayadashmi, and coronation ceremonies, were 
explicitly royal in their imagery and symbolism. They were, as it were, legitimation 
rituals mediated by . Brahmans. But such rituals only addressed themselves to the 
community from on high, or a distance. They could not make or maintain the community in quite the same terms as some other social practices, which one might loosely define as 
consensus building devices. 
These were public occasions which invited communal participation and reaffirmed a 
sense of community. The festival of Holi, celebrated all over India, serves as an example. We have an account of it as it was celebrated in villages of central India and the northern Deccan in the early nineteenth century. A sacred spot was chosen in the village a month in advance of the main Holi ceremonies. The spot was then hallowed by the village pujari in the presence of the pate[ and village elders. A pole was next planted here for the 
Holika. The children of the village devoted themselves to the construction of the Holika from cow dung cakes, wooden planks and combustible rubbish during the ensuing month. The Holika was communally worshipped on the appointed day at the end of the month 
and then burnt. It was set up in front of temples of Shiva or Vishnu in some parts of the Deccan. The more 'solemn ceremonies' of Holi ended with the worship and burning of 
the Holika, and a carnivalesque strain now emerged. The playing of Dulandi on the day 
after Holika went hand in hand with the free use of 'abusive' language: 
'All distinctions of rank are levelled; any chance passenger, 'be he hakim, old man or raja', is obliged to bow to the law of the Huli; they must bear with good grace, all the vulgar gali... '92 
The normally 'respectable' individual would also occasionally join in: 
'He will forget, for the time, all sense of decency, and think it no degradation to expose himself for the sport of the insane rabble ... his face having been blackened, he is mounted on a sorry donkey, and paraded in mimic state through the streets, his drunken attendants hooting and shouting, calling him all the fine names they can think of ... '. 
However, 'many of the more respectable persons' withdrew into their houses to perform a private Holika ceremony when 'persons of the lower orders sally forth into the 
streets'.They clearly disapproved of the behaviour of the 'lower orders', notwithstanding 
the efforts of the Bhavishyottara Purana to incorporate it into the 'official' tradition about 
90 Brown, 'Ceremonies Observed at the Coronation of a Hindu Rajah', Asiatic Researches, 13(1820), pp. 311-16. 91 IOLR, Elliot Collection, Mss Eur F-47, T. Munro to Madras Board of Revenue, Letter, 20 Mar 1802. 92 Khan Ali, 'On the Huli in Malwa', JASB, 10, 1(1840), pp. 311-26. 
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Holi: 
'Then let the people, fearless, thrice circumambulate the fire ... , and let 
them sing and laugh, and let everyone utter without fear, whatever comes into his mind. In various ways, and in their own speech, let them freely indulge their tongues, and sing ... whatever songs they will. Apalled by 
these vociferations, by the oblation to fire, and by the loud laughter of the 
children, that wicked rakshasi will be destroyed and thenceforth the festival of Holika shall be renowed among mankind'. 
The 'levelling dimension' of Holi was short lived and the 'return to the state of sober 
citizens' was noticeable. Customary social roles were highlighted, as if to emphasise that 
people had 'become rational again'. The zamindar was attended by his raiyyat when he 
set out to exchange gifts with his relatives. Various tradesmen went from door to door, in 
order to earn their customary cash tokens. The barber thus carried his mirror about and 
the pattal-maker a colourful pattal. In Rajputana, 'princes and chiefs receive gifts from 
their domestics' to mark the end of riot and the return to sanity. As the Holika burnt 
down, people also dashed off with glowing bits of wood or cow dung cake to rekindle 
'the culinary fire at home, which has (previously) been religiously extinguished'. This 
practice was known in many parts of India, and not only among Hindus. Some non-Hindu 
families also took great pains to keep the freshly kindled fire alight throughout the year, 
until the time of the next Holika: 
'In travelling among the Bheels of Bagur we met with some tribes among 
whom the prejudice on this point was very remarkable'. 
Khan Ali, the author of the foregoing observation, noted with some surprise that Muslims 
'of the poorer sort' also shared with Hindus and Bhils the significance of this Holi 
practice. 
A very elementary analysis of the foregoing description of Holi suggests that it 
incorporated two almost paradoxical elements within it: the rejection and defiance of 
authority and also its recognition and reaffirmation. If it is remembered that Holi was 
celebrated publicly in the 18th century context of the communal domain, one or two of its 
features take on an additional significance. The Holika ceremony, which was meant to put 
an end to the -dark side of things, - bad agricultural seasons, epidemics, personal 
misfortunes and so on, - and inaugurate the good side, - health, plenty and happiness, -
was performed in front of the local temple, the mos~ potent symbol of the king's 
patronage. When the people became 'rational again' after dulandi, and reverted to their 
'customary roles ' , the zamindar, or local king, led his raiyyat in public procession in 
person, while visiting relatives to exchange gifts with them. Holi was a manifest display 
of communal consensus about who was king, who was the community, and what 
relationship they bore to each other. 
30 
If Holi symbolized incorporation within the domain, certain other visual, or hypothetically visual, symbols emphasized the opposite: exclusion. The wooded and hilly 
margins of settled agriculture in Telangana and Berar were the home of a variety of 
shifting cultivator and hunting gathering groups, such as the Chenchus, Bhils, Gonds and Boyas. Their marginality was emphasized in the small kings' domains in the settled 
agricultural tracts in terms of disassociation and exclusion through telling motifs. The Chenchoowars residing in the hills near Srisailam aroused sentiments associated with the 
unfamiliar and unacceptable among the people of the neighbouring plain. Their wandering life and different ways were regarded with misgiving: 
'They never stay in one place for more than a month. Some of them used to erect...huts on the hill of Srisail...and, .. .if they wanted any provisions, used to go to the gramam [to] buy ... bhomeeapatram [or mudpots], cholem, sajaloo, netchmy, rice, salt...tamarind ... ,carry them to their own places, beat the cholem with stone, for they ... [have] ... no ... pestle and mortar, dress it in the mudpot, and [thus] take their victuals. They also eat chechoogadaloo [or a jungle root] after rooting it' .93 
The Chenchoowars' want of a sense of dress and toilette, the latter including a disregard for the imperatives of the menstruation cycle, also excited strong disapproval: 
' ... they never clean the dirty places unless they found water at that very time'.94 
Legitimation rituals and consensus building devices were as temporary as they were influential. Although they recurred, they were based on short lived experience. They could fade from memory in intervals. Incorporating legends were, however, potentially more 
abiding. They relied on the constant renewal of memory; simply through the telling formally or informally, in public or in private, by specialist or non-specialist, by child or 
adult, in part or in whole. They could also be written down or inscribed. The following 
oral traditions, - myths, legends, histories and folklore, - from the 18th century were, in fact, transcribed. The manner and context in which this was done, - by the Brahman 
agents of a British officer, - must have have introduced distorting layers of interpretation 
and interpolation. Nevertheless, they are no less a valuable portion of the 18th century 
record than are -Asaf Jahi and British documents, for we know that their original 
authorship was local, both in the sense of being indigenous and in the sense of coming 
'from below', at least as low as one can get in the circumstances. 
The importance and role of legitimation rituals and, to a lesser extent, consensus building devices, in the maintenance of kingship in medieval and post-medieval South India have been emphasized by various historians in recent years. But since both 
93 IOLR, Mack Unbound, 38. 
94 Ibid.; see also: Mack Gen, 52, Hill People of Bhadrachalam and Palunsha, 1798; Elliot Collection, Mss Eur D 318, Aboriginal Caste Book, ill. 
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legitimation rituals and consensus building devices tended to be articulated through formal 
and spectacular means, the less obvious, but probably more abiding, role of incorporating 
legends, - as folk memory, - has gone almost unnoticed. Local traditions usually traced 
the origins of the patron-protector and his domain to divine intervention, and selectively 
glorified their subsequent history. 
In the tradition of a Deshmukh of Udaigiri, one of his ancestors, Lakshmana Rao, was 
eulogised for having suppressed the destructive activities of an enemy, Mukku Timmanah, 
and bringing 'good order' to the country. His measures to achieve good order involved 
acts befitting a patron-protector. He is said to have repaired tanks, sunk wells and 
'induced the inhabitants to give danapatrams', or deeds of charity. Some landed elements 
gave a tenth part of their land, others an eighth part and yet others a fifth. Another 
deshmukh recalled the measures of patronage undertaken by his grand uncle, Ramchandra 
Bhopulla Bala Rao, who built, among other things, an agraharam for Brahmans, complete 
with fields and gardens around it.95 
The tradition of Pratikanda also highlighted the activities of patrons; a zamindar who 
built a reservoir, a goldsmith who endowed a temple, and a Begum Sahiba who instituted 
charities. The family tradition of the Dupaad zamindars attached a foundational 
significance to the measures of patronage undertaken by a certain Venkatadri Naid. The 
Naid chose to build up Srisailam as his capital on account of the presence in it of a 
Mallikarjunaswamy temple. He sent for sahukars, banias, Brahmans and various other 
settlers, and Srisailam boasted at least one thousand houses in a short time. The Naid also 
built a village some distance east of Srisailam and established a temple there. This village 
was called Venkatadrinaidpaliam after him. Furthermore, he had one new reservoir dug 
out and several old ones repaired. Still more settlements, gardens and temples, were also 
established, and grants instituted for their upkeep. His sons continued to build settlements 
and to institute new charities. Their father's sisters also joined in to build a temple 
dedicated to Venugopalaswamy in a village called Malempullah, besides building several 
choultries and instituting other charities. A later Naid in the Dupaad tradition established 
fifteen new agraharams. Two other Naids, later still, were also involved in similar activity. 
Subba Naid, who recounted the Dupaad tradition in the early nineteenth century, was 
himself known for his generosity towards religious folk, kinsmen, bards, dancers, 
performers, servants and others; he was popularly referred to as the kalpavriksha, the 
proverbial tree that never ceased to bear fruit. 96 
The local traditions of several villages around Gooty recalled favourably the activities 
of generous patrons and those of the selfish and oppressive with bitterness. The 
95 IOLR, Mack Unbound, VII/15. 
96 This kalpavriksha was denuded of much of its fruit by Munro's revenue settlement, however, which left Subba Naid somewhat impoverished and bitter according to his tale in the first decade of the nineteenth century. (IOLR, Mack Unbound, 34) 
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foundational importance of the community over which the patron- protector presided was 
emphasised in the Gooty traditions. Stories regarding the establishment of villages 
described how patrons had been instrumental in inviting settlers from various regions and 
bestowing offices, grants and honours upon them, according to status and rank. Descent 
and gotra were accounted for in these appointments. Various village authorities, - karnam, 
purohit, blacksmith, carpenter, potmaker, washennan, barber and others, - thus received 
hereditary functions. The grants and allowances connected with each person and office 
were recorded, which usually took the fonn of land demarcated by stone inscriptions at 
regular intervals. Each inscription invoked a particular god and his qualities, and gave the 
details of possession. Anyone disturbing the stone inscriptions was warned to expect 
punishment for the sin of killing a cow at Kashi.97 In Mootalapadu, tradition having been 
recounted to link patron with community, and community with land, the location of the 
settlement was described in sacred tenns, - by the names of the holy temples, tanks and 
rivers in various directions, - as well as in relation to nearby villages, marts, towns and 
forts. 98 The karnam of the village Bhairavasamudram in the Ganjikotta division of the 
Cudddapah district in southern Rayalseema had a historical record of grants made by 
various patrons to temples and individuals.99 Elliot obsetved for a district in north eastern 
Telangana that 'ancient names and ancient boundaries for every sub-division of a village 
exist everywhere ... The limits of the padah are known to everyone in the village. Each 
padah has a name given to it from time immemorial and is [still] talked of by that name 
in everyday's conversation. Many ryots cultivate within the padah without exceeding its 
limits [although] the individual holding in it [might] shift from accidental causes such as 
poverty, death and desertion' .100 More abstract conceptions also suggested the habitation of 
settlements under the shadow of patron-protectors by communities linked in traditional 
ways. 101 The linking of community to patron in reverential tenns was evident to a 
surveyor of irrigation works in southern and eastern Telangana in the late 18th century: 
' ... attached to the memory of the founders of these works [are] peculiar ideas of respect and estimation, not inferior to those of the founders of pagodas, choultries and other public edifices, to which ... religion ... [has] 
annexed a superior stamp of sanctity and honour. . .. the care of making 
and keeping them in constant repair has always been a peculiar object of the ... Hindoo Governments and ... Mohdmmedan chiefs as were distinguished for a regard to the welfare of their people' .102 
97 IOLR, Mack Unbound, 36. 
98 IOLR, Mack Unbound, 39. 
99 IOLR, Mack Unbound, VIII/3. 
100 IOLR, Elliot Collection, Mss Eur F 47, Local History, Il. 
101 As in an eighteenth century manuscript of a popular Kannada account of caste divisions that was shown to one of Mackenzie's agents. (IOLR, Mack Gen, 20/4) 
102 IOLR, Mack Gen, 59. 
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In the tradition of the zamindar of Aygoody, as related in the early 19th century, the 
ancestor who founded the zamindari was at first a sardar in the army of a Delhi badshah. 
The badshah became infatuated with a young woman of the sardar's family and one day 
proposed marriage. The sardar, however, pleaded that his religion and caste did not 
sanction such an alliance. But the king was adamant and threatened to take the woman by 
force if the sardar would not give way. The troubled family decided to flee Delhi by 
night. But the king's agents came in pursuit the following morning, and began to catch up 
with the sardar and his family when the latter were forced to check their progress at the 
banks of a violent stream. The trapped family prayed to their family deity for help. A 
divine miracle saved them. Two Pongoo trees on either side of the stream bent low to 
form a bridge over it, and came upright as soon as the sardar had crossed over with his 
family: 
'This circumstance is regarded ... as an occurrence of itself sufficient to 
emblazen the lives of these poligars'.103 
Thereafter, the sardar arrived in Vijayanagara, where he was honourably received by the 
king and given the position of a naik in his service. The naik subsequently had a dream 
in which he was urged to go a certain tract, clear the jungle there, and establish temples 
and settlements in it. The dream also informed him of the imminent arrival in the tract of 
certain families being driven from their homes by famine. The tradition of Aygoody thus 
emphasised the creation of a patron-protector, and his community and domain, through 
divine intervention. A similar strain was also to be found in the tradition of the Tottiars 
further to the south.104 
Ballads, rituals, traditions and the other efforts that emphasised the importance of the 
defence of the community and domain, as well as the leadership of the patron-protector, 
usually tend to give the impression that all was happy and well within the domain itself. 
But when that impression is placed in the context of the constant efforts small kings made 
to maintain defensibility against external attacks, it belies a somewhat deliberate and 
overstated emphasis on depressing internal conflict and creating internal consensus. 
Internal conflict. could arise from a variety of factors: the unequal distribution and 
appropriation of land and other resources, and social and religious inequalities. 
The inevitability of caste inequalities was recognized frankly in a Kannada document 
of the late eighteenth century. There were those castes, ii declared, which were free and 
those which were servile.105 The general sentiment was borne out in the actual treatment 
of weavers, for example, with regard · to their place of residence in villages. Weaver 
103 NAI, SIR, FB and M, M-19, A biographical account of the Zamindar of Aygoody, 1801-20; see also: M-24, An account of the Tottiars of Dindigul, 1818. 
104 Ibid. 
105 IOLR, Mack Gen, 20/4. 
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families were common in districts throughout Hyderabad. They were usually obliged to 
live apart from the main settlement, which was reserved for the more respectable castes, 
the former's ritual status and occupation 'not requiring residence where there is any local 
objection'.106 When the ritually inferior were allowed in the same settlements as higher 
castes, elaborate rules governed their access to various public places and occasions. They 
were debarred, for instance, from entering temples or participating in certain religious 
festivals which involved high caste participation and received the patronage of the 
zamindar. Their own shrines and festivals were placed at a safe distance from the 
respectable precinct. In Amravati, the annual festival in honour of shakti goddesses was 
confined to the outskirts of town, being shunned in particular by the Brahmans, who 
refused to visit outcaste temples. Another Shudra festival, sheddel, was also confined to 
the outskirts. It was managed, furthermore, solely out of the contributions of its 
participants, in sharp contrast to festivals like Navaratri, Ramanaumi and Sankaranti, 
which were supported in grand style by the Zamindar of Amravati and celebrated in 
public thoroughfares with great ceremony and elan.107 
The communal disfavour which governed the occupation and residence of particular 
groups was evident to observers in the Raichur Doab in the early years of the nineteenth 
century. Land and resources were unequally distributed 'between the [upper and] .. middle 
classes and the lowest classes, or between the farmer and the slave'. Bedars, who 
straddled this divide, occupied an ambiguous social position. Some politically powerful 
families, such as those of the Raja of Shorapur, and the poligars of Arugiri, Keeadigiri 
and Gullug, were 'indulgently treated', but the majority of Bedar families were ranked 
below the Shudras, and regarded as outcastes on account of their hunting activity. Dheds 
in the Raichur Doab shared the Bedars' fate, 'being here the same miserable wretched 
creatures as elsewhere' .10810') 
The possibility of internal tensions arising from social and ritual iniquities was 
recognised by political and religious authorities, and attempts were made to resolve or 
depress them. A dispute over the use of caste insignia arose between members of right 
and left hand castes at a marriage ceremony in Rayalseema. It was, as usual, referred to 
Kanchi for settlement. The decision taken there was ratified by the local authorities. 
Kanchi had issued a list of insignia appropriate to each of the sub-castes each caste 
involved in the dispute. Leaders were allowed privileged access to some additional 
insignia, however: 
'Besides the ... [insignia] ... to which the nadudesha are entitled, as the white 
106 NAI, SIR, FB and M, M-64, Memoir, 1810; see also: Walker, ' Tour in the Nizam's Territories ' . 
w7 NAI, SIR, FB and M, M-87. 
108 NAI, SIR, FB and M, M-182, Memoir of Raichur, 1816-17. 
l ()C) IOLR, Mack Gen, 59, Extract from Letter, J. Sullivan to Court of Directors, 3 Feb 1779, On the Northern Circars. 
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umbrella and the palpavada (spreading of cloths) are the highest honours, sanyasis, gods and princes are entitled to them' .110 
A warning was issued against any disregard for the Kanchi's prescriptions: 'whoever 
takes an insignia to which he is not entitled, his family will surely die'. m 
Caste sanctions were also regularly provided for in the legal proceedings of 
Marathwada villages, affecting both offenders and victims. When the non-Brahman officer 
of a sardesai carried away a Brahman family from a village he was attacking and retained 
its youngest daughter in custody, the horrified authorities described his conduct as 
'unworthy even of a Muhammadan'. The officer was severely punished and the sardesai 
whom he served was also issued a reprimand. In another case of caste offence, a Maratha 
who killed his mistress and her paramour was granted a pardon, but was directed to 
undergo the purification ceremonies necessary for recovering caste. Victims of caste 
outrage were no less subject to notions of caste honour than offenders. A Maratha 
returning from Muslim captivity was considered to have lost his caste and was not 
allowed to resume residence in his village until the local patels had considered his case. 
In one instance, they decided to allow him back into the fold after he had undergone the 
purification ceremonies enjoined by the shastras. The patels' decision was approved of 
and confirmed by the higher authorities.112 The concern of the Dasari division of the 
Chenchu tribe in Telangana to preserve their social integrity was reflected in the dim view 
that their guru took of acts that questioned the community's ritual nonns. The Dasari 
Chenchu were required ritually to affinn their allegiance to their order by making presents 
and paying respects to their guru at the math of Ahubol annually, at the time of the 
phalgun festival. Any individual failing to comply with the requirement received a stem 
message from the guru. The messenger would usually convey to the deviant that he had 
forfeited the privilege of wearing the red mark of the sect on his forehead and would not 
be released from the guilt of his act of omission until the guru himself had personally 
pardoned him. This was, in effect, a threat of excommunication and rarely failed to 
work.113 
Particular caste disputes might be resolved, but deeper antagonisms were another 
matter. Certain Brahman castes of the Deccan looked upon the Karli Brahmans of 
Maharashtra with suspicion. It was believed that: 
'They ... beguile Telegu brahmin youths into their houses; such a one they feed luxuriously and give him a female to attend , him, so that attachment for her may keep him there until ... [the festival of Navaratri]. On this occasion they feed him amply and then bring him before the ... Goddess, and as he bows down to her they slay him. This is done in every 
110 J.F. Mackenzie, 'Caste Insignia', IA(1875), pp. 344-5. 
111 Ibid.; see also: J.F. Kearns, 'The Right-Hand and Left-Hand Castes', IA, Dec 1876, pp. 353-4. 112 S.M. Edwardes, 'Side-lights on Deccan Village Life in the Eighteenth Century ', IA(l926), pp. 108-13. 
113 IOLR, Mack Unbound, 38. 
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The Karli Brahmans' methods were said to have become more covert after their public 
humiliation, a parade with shaven heads, in Poona as a punishment for their malpractices. 
They were now accused of claiming Telegu Brahman victims with even greater guile than 
before: by serving them food that contained slow working poison at the religious feasts to 
which they traditionally invited them. 
1.3.3 Communal Domains in Conflict 
The attempt so far has been to indicate how the productive cores of the Hyderabad 
countryside concentrated labour and resources; how their competition held the potential 
for conflicts; and how the nature of zamindari and nawabi authority gave real meaning to 
this potential. This section looks at the way in which such potential was translated into a 
criss-cross pattern of local alliances and conflict. Numerous Telegu local histories that 
become available from the late 18th century allow for a long term insight into the pattern 
of competition and conflict between the core areas of zamindari and nawabi power in the 
Hyderabad countryside. This had implications for local powers and for any attempts to 
build up a regional power in the Deccan. The Telegu regions of Hyderabad, - Telangana, 
Rayalseema and Andhra, - were, generally speaking, sparsely populated and offered only 
limited opportunities for agricultural expansion, except in the fertile river valleys and well 
watered plains. Most of the more ambitious land-controlling groups hence concentrated 
their expansionary efforts in a limited number of fertile core areas. This meant that the 
boundaries of agriculture and ambition were liable to meet and clash as the bosses of 
local domains competed for fertile land and labour from a scarce pool. Such a situation 
provided potential for local conflict. Local bosses were tempted to attempt expansion by 
military means, or to destroy the villages and crops of enemies. Both methods put further 
pressure on scarce resources. Local traditions often represented the encounters of their 
patron-protectors and communities with the wider world in terms of the quest for more 
land or the defence of existing possessions. Support for the patron-protector in the 
defence of his domain was, indeed, even enjoined upon inhabitants as a matter of sacred 
duty. 115 They were called upon to follow their leader in defending the honour and sanctity 
of the commuriity and domain. Zamindars themselves represented any attack on their 
authority as an attack on their rusoom, or customary privileges, to which they were 
entitled as the patrons and protectors of their tracts. 
Local bosses in the quest for more land and power also represented their encounters 
with the wider world as matters of inter-communal rivalry and conflict. The neighbouring 
Boyas figured prominently as an enemy community in the tradition of the Naid zamindars 
114 C.P. Brown, 'Translation of a Mahratta Docwnent', MJLS, 32(1844), pp. 94-7. 
115 For a brief discussion of the 'sanctity' of the Gadwal, Wanaparthy, Jatprole and Amarchinta samathanam-s in the 
context of external pressures, see: M.V. Rajagopal, Mahbubnagar, (Hyderabad, 1976), pp. 38-41. 
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of Dupaad. For example, conflict with the Boyas had occupied much of the career of one 
of the Naid ancestors, Suryappa Naid. The Boyas had at one time begun to 'destroy the 
[Naid] countries' east of Srisailam so comprehensively that Suryappa even considered 
flight. Such activity on the part of the Boyas was characterised with hostile disapproval in 
the Naid tradition. The appearance of Muslims, too, was first seen in similar vein, as the 
advent of turshaloo. Their offensive characterisation was initially understood with 
reference to the activities of Fakhrullah Khan and Ibrahim Khan, Mughal intermediaries 
of the late 17th century. Fakhrullah Khan inflicted a crushing and humiliating defeat on 
Venkatadri Naid, a successor of Suryappa's. He destroyed the buildings and temples of 
Srisailam, massacred most of the Naid household, and dishonoured its women. After 
surveying the scene of destruction, Venkatadri Naid retired to his native village, bathed in 
the sacred tank there, prayed to his household deity, despaired of redeeming his honour 
and committed suicide. The experience of one of Venkatadri's successors, Mallikarjuna, 
with Ibrahim Khan, was similar. Two further descendants, Purushottam and Chinnappa 
Naid, had 'much trouble' with yet other neighbours, Reddy zamindars. Chinnappa's sons 
were again severly humiliated, by a qiladar who received assistance from one of their 
cousins, and committed suicide. Their descendants struggled to avenge the humiliation and 
losses, but were diverted by the attacks of the Boyas, who were by now back in 
business. 116 
The zamindars of Chintapalli, Innaconda and Bellamkonda also had troubled relations 
with their neighbours, the Chincowars and Cammawars of the hills that marked the 
western boundaries of their domains, and with the poligars beyond the hills. Friction 
heightened between the local bosses on either side of the hills in the 1790s. The 
zamindars on the Chintapalli side accused those on the other side of provoking them by 
attacking their domains. They described them offensively as leaders of communities 'who 
have neither mercy, nor truth, nor modesty' and consider the murder 'a trifling matter'. 
The zamindars also suspected the hill people of conniving with the attackers, by 
deliberately leaving the passes in the hills poorly guarded. The hill people replied that this 
was merely an excuse on the part of the Chintapalli zamindars to avoid paying them the 
customary allowances due for the defence of the passes, and warned that provocative 
aspersions were being cast on their sense of honour. They soon retaliated by burning and 
plundering the Chintapalli zamindars' villages. The latter also replied by carrying fire and 
sword into the hills.117 
Jupulli Appa Rao, a zamindar of Udaigiri, Khamman and Sarvepalli in the 1790s 
narrated another tradition that referred to local enmities and conflicts. Neighbouring 
poligars had begun 'interfering' with the Rao villages in his great grandfather's time and 
116 IOLR, Mack Unbound, 35. 
117 IOLR, Board's Collections, F/4/30/849, c.1796. 
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were forcibly subdued by him. But Mukku Timmannah 'resumed to destroy the countries' 
after a quiet interlude. Appa Rao's grandfather also had an unhappy relationship with 'the 
Damarla people', who deprived him of villages and rights. Appa Rao's son, Lakshman 
Rao, was forced by the Damarlas to relinquish his possessions and go into exile. Jupulli 
Appa Rao himself grew up in exile, but later managed to regain some of the Raos' 
traditional influence. Syed Qadir Khan, a jagirdar, now proved to be the main obstacle in 
the way of the fulfilment of his hopes: 
'which being my rights ... we have asked him why he would not allow [us] our rights .. .' .118 
Ramchandra Rao, another zamindar, narrated another tradition, which again recalled 
the story of several generations of uncertain possession and influence on account of 
enemy activities. One of his ancestors, Dharma Rao, had for many years remained 
engaged in conflict with the poligars of Udaigri, as they had encroached upon his domain. 
A descendant of Ramachandra's had had similar experiences with 'the Damarla people', 
as well as with other 'Rao peoples', and finally died in great distress. The father of the 
narrator of this tradition, Ramachandra Rao, had been able to retrieve the situation 
somewhat, thc,mgh he, too, continued to be harassed by the Damarlas. Ramchandra Rao 
himself had inherited the ancestral domain in the context of external enmities and 
hostilities. He spoke of enemy neighbours with bitterness, referring offensively to their 
caste and community. He represented his losses as injuries to the honour of his 
community and domain, and to his gains as adding to their glory. He displayed the 
symbols of the latter, - robes, titles, riding in state, - with pride: 
'We being Vellamahs, ... belong to the Gotra of Viplav ... [The] Rayangaroos ... are [among] my [illustrious] relations. We used to dress [in]. .. gold embroidered cloths, and the circar also presented the same to us. We also dressed [in] the gowns of white cloth .. .'.119 
The Raos of Hannamkonda also referred to enemy communities in bitter and offensive 
terms, while glorifying their own status and deeds: 
'The faujdar used to send a proper person .. . to meet [us]. .. outside ... [the] village, and ... always [rose] ... from his seat when ... we went to [the] cutcherry. He used to seat us near his pillow .. .' .120 
External observers also noted that the patron-protectors' quest for authority led to local 
conflicts. Patupoliam, the petta of a 'petty poligar', was 'populous, owing chiefly to the 
insecurity of the jungly tract in its neighbourhood from the contentions of this poligar and 
118 IOLR, Mack Unbound, VII/15. 
119 Ibid. 
120 IOLR, Mack Unbound, VII/16. 
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his neighbour of Cotupaliam' in the early years of nineteenth century.121 The poligars of Keeadigiri and Arakil were: 
'very apt to encourage their retainers in predatory incursions into the Raichur districts, on account of their claims to rusoom being unsatisfied' .122 
The Ca vital pargana of Raichur was plunged into 'a state of great confusion owing to the 
unsettled pretensions of the Zamindars on the fiefs of Neelkantha Rao and the Desai, both 
of whom have been ejected and are refugees within the Kannagiri district... ' 123 at the turn 
of the nineteenth century. The ejected local bosses' attachment to their land as their main 
source of livelihood is understandable. It must have been the greater for its being 
reinforced by traditions that mixed the defence of the domain with the honour of the 
community and of the patron-protector. Though the Rao and the Desai had been forced to flee, 'their tenants deny all allegiance to the Zamindar; they slight his authority on all 
occasions of its being asserted and retaliate on his villages whatever evils be produced on 
theirs'. 124 The ejected parties complained bitterly about the zamindar's dishonesty and injustice, and their resentment took the fonn of counter attacks: 
' ... every poligar maintains his tenants in an anned state, and if he thinks himself sufficiently powerful, demands his rusoom at the head of a force; otherwise he sends parties in the night to rob the villages and lay waste the fields of those who refuse compliance, and retire from such depredations to the security of their ghadi-s, situated for the most part on numerous low hills .. .'. 125 
In the Rawdiconda pargana tensions ran so high as to 'keep nearly the whole of the male population in an anned state'. 
Sometimes, the community of a disputed poligar domain would retire into the hills or jungle when forced out of their rusoom on the plain. In Gurramkonda, 'the fonner co-
adjutor of the poligar of Toomalgudy' would emerge from his retreat at night 
accompanied by his loyal band. They would carry torches and sound drums and trumpets 
as they went attacking villages, making no secret of their sense of outraged honour. 126 Similar means were adopted by the nadu gauda-s of Raichur district. When the Raichur Zamindar forced · the nadu gaudas to flee and tried 'to assume the management of the 
villages' himself, he found 'considerable opposition on the part of the inhabitants 
121 Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, I, 70-105. 
122 NAI, SIR, FB and M, M-158. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 
126 NAI, SIR, FB and M, M-47. 'In Gurramconda in particular', according to Munro, writing in 1802, 'every head of a village favoured by natural strength of the country became a poligar'. (IOLR, Elliot Collection, Mss Eur F-47, Thomas Munro to Madras Board of Revenue, Letter, 20 Mar 1802; see also, Munro Collection, Mss Eur 151/10, 'Instructions to William Thaceray, Adoni Division, 31 Dec 1800). 
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themselves, where villages ... afford sufficient protection against any but serious attacks'. m 
In the Mud gal Circar, local bosses tried to make sure that their ghadis were 'of competent 
strength against any hasty insult or revenge of their neighbours .. .' .128 One of them, 
Venkatiah of Tawurugiri and Halapoor, was considered a 'highly respectable' old man. 
But since old age and respectability were no guarantee of rusoom, 'He has upwards of a 
hundred armed retainers'. 129 In Tawurugiri, local bosses were generally regarded the 
'sovereigns of the villages they own' and the sense of community they commanded in 
their villages was closely aligned with the military measures they took for the defence of 
their domains. Their villages were generally surrounded by ramparts and the towers were 
kept in good order. Most of the inhabitants bore arms and were expected to be ready to 
fight when called upon by the patron-protector to do so: 'The independent...tone of the 
Dessyes pervades their dependants and tenants'. 130 The latter apparently had good reason 
to put their faith in the leadership of their patron-protectors: 
'The population of the villages belonging to the Desais is usually great 
and the inhabitants themselves much better conditioned than those of the 
circar villages; this arises from the immunities they receive, the mutual protection they afford each other, contrasted with the insecurity of the 
circar tenants, whose lands are laid waste and property plundered, either from the wantoness of the Desai's tenants or with the object of inducing 
their settling within the Desai 's protection, which in some instances is bought by the payments of fees or rusooms '. 131 
Patron-protectors and inhabitants felt it necessary always to be in a state of readiness 
to respond to unexpected threats to community and domain. Not even the death of the 
poligar was allowed to compromise this concern in Aygoody. If the death of a reigning 
poligar could be anticipated, his heir was ceremoniously prepared for the succession a few 
hours before the expected event. He was then led to his father's deathbed to receive from 
him the chief arms of the poliam. Next he was taken in joyous procession to a 
dharmashala specially prepared for the succession. Here he demanded tokens of tribute 
from the 'principal subjects' of the poliam as proof of their allegiance. When he had 
received these, he was declared the lawful successor, and 'the people raised their hands 
and adored him'. The new poligar was expected to assume his responsibilities without any 
delay. He was he!]ce forbidden to see his father's corpse or to show any signs of grief at 
his death. The funeral rites were performed by a younger brother or cousin.132 
While spectacular public rituals played an obvious part, ballads were another familiar 
means of inspiring leaders and populace to give priority to the defence of their 
127 NAI, SIR, FB and M, M-182. 
128 NAI, SIR, FB and M, M-176. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132 NAI, SIR, FB and M, M-19. 
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community and domain. As the popular prescription of the Sumati Shatakam put it: 'To 
attack in battle s meritorious for a man; this quality the poets should praise and education 
teach'.133 A 17th century ballad of the Naid of Kurnool began with a kind of war cry on 
the part of the hero; 'I come, its I, the mighty Papadu'!134 It then described the hero 
taking leave of his mother with ambitious intentions on his mind: 
'Then to his mother quick he hied, 
And lowly bent him by her side: 
'Mother' to fix and drive the share, 
The filthy household pot to bear, 
Are not for me. My arm shall fall 
Upon Golkonda's castle wall: 
I'll scorn the lord of Delhi's might; 
To me shall Bandar yield this night; 
Before Kurnool I then will stand, 
And with gold jewels deck this hand. 
Let not my followers miss the prize 
That fortune holds before their eyes'! 135 
Next came the appearance of the hero clad in armour, inspiring respect and terror in the 
hearts of all: 
'Within its form low crouched the hare; 
Trembled the deer to leave their lair; 
The tender babes refused their breast; 
The fox and the lion slunk to rest'.136 
Then came the meeting of the poligar with his loyal band of warriors. Every act on this 
occasion, even their nervous consumption of liquor, was invested with heroic significance. 
The fragment of the ballad of the Kurnool poligar ends at this point, but it is not difficult 
to imagine the strain in which it might have continued, describing the exploits of the 
warriors which led to the greater glory of the poliam. 137 
Zamindars found internal conflict depressing and consensus building devices a 
necessary part of their efforts to mobilize people and resources in their domains so as to 
effect further expansion or to defend against aggression. Defensive or offensive 
maneouvres also tended to distract from internal conflict. Conflicts in the Hyderabad 
countryside were thus the products of external exigencies as well as the internal realities 
of the core areas of local power, and became ideological ingredients in the traditions 
about, and the practice of, local sovereignty. Not surprisingly, therefore, the zamindar in 
the Deccan was, par excellence, a warrior chief. Nor did he hesitate to suppress internal 
conflict with armed force when traditional conflict depressing and' consensus building 
133 IOLR, Mack Unbound, VII/38. 
134 J.A. Boyle, 'Telegu Ballad Poetry', IA(1874), pp. 1-6. 
135 Ibid. 
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devices failed to work. 
The zamindars' local warfare also helped shape the overall framework and character of 
the regional political order of Hyderabad Deccan. The sorts of political alliances that 
emerged in Hyderabad were striking for the shifting basis of terms between neighbouring 
zamindars and intermediaries, usually revenue farming military usurers. Family annals 
from the late eighteenth century and the early 19th century illustrate the point. A 
zamindar of Khammam district recalled the history of his family's fortunes in terms of 
the chequered story of their possessions on account of impermanent and uncertain 
alliances with neighbours and with intermediate elements. His grandfather had seen a 
considerable reduction in his possessions and resources. His father, Lakshman Rao, had 
then been able to retrieve them by seiving the Cuddapah Nawab, who rewarded him with 
a jagir of 32 villages and gave him 'leave to beat drums and sound trumpets' when riding 
in state. But subsequent wars with the neighbouring Damarlas took their toll once again, 
and Lakshman Rao was forced into exile in Venukonda. He sought to cultivate good 
relations with the revenue farmers of the Nawab of Cuddapah from his retreat. The efforts 
eventually bore fruit. The author of the story, Appa Rao, was restored to deshmukhi rights 
in the Udaigiri district. Not all of his problems were solved, however, as Syed Abdul 
Qadir Khan, a rival jagirdar, would not let him resume some villages, even though the 
intermediary revenue farmer, Narasimha Reddy, had agreed to this proposal.138 
Venkatarama Bhopulla Bala Rao was another deshmukh in Khammam with a story of 
changing alliances and fortunes. There was a time during his father's reign when 'the 
faujdar used to send a proper person to ... meet [us in the] ... village, ... always ... [got]. .. up 
from his seat when we went to the Cutherry [and would] seat us near his pillow'. But the 
'Damarla people' had forced Bala Rao's father out of his possessions and the situation 
had not altered until Bala Rao has been able to find favour with the revenue farmer Hafiz 
Himmat Khan. The sarkar then recognized the deshmukh's status, sending him robes of 
honour on the appropriate occasions.139 
The struggle over rights and possessions had, in yet another part of Khammam, driven 
the heads of two branches of a family into the camps of rival poligars of the 
neighbourhood. One of the heads, Abahu Naid, was able to gain the additional support of 
Khammam faujdar-s against his opponent. The rivals embarked upon a confrontation in 
which they sought to expand the range of their own support and to destroy the other's 
domain. Meanwhile a third party, the samasthanik of Venkatagiri, made quiet gains by 
encroaching upon the lands of both the distracted opponents and had his acquisitions 
confirmed as jagirs by greasing the right palms in the Hyderabad darbar. One of the 
Naids sent a Brahman agent to Poona to solicit the Peshwa's support. Encouraging hints 
138 IOLR, Mack Unbound, 7/15. 
139 IOLR, Mack Unbound, 7/16 
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came from that quarter, but no concrete help. The Naid's position deteriorated. He was 
finally captured along with his brother by the rival Naid, Abahu, who was then in league 
with Sadashiv Rao, the faujdar of Khammam. The brothers were thrown into prison, 
where, unable to bear the indignities and humiliation they were subjected to, they both 
committed suicide. One of the descendants of the eclipsed branch was able revive its 
fortunes somewhat; he managed to win over a new faujdar, Mir Saheb, to his side. The 
process of recovery was arrested, however, · once Mir Saheb was recalled, especially as the 
rival had by now managed to gain the support of Boya Raja, one of the most powerful of 
the Khammam poligars. Fortune smiled briefly on the wretched when a new faujdar came 
looking for support against the Boya Raja, who had become a serious menace to supra-
local authority in the region. Sheshachalapati Naid saw his chance and pitched his forces 
on the faujdar's side. Here matters rested when he narrated his story at the end of the 
eighteenth century.140 
The Reddys of the Krishnagiri district in Kumool recalled yet another story of 
changing fortunes in the late 18th century, charting its course between the tussles and 
alliances of the Reddys with the Nawab of Kumool, the Raja of Gadwal, the Sultan of 
Mysore and local poligars. Towards the end of the story, Munawwar Khan brought an 
army from Kumool and 'ruined the thana established by the Gadwal people'. Then Hyder 
Ali struck the fatal blow: 'the people ... having suffered a great loss by the disturbances of 
Hyder Naik ... ran away to strange countries'. 141 The affairs of Mootalapadu samasthanam 
in Duvur taluq were also subject to the uncertainties of shifting local alliances, as well as 
the changing postures of intermediary revenue farming military usurers. Several amaldar-s 
arrived and departed within a short period, for example, variously on behalf of the Nawab 
of Kumool, the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Rajas of Gadwal and Raichur. Duvur was 
also subjected to the periodic ascendancy of several neighbourhood poligars. Each phase 
of changing alliances brought with it confirmatory sanads, rituals and robes of honour, but 
also war and dispossession. 142 
Local poligars were the main actors in the quest for authority and resources in the 
Raichur doab. They constantly sought to bring more villages under their control and were 
highly sensitive to any dimunition in their orbits of influence. They regarded their sway 
over villages as -protective and termed the tribute payments to which they lay claim in 
return as rusoom. The latter was an important source of income and a great point of 
honour. Any threat to rusoom was seen as a threat to the poligar and to the poliam. 
Poligars were consequently locked in a web of bitter conflicts amongst themselves and 
with intermediate revenue farming elements. It was against this backdrop of their mutual 
140 IOLR, Mack Unbound, 35 
141 IOLR, Mack Unbound, 37 
142 IOLR, Mack Unbound, 39 
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rivalries that the poligars of the parganas of Jalihal, Mosulkul and Berrudona sought 
alliances with Hyderabad's revenue farmer for their region; for example, the Raja of 
Shorapur. In some cases, they cultivated his support through marriage alliances. 
According to a contemporary, the Raja himself 'provoked rather than alleviated' the local 
conflicts. He was, in fact, 'deeply interested in the maintenance of the system' of local 
rivalries, since they allowed him to exercise a powerful local influence. A neighbouring 
revenue farmer, the Raja of Raichur, who farmed the Raichur and Cavital districts, was 
similarly disposed. The two raja-s frequently lent their support to rival poligars. The 
poligars of Keeadigiri, Arakeyri and Gullug, whose poliams were situated in the Raichur 
Raja's districts, and who were at war with that Raja as well as with poligars loyal to him, 
were, for example, supported by the Shorapur Raja, who accorded them shelter and 
provision in his districts.143 
Despite the widespread willingness of weighty elements in the Hyderabad countryside 
to defy the demands of revenue farmers, strands of co-operation and collaboration 
continued to subsist between them, manifesting themselves usually as temporary alliances 
of expediency. The context for such co-operation was set by the conflicts between 
zamindars, and between zamindars and intermediaries. Some of the larger zamindars 
themselves doubled as revenue farmers. The Raja of Raichur was an example in the 18th 
century. He first became the manager of the jagir of an intermediary, Munir ul Mulk, and 
then used the influence this position afforded him to set up as a revenue farmer in his 
own right, eventually to become the largest and most powerful revenue farmer in the 
Raichur doab. In his dual capacity as zamindar and intermediary, he collected more for, -
although he probably also witheld more from, - Hyderabad than any other person in the 
region. He was also able to get the Nizam to confer royal honours upon him. He farmed 
the two doab districts of Raichur and Mudgal and maintained a force of 1000 cavalry, 
1500 infantry and an even larger 'militia' to enforce his revenue collecting authority. 
Much of his force was concentrated in Cavital and Bhunnoor in the early nineteenth 
century, as it was here that he faced the maximum opposition from local bosses. The 
leading opponents were a mirasidar called Neelkantha Rao and a desai: 
'Both of the ejected parties are loud in their complaints on the injustice 
and dishonesty of the Zamindar's conduct...they foster a spirit of 
resentment which operates in encouraging their tenants to great irregularities' .144 
The Raja of Shorapur was another zamindar who doubled as a revenue farmer. His 
ancestors had managed to extend the boundaries of the poliam by military force until it 
was one of the strongest core areas of local power in the region by the early 18th 
143 NAI, SIR, FB and M, M-182; M-158. 
144 Ibid. 
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century. They had also begun to intervene in the disputes of other, smaller poligars in 
order to gain additional income, status and land. Such developments in Shorapur were 
paralleled by similar ones in the neighbouring Gadwal and Deodrug. Deodrug emerged as 
the major rival of Shorapur and held the upper hand for some time. The first Nizam, 
Nizam ul Mulk, for example, appealed to the Raja of Deodrug for help when he was 
unable to dislodge the Raja of Shorapur from the fort of Waggangiri sometime in the 
1720s; the Raja of Deodrug achieved the · same object merely by sending threatening 
summons to the Raja of Shorapur. Although the Raja of Shorapur had to pocket the insult 
on this occasion, he built up his strength and resources in subsequent years and waited for 
the right opportunity to seek revenge. That opportunity presented itself when the two 
raja-s became engaged in an armed conflict over some disputed territory. The Raja of 
Shorapur was able this time round to inflict a crushing defeat on the Raja of Deodrug. 
The latter was so shocked and humiliated by the extent of his reversal that he gathered up 
his family in a room stocked with gun powder in his hill fort and fired the explosive 
material. The Deodrug poliam never revived afterwards. The neighbouring zamindari of 
Gadwal was able to build up great strength by the late 17th century. It was able to defeat 
an army sent by the Sultan of Bijapur against it. Aurangzeb, the Mughal emperor 
campaigning in the Deccan, became keen on an alliance with the Raja. The Raja 
continued to exercise considerable influence afterwards, and even a respectable neighbour 
like the Nawab of Kumool was obliged to pay him tribute until the middle of the 18th 
century.145 
All the nawabdoms, not only Kumool, that emerged as local powers in the 18th 
century in fact suffered adverse consequences from the local and supra-local conflicts of 
that century. The reverse side of Ibrahim Beg Khan's conquest of a fertile and productive 
core area in Nirmal was that the tract was gradually ravaged through warfare with hostile 
local zamindars. Some productive pockets became rebel strongholds and too expensive to 
conquer profitably. The Nawab relied increasingly on taxing the manufactures and trades 
of Nirmal for revenues towards the end of his reign. The same policy was not only 
continued by his son and successor, Ihtesham Jang, but even carried to a destructive limit. 
Traders and artisans actually began to flee Nirmal on account of the oppressions of the 
tax collectors in .his time. Faced with a shattered economy and declining revenues, the 
nawab also became increasingly vulnerable to local and supra-local opposition. He was 
finally overthrown by an army under the Nizam's personal command in 1782.146 The 
experiences of the Nawabs of Kumool and Cuddapah were similar to Nirmal 's, except 
that they continued to survive with restricted areas and diminished influence for varying 
145 Ibid. 
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periods into the 19th century. 147 
1.3.4 The Local Factor in Hyderabad's Regional Order 
The four sub-regions of Hyderabad were variable in their productivity; this was 
reflected in their agriculture, manufacture and trade. The main centres of economic 
activity were located in core areas, which were distinguished by their fertile agricultural 
hinterlands, and capacity to support manufacture and commerce. Principal trading centres 
also tended to coincide with the principal centres of political power. This coincidence was 
not accidental. Zamindars and nawabs, the local bosses of the core areas, were actively 
interested in the growth of economic activity. They also patronized many social and 
religious institutions in their domains. This was intended in part to give their authority 
legitimacy in the context of external and internal conflict. Externally, the patron-protectors 
competed with rival local powers for scarce resources. Internally, they sought to depress 
tensions arising from economic, social and ritual iniquities, which might threaten the 
integrity and defensibility of their domains. Rituals, festivals, traditions and ballads were 
some of the means used to elaborate and glorify the patron-protector's authority, as well 
as to mobilize the loyalty of the community that inhabited his domain. 
Yet although patron-protectors strove to build solidarity and consensus within their 
domains, the success of sovereignly local powers in the core areas of the Hyderabad 
countryside did not contribute here in the 18th century to the emergence of a political 
order to match that of Awadh or Banaras in north India. The very external and internal 
imperatives that led to the strengthening of zamindari and nawabi domains also led to an 
heavy reliance on military methods, which continued to fuel warfare. But one of the 
features of local competition and conflict was, nevertheless, the operation of strands of 
collaboration, albeit expedient and temporary, between local bosses with common 
enemies. The fluctuating character of political relations between the core areas also 
opened up possibilities for supra-local powers, who could profit by local rivalries. The 
Asaf Jahi regime was thus ultimately based on the shifting sands of temporary alliances 
of expediency in the countryside. While these factors raise doubts as to whether a stable 
and peaceful bureaucratic state could operate in Hyderabad, they might also have had 
implications for · !he overall character of the regional political order in relation to the 
imperial aspirations of several powers in southern and central India in the 18th century. 
1.4. Conclusion 
The most general point that emerges from this chapter is that it would be too 
simplistic to equate areas with apparent dynastic coverage with stable 'successor states'. 
147 For details of their decline, see, for example, IOLR, Mackenzie Unbound, VIII/3, 17, 42; W. Kirkpatrick, Select Letters, Appendix. 
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Similarly, areas without dynastic covers, but with internal conflict, cannot be equated with 
areas of political disorder and economic decline. Several historians have already explored 
some 18th century areas with dynastic covers in recent years and come up with 
alternative formulations to the classic stereotype of the bureaucratic and military fiscal 
Mughal state. Nevertheless, they still perpetuate some old notions: that a strong, or at 
least a dominant, centre was the necessary pivot of a regional political order, and that the 
regional political order, or its centre, was co-equal with the state. Hyderabad seems to 
provide a useful counterpoint to such notions. Both the regional political order and the 
centre here were moulded by a criss-cross pattern of alliances and conflicts in the 
countryside, in inter-relationship with similar factors at the supra-local and inter-regional 
levels, which are discussed in the next chapter. A further point emerges from this. 
Conflict and warfare were not necessarily indicators of disorder or decline, a factor which 
has not generally been appreciated in the historiography of 18th century India. 
This chapter has tried to unravel some of the realities behind the alliances and 
conflicts at the local level of politics in the Hyderabad countryside. Far from being an 
economic backwater, the Hyderabad region was dotted with core areas of productivity, 
which were more dispersed in some sub-regions than in others. The core areas 
concentrated population and resources in order to sustain investment, agriculture, 
manufacture and trade. Since labour and resources were both scarce, the core areas 
competed for them. The manner in which they did so was inextricably linked with the 
nature of the society in those areas. Political authority was exercised by local zamindars 
and nawabs, who were no mere administrative functionaries appointed and controlled by 
the centre, but virtually independent indigenous small kings. The small kings tried to 
elaborate the role of the patron and protector in a post-Vijayanagara tradition. This meant 
that they had to be, and had to be seen to be, warriors capable of defending their 
communities and domains. 148 They had to be seen to be divinely blessed royal patrons. 
The complexity and living quality of kingship as an ongoing process can only be guessed 
at. But the 'cultural' record, - monumental, oral and literary, - is still quite rich with hints 
and details of legitimation rituals, consensus building devices and incorporating legends. 
As the small kings competed for scarce labour and resources, as well as the glory of 
their communities and domains, they entered into multi-lateral alliances and conflicts. 
Amongst those to whom they turned for help were supra-local elements of non-indigenous 
origin. The latter, armed with superior military skills and capital, as well as banker 
support, hoped to be able to lay the foundations of a 'Mughal' style bureaucratic and 
military fiscal state in Hyderabad. But sandwiched between local kings and foreign 
powers, they were themselves drawn into local and inter-regional alli.ances and conflicts. 
148 One is still today struck by the remains of 18th century mud and stone forts throughout what used to be the Hyderabad region. 
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The frustration and failure of Mughal style state building in Hyderabad did not induce the 
supra-local elements of Hyderabad to go away. Even a shrinking and volatile Hyderabad 
was apparently still a land of hope and profit.149 How they continued to operate here is the 
subject of the next chapter. 
149 Most of the Maratha sub-region and the whole of the Andhra sub-region were lost to foreign military fiscal interests by the end of the 18th century. The Berar sub-region and parts of Rayalseema were lost in the middle 
of the subsequent century. 
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2. SUPRA-LOCAL AND INTER-REGIONAL FACTORS 
2.1 Introduction 
Several historians have written sophisticated accounts of new regimes with stable 
underlying structures in 18th century India in recent years.1 These accounts uniformly question the conventional wisdom that the eighteenth century was largely one of anarchy, 
warfare and decline. They redress an imbalance in the historiography of the century by 
emphasising important developments in the stable areas of the sub-continent, and by qualifying the ills of the unstable ones. However, a hiatus still seems to exist between 
recent works and older works on the 18th century. The new work does not so much deny 
as, for the most part, shy away from the themes of conflict that preoccupy much of the 
older work. 2 Yet, what stands out in the politics of 18th century Hyderabad is its criss-
cross pattern of alliances and conflicts, - at the local, supra-local and inter-regional levels, 
- which shaped the fortunes of its centre. 
The last chapter indicated that a dynastic cover did not imply a strong regional centre in Hyderabad, and even less a bureaucratic and military fiscal state. On the other hand, it 
also suggested that pervasive local conflicts did not imply a region of anarchy, disorder 
and decline. On the contrary, the local conflicts symbolized dynamic economic activity in the core areas; competition between them for scarce labour and resources, and a post-Vijayanagara tradition of kingship and community in the zamindari and nawabi domains. This chapter seeks to locate the supra-local and inter-regional factors in Hyderabad 's political order, in the context of and in inter-relationship with, alliances and conflicts at the local level. The first section addresses itself to the typology of pre-colonial states in the historiography and suggests that this is inadequate to deal with a region like Hyderabad. The second section suggests that just as the older concept of 'zamindar' does 
not recognize the full reality of the 'small kings' in the Hyderabad countryside, so, too, terms like 'mansabdar' and 'jagirdar' misrepresent the character of 'supra-local intermediaries', by imputing to them more bureaucratic and military fiscal power than they actually ha.d. The term 'supra-local intermediary' would suit the Hyderabad case because the 'mansabdars' and 'jagirdars' here were really a species of military creditor 
and revenue farmer. They could not settle down in the core areas of the Hyderabad 
countryside on any permanent basis, unlike their counterparts in North India. Instead, they 
remained a highly mobile group, farming military and revenue assignments throughout the 
region as and when they could. The later sections explore the actual dynamics of 
2 
Barnett, North India Between Empires; Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars; Calkins, 'The Formation of a Regionally Oriented Ruling Group'; Khan, History of Tipu Sultan; Sen, 'A Pre-British Economic Formation' ; Alam, The Crisis of Empire. 
Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire; Sardesai, New History of the Maratha People. 
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intermediaries in operation. The way they operated was, inter alia, relevant to the nature 
of foreign intervention and, later, British expansion in Hyderabad. Military fiscalism, 
rather than commerce, private trade, or industry is suggested as the main engine of foreign intervention and expansion in the 18th century. 
2.2 The State in the Historiography 
The most influential and . abiding paradigm about the nature of the state in India in the 
two or three centuries immediately prior to British rule is still today, - when alternative paradigms are being generated rapidly, - that of the Mughal state.3 Such terse formulation 
necessarily does injustice to the differences of method and interpretation in a vast corpus. 
The purpose here, however, is simply to highlight some underlying assumptions of that 
corpus and of the related historiographies of the Maratha states, the Delhi sultanate,4 and 
the Deccan kingdoms,5 which are all influenced by it. The Mughal paradigm assumes the 
overarching importance of the state, and within the state, of the centre, in the pre-colonial political order. The key components of the state and the centre are the imperial court and 
the military fiscal bureaucracy, headed by the nobility. The Mughal system eventually 
rested on the countryside: indigenous rural elites, - zamindars, patels and patwari-s, -
were assimilated to the Mughal state's administrative bureaucracy as local functionaries. 
When these local functionaries rebelled, or were alienated, as happened in many parts of 
the sub-continent from the late 17th century onwards, the Mughal state faced crisis. The 
crisis might equally originate in, or be compounded by, divisions among the nobility; 
withdrawal of support by merchants and bankers; weak emperors; foreign invasions; and long drawn warfare. 6 The crisis of the Mughal empire after the death of Aurangzeb was 
until recently taken as the starting point of the final decline of the Mughal empire. In 
recent years, however, a new dimension has been added to the analysis: 'decentralization'. 
Alam and Nayeem argue, for example, that the decline of the empire in some parts did 
not mean that the empire declined as a whole. If Punjab was lost, the empire continued to 
survive in other regions, - such as Awadh and Hyderabad, - albeit in a decentralized 
4 
6 
Alam, The Crisis of Empire; Athar Ali, The Mughal Nobility; Chandra, Parties and Politics; Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal India; Moreland, The Agrarian System of Moslem India; Nayeem, Mughal Administration of Deccan; Richards, Mughal Administration; Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire; 'Symposium: Decline of the Mughal Empire', JAS. 
' 
M, Habib and K.A. Nizami (eds.), Delhi Sultanate, (Delhi, 1970); I. Prasad, History of Medieval India; from 647 AD to the Mughal Conquest, (Allahabad, 1966); K. S. Lal, History of the Khaljis, (Bombay, 1967); M. Ahmad, Sultan Firoz Shah Tughlaq, 135/-88, (Allahabad, 1978); A. Halim, History of the Lodi Sultans of Delhi and Agra, (Dacca, 1961 ). 
H.K. Sherwani, The Bahmanis of the Deccan, (Hyderabad, 1953); A.M. Husain, Khandesh in a New Light, (Bangalore, 1963); S.K. Sinha, Medieval History of the Deccan, (Hyderabad, 1964); I.A. Gauri, 'The Central Structure of the Kingdom of Bijapur', Islamic Culture, 44(1970), 19-33. I. Habib, 'Agrarian Causes of the Fall of the Mughal Empire' , Enquiry, n.s., 3(1960), pp. 68-80; M . Athar Ali, 'The Passing of Empire: the Mughal Case', MAS, 9,3(1975), pp. 385-96; 'Symposium: Decline of the Mughal Empire', JAS, 35, 2(1976), pp. 221-63 . 
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regional guise, which was more suited to contemporary conditions.7 There are two problems with the Mughal paradigm as far as Hyderabad is concerned. Since it sees areas 
without strong bureaucratic and military fiscal administration, - whether emanating from 
the imperial centre or from its regional surrogate, - as areas without political order, the 
realities of Hyderabad beneath its Asaf Jahi dynastic cover would presumably qualify it 
only as a region of disorder and decline. Yet, we have evidence of dynamic economic 
activity based on vibrant core areas, and of well articulated small kingdoms within them. 
The other problem is that the Mughal paradigm cannot see a regional order operating as it 
were through a pattern of local, supra-local and inter-regional alliances and conflicts, at least not without the state and centre being dominant. 
The typology of 18th century states that emerges from several recent studies questions 
some older notions about the nature of the Mughal state, its paradigmatic significance for 
the sub-continent as a whole, and the effects of its decline. Cohn, Barnett and Bayly, for 
example, see the decline of the Mughal empire as part of a wider process of decentralization in north India, which was characterised by the emergence of regional 
regimes based finnly on their own local dynamic and underlying structures. 8 The 
aspirations and activities of regional elites, who commanded new developments in the growing agricultural and commercial economies of their regions, occupy a central place in 
the discussion on the decentralized 'successor states'. The successor states are thought to have been based on intimate alliances between magnates of rural society; local notables 
and aristocrats; captains of manufacture and trade, and sceptre and sword wielding elites. Such alliances were shaped by, and, in tum bore upon, those various forces of which the 
most telling motif was 'the penetration of market forces into agriculture' and examples 
were, the 'involvement of fanners with trade and trade with fanning'; market-oriented production of rural and urban manufacturers; growth of rural and urban markets with links 
to inland and overseas commerce, and increasing sophistication in money use and banking.9 When these various developments became pegged onto a regional political 
order, they bestowed power and dignity on the principal participants, giving them material 
and ritual returns for their investment. 
Bayly dwells on the post-Mughal political regimes in North India, taking care to 
account for the varying circumstances of their decentralization. 10 One of his concerns is to 
analyse the post-Mughal ruling elites across the Ganga valley, in relation to their intimate 
connections with commerce and with the 'rooted servic~ gentry'. Though agricultural prosperity deserted older Mughal centres, labour and capital found fresh opportunities in 
7 
8 
9 
M. Alam, The Crisis of Empire; Nayeem, Mughal Administration of Deccan. Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars; Barnett, North India Between Empires; B.S. Cohn, 'Political Systems in Eighteenth Century India: the Banaras Region' , JAOS, 82, 3(1962), pp. 313-20; CEH/, I, 172-93. F. Perlin, 'Proto-Industrialization and Pre-Colonial South Asia', Past and Present, 98(1983), pp. 30-95. 
10 Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars. 
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areas experiencing new growth and protective patronage. The decline of older tracts might 
well have been balanced out by regeneration and growth in the 'core stable areas' of the 
successor states in the period 1730-1800. 
Whilst this happened, the increasing monetary demands of regimes like those of Banaras and Awadh added weight and dignity to the position of merchants and 
commercial farmers in politics and society. The activities of the latter groups, together 
with the kingly style of the new aristocracies and the expansion of settled agricultural 
communities, propelled manufacture, trade and commerce, and consolidated markets and 
towns. Commercial and trading links between the 'stable' areas also set off regeneration in unsettled intermediate tracts. 
The influences of the European economy worked through Indian commerce well before formal British rule was established, preparing the stage for that later event. The disruption 
of bullion flows from Bengal into the upper Ganga valley, for a variety of reasons, in the period 1740-60, and their subsequent reversal, caused the movement of merchants 
eastwards towards Calcutta. After colonial rule became a reality, some previously 
established patterns in the political economy continued to prevail in the period 1780-1830. The economic centres of the decentralized states - Lucknow, Fyzabad, Farrukhabad and Banaras, - continued to prosper, benefiting local merchant communities in their 'final flowering', even as they founded partnerships with the cash based British revenue system. It was not until the 1830s that the political economy of post-Mughal regimes was 
seriously disturbed as, among other things, the small town aristocracies declined, government expenditure fell and revenue demands increased. 
If the building-blocks of the new states outlasted the early days of colonial rule, they 
also raise questions about the background to the emergence of the new regimes. The 
terms in which the passing of the Mughal empire has been viewed deserves a change in 
emphasis. Decline and degeneration can no longer be seen as its principal motifs: there is plenty of growth, regeneration and change to be discovered in state-building away from 
the old Mughal centres. If some of the latter, together with the groups associated with them, were eclipsed, other centres and groups, old and new, acquired wealth and stability, 
and shaped society in a decentralized political setting. 
Perlin's understanding of the transformations of the political order in the 18th century 
extends beyond even the problem of the passing of the Mughal empire. 11 He would have 
us pay greater attention to changes in the economy and society of the subcontinent as a 
whole, in relation to developments in the wider world from as early as the 15th century, from which time began the settlement of extensive tracts of agricultural country and 
'accelerated urban growth at all levels'. Population held steady, everi grew, while this happened. At the same time, the tax-gatherer became more inclined to collect in cash, and 
11 Perlin, 'Proto-fudustrialization'. 
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systems of measurement 'of all kinds' became more exact. Monetization went hand in 
hand with a growing sophistication in monetary, financial and accounting techniques and 
institutions. Urban and rural manufactures gathered volume and pace, networks of trade 
and commerce cutting increasingly across political and ecological boundaries. Food and 
raw material production also tended to align themselves with developments in 
manufacture, trade and commerce. Nor were these several trends isolated. They became 
integrated across the sub-continent. Money circuits were created between major industrial 
centres and ports, as also between these and agricultural production: witness the role, for 
example, of bankers in taxation and politics. Proliferating mints further emphasized 
greater recourse to cash wages, whether to craftsmen, labourers, soldiers or servants. 
The long term changes in economy and society observable since the 15th century 
became, despite patches of decline, more intense in the late 17th and 18th century, and 
complemented transformations in the political order in the latter period. Political 
'decentralization', from successor states to small lordly courts, was the counterpart in fact 
of the mature 'rurban economy'. Both developments took place in the context of an 'open 
frontier' with European Companies. The local and international needs of the British drew 
them, for example, into advance payment systems, but only previous money use and 
'rurbanization' could have made the systems at all possible. From advance payment 
systems, to supervision and control of manufacturers was but a short leap. There were, of 
course, additional reasons for the British wanting, and being able effectively to establish 
commercial and political control: for example, particular features of commerce and 
industry in Western Europe, and the emergence of its maritime power. Yet the road to 
colonial conquest was long and complex, and cleared in the days of the pre-colonial 
economy. 
The analyses of both Bayly and Perlin open up sophisticated new ways of looking at 
the pre-colonial political economy. Yet one of its important aspects appears to have been 
underestimated by them. They seem to imply that local elites effectively created the 
underlying structures and building blocks of regional regimes, which supplanted the 
Mughal empire in the eighteenth century whenever they became involved in the 
commercialization of their agricultural, manufacturing and trading bases. The areas that 
witnessed conflict and decline, on the other hand, were those where markets, commerce 
and regional elite co-operation failed to emerge. There is a danger in such a view of 
overlooking the shifting regional dynamic that might haye characterised not only the 
Mughal economy, but also economic activity in earlier periods of Indian history. 12 A 
situation of political conflict need not necessarily have inhibited economic activity. In 
some regions, according to Raychaudhuri, it even helped improve the fortunes of 
12 See, for example: H.K. Naqvi, Urban Centres and Industries in Upper India 1556-1803, (Bombay, 1968); H.K. Naqvi, Urbanization and Urban Centres under the Great Mughals, (Simla, 1972). 
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commerce. Washbrook takes the point further for the Coromandel coast, where 'expansive 
commodity markets' in the latter half of the eighteenth century came, in part, 'from the 
instabilities of climate and warfare' .13 The Hyderabad region was by no means a stranger 
to the operation of vigorous commercial and market forces in the eighteenth century, 
zamindars and nawabs being ever keen to develop bonds with bankers, and to protect and 
patronize centres of production and trade. Yet local co-operation between landed and 
commercial elites did not emerge in Hyderabad as the foundation of a successor state, as 
in Awadh or Banaras. Indeed the growth of economic investment and social and political 
co-operation within the core areas may even have exacerbated tensions at the the local 
level of Hyderabad's regional political order as a whole. 
Closer to Hyderabad, in central and western India, Surendra Nath Sen was writing as 
long ago as the beginning of this century of the increasing regionalization of Maratha 
power after the passing of Shivaji. Shivaji's quest for a centralized swarajya was 
compromised in the days of Shahu and the process was taken further in the Peshwa 
period, when powerful regional Maratha chiefs carved out independent political bases, 
while paying lip service to the notion of centralized sovereignty. 14 The recent works of 
Gordon, Wink and Perlin give greater depth to Sen's original hypothesis about the 
fragmentation and regionalization of Maratha power in the 18th century. Gordon writes 
about the slow formation of the military, administrative and economic building blocks of 
Maratha rule in Malwa, which was conquered in the eighteenth century. Perlin finds the 
increasing strength and power of regional Maratha chiefs reflected in the social and 
economic changes that were occurring in Deccan villages in this period. Wink 
concentrates on a more general theme, the crisis generated by the incompatibility of 
regional political ambitions with an ideology of universal sovereign domain. As the 
ambitions of regional Maratha chiefs grew more strident, they took the form of Jana, 
which progressively undermined the old ideal of a centralized Maratha swarajya.15 
Stein provided the initial context for modem research on south India by formulating 
the concept of a pyramidally segmented and sacrally ruled state in the Chola and 
Vijayanagara kingdoms of the medieval period.16 Appadurai and Dirks have extended the 
13 D.A. Washbrook, 'Some Notes on Market Relations and the Development of the Economy in South India, c.1750-1850', pp.1-21, (Unpublished Paper). 
14 S.N. Sen, Administrative System of the Marathas, (Calcutta, 1925, 2nd Edition). Gune reflects Sen's view in The Judicial System of the Marathas, (Poona, 1953), though his central' concerns are different. 15 S.N. Gordon, 'The Slow Conquest: Administrative Integration of Malwa into the Maratha Empire, 1720-60', MAS, 11, 1(1977), pp. 1-40; F.Perlin, 'Of White Whale and the Countrymen in the Eighteenth-Century Maratha Deccan', JPS, 5(1977-8), 172-237; A. Wink, 'Sovereignty and Universal Domain in South Asia', IESHR, 21, 3(1984), pp. 265-92. 
16 Bringing to bear the findings of Southall's work on Africa on to his own work on south India, Stein uses the characterisation primarily to describe the Chola state. He extends it to the Vijayanagara state as well, but in a modified form. For, supra-local warrior chiefs, or nayak-s, and villages, rather than the Chola nadu became focal points of power in the Vijayanagar period. (B. Stein, Peasant, State and Society in Medieval South India, [Delhi, 1980]; 'The State and the Agrarian Order in Medieval South India: A Historiographical Critique' in Stein [Ed.], Essays on South India, [Honolulu, 1975]). 
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implications of his research since. Concentrating on pre-colonial and colonial Tamil N adu, 
Dirks recognizes the legacy of a Vijayanagara style of kingship, as described by Stein, in 
the small kingdom of Puddukottai. This informs his subsequent analysis of links between 
caste formation and caste power, and between royal and religious functions and rituals in 
Puddukottai.17 Appadurai's emphasis is on the role of temples, which were crucial to the 
maintenance of kingship in his view. 18 
The works of Stein, Dirks, Appadurai, Barnett and Wink, it can be argued, generally 
tend to underestimate the importance of conflict in the shaping of regional politics in 
India in the pre-colonial period. Mostly concerned with offering systemic explanations of 
Indian phenomena over time and space, they seem inclined to view political conflict as a 
functional variable within the logic of an overall consensus. If it is not that, then it was a 
dysfunctional element, which eventually undermined the state or empire from within. 
This enquiry into 18th century Hyderabad does not equate the regional political order 
with the state or place a special emphasis on the power of its centre. It gives primacy to 
alliances and conflicts at all three of its levels: the local, the supra-local and the inter-
regional. 19 
17 
18 
19 
The political hierarchy and social network in relation to which local kingly power was exercised, and interacted 
with kinship and caste, were, in Dirks' view, related to the ritual-religious functions of kingship and to the 
military might of the nayak or raja in question. 
The temple enshrined the paradigmatic sovereign. The leader of the sect associated with the temple provided the key link between the temple and the king. The king intervened in sectarian and temple disputes in his capacity as 
an administrative, human sovereign. He thereby became an important object of the same 'metasocial' and 
'reflexive' concern with which society viewed the temple. (A. Appadurai, Worship and Conflict under Colonial Rule: A South Indian Case, [Cambridge, 1981]; 'Kings, Sects and Temples in South India, 1350-1700 A.D.', IESHR, 14, 1[19]). 
Perhaps one reason why some modem day historians of the 18th century appear to fail to give political conflict the primacy it seems to deserve in some situations, is that they wish to escape identification with an older 
tradition of writing, in which both imperial apologists and nationalist ideologues shared common assumptions 
about the degeneration and decay of India on the eve of colonial rule. Another reason for underestimating the importance of political conflict seems to be the influence on these modem writers of a certain tradition in 
sociological writing, - 'equilibrium models' from Durkheim to Parsons, - which appears to favour a view of 
social and political consensus more suited to some modern western societies while constructing models of foreign 
societies. Moreover, anyone wishing to gain intellectual recognition and academic respectability must project the findings of a· particular case study as a 'model' relevant to the understanding of the wider region as a whole. Such irifluences do not necessarily rule out either a genuine concern with the 'world views' of indigenous 
societies or scholarly advances in ways of understanding them. Nevertheless, they can lead to serious problems in 
the writing of history if the importance of temporal change and regional variation is underestimated. 
The possibility of an unsatisfactory treatment of conflict by several historians of 18th century India has 
already been alluded to. One may further refer to such volumes, as Kingship and Authority in South Asia [J.F. Richards, (ed.), Madison, 1978] and Realm and Region in Traditional India [R.G.Fox, (ed.), Delhi,1977-8] for 
the kind of model building that is so concerned to conquer time and space at a sub-continental level, that it gradually loses the flavour of the unique in dealing with its immediate subject of study. The sophistication of the 
authors' methods is no comfort in this context. Dirks' recent work on Puddukottai is a most interesting example 
of the problems that can arise for a historian who wishes to reconcile his sophisticated understanding of a foreign 
culture with the quest for a 'model' that will decode its history almost without reference to the specificities of 
time and space. He makes the untenable assertion that it is precisely the atypicality of the minuscule Puddukottai 
that qualifies it as an ideal case for generating a 'model' for understanding the history, society and culture of pre-
colonial and colonial India better than before. He uses, further, the questionable methodological device of 
'freezing' time over a period of 150 years, some of them years of crucial historical change, to generate the basic framework of his interpretation. 
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2.3 The Writing on Hyderabad 
Most existing work on Asaf Jahi Hyderabad assumes the existence of a Mughal style dynastic bureaucratic state, and its recent examples follow a nineteenth century tradition 
of narrative writing on dynastic, diplomatic and military affairs. Regani and Chaudhari, for example, assume that weak Nizams were symptoms of a weak dynastic bureaucratic 
state, and focus on the diplomacy of the British, which supposedly coerced a weak but 
sovereign state into an increasingly unsovereign-like and subordinate status under the hegemony of the British empire.20 Their main difference with the imperial apologists of the 19th century is one of emphasis, not method. While writers like Fraser and Gribble presented Hyderabad's subsidiary alliance with the Company as one beneficial for a state prone to internal strife and external vulnerability,21 Regani and Chaudhari express strong doubts about the fairness of British diplomacy, the integrity of their promises and the long term effects of their alliance on Hyderabad. Leonard offers a much more sophisticated 
account, but does little to question the conventional assumption about the existence of a 
stable dynastic bureaucratic state, except for the early Asaf Jahi period, when, she argues, Nizam ul Mulk laid greater emphasis on military coercion than on bureaucratic 
administration.22 Nayeem's more recent work on Nizam ul Mulk contends that in fact the first Nizam presided over a full blown Mughal style government. He suggests that far from being an independent state, Hyderabad continued to be a loyal, even an exemplary, Mughal suba under the first Nizam (1724-48). 23 
Earlier work on Qutub Shahi Hyderabad is also rather prone to the uncritical 
acceptance of the notion of a dynastic bureaucratic state. The voluminous and painstaking 
researches of Siddiqui and Sherwani, the two major writers on Qutub Shahi history, allow 
us, however, to speculate along somewhat different lines from their own.24 Two 
circumstances that attended the first Golconda king, Quli Qutub Shah's, break away from Bahmani Bidar were his serious differences with fellow nobles and his emergence as a highly successful military commander against rebellious Telegu and Maratha naiks. Once he was independently established in Telangana, Quli continued to spend much of his time fighting with the landed and militarized naiks. The relative peace that marked the last 
seven or eight years of his reign might have been due to the capitulation by the naiks of 
20 Regani, Nizam-British Relations: 1724-1857, (Hyderabad, 1963); N.G. Chaudhuri, British Relations with Hyderabad, 1798-1843, (Calcutta, 1964). 
21 Fraser, Our Faithful Ally; Gribble, History of the Deccan; see also : Briggs, The Nizam. History and Relations; McAuliffe, The Nizam. 
22 Leonard, 'The Hyderabad Political System'. 
23 But Nayeem is clearly suspect on this point. The same trusting acceptance of descriptions in the Asaf Jahi records that leads him to conclude that the Nizam was a loyal subadar also leads him to believe that he administered virtually the whole of peninsular India, - from the river Narbada in the north to the Indian ocean in the south, except for a narrow strip on the west coast, running from Surat in the north to below Cochin in the south, - as a dutiful governor on behalf of the Mughal emperor in Delhi. The independent regimes of Mysore, Poona and Madras, to name only a few of the bigger ones, must be regarded as aberrations of Mughal rule on this view. (Nayeem, Mughal Administration of Deccan) 24 Siddiqui, History of Golcunda, (Hyderabad, 1956); Sherwani, Qutb Shahi Dynasty. 
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the poorer core areas, not because they had grown any more friendly towards him, but because their resources were exhausted by years of warfare. The naiks of the richer core 
areas continued to defy Qutub Shahi authority.25 
The expansion achieved by the second Golkonda king, Qutub ul Mulk, into parts of 
Rayalseema was chiefly due to his astute exploitation of local zamindari conflicts there. 
He gave military support to zamindars opposed to Vijayanagara backed rivals and gained 
revenues and territories from them in return. The Golconda sultanate did not sit on a firm 
territorial foundation, but on the changeable fortunes of its military intervention in the political affairs of the naiks. In practice, it was not always possible to contain naik 
warfare within manageable limits. The reign of Jamshid Qutub Shah (1543-50) is 
described by Sherwani as a period of savage civil war. The intensity of warfare was lower in the subsequent reign of Ibrahim Qutub Shah, as Golconda was now more willing 
to recognise, and to compromise with naik power than before. The naiks themselves were 
happy to offer token submissions to Golconda in return for the recognition of their local 
authority. Such conciliation and compromise was an important factor in the sultanate's 
victory over Vijayanagara, - where relationships between the centre and the naiks were, in 
contrast to the situation in Golconda, greatly strained. Another key factor in Golconda's 
victory, which was achieved in 1565 in combination with the four other Deccani sultans, 
was the important change that was taking place in its military technology, which was 
exemplified by the incorporation of recently arrived superior foreign artillery into its 
campaigning strategies. 
This change gave rise to an important new influence in Golconda's politics, however, 
that of powerful military intermediaries, which was to have a lasting impact. The intermedieries were desirable allies when kept happy, but dangerous opponents when dissatisfied. The delicate balance between Golconda's stately ambitions and the aspirations 
of powerful local naiks that had begun to emerge through the patchwork of local warfare 
by the mid-16th century was upset by the rise of ambitious supra-local intermediaries. 
The centre's already precarious hold over the margins of Telangana and Rayalseema also 
began to crumble in this period. At one level, the landed and militaristic naiks rejected Golconda's authority, in local tandem or in alliance with intermediaries. At another level, 
serious rifts developed between the Deccani and Afaqi factions at the Qutub Shahi court. Even as Mohammed Qutub Shah built the new city of Hyderabad, gathering some of the finest Telegu and Deccani poets, and Muslim architects arqund him, its foundations were being shaken by Telegu landlords, Muslim military commanders and Mughal invaders. 
A section of the Golconda military elite under Mir Jurnla Mohammed Saiyyad Ardistani were openly welcoming Mughal designs on south India by the 1630s. Perhaps 
they saw in these an opportunity for penetrating into the richer macro- regions to the east, 
25 This and the three subsequent paragraphs are based on the works cited in the last footnote. 
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west and south of Golconda. Not only were the Mughals obviously superior in military 
terms, they were also sorely in need of local collaborators, whom they could be expected 
to reward handsomely. The activities of Ardistani and his supporters did not go 
unresisted. Madanna, Akkanna and Neknam Khan tried to strengthen Golconda's forces to 
counter the Mughals. But despite their openness to the new military technology, and 
invitations to mercenaries looking for new opportunities, they did not get very far. 
Perhaps it was a case of too little coming too late. 
The Mughal penetration itself was neither swift nor productive of peace. It escalated 
both local and supra-local warfare in the Deccan by injecting a vast new military element 
into it, especially at the intermediary level. The consequences of this escalation were felt 
throughout the 18th century. The crisis and conflicts that brewed in Hyderabad in the last 
days of control by Delhi gathered further momemtum as that control failed. Lack of 
funds, according to Richards, was not the reason for the Mughal collapse in Golconda. 
The Bijapur and Golconda territories yielded enough funds to put the Mughal 
administration on a secure basis if Delhi had intended it, but Aurangzeb preferred to 
commit his revenues to the costs of war with the Marathas and to extending the southern 
military frontier further. He also added more land to khalisa holdings, which already 
included the 'choicest' areas, at a time when Deccani nobles were clamouring for more 
jagirs. Nor was Aurangzeb able to make many secure alliances with the Maratha, Gond, 
Bedar and Telegu warrior chiefs who crossed the Mughal path. Pam Naik, the Bedar chief 
of Shorapur, was given rank and title after being warred down, but later alienated by the 
arrogance and hostility of the 'Indo-Persian' nobility in the Mughal camp. Other Bedar 
chiefs also lost confidence in the Mughals. They exploited their familiarity with the local 
terrain in opposing the Mughals. Padiah Naik's raids began in the Raichur Doab in the 
west and extended upto the Andhra coast in the east. Similar pressures were also exerted 
by Maratha, Gond and Telegu raiders in yet other parts of the Deccan. Pap Rai was a 
celebrated example in central Telangana. Mughal deputies responsible for administering 
the Deccan subas became increasingly isolated and vulnerable amidst such local hostility. 
Delhi did little to rescue them from their predicament, or to maintain them in steadfast 
loyalty. 26 
Mubariz Khan, the subadar of Golconda between 1713 and 1724, sought to find the 
answer to his difficulties in coercive military tactics. He concentrated his attention on the 
area between the Godavari and the Krishna and hammered away at zamindari strongholds. 
Although able to coerce many zamindars into submission, he was unable to win their 
confidence or to disengage them, from their local bases, for the most part. His was, in 
effect, a military regime. The emphasis was not on 'state building', but on survival by 
accumulating forces of terror. It was difficult to counteract the hostility of local 
26 This and the first part of the subsequent paragraph are based on: Richards, Mughal Administration. 
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zamindars, however, without securing the support and loyalty of supra-local intermediary 
elements. But Mubariz Khan kept a jealous and watchful eye on them, too. The latter 
were unlikely to be won over while the centre tried to restrain on their independence. 
They were aware that it needed their support against zamindar hostility and expected a 
better bargain than what Mubariz Khan was willing to offer them. Nizam ul Mu1k might 
have perceived this weakness in Mubariz Khan's position when he returned from Delhi to 
reassert his authority in the Deccan in 1724. He certainly appears to the have made more 
lucrative offers than his opponent to Deccani intermediary elements and to have attracted 
greater support among them.27 This enabled him to score a decisive victory over Mubariz 
Khan in the battle of Shakkarkheda. 
The dilemma that Mubariz Khan faced in Hyderabad, - to what extent to submit to the 
demands of militaristic revenue farmers in the face of zamindar hostility, - was also faced 
by Poona, elsewhere in the Deccan. Maratha deshmukhs formed a hefty class of the rural 
elite here and the more powerful amongst them accumulated large inam-s, maintained 
private armies and built imposing fortresses. Fukuzawa characterizes these men as 'rural 
aristocrats' who were a serious threat to Poona's authority.28 But the Peshwa was, unlike 
Mubariz Khan, willing to give greater power to his revenue farmers in order to try and 
impose control over the deshmukhs. The revenue farmers were supervised less and less as 
the 18th century wore on. 29 
2.4 Supra-local Intermediaries 
The foregoing account of the interactions between Hyderabad's naiks and the Qutub 
Shahis and the Mughals suggests at least 17th century origins for some features of the 
18th century political order in Hyderabad. Neither the Qutub Shahis nor the Mughals 
seem to have been able to consolidate a centralized bureaucratic and military fiscal 
administration, and the naiks seem to have been independent in their core areas. Supra-
local military commanders appear to have been attached to the centre as military creditors 
and revenue farmers with financier backing. The implications and character of naik 
independence in the countryside for the 18th century political order have been discussed 
in the last chapter. The focus here is on revenue fanning military creditors, who formed 
the supra-local factor in the region's order. The Qutub Shahi kings of late sixteenth 
century Golconda had attempted to offset the rise of rebellious and independent minded 
Telegu naiks by responding favourably to the ambitions of. mercenaries who had come to 
Hyderabad seeking prospects in military service and revenue fanning. The Mughals had 
later given further encouragement to such intermediary elements by practically relying 
27 Eastwick, Kaisernamah-i-Hind, Appendix. 
28 CEHI, I, 193-203 
29 A. Wink, 'Maratha Revenue Farming', MAS, 17, 4(1983), 591-628. 
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upon them for effecting the Deccani conquest. 30 
But if neither the Qutub Shahis in the 17th century nor the Mughals in the 18th 
century were able to develop a strong bureaucractic and military fiscal administration, 
then how were the supra- local elements able to exert their authority? How can we refer 
to them at the Golconda or the Asaf Jahi court as 'nobles' or members of 'darbar 
factions'? The answer proposed here is that these men were independent or semi-
independent military creditors and revenue farmers. They mediated between a weak centre 
and inter-regional foreign powers, as between the centre and local nawabs and zamindars 
involved in criss-cross alliances and conflicts.31 Since the centre that took recourse to their 
services was steeped in a 'Mughal' ethos and aspired to a Mughal style bureaucratic and 
military fiscal government, the military creditors and revenue farmers also received 
'Mughal' titles and honours. But these can be deceptive.32 Hyderabad's mansabdars and jagirdars did not have the qasbas or 'rurban' seats of power that their counterparts did in 
North India. They were in different places and assignments at different times, depending 
on how well or badly they interacted with the local, supra-local and inter-regional factors 
in the politics of the region. Furthermore, they became internally divided as the 18th 
century wore on by taking sides with local rivals and by mediating the rival interests of 
foreign powers in the Asaf Jahi darbar.33 Successive Nizams in the latter half of the 18th 
century may, indeed, be described as pawns in the hands of rival factions of revenue 
farming military creditors and of the foreign powers associated with them. The most 
powerful revenue farmers can be described as a 'nobility' to this extent. Nevertheless, to 
avoid the classic Mughal connotations of terms like nobility, jagirdar and mansabdar, it 
seems best to describe Hyderabad's revenue farming military creditors as 'supra-local 
intermediaries'. 
Their routes to intermediary status were as varied as their origins. Some were 
descended from Deccani and Afaqi military commanders at the Qutub Shahi court.34 
3° For a useful description of the numerous official titles and establishments of revenue farming military usurers in the period 1720-1748, see: Nayeem, Mughal Administration of Deccan. 
31 See discussion below. 
32 See Nayeem, Mughal -Administration of Deccan for a detailed account of Mughal functions and titles in Hyderabad during the first Nizam's time. For the earlier Mughal period, see Richards, Mughal Administration. 33 See discussion below. 
34 See Sherwani for details on the Deccanis and the Afaqis. 
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Others were descendants of Mughal commanders, nobles, jagirdars and revenue farmers. 35 
Yet others came to Hyderabad in the 18th century. Still others were recruited by 
Hyderabad 's diwan, Chandu Lal, or went there after the disbandment of Maratha armies, 
in the early 19th century.36 The linguistic and ethnic origins of Hyderabad's intermediaries 
can be traced to many places: eastern and northern Africa; western and central Asia; 
Afghanistan; and northern, western and central India. Some also came from Europe or 
were of mixed Eurasian descent. Only a handful of Hyderabad's intermediaries appear to 
have become established as hereditary noble lineages, with family titles and regular 
military and revenue assignments. The paigah family of Shams u1 Umra, which 
maintained the Nizam 's household troops against revenue assignments in northern and 
central Marathwada, was the best example.37 
There seems to have been no constant or fixed basis for the way in which supra-local 
intermediaries at the Asaf Jahi darbar combined into factions as far as ethnicity, religion, 
caste and sect are concerned. The main considerations seem to have been personal 
calculation and political expediency: which foreign power was the right one to associate 
with at any given time; which candidate of the Asaf Jahi family was the right one as 
Nizam; which configuration of local allies was the right one to support and which to 
oppose. Only in the case of some Pathans in the mid-18th century,38 and groups of Arabs, 
Rohillas and Sikhs in the mid-19th century,39 can one talk of factions being based on 
identifiable religious, sectarian or ethnic solidarities. Certainly the 'factionalism' of the 
Asaf Jahi darbar should not be confused with the 'factions' of 20th century Indian 
35 SJM, Mss Hist 459, Mohammed Faizullah Munshi, 'Waqai-i-Dakkan', Hyderabad, 1235 A.H. (Persian); Mss Hist 80, S. Amjad Husain, Tarikh-i-Amjadiya, c.1869-70, (Persian); Mss Hist 326, Girdhari Lal, 'Tarikh-i-Zafra' (Persian); Shah Tajalli Ali, Tuzak-i-Asaftya, (Hyderabad, 1310 A.H.) (Persian); Ghulam Ahmed, Nizamabad-i-Dakkan, (Urdu); Mohammed Imamuddin, Tarikh-i-Nirmal; Abul Barkat Mohammed Qutubullah, Tarikh-i-Beed, (Hyderabad, 1317 A.H.) (Urdu); Mohammed Abdul Wahab Andalib Hyderabadi, Tarikh-i-Kaulass, (Hyderabad, n.d.) (Urdu); Sirajuddin Talib, Nizam Ali Khan, 2 Vols, (Hyderabad, 1934) (Urdu); Sarnsamud Daula Shah Nawaz Khan, Abdul Haqq and Mir Ghulam Ali Azad, (trans. H. Beveridge), Maasiru-l-Umra, 3 Vols, (Calcutta, 1911); J. Scott (trans.), [Ferishta's]History of Deccan, Vol. 2, (London, 1794); IOLR, Mack Gen, 43/6; 27/10, Memoirs of Nasir Jang; 46/2,7, The Nizam's Army, 1786; Mack Unbound, VIl/1 , History of Nellore, 1802; VIl/42, Cuddapah; R. Subba Rao, 'A Persian Firman of Hejira 1146 (1733 A.D.)', JAHRS, 3, 2-4(1929), pp. 90-4; W.F. Sinclair, 'List of Weapons used in the Dakhan and Khandesh', IA(1873), pp. 216-18; Leonard, 'The Hyderabad Political System'. 
36 See Chapters Three and Four below; see also: IOLR, H.Misc, H/707/2, Jenkins's History of Berar (c.1700-1820), 1826; R. Jenkins Collection, Mss Eur E 112, Translation of a History of the Bhonsles (c.1730-1818). · 37 IOLR, Mack Gen, 46/2; Crown Representative's Records, R/2/70/71, Origin and History of the Paigah; Shah Nawaz Khan, Maasiru-l-Umra; Talib, Nizam Ali Khan, II, 121-3; 
38 See, for example: IOLR, Mack Gen, 27/10; 41; Mack Unbound, VIl/42; I/13, History of Kurnool; Scott, [Ferishta's]History of Deccan, II; W. Kirkpatrick, Select Letters of Tipu Sultan, (London, 1811), Appendix, History of Pathans of Shahnoor; Eastwick, Kaisernamah-i-Hind, Appendix. 
39 See Chapters Three and Four below; also: NAI, HRR, 791, Hindu-Muslim Disturbances in Berar, 1838; 776, Aurangabad Troubles, 1845; 87, Disturbances in Western Berar, 1850-1; 484, Hindu-Muslim Tensions in Berar, 1849-50; 93, Violence, 1855; For Pol, 11 April 1838, Cameron to Gol, 61, 15 Mar 1838. 
4° C.J. Baker, The Politics of South India 1920-37, (Cambridge, 1976); B.R. Tomlinson, The Indian National Congress and the Raj, 1929-42. The Penultimate Phase, (London, 1976); D.A. Washbrook, 'Country Politics: Madras, 1880-1930', MAS, 7, 3(1973), pp. 475-531; D.E.U. Baker, Changing Political Leadership in the Central Provinces and Berar, (Delhi, 1979); M.K. Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vols. lxiv-lxx, (New Delhi, 1976-7). 
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politics.40 The factions of the Mughal court are a much closer parallel.41 
2.4.1 Intermediaries in Early Asa/ Jahi Hyderabad, c.1724-95 
It was suggested in a previous section that the undoing of the last Mughal subadar of Golconda, Mubariz Khan, was to some extent precipitated by his attempts to curb the powers of supra-local intermediaries. His successful opponent, the first Nizam, was more prepared to come to terms with their independence. Their greater independence vis-a-vis the centre under the Nizams did not mean that the supra-local intermediaries became any 
more established locally and less militaristic in their strategies. On the contrary, one gets the impression of zamindars attempting further to build up their military capacity against intermediaries in the early Asaf Jahi period. The zamindar of Jatpole, one of the most powerful in the Khammamett Circar, for example, began to improve his defences after 
several encounters with amil-s and naib-s. In particular, he built a fort in Bolavaram and 
attempted to reorganize his forces with the assistance of a mercenary, Syed Ahmed, who had gained a considerable reputation in the region for his military skills.42 The Jatpole Zamindar's eagerness to refurbish his defences was not misplaced. Mohammed Ameen Khan Arab, the revenue farmer of the district, was soon knocking at his gates to tell him that his military initiatives amounted to rebellion against Government and the new fort 
must be demolished without delay.43 The Jatpole Zamindar's concern to fortify himself 
represented the general state of the feeling among Hyderabad zamindars. The Zamindar of Paluncha in Khammamett Circar relied heavily on the natural strength of his country to keep himself secure. The Bhongir Zamindar's country offered no such natural defences, 
and Narayan Reddy resided, therefore, in a strong stone fort built on a solitary hill rising 
sheer from the plain. Some miles south of Bhongir, the zamindar of Kolapalli, Chinna Krishna Ankiah, lived in a similar stone fort. Zamindar Vasireddy of Guntur Circar defended himself from a fort on the South bank of the Krishna. Manoor Narsanna lived in Chilakallurpuram fort not far from Vasireddy. Moolraj Govind Rao also commanded a 
strong hill fort in the same region. Zamindarni Sanjamma of Amrabad relied on the 
mountainous and woody nature of her terrain for security, and so did Saku Ram, a 
zamindar immediately to her south. Kistappa Naik of Deodrug lived in a strong hill fort in the more open _Raichur Doab, and so did Venkat Naik of Shorapur. Man Mohan Rao Pinglia was so well fortified in Rudrur, to the north west of Hyderabad, that the Nizam's forces were five months on one occassion before their seige against him could succeed. Gopal Singh of Qandahar, north west of Rudrur, also secured himself in a strong hill fort. The zamindar of Medak, Sadashiva Reddy, commanded several forts a short distance west 
41 Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics; Athar Ali, The Mughal Nobility. 42 APSA, DDI, Letter 2246, Nizam to Mohammed Amin Khan Arab, 24 Jamadi ul Awwal, 1211 A.H. 43 APSA, DDI, Letter 2248, Mohammed Amin Khan Arab to Jagannath Rao, a copy of the letter cited in the last footnote. 
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of Hyderabad, before his rebellion and defeat in 1795. Munga Rao of Chinnoor was a 
powerful zamindar to the nmth east of Hyderabad. He lived on a well fortified island in 
the Godavari, which enjoyed the added protection of jungle on both banks of the river. 44 
The zamindar of Anantagiri in the Nihal Kondapalli pargana of Khammam Circar built 
his strength to counteract threats from the qiladar of Khammam. His efforts received a 
boost on one occasion when the qiladar's amil, Rajeshwara, having fallen out with his 
master, joined forces with him. The qiladar, Jafar Khan, was obliged to beat a retreat in 
the face of a powerful local combination. Hyderabad took a dim view of these 
developments, however, and sent additional contingents under two other intermediaries, 
Shujat ud Daula and Nadir Jang, to help restore Jafar Khan to his authority. But Nadir 
Jang wrote apologetically to Hyderabad that their forces, too, were unable to overcome 
the superior power of the local combination.45 What Nadir Jang experienced in the east, 
Sirajuddin, another intermediary, experienced to the north of Hyderabad. He had been sent 
to Deverkonda to collect the revenues of Fasli 1180-81, but found the strength of the 
local resistance difficult to overcome. The deshmukhs and deshpande-s had succeeded in 
mobilizing the villages by raising the cry of rusoom in danger. Sirajuddin urged 
Hyderabad to order reinforcements under Zafar ud Daula and Salabat Khan, the two most 
powerful jagirdars in the Deverconda region.46 Siddi Ambar Khan in 1786 similarly sent 
distress signals from the west and south of Hyderabad. He asked for reinforcements to 
help impose control over the zamindars of Koilkonda, Tandur and Suggur, who not only 
defied him in their own districts, but also undermined his authority in the neighbouring 
districts under his charge by attacking the qasbas and fortresses there.47 
Fathullah Khan, a revenue farmer in the Khummum and Nalgonda districts, wrote to 
Hyderabad in 1195 A.H. that he was seriously troubled by the hostility of zamindars like 
Jagannath Rao, Vasireddy and Tirupati Rao. The three had carried out a particularly 
daring raid on the fort of Innaconda recently, even though it had been garrisoned by two 
quite respectable commandants, Hasan Beg and Faizullah Khan.48 Saif Jang's rentership of 
several eastern districts in the 1780's was also marked by a continual conflict with 
zamindars. He led a large force against Aswa Rao of Bhadrachalam on one occasion in 
the hope of emulating the jagirdar of Nirmal a few years earlier, when the jagirdar had 
brought Aswa Rao to his knees. But the zamindar had then got away by paying the 
Nizam a bribe of Rs 3 Lakhs and had since built up his military strength as well as his 
revenue arrears. Saif Jang was obliged to call off his campaign when he realised that its 
costs would outstrip its benefits. The revenue farmer knew from experience that subduing 
44 IOLR, Mack Gen, 46/2. 
45 APSA, DDI, Arzi, 5.488, n.d. 
46 APSA, DDI, Arzi, 5.465, F 1180-1. 
47 APSA, DDI, Arzi, 5.504, 1186 A.H. 
48 APSA, DDI, Inayatnamah, 9 Jamadi us Sani 1195 A.H. 
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zamindars militarily was no guarantee of local co-operation or financial success. He had 
defeated and dispossessed Moolraj Govind Rao of Innaconda earlier, but had been forced 
to re-instate him after four years, upon realizing that keeping the zamindar in prison was 
financially a 'ruinous measure'. 49 Vasireddy of Chintapalli was another thorn in Saif 
Jang's flesh. His 400 cavalry, 1000 infantry and 8000-10,000 tenants might not score 
outright victories, but they were certainly strong enough to make any campaign against 
them a risky and expensive affair.50 If troubled by some powerful zamindars, Saif Jang 
was more than a match for most others. He rented districts worth Rs. 52 lakhs from the 
Nizam and excessive coercion was the key to his operations in the countryside. The 
forces under his immediate command - 2400 cavalry, 6260 foot soldiers and 13 guns -
were believed to be superior to the Nizam's own household troops. Yet, Saif Jang's 
methods were counter productive in the long run: 
'Syf Jang during eight years that he has rented it has committed 
unparalleled oppressions on all the inhabitants which has reduced their 
numbers greatly and in many parts put an entire stop to cultivation .. .'. 51 
Militaristic strategies were also in evidence in Nirmal in northern Telangana in the 
latter part of the 18th century. Ibrahim Beg Khan, jagirdar of several districts along the 
Godavari, was obliged to send for reinforcements from Hyderabad on one occasion while 
engaged against the zamindar of Gopalpet, Hanumanth Reddy. Though Hanumanth Reddy 
was forced to retreat, Aswa Rao of Bhadrachalam now came forward to continue the fight 
against Ibrahim Beg Khan. The fort of Zafargarh was wrested from his naib while the 
jagirdar was away in Nirmal. Ibrahim Beg Khan retaliated by laying seige to Aswa Rao's 
stronghold. The seige succeeded after three months. Aswa Rao was taken prisoner and 
publicly paraded with a shaven head on the back of a donkey before being returned to 
Palunsha in disgrace. But the zamindar wasted no time in organizing a resistance to the 
jagirdar's authority once again. This time Ibrahim Beg Khan's younger brother went out 
against him, and the zamindar was again taken prisoner and publicly humiliated. But 
Aswa Rao's second defeat and disgrace still did not wipe out local resistance in the 
region. Hanumanth Reddy of Gopalpeth was back in the fray by this time, and was 
mobilizing support against Ibrahim Beg Khan's brother. 
The conflict with Ibrahim Beg and his brother did demand its price from the 
zamindars. The zamindari of Dilipkonda was destroyed completely by Ibrahim Beg Khan, 
and he was also one of the principal parties instrum~ntal in a thorough sacking of 
Surapur. In other parts of the Nirmal country, his coercive measures led to depopulation. 
Ibrahim Beg Khan's son and successor, Ihtesham Jang, began his career by putting to 
49 IOLR, Mack Gen, 46/2,4. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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death 'on suspicion' almost the entire population of a well settled quarter of Nirmal. 
Thtesham Jang was forcibly removed in 1782 by an army personally led by the Nizam, 
and supported by many zamindars of the Nirmal countryside. A series of revenue farmers 
obtained charge of Nirmal after Ihtesham Jang's removal. But they, too, proved to be 
given to excessively coercive measures by and large. The first revenue farmer after 
Thtesham Jang, Narsing Rao, on one occasion rounded up most of the patels, patwaris, 
dukandar-s and artisans of the Nirmal fort district on suspicion that they were evading 
revenue payments. Most of the prisoners died from the tortures inflicted on them with a 
view to extract 'truthful' confessions. Nirmal's inhabitants were reported to be migrating 
rapidly to places like Adilabad, Bori, Chanda and Nagpur by the close of Narsing Rao's 
second year in the rentership. Some previously well settled tracts were fully abandoned by 
his fifth year. Shankar Naik became revenue farmer after Narsing Rao. He was a less 
grasping creature than his predecessor, but was still enough of one to force the deshmukh 
of Ankur pargana, Rama Reddy, for example, to take up arms against his revenue 
demands. Shankar Naik's response to Rama Reddy's act of 'rebellion' was to attack and 
kill him, as well as overrunning his zamindari from end to end. Langu Pandit succeeded 
Shankar Naik as renter of Nirmal. His initial concern was to reattract the settlers who had 
deserted in the time of his predecessors. But gradually he too became militarily embroiled 
in conflicts with the zamindars. Zamindarni Antamma was one of the principal sufferers 
at his hands. The forts and pettas of Sumapalli, Koratpalli and Ramandag, all belonging 
to her, were completely destroyed. All the standing crops in her zamindari were razed. 
Badruddin Husain Khan took the rentership of Nirrnal after Langu Pandit. His own charge 
was nominal; the real initiative lay with his naib, a Komti moneylender, with whom he 
was considerably in debt. The komti seems to have been determined to recover the sum 
he was owed directly from Badruddin's revenue assignment. His visitations were thought 
to be worse than the famines that had occurred during the last two years of the rentership 
of the previous revenue farmer, Langu Pandit.52 
The next two years were years of fightback by deshmukhs, patels and patwaris in 
various parts of Nirrnal. The naibs of Mohd. Ali Khan Lohani, who was renter at this 
time, imprisoned at least 20 village headmen and zamindars, and were involved in warfare 
with many others. The initial leader of the rebellion against Lohani was the deshpande of 
Kusumath pargana. He was taken by Lohani after a prolonged encounter and put to death. 
The next leader of the rebels was a Maratha Brahman called Baba Phadkia, who raised a 
7000 strong army with the help of patels and patwaris. Lohani was recalled to Hyderabad 
at this juncture. But he was reappointed to the Nirmal rentership only two years later, as 
the renter in the interim, Sharf ud Daula, had been unable to raise much revenue. 
Lohani 's naibs found many zamindars and village headmen still in a defiant mood upon 
sz Imamuddin, Tarikh-i-Nirmal, pp. 76-112. 
66 
their return. Metpalli and Koratpalli were the principal seats of the resistance and 
zamindar Kona Rao was now their leader. The naibs' answer to the resistence was along 
familiar lines: Balkonda. Bheemgal, Indur, Bodhan, Thukal, Khedgaon and several other 
places were completely destroyed. 53 
Frykenberg's findings for Guntur are also relevant on the subject of zamindar hostility 
and the militaristic approach of supra-local intermediaries in the Hyderabad countryside. 
The British interest in Guntur dated from '1759, but they were not able to introduce any 
direct control over the zamindars of the district until 1788. Militaristic Hyderabad 
intermediaries farmed the district's revenues in the intervening period. The first of these, 
Husain Ali Khan, mostly relied on military fire power to effect revenue collections, 
between 1759 and 1768. The twelve years following Husain Ali Khan's departure were 
'years of rapine, grasping renters, rebellious zamindars, bandits, and French agents and 
deserters'. Saif Jang became the revenue farmer of Guntur in 1782. The six years for 
which he held the assignment witnessed a series of military campaigns. 54 
When the Madras government finally began to administer Guntur directly from 1788, 
it, too, was confronted with opposition from local quarters. Village headmen practised 
evasion through the familiar techniques of falsifying accounts and exaggerating statements 
of customary expenses. Zamindars refused to acknowledge, or to pay up arrears from 
previous years, which were estimated at Rs.30 lakhs. The largest zamindar of Guntur, 
Vasireddy, offered armed opposition, though this form of resistance on the part of the 
zamindars became less frequent against the Company, most zamindars perhaps that the 
military strength of the British was an altogether different proposition from anything they 
had encountered from militaristic revenue farmers before. Zamindari defiance now usually 
took the form of corrupting British officers and their dubashes. Whilst administrative 
failures and local opposition affected Madras' revenue collections adversely, the famine, 
tidal wave and drought that occurred between 1790 and 1793 compounded the adversity. 
The Madras government realised by 1802 that its prospects for recovering revenue arrears 
from earlier years were bleak. The permanent settlement that it now introduced cancelled 
earlier arrears and gave the zamindars easier terms of repayment than before. The latter 
had rarely enjoyed such good terms and proceeded to destroy themselves through over 
indulgence. Madras introduced ryotwari settlements in Guntur after the political demise of 
the zamindars. But the local bosses of ryotwar, too, were able to hold a weak central 
authority to ransom for several years.55 
Administrative misfortune was not the unique experience of the British in 18th century 
Deccan. A framework of bureaucratic administration was not entirely absent in 
53 Ibid.; see also: Ghulam Ahmed, Nizamabad-i-Dakkan, p. 24; Tajalli Ali, Tuzak-i-Asafiya, pp. 196-208, 296-303. 54 R.E. Frykenberg, GunJur District 1788-1848: a History of Local Influence and Central Authority in South India, (Oxford, 1965). 
55 Ibid. 
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Hyderabad. But, as Richards and Nayeem show, for the Mughal and early Asaf Jahi 
periods, respectively, this had to depart from the classic Mughal mould in order to meet 
the local exigencies of the Deccan.56 It is doubtful if the Mughal or the early Asaf Jahi 
administrations were stable or continuous throughout the area to which they nominally 
laid claim, for example. Quite apart from a direct Maratha presence in Berar and 
Marathwada, revenue farming and the recognition of zamindars and nawabs as tributary 
sovereigns, rather than as bureaucratic agents of the central government, were widespread 
practices. Revenue farming and peskashi relationships were both sure signs of the absence 
of direct administrative control in 'Mughal' style government57 and in Hyderabad, too, 
they indicated that the core areas of local power and militaristic revenue farming 
intermediaries were not amenable to direct bureaucratic control.58 Even within those areas 
where the stamp of regular administrative control seems clear in 18th century Asaf Jahi 
documents, Asaf Jahi bureaucratic references could simply be a veneer, serving only as 
the officially preferred designations for core areas of local power where actual control 
was weak on the ground. The military vulnerability of zamindars and nawabs did not 
necessarily diminish their local political and social influence when it came to making 
revenue collections in their areas, and they continued to remain dominant here despite 
official fiction.59 Elsewhere, the growth of local resistance might oblige the centre to 
assign districts once under direct bureaucratic control now to revenue farmers, or to enter 
into peshkashi relationships with local nawabs and zamindars. 
A corollary of the superior bargaining power that supra-local intermediaries enjoyed 
vis-a-vis the centre in the face of zamindar hostility in Asaf Jahi Hyderabad was their 
strong influence on the shape and character of darbar politics. The Asaf Jahi darbar was 
an arena for the airing, adjustment and confrontation of their differences and quarrels. 
Like their counterparts in Delhi, Arcot and Poona, Hyderabad's intermediaries were also 
prone to divisiveness. This can be traced to some extent to the nature of their 
involvement in the politics between the core areas of local power and between foreign 
powers. 
Just as an identification of interest with one zamindar or a group of zamindars could 
lead a supra-local intermediary into warfare with a rival zamindar or group of zamindars, 
it could also lead him into conflict with intermediaries on the opposing side. Similarly, 
supra-local divisions could arise from identification with the interests of rival foreign 
powers. Yet another source of divisiveness was the clash of ethnic affinities. But neither 
the causes of divisiveness nor the composition of supra-local groupings were fixed. Both 
56 Richards, Mughal Administration; Nayeem, Mughal Administration of Deccan . . 
57 CEHJ, I, 172-93; Wink, 'Maratha Revenue Farming'. 
58 Leonard, 'The Hyderabad Political System' . 
59 The distinction that Malik makes between primary and secondary zarnindars in the Maratha Deccan could be relevant here. See also: Nayeem, 'The Working of the Chauth and the Sardeshmukhi System' ; Z. Malik, 'Chauth Collecting in Hyderabad'; Richards, Mughal Administration. 
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changed over time, according to circumstance, interest and conjuncture. One or two 
general factors might be said to have perpetuated the divisiveness. The absence of a 
strong central authority capable of dispossessing or destroying rebellious intermediary 
elements was one of these. Another was the absence of a centralized system of military 
and fiscal administration. Unlike in Mysore or Bengal, but as in Delhi or Poona, 
Hyderabad delegated its military and revenue requirements to intermediaries. 
The peshkar of Nizam ul Mulk, Mansaram, observed that 'great disorder' had 
prevailed in Hyderabad when his master was away in Delhi in the period 1737-41, having 
left his son, Nasir Jang, in charge in Aurangabad.60 He was probably referring to the 
divided Asaf Jahi ranks and to the opposition they experienced from zamindars and 
nawabs. When the Nizam returned from Delhi in 1741, Nasir Jang himself confronted him 
in an open war, showing how the Hyderabad nobility were subject to divided loyalties. 
The Nizam's conciliatory attitude towards Nasir Jang and and his partizans after his 
victory in the war may have been an attempt to minimise the risk of pushing a disloyal 
section of the nobility, recently beaten in open confrontation, into covert forms of 
resistance.61 His concern was understandable. Control over deputies south of the 
Tungabhadra was already tenuous. Moreover, these men were not always in full control of 
their own ranks. A contemporary of the Nawab of Carnatic, Safdar Ali, remarked in 
1741-42, for example, that he was without money, troops or authority, as every 'Muslim 
lord' serving under him considered himself to be the master of his particular fort or bit of 
territory. The faujdar of Kurnool, Himmat Khan, would have been one such 'Muslim 
lord'. He had refused to pay tribute to Nizam ul Mulk for several years when the subadar 
of Bijapur, Himmat Yar Khan, was appointed in 1742 to collect it from him by force. 
However, the subadar was routed and killed in the ensuing military encounter with the 
faujdar. The faujdar 'begged [the Nizam] for forgiveness' after this episode, pleading that 
his action against the late subadar had been an act of indiscretion, not disloyalty. The 
Nizam, too, accepted his apology 'magnanimously'.62 
If the Nizam was unable or unwilling to hand out retribution to supra-local rebels, it 
was probably because he accepted their power and divisiveness as facts of political life 
and tried to deal with these as cautiously and diplomatically as possible. There was 
another reason for settling leniently with revenue farmers. Conflict with mutually hostile 
'Muslim lords' was only one aspect of Nizam ul Mulk's troubles. He was also troubled 
by the unending hostility of zamindars and nawabs. The conflicts attending the last phase 
of Asaf Jahi intervention in Guntur as well as the subsequent efforts of the British in the 
district have already been alluded to. In the earlier period 1687-1752, too, Mughal and 
60 Pagdi, Eighteenth Century Deccan. 
61 Y.H. Khan, The First Nizam; the Life and Times of Nizamul Mulk Asa/ ]ah/, (2nd edn., Bombay, 1963). 
62 Khan, The First Nizam. 
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Asaf Jahi relations with zamindars had been marked by suspicion. Whenever ascendancy 
was on the side of supra-local authority, this seems to have been achieved through 
coercive tactics. Rustam Khan built towers of skulls for seven years in Andhra.63 Nizam 
ul Mulk's own technique was to lead an army into one district, collect as much as was 
possible there, and then move into another district. When he remained in Aurangabad, he 
sent deputies on similar campaigns. Nasir Jang was sent 'to the south to collect tribute 
from the various zamindars' on more than one occasion after 1741.64 Even though 'every 
commander of a district had assumed the title of 'Nawab" in the Camatic, the supra-local 
intermediaries were, still, the Nizam's most reliable allies in a generally hostile 
countryside. Nizam ul Mulk carried out an almost continuous military campaign against 
Camatic zamindars in the years 1742-44 and negotiated peace settlements with numerous 
Camatic revenue farmers in the same period. The diwan chiefly responsible for making 
these settlements was greatly honoured by him. He was again favourably referred to in 
Nizam ul Mulk's last testament, which praised him for raising more revenues than any of 
his predecessors.65 Nizam ul Mulk's final testament also advised his son and heir, Nasir 
Jang, to be constantly on the move if he wished to raise satisfactory revenues. He was 
always to carry his treasure with him. The troops were already three months in arrears of 
pay and the treasure would help diffuse tensions if they became mutinous. Nasir Jang was 
further advised to lock up 'the Brahmans ', probably a reference to the many Brahman 
zamindars of the Hyderabad countryside. He was asked to be particularly careful of the 
two Maratha Brahmans Moru and Ramnath, who, though now in prison, could be 
expected to create disturbances once they were released after serving their sentences.66 
Nizam ul Mulk's fears about zamindar hostility in the 1740s continued to be valid at 
the time of Nizam Ali Khan in the 1790s. Disturbances occurred in the vicinity of 
Hyderabad in each of the three years 1791-93.67 Several zamindars of the Raichur Doab 
had to be coerced into submission in 1792 and Company troops were sent out to Raichur 
again in 1794.68 Troubles with 'refractory zamindars' also occurred in Ganjicotta, 
Kannagiri, Anagundi, Khammam and Cuddapah in the years 1794-96.69 
One also hears of 'disturbances ' and ' insurrection' in northern Telangana and Berar in 
the 1790s. The Zamindar of Chinnoor, who had 'for some years plundered and 
63 Richards, Mughal Administration; Frykenberg, Guntur; IOLR, Mack Gen, 7, The Provincial Annals of Condaveed. 
64 Burhan Tun Hasan, Tuzak-i-Walajahi, I, (Madras University Islamic Series), (Madras, 1934); Shah Nawaz Khan, Maasiru-1-Umra, I, 836; II, 399-400; Pagdi, Eighteenth Century Deccan. 
65 Khan, The First Nizam. 
66 Fighting and bribing the Marathas had been a constant source of strain on Niza.in ul Mulk throughout his career. He advised Nasir Jang to try and keep peace with them as much as much as possible, though not at the price of allowing them to make further territorial gains in the Deccan. 
67 IOLR, H.Misc, H/563/1 , Notes on Hyderabad Affairs, 1784--98, p . 76; H/563, pp. 66-85. 68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
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depopulated the Nizam's districts to a considerable extent', was reported to be leading an 
open 'rebellion' in 1794.70 The most serious challenge in Marathwada came from the Zamindar of Sholapur, who openly defied Hyderabad 's authority to demand tribute from him between 1795 and 1802, when at length Company troops were sent out to threaten him into a compromise. 
Conflicts among Hyderabad intermediaries, and between them and the nawabs and 
zamindars; the inroads of the Marathas into Hyderabad revenues; the increasing recourse 
to military means that these factors entailed, and the accompanying squeeze on finances 
were all features present in Nizam ul Mulk's time. They received further impetus in the 
years after his death. 
2.5 Foreign Powers in Early Asaf Jahi Hyderabad: mid-18th Century 
Maratha intervention in Hyderabad's politics had been a constant affair in Nizam ul Mulk's time, though he might have consoled himself that he too could exploit Maratha divisiveness on occasion.71 Still other powers emerged in south India from the middle of 
the 18th century, - the French, the British and the Mysore Sultans, - who were also 
willing to interfere in Hyderabad's affairs to their own advantage. The French East India Company gained power in Hyderabad through the supply of troops in return for cash payments and revenue assignments. This occurred in the context of Hyderabad's supra-local rivalries and external wars. But the earliest French links in Hyderabad concerned the 
French trading Company's commercial interests. An acquaintance with courtly forms and 
etiquette, as well as friends at the court, were necessary for making successful 
applications for trading permits and concessions. The friends that it cultivated in the Nizam's court were also the principal partners of French commercial enterprise in Hyderabad. They invested private shares in the Company's trade. Only in Andhra did 
French factories actually organise local investment and manufacture for overseas trade. Ananda Ranga Pillai, the French governor's chief dubash, has left a record of the early links between Pondicherry and Hyderabad in his diary. These links were maintained 
through a man called Imam Saheb, who wielded some influence at the Nizam's court. 
Imam Saheb served the French interest at the Nawab of Arcot's court as well. While he 
was resposible for representing the French in Aurangabad and Arcot, Imam Saheb also 
appears to have helped channel the investments of some nobles of both those places into 
the French trade. His own investment activity was an example of this. 72 
10 IOLR, H.Misc, H/563/1, pp. 87-9. 
71 Pagdi, Eighteenth Century Deccan. 
72 The chief dubash of Pondicherry records that he went to Porto Novo in January 1737 to load a ship with bales of cotton fabric belonging in part to the French deputy governor and in part to Imam Saheb. (The Private Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai, 12 Vols, [Madras, 1904-28] ; I, 11); see also: The Diary, I, 87, 406-7; ill, 60. 
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Both Imam Saheb and the concessions he procured were received by Pondicherry with 
elaborate attention and ceremony in the early years. When a charter arrived from the 
Nawab of Arcot giving the French authority to coin their own money, for example, it was 
received with a 21-gun salute. Nazar-s of Rs.80,000, Rs. 25,000 and Rs. 15,000 were also 
sent to the Nawab, to darbar officials at Arcot and to Imam Saheb, respectively, on this 
occasion.73 Imam Saheb himself was received with a 21-gun salute when he paid his first 
visit to Pondicherry. He was escorted by Company merchants, in procession with dancers 
and musicians, to the council hall, where he was met by the governor and his council 
with great ceremony.74 But the reception accorded Imam Saheb was distinctly less 
elaborate, even low key, when he arrived in Pondicherry for a second time one year after 
his first visit.75 It seems as though the French were by now beginning to realise that their 
power in south India was equal to that of some local rulers. Pondicherry no longer felt 
the need to treat Imam Saheb as anything more than an ambassador dependant on their 
patronage.76 Imam Saheb was treated with even less ceremony later still and was 
expected, moreover, to perform his tasks as a paid go-between with maximum efficiency. 
On one occasion, he sent a copy of a letter he had persuaded the Nizam to write to the 
Nawab of Rajamundry to Pondicherry. The Nizam ordered the Nawab to desist from 
attacking the French factory at Y anam on the Andhra coast in this letter. Imam Saheb 
asked the French governor for a payment of Rs. 25 ,OOO for procuring the letter. Dupleix 
gave a state reception to the Nizam's letter, but privately did not believe that it was worth 
the sum his agent put on it. He sent a strongly worded reply to Imam Saheb. He would 
have to accept his payment in French broad cloth, the governor wrote, as Pondicherry 
could not spare such a large sum in cash at the moment. Besides, the worth of the order 
he had procured from the Nizam was questionable. The Nawab of Rajamundry could care 
but little for such orders, and if he did refrain from attacking Yanam, 'He will do 
so ... only for the love of God, and never through fear of the Nizam '. Dupleix also 
reminded Imam Saheb of a previous payment the services for which he had yet to carry 
out fully. 77 
The change in the French governor's attitude towards Imam Saheb, as well as towards 
the Nizam, indirectly might be understood with reference to the overall change in the 
status of the French in the political affairs of south India in the late 1740s. They had by 
this time begun to assume a strong stance against their trading rivals, the British, and 
were willing to lend military support against them to one of the factions at the Arcot 
73 Ibid., I, 2-3. 
74 Ibid., I, 84-6. 
75 Ibid., I, 112-14. 
76 Presents sent to Pondicherry by the Nawab of Arcot and Nasir Jang, the Nizam's son, in 1741, and by the Nizam himself in 1743 were given state receptions. (The Diary, I, 175-6, 234-8). 
77 Ibid., I, 339-41. 
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court. They were also willing to enter into advantageous bargains with local jagirdars and 
zamindars who were in need of military help against their rivals.78 Dupleix was, moreover, 
by 1747 in direct negotiation with Nasir Jang on the subject of the succession dispute in 
Arcot, and79 the French were giving open backing to the faction led by Chanda Saheb by 
1748.80 The Arcot dispute eventually led back to the succession dispute in Hyderabad. 
This is how the French military and political intervention in Arcot later led to similar 
intervention in Hyderabad. The key figure iii the latter exercise, Bussy, discovered that the 
Nizam was a pawn in the supra-local factional contests of the Hyderabad court and that 
these were open to foreign influence. His own French force was the best military outfit in 
Hyderabad, and as time passed he found that he could use it to gain influence in the 
Hyderabad darbar and revenue assignments in the Hyderabad countryside. 81 
As with the French, the early British connection with Nizam ul Mulk's court also took 
the form of merchant embassies seeking trading concessions on the Coromandel coast. 
Some nobles of the Aurangabad darbar also invested in the British trade.82 Though the 
British trade involved investment and manufacture in Andhra,83 it is doubtful if, as with 
the French, Hyderabad was a significant partner in its overall trading activity in south 
India. 84 British appeals to the Nizam for the support of their trade amounted to a demand 
78 Ibid., ill, 108-9, 125, 137, 170, 174-7. 
79 Ibid., ill, 292-5; IV, ix-x; V, xv-xvi. 
80 Ibid., V, xvii-xviii. 
81 J. Scott (tr.), (Ferishta's) History of the Deccan, II, (London, 1794), V, 226-7; IOLR, Mackenzie General, 
'Memoirs of Nasir Jang', 27/10; Mackenzie General, 'Anecdotes of the Southern courts of Hindustan ... by a Musalmaan, 1781-82', 43/3; IOLR, Orme Collection, 'Deccan Affairs, 1756-57', O.V./42; The Diary, VII, 432; vm, 26-7, 41-2, 101, 180-1, 227, 252-7, 290-1 , 332-3, 393, 438; IX, iv, 19-20, 70, 196, 249; X, xxi-xxiv, 102, 107-8, 116, 143-4, 194-5, 210-13, 319-21, 332-9, 395-7. 
82 The Diary, IV, pp. x-xi. 
83 S. Arasaratnam, 'Trade and Political Dominion in South India, 1750-90: Changing British-Indian Relationships', MAS, 13, 1(1979), pp. 19-40; D.A. Washbrook, 'Some Notes on Market Relations and the Development of the Economy in South India, c.1750-1850', (Unpublished Paper); IOLR, Madras Consultations, 1761-4, P/240/19-22, Entries for 'Masulipatnam' and 'Investment'; Lanka Sundaram, 'The Revenue Administration of the Northern Circars', JAHRS, VI, 2(1931), pp. 87-120; VII, 1(1932), pp. 32-48. 
84 Washbrook ('Some Notes') suggests that manufacture and markets connected with the export-import trade of Andhra declined in the period 1750-1850. Orn Prakash ('Foreign Merchants and Indian Mints in the 17th and the 
early 18th century ' [Unpublished Paper]) suggests for an earlier period that the south Indian system of minting 
coins on the Coromandel coast was 'less conducive to the growth of trade' than the Mughal system, 'which was 
clearly more congenial for the growth of trade and commerce'. Company officials in the Andhra coastal districts 
asked to review the history of trade between their districts and the interior in the 18th century argued in 1799-1800 for a severe decline in the trade from the 1740s, including the complete ceasure of almost all its important 
sectors. (IOLR, Board's Collections, F/4/80/1771). 
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for the support of their candidate in the Arcot succession dispute by the mid-1740s.85 
Later still, the British, too, like the French, were able to consolidate links with the 
factional politics of the Hyderabad court, and these eventually developed into political and 
military intervention in return for cash payments and revenue assignments. 86 
The Maratha and Mysorian ability to cream off Hyderabad's revenues and gain 
influence in its darbar politics was also related to their ability to exploit the factionalism 
and divisiveness of Hyderabad's supra-local intermediaries, through political and military 
intervention. They were also concerned, at the same time, to forestall their rivals from 
making revenue and territorial gains in Hyderabad at their expense. The weakness of 
Hyderabad's central authority was a great help in their maneouvres. Even though the 
Maratha house was a divided one throughout much of the 18th century, the Peshwas were 
able to invade most parts of India in the period 1713-60. But whereas they began to fail 
in other parts after 1760, they rarely fared ill in Hyderabad until almost the end of the 
century. The progressive break up of the Maratha 'confederacy' after c.1760, - which 
made the Marathas vulnerable to the Company in an all-India context, - was apparently 
no hinderance to Maratha fortunes in Hyderabad until 1795.87 Hyder Ali's and Tipu 
Sultan's Mysore was a much more compact and centralized kingdom than the Maratha 
power. The Sultans prevented the emergence of anything approaching the Maratha or Asaf 
85 IOLR, Home Misc., H/128/10, 'Qiledars, Poligars and Princes Subject to the Nizam, 1746-48', pp. 581-669. The ambassador of the British at the court of Nizam ul Mulk, the Khoja merchant Nizamatullah Khan, pleaded with the man whose favour he enjoyed, the Nizam's son Nasir Jang, that the British had 'not only enriched this part of the country in particular, but the whole of the dominions of the Grand Mogul'. Nizamatullah's colleague, another merchant, Haji Haji of Arcot, emphasised the point further by criticizing the activities of the French and their ally, Nawab Anwaruddin Khan of Arcot, which he projected as being in sharp contrast to those of the British: 'The Nawab is but a renter, he does not much regard the distress of the people ... The French are very generous in making presents of other people's goods'. Nasir Jang was active in putting the British case to Nizam ul Mulk against the French. He described the British governor on the Coromandel coast, Commodore Griffin, in May 1747 as a 'very obedient, serviceable and profitable person to the Circar'. He expected to be reimbursed by Commodre Griffin for his pains: 'Now in consideration of these favours ... you must. .. send me a most suitable reward that may encourage me to help you or recommend your affairs for the future'. The British agent who made payments to Nasir Jang's agent, Khoja Dauran, was a man called Bundla Mutla. He complained on one occasion that the Rs.20,000 he had been allowed over a six month period to grease important palms in the Aurangabad darbar were quite inadequate. He should be allowed another Rs. 60,000 or so: 'It would take a large 
86 
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sum to make presents only to the officers and ministers of His Highness at the first visit'. 
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Jahi styles of nobility or systems of revenue farming. They also waged a constant war 
against poligar power in their attempts to build up a centralized miltary and fiscal system, 
and were, in this respect, the forerunners of later Company policies in south India. 88 
.If conflicts in Hyderabad received a further impetus from the mid-18th century, this 
also had to do with the emergence of strong foreign powers, which were ever willing to 
exploit the divisiveness of its supra-local intermediaries. Though the foreign powers 
varied in character, they were all superior to Hyderabad in one crucial respect, military 
strength, .and this was eventually what allowed them to become influential and successful 
here. 
Much debate has taken place in the last twenty or thirty years about the nature of 
European expansion in India: whether this was a product of private trading and industrial 
or mercantilist interests, of political or commercial/economic interests, or of the man on 
the spot on the imperial frontier. It seems wise not to seek a single set of causes, or even 
a coherent imperial policy in the early period, c.1745-1845, in the light of the varying 
evidence for different regions, and at different levels of operation. If we were to 
generalize, however, the evidence for Hyderabad would suggest that the predominant 
motivation behind both French and British expansion here was similar to the motivation 
of indigenous powers like Mysore and the Marathas: military fiscalism, or hiring out 
troops for fiscal, territorial and political gains.89 
2.6 The Character of Hyderabad's Regional Political Order 
Nizam ul Mulk was unable to establish or consolidate his grip over many areas of 
which he was nominally master, thanks to ambitious intermediaries and hostile zamindars. 
This circumstance adversely affected his ability to restrain Maratha impositions, whether 
they took the form of chauth and sardeshmukhi or territorial expansion. What successes 
he enjoyed in his bluff and bluster diplomacy against them was mainly due to their own 
divisiveness and not due to his superior fire power. Nizam ul Mulk's successors not only 
inherited the problems of independent minded intermediaries, hostile zamindars and 
powerful Maratha neighbours, but also had to contend with a new set of mightier 
neighbours. All these factors had a role to play in the succession disputes after the death 
of the first Nizam·. 
88 Khan, History of Tipu Sultan; M.H. Gopal, Tipu Sultan's Mysore: An Economic Study, (Bombay, 1971); A. Sen, 
'A Pre-British Economic Formation'; L.B. Bowring, Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan, (Oxford, 1893); M. Wilks, Report on the Interior Administration, Resources and Expenditure of the Government of Mysore, (Calcutta, 4 May 1805); IOLR, Board's Collections, On Poligars and Jagirdars in the Ceded Districts, 1799-; IOLR, Orme Collection, Orme India XVII/42, J. Stuart's Travels in the Deccan, 1769-, pp. 4932-7. 
89 For a further discussion of British expansion and hegemony in Hyderabad, see Chapters Three and Four below. 
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2.6.1 The Succession Struggles of 1748-62 in Perspective The dispute between Nasir Jang and Muzaffar Jang seemed concluded when the latter surrendered himself to the former after the seige of Vaduvalur. But Nasir Jang's victory quickly revealed itself to be a hollow one. His camp was tom by divisions among the nobility, from whom, moreover, he got contradictory advice. Some of them carried on secret negotiations with Chanda Saheb and. Dupleix and others with Feroze Jang and his Maratha supporters. Nasir Jang was troubled by the uncertainty of his own situation and rival counsels did little to dissipate his fears and suspicions. When he finally arrived in Arcot after a month long vacillation at Vadavallur, his situation deteriorated further. Dissessensions had become more pronounced in the camp and desertions now began to occur. These were fuelled further by the scarcity and epidemic that were experienced at Arcot. Whilst the camp thus disintegrated on its fringes, its centre was also cast in turmoil. Mohammed Ali, whose succession to the Arcot nawabi Nasir Jang had originally come to support, and his allies, the British, despaired of getting any decisive help from Nasir Jang. Their despair soon turned into alarm. Nasir Jang's predicament, and its implications for Mohammed Ali and the British, had not been lost on their rivals, Chanda Saheb and Dupleix. Seeing their advantage, they struck back. Mohammed Ali and the British could defend themselves but poorly while Nasir Jang's camp remained paralysed. When Nasir Jang finally did manage to scramble to his feet, it was too late. Dupleix was able to dictate terms to him. But even these were not enough to save Nasir Jang. A plot hatched by the Pathan nawabs of Kumool and Cuddapah, and the French commandant stationed near Arcot was already unfolding when Nasir Jang signed his treaty with Dupleix. The Nizam was taken by surprise and assasinated before either he or Dupleix realised what was going on behind their backs.90 
The same combination of hostility and plotting that removed Nasir Jang also removed his successor, Muzaffar Jang. The problem of a divided nobility was compounded for Muzaffar Jang by his financial bankruptcy. He was obliged to borrow from Pondicherry in order to compose 'disturbances arising from the non-payment of salaries' to his troops. The borrowed sums were not enough to meet all their arrears, however, and the mutinies continued to occur. The influences of financial bankruptcy and mutinuous troops did not exceed the importance of supra-local intermediaries in deciding the outcome of Muzaffar's battle of succession. He was killed in an open encounter with the Pathan nawabs barely a month after his coronation. 91 
Neither of the two original contendors for Nizam ul Mulk's throne thus returned from their battles of succession, which were both conducted in the south, in the context of the Arcot succession dispute and Anglo-French rivalry. Salabat Jang returned, instead, almost 
90 Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 1-62. 91 Regani, Ibid .. 
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three years after the death of Nizam u1 Mulk, under the guardianship of Bussy. The road back to Aurangabad was not trouble free, however. Clashes took place with the nawabs of Kumool and Cuddapah south of the Tungabhadra. Balaji Baji Rao's army waited in the 
Raichur Doab to press Maratha demands. Salabat Jang was forced to giving them a sum in ready cash and promises of more later. Past this hurdle, Salabat Jang discovered that 
not much had remained of Asaf Jahi authority above the Krishna. Bussy and he decided 
upon reaching Aurangabad that it might pay to launch an attack on Poona while the 
Marathas were distracted in north India. But the campaign against Poona turned out to be 
a disaster. Maratha soldiers and peasants retreating in the face of the Hyderabad army followed a policy of destroying crops and burning villages, and this caused near famine 
conditions in the Nizam's camp. Salabat Jang was forced to tum back. Meanwhile, the Peshwa had returned from the north. He caught Salabat Jang on his return march and forced him to sign a most unfavourable peace agreement. The Nizam 's fortune took a further plunge near Bhalki. Mutinous troops killed his diwan, Raghunath Das, under the influence of Ram Chander Jadav, the jagirdar of Bhalki, who promised them alternative 
employment, food and regular pay. Hardly was this affair over and Salabat Jang had 
resumed his weary march back to Aurangabad, when news arrived that his brother, Feroze Jang, was marching from the north to stake his own claims to the Hyderabad throne. His 
claims were made the more ominous by the presence of a Maratha army behind Feroze Jang. Salabat Jang and Bussy changed direction and marched towards Hyderabad instead 
of Aurangabad. In Hyderabad, too, they were made unwelcome and had to enter by using force against the qiladar of Golconda. Feroze Jang died before reaching Hyderabad, but Salabat's problems were still not all resolved. The treasury was nearly empty and the 
troops were six months in arrears of pay. Even the elite French contingent was without 
pay for two months. The Nizam felt obliged to take recourse to distress measures. An 
expensive loan was contracted with Hyderabad sahukar-s and the French were asked to help themselves to what they could raise directly from the countryside. The extortions that followed created havoc in the countryside and nor was Salabat Jang's financial distress 
relieved.92 
Splits began to occur among the top dogs of the Hyderabad darbar under such strains. Bussy and Syed Lashkar Khan, the diwan, turned against each other and a military 
encounter between them became a possibility in 1753. The diwan was finally outmatched 
and forced to resign. But his replacement, Shah Nawaz ~an, inherited his problems. Government posts were auctioned, and when this still failed to tide over the financial 
crisis, Bussy was given the Northern Circars in jagir. The drama of shifting loyalties and factionalism ranged itself around two groups for the next six years, one led by Bussy and 
92 Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 51-78; IOLR, Mack Gen, 41; SJM, Syed Mohanuned Ali al Husaini, Hist. Mss, Tarikh-i-Rahat Afza, c.1770. 
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the other by Shah Nawaz Khan. It was Bussy who usually wielded the stronger influence, 
though this did not mean that he had no problems. He was, in fact, continually troubled by the hostility of the Marathas externaly and of zamindars internally. Possessing a sanad for the Northern Circars was one thing but raising revenues from them quite another. The 
French found themselves competing with Jafar Ali Khan, who had been renter here before 
them and refused to relinquish his position. Moreover, he gave support to the anti-French 
faction in the Aurangabad darbar. Meanwhile, both parties faced zamindar hostility in the Circars, particularly from the Rajas of Bobbili and Vijayanagaram. The court and the 
countryside thus continued to remain arenas of confrontation for the French and non-
French factions. 93 
The French might well have emerged supreme after 1756 had Pondicherry's adversities in the south not forced Bussy to withdraw from an advantageous position in Hyderabad. 
That position had been built up through a complicated round of diplomacy and warfare, 
much of it within Hyderabad. Bussy now felt confident enough to return to the Northern Circars and try his luck with the zamindars again. It was on this occasion that he inflicted 
the crushing defeat on the Raja of Bobbili that was to pass into Telegu ballads and, later 
still, into its literature and film. Whilst the victorious French party thus concentrated its 
efforts in the east, the non-French party, which had come out ill from its protracted 
engagement with the former, had gone west in disarray. Here its leader, Shah Nawaz 
Khan, was deposed by troops over twenty two months in arrears of pay, bands of whom dispersed into the countryside and turned to plunder and banditry. Encroaching Maratha forces did the same with even greater efficiency and ferocity. Earlier grain scarcities in 
the west were, in such circumstances, transformed into famine conditions.94 
But the rising French fortunes in Hyderabad were dealt a fatal blow by developments 
in the Anglo-French rivalry in south India. The tide of war there had steadily been 
turning in favour of the British since March 1751. Chanda Saheb was dead by the end of 
that year and Dupleix' other allies were not faring too well either. The famous French 
defeat of Wandiwash came in October 1752. The French continued to lose further ground 
through a series of unsuccessful local alliances. The British made peace with a beleagured 
Dupleix in December 1754, but this remained fragile and was shattered in 1757. The last 
stand that Pondicherry now offered against Madras required it to concentrate all the forces 
it could command. Bussy was pulled away from a potentially supreme position in 
Hyderabad. In Andhra, the zamindars fought back with Britjsh support. A crushing defeat 
was inflicted on a depleted French force at Masulipatnam in 1759. The French were never 
93 Shah Nawaz Khan, Maasiru-l-Umra, I, 12-30; IOLR, Orme Collection, O.V./42, Deccan Affairs, 1756-7; Lanka Sundaram, 'Revenue Administration of the Northern Circars'; Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 63-120. 94 Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 63-120; Shah Nawaz KhaJ1~ Maasiru-1-Umra; Sundaram, 'Revenue Administration' ; Y. Vittal Rao, 'Socio-Economic conditions in Andhra in the Company period till 1858', JAHRS, 31, 1-4(1965-6), pp. 9-30. 
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able to regain their influence either in the Northern Circars or in Hyderabad after these 
events. 
2.6.2 Nizam Ali Khan (1762-1803) 
2.6.2.1 The Centre and Local and Supra-local Factors 
The affairs of Salabat Jang's camp in Bidar had, meanwhile, begun to witness a 
change in personal political fortunes. Salabat Jang's brother, Nizam Ali Khan, began to 
take an upper hand in darbar affairs after returning from a successful military campaign 
against Poona in 1761. Even though this success was chiefly due to Maratha diversions in 
north India, it was still a rare one as far as Hyderabad was concerned, and Nizam Ali 
Khan gained status and influence, until he was finally able to depose Sala bat Jang in 
1762.95 However, Nizam Ali Khan's reign brought no reduction in the supra-local 
divisiveness of Hyderabad's intermediaries. He continued to be an uncertain master at the 
best of times. An important challenge came from Ihtesham Jang, the new Nawab of 
Nirmal, in 1782. Nirmal was one of the richest pockets of Telangana and Hyderabad 
could ill afford to lose its revenues completely. lhtesham Jang's father had already been 
irregular in his payments to the centre before him and had amassed a private fortune of 
Rs. 52 Lakhs. Now Ihtesham Jang threatened to withold his peshkash payments altogether 
and defied the Nizam 's summons on several occasions. Nizam Ali Khan was eventually 
obliged to lead an army against the Nawab personally in 1782. lhtesham Jang was 
removed from Nirmal after two encounters and given a smaller jagir in Ellichpur, in 
Berar. But Ihtesham Jang continued to be defiant, though now less overtly than before. He 
was suspected of conniving at Nagpur's encroachments upon northern Berar, for instance. 
A succession of revenue farmers, - Narsing Rao, Langu Pandit, Mohammed Khan Lohani 
and Sharf ud Daula, - also continued to defy the Nizam's authority in Nirmal after the 
removal of Ihtesham Jang and, like him, had to be chastened by force on several 
occasions.96 
Intermediaries associated with other parts of the Hyderabad countryside also continued 
to give trouble to the centre. The jagirdar of Adoni and Raichur, the Nizam's nephew, 
Mahabat Jang, approached the British resident, Johnson, for a separate alliance against his 
uncle, the Nizam, in 1784. The Nizam imprisoned his brother Mughal Ali in 1792-3 for 
corresponding with Hashmat Jang, a jagirdar suspected of cultivating Maratha patronage. 
Hamid ud Daula, one of the Nizam's grandsons, was reported to be organising resistance 
to his authority in Cuddapah in 1794 with a view to seizing the treasury there. Nizam Ali 
Khan wished in 1795 to remove Asad Ali Khan, revenue farmer of Cuddapah and 
95 Regani, Nizam-British Relation.s, pp. 121-4; IOLR, Mack Gen, 41 ; 46. 
96 IOLR, H.Misc, H/219, Extract of Bengal Secret Consultations, 13 Jan 1783; SJM, Mss Hist 459, Mohammed Faizullah Munshi, 'Waqai-i-Dakkan', vols. 57-8; Imamuddin, Tarikh-i-Nirmal, pp. 79-112; Talib, Nizam Ali Khan, pp. 130-9. 
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Khammam, from his charge for failing to keep up regular revenue payments. But he was 
too frightened to attempt this himself and debated over whether to ask a French corps in 
his service, or another revenue farmer, Mohammed Ameen Khan Arab, to do it for him. 
Asad Ali Khan had, meanwhile, learnt of the Nizam's intentions. He instructed his agents 
in Cuddapah and Khammam not to give up their control and himself hastened to 
Hyderabad to 'solicit' the Nizam not to transfer him from his districts. While he gave 
Asad Ali Khan evasive replies, the Nizam approached the British resident privately for 
help. He pleaded with the resident that the revenue farmer would heed his transfer order 
only if this was delivered to him by the resident on the Nizam's behalf.97 
There were other intermediaries whose attachment to Hyderabad was dictated more by 
the imperatives of survival than by notions of steadfast loyalty. The jagirdars of Kumool, 
Cuddapah and Adoni realised, for example, that Hyderabad would not come to their 
rescue if they were threatened by Mysore or the Marathas. The jagirdar of Adoni, 
therefore, took more care to conciliate Mysore and the Marathas, than he did to conciliate 
the Nizam. Ranmast Khan of Cuddapah looked in vain for Hyderabad's support when 
Tipu Sultan threatened to deprive him of his possessions, if he did not satisfy Mysore's 
demands for tribute. The terror inspired by Tipu Sultan's threat was so great that 
depopulation began to occur in Cuddapah and Ranmast Khan's annual revenue collections 
fell rapidly from Rs. 22 Lakhs to Rs. 5 Lakhs annually. When Mahabat Jang, the jagirdar 
of Adoni, died in 1794, the Nizam first confirmed the deceased jagirdar's son, Ghulam 
Husain, as his successor. But he later contemplated giving the jagir to another 
intermediary, Mustaqeem ud Dow la. A 'strong sensation existed' in Raichur, however, 
when the Nizam's change of heart became known there. The protest 'speedily grew into 
an open insurrection' and was not arrested until the arrival of Company troops within 
striking distance of Raichur. But the chastening of Ghulam Husain still did not make 
Adoni and Raichur a trouble free jagir. For a while the diwan, Azam ul Umra, 
contemplated awarding it to himself, but he was discouraged at the prospect of becoming 
'immediately responsible to the Marathas', whose claims of chauth from the districts gave 
them a direct interest in the affairs of Raichur and Adoni. Hyderabad eventually decided 
to farm out the jagir afresh by inviting new bids. No sooner was a new revenue farmer 
appointed that the Peshwa's vakil reminded Nizam Ali Khan of Poona's outstanding 
claims against the districts and warned him to 'settle in a dignified manner'. The Nizam 
was bullied into conceding even more to the Marathas from Adoni and Raichur than 
before in the subsequent negotiations with the vakil, Govind Kishen.98 
Perhaps the most powerful challenge that Nizam Ali Khan had to face from 
intermediaries and zamindars in the latter part of the 18th century was the one led by his 
97 IOLR, H.Misc, H/562; H/563; H/563/1. 
98 IOLR, H.Misc, H/563/1; H/570. 
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son Ali Jah in 1795. Ali Jah became associated with the plans of a powerful Telangana 
zamindar, Sadashiva Reddy of Medak, and also helped to focus the discontent of other 
zamindars and intermediaries. Contemporaries traced the beginnings of the discontent to 
1791-92, when the Nizam had used a considerable force 'in suppressing a rebellion which 
raged in the vicinity of Hyderabad'. The unrest once again came to a head in 1795. 
Nizam Ali Khan was at this time returning from a disastrous military encounter with the 
Marathas at Kharda on the western frontier of Hyderabad. He was obliged to set up camp 
in Sadashivpet in order to 'settle the affairs of the disturbed district'. The zamindar, 
Sadashiva Reddy, was accused by the mutsaddi-s of the revenue department in Hyderabad 
of withholding Rs. 33 Lakhs from the centre. He initially evaded the Nizam 's summons 
under various pretexts, but finally declared that he would see him only after an agenda 
had first been agreed upon between his and the Nizam's agents. Whilst the Nizam was 
represented by one of his high ranking courtiers, Sadashiva Reddy's case was represented, 
suggestively, by no other than Poona's vakil, Govind Kishen, in the preliminary 
negotiations that followed. This fact lent credence to the Nizam's suspicion that Poona 
was encouraging the rebels in order to underline its message to him after the recent 
disaster at Kharda that it expected him to abide by the terms of the Kharda treaty, even if 
these were highly unfavourable to Hyderabad. Govind Kishen and the Nizam 's 
representative were able to agree on an agenda in due course. 
The zamindar would pay Rs. 5 Lakhs as revenue arrears to Hyderabad and the latter 
would demand no more from him until the disputed revenue accounts had been re-
examined to the satisfaction of both parties. The zamindar would also hold his fire while 
that re-examination was going on and offer his brother as a hostage to the Nizam as a 
proof of his good intentions. However, the truce lasted only seven weeks. Sadashiva 
Reddy resumed his posture of defiance, and was joined by the Nizam's son and son- in-
law, Ali Jah and Nizam ul Mulk, respectively. The latter raised 'a large irregular force' in 
the neighbourhood of Hyderabad. Support for the rebels also came from 'chiefs and 
zamindars' throughout the Hyderabad countryside. The garrison at Bidar declared in their 
favour and so did 1000 Rohillas in the fort of Udul. Mir Imam came to join them from a 
post south of the Krishna. He was beseiged on his way by the French troops at Jadcharla, 
but managed to . fight his way out with a great show of skill and courage. He was 
'honourably received by the Prince' when he arrived in Ali Jah's camp. Ghulam Husain 
had recently been denied his late father's jagir in Raichur and Adoni by the Nizam. He 
too declared in favour of Ali Jah, who responded by promising to restore him in the jagir 
after the rebels had won their victory over the Nizam. The garrison of Aurangabad fort 
defied its commandant 's orders to fight for the Nizam, against the rebels, and forced him 
to flee. Another body of soldiers arrived from Cuddapah to enlist with the rebels.99 
99 IOLR, H.Misc, H/563; H/563/1; H/570. 
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The Nizam was alarmed by the progress that the rebels were making and ordered for a force to be mobilized against them. The French corps led by Raymond, other troops from Hyderabad led by Dilawar ud Dau1a, and the contingents of Ghasi Meah and Asad Ali 
Khan from the south formed the key elements in the loyal army that was raised. The 
rebels were forced to retreat towards the western frontier after a series of engagements 
and seiges. They offered to negotiate at Bidar. But Ali Jah asked for extravagant terms. 
He wished to have either the diwani or independent control over a large number of 
Hyderabad districts. Hostilities were resumed and the two rebel leaders, Ali Jah and Sadashiva Reddy, were taken prisoner. Ali Jah died while being escorted back to Hyderabad. The general impression was that he died of a sudden malignant fever, but 
there were those who suspected poisoning, and others who suspected suicide. Sadashiva Reddy was deprived of his main districts upon arrival in Hyderabad and given a minor 
charge instead. 100 Although the campaign against Ali Jah and Sadashiva Reddy was 
successful, their rebellion nevertheless dramatized the pervasive problems faced by 
Hyderabad. The Nizam himself admitted that his son had become the focus of many popu1ar hopes and expectations. 
Foreign commentators were more harsh in their judgement: 
'He (the Nizam) might be regarded as a useful instrument who would readily accord his sanction to another power, whom he would allow to act as long as outward appearances should be conceded to him. He preferred living at Hyderabad ... with an extensive nominal authority to a more limited domain with absolute power. .. the Prince is in an eternal state of war with his subjects; there is no such predicament as absolute peace or quiet, external or internal. The revenues are collected at the point of the sword and troops are incessantly traversing the country ... [As regards] external hostilities... much show is made ... when little is intended; and great movements ... 101 from which little follows'. 
The foregoing observation by the British resident was in line with what Tipu Su1tan was 
thinking. He advised the Nizam in 1709 to wake up and attend seriously to the business 
of government, looking particu1arly into every aspect of his diwan, Azam ul Umra's, 
administration. The Peshwa, too, expressed similar sentiments in 1794/95.102 
Yet more opposition to the Nizam's authority came at the tum of the century. The Nawab of Kumool openly denied the Nizam's right to collect any tribute, for example, 
and increased the strength of both his fort and his forces in case the Nizam should decide 
to retaliate by force. The Nizam 's ministers were, in fact, pot at all confident that their forces could coerce the Nawab into submission. They pleaded with the resident for 
additional support to subdue the N awab of Kumool, as well as several southern 
100 Ibid. 
101 IOLR, H.Misc, H/563/1. 
102 Ibid. 
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zamindars, including those of Sholapur, Raichur, Pangal and Gadwal. 103 Hostile zamindars 
and defiant intermediaries did nothing to give the Nizam strength. Yet it was the troops 
that they provided him, together with what forces his foreign allies of the moment leased, 
that formed the Nizam 's chief instrument of war. When he managed to put these together, 
they remained essentially a coalition of private armies, incapable of overcoming their 
conflicting loyalties. They were also often deficient in number, pay, equipment, training 
and discipline. Such forces as were more efficient, - the troops of Salabat Khan, who held 
a jagir in Berar, and Muzaffar ul Mulk, who held a jagir in Khammam and Cuddapah, -
were as likely to obey the Nizam's summons as to disobey them. When the latter was the 
case, it was not unusual for the Nizam to go through a tortuous round of diplomacy 
before a compromise was arrived at. If coercion was the path he chose, however, this was 
preceded by allurements, pleading or threats to other intermediaries who might usefully 
lend him military muscle against the original offender. Some of the intermediaries whose 
co-operation he sought might want an extension of their jagir, others a cancellation of 
revenue arrears, and yet others a release from disfavour or disgrace. 
The supra-local intermediaries of Hyderabad were much divided by faction fighting 
and internal strife. Whilst such a state of affairs was in itself sufficient to prevent a strong 
centre from emerging in Hyderabad, the latter was put under added pressure by zamindar 
hostility and the conflicts between the zamindars and intermediary elements. Their 
militarisitic strategies had not befriended Mughal intermediaries to the zamindars and 
nawabs of Hyderabad in the early part of the 18th century. The conduct of Asaf Jahi 
intermediaries in the remaining part of the 18th century did not take them any closer to 
the local bosses either. The threat of coercion remained the primary basis of the 
relationship between supra-local intermediaries and local bosses in the Asaf Jahi period. 
Though the story is still incomplete and the picture sketchy, there is enough evidence to 
cast serious doubts on some recent suggestions that a 'decentralized successor state' had 
emerged in Hyderabad in the last four decades of the 18th century. Yet though the 
divisions of Hyderabad's intermediaries made them vulnerable to the hostility and power 
of the zamindars, they were never entirely rooted out of the region. 
Stated at its simplest, this was because the zamindars were not united in their hostility 
and, furthermore,- entered into temporary alliances of expediency with intermediaries in 
order to conduct their own local quarrels and wars. In Andhra, according to Frykenberg, 
zamindari rivalries, as well as zamindar conduct towards supra-local authority, could be 
traced to the manner in which zamindars traditionally controlled land. 'Village systems of 
power' were the primary units of land control. Each village was ruled by extended 
families of one or more of the elite castes. The complicated competitions that occurred 
among village level elites extended into extra-village level arenas, where zamindars 
103 IOLR, Bengal Consultations, P/69, Resident to Gol, Letters, 24 Nov and 6 Dec 1799, 3 Jan and 3 Feb 1800. 
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formed the 'social cement' between 'opposed cultures'. The weakness of Hyderabad made 
zamindars powerful, but their handling of this power, and later the attempts of Company 
administrators to reach deeper into the system of land control and revenue management, 
first made them vulnerable to supra-local authority, and eventually caused their political 
demise. Increased zamindari power led to increased emphasis on traditional zamindari 
pastimes - mutual isolation, warfare, rapacity, ostentation and internal wrangling.104 
2.6.2.2 The Supra-local Factor 
The alliances that neighbouring powers made in Hyderabad during the eighteenth 
century may be seen as resolutions of their particular interests into the factional conflicts 
of Hyderabad's supra-local intermediaries, rather than as compacts with the Nizam at the 
head of a centrally unified government. When Nizam Ali Khan pleaded with Madras in 
1762 for example, for British military support to avenge a humiliating defeat at the hands 
of the Marathas, he represeted, in fact, only one of two rival Hyderabad factions courting 
the favours of the British. The Nizam offered Madras a cash payment of Rs. 1 Lakh and 
undisputed control over the Northern Circars in return for military support. But the rival 
offer of Husain Ali Khan, the faujdar of Rajamundry, was also a lucrative one as far as 
Madras was concerned. He offered Madras a share in the administration and revenues of 
the Northern Circars in return for 1000 troops, if they helped him make forced collections 
from hostile zamindars. Madras preferred Husain Ali Khan's offer to Nizam Ali Khan's 
in the event. The Nizam's offer entailed getting militarily embroiled with Poona, 
something Madras definitely wished to avoid at this juncture. Husain Ali Khan's offer, on 
the other hand, was less controversial. It did involve conflict with zamindars in the 
Northern Circars, but it steered clear of the Marathas. Despite the Nizam 's denunciation 
of the agreement that the British made with Husain Ali Khan, and the formal dismissal of 
the latter as the faujdar of Rajamundry, British troops did arrive to serve Husain Ali 
Khan, and he did make forced collections with their help.105 Only later did Madras agree 
to withdraw support from Husain Ali Khan and listen to Nizam Ali Khan's proposals. But 
it still refused to let go of the hold over Rajamundry that Husain Ali Khan had allowed 
it. This was to force the Nizam's hand. The Company had not received full payment for 
their services to J:Iusain Ali Khan, as he was forced out of his rentership rather abruptly. 
Madras now argued that it had eventually served Hyderabad 's interest in serving Husain 
Ali Khan and the Nizam should, therefore, make up for the shortfall in Husain Ali Khan's 
payments. Rajamundry would be the bargaining counter in the negotiation. 
104 Frykenberg, Guntur; article in V.K. Bawa (ed.), Aspects of Deccan History, (Hyderabad, 1963). 105 IOLR, H.Misc, H/108, Intermediaries in the Revenue Administration of the Northern Circars, Madras Letter, 29 Jan 1773; H/335/1, J. Sullivan to Court of Directors, 3 Feb 1779; H/262/1, Madras Letter, Nov 1762; Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 124-44; Sundaram, 'Revenue Administration' . 
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However, Nizam Ali Khan was not convinced by Madras' argument. He was also 
distracted by renewed Maratha attacks at this time on his western and northern frontiers. 
He demurred. But Madras construed his lack of response as an evasive tactic. It decided 
to give him a warning by renewing the alliance with the faujdar of Rajamundry, now a 
successor of Husain Ali Khan's, Abdul Rahman. Whilst the British sold their support to 
his rival in the east, the Nizam was worsted by the Marathas in the west. Even though he 
was upset at their renewed alliance with the faujdar of Rajamundry, this defeat reduced 
him once again to begging the Company for support. But before Madras could respond to 
his second application, the Nizam was once again drawn away to war with the Marathas, 
this time against Nagpur forces on the northern front. He was still engaged against 
Nagpur when Madras launched an invasion into the Northern Circars in 1766, armed with 
a Jarman from the puppet king of Delhi. The Nizam found a faction led by his diwan, 
Rukun ud Dau1a, favourably disposed towards the British invasion and was forced to cede 
the Northern Circars to the Company. The Company promised him two detachments of its 
troops and recognition for his brother, Basalat Jang, as the jagirdar of Guntur for as long 
as he lived, in return. The British faction remained pre-eminent in Hyderabad for some 
time.106 
It tried to keep its position secure by being conciliatory towards the powerful Maratha 
faction. The two even joined forces to make war against Mysore in 1767. But the 
honeymoon did not last. The British faction fell from grace as the Nizam prepared to 
attack Madras 'persuaded by those of his courtiers friendly with Hyder Ali'. Hardly had 
this campaign begun, when the Rukun ud Daula lobby was once again able to prevail 
upon the Nizam. It persuaded him to renounce his connection with Hyder Ali and to 
conclude a new friendly alliance with Madras. But this too proved to be a temporary 
affair. Anti-Ruknud Daula groups had become active with Basalat Jang, the jagirdar of 
Guntur, as the chief instigator behind them. Basalat Jang was insecure in the belief that 
the British and the Rukun ud Dau1a faction were keen to drive him out of Guntur, and 
solicited Mysore 's support against them. Hyder Ali provided this in the shape of a corps 
of French troops in his service. The British faction in Hyderabad was thus in danger of 
being eclipsed in 1775, and Madras feared for the security of its possessions in the 
Northern Circars. -But Basalat Jang himself presented them with a timely opportunity to 
bolster their weakening position. He was being threatened by the overbearing postures and 
exorbitant demands of Hyder Ali's vakils in 1778. He offered to let the British have 
Guntur on contract if they would give him a battalion of troops to counteract the Mysore 
threat. News of the independent alliance between Basalat Jang and the British horrified 
the Nizam, and he now turned to the Maratha and Mysore factions for support. But 
106 Frykenberg, Guntur; Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 124-44; IOLR, Mack Gen, 43/3; H.Misc, H/212/3 , Madras and Country Powers, 1774; H/262, Madras Letters, 1 Mar and 8 Aug 1768, 27 June 1769; H/563; H/609/1; Subba Rao, 'Correspondence'; Sundaram, 'Revenue Administration'. 
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Calcutta prevented an ominous combination against the British developing by a timely 
reversal of Madras' alliance with Basalat Jang, and by making friendly overtures to the 
Nizam.107 
The inroads that any neighbouring power could make into Hyderabad matched to some 
extent the rising and falling fortunes of particular combinations of individuals or factions 
among Hyderabad's supra-local intennediaries. Foreign interventions were not detennined 
by the invitations of Hyderabad factions alone, of course, but eager local collaborators did 
help the cause of ambitious neighbours. The typical path to influence that foreign powers 
followed in Hyderabad was first to make an alliance with a particular faction and then to 
bolster its position as much as possible. Hyderabad's shifting alliances with various 
foreign powers also reflected to some extent the changing balance of power between the 
latter in the context of an all-India or south Indian rivalry. 
Relations between the Company and Mysore deteriorated in the late 1780s and their 
factions in Hyderabad strained in opposite directions. The British appointed a resident to 
mobilise opinion against Tipu Sultan. The tenns that Calcutta offered outmatched the 
tenns that Shrirangapatnam could offer. An anti-Mysore alliance was also fonned in 
Poona at the same time. The triple alliance that would inaugurate Tipu Sultan's political 
demise was ready by 1790. But the diplomatic gains that the Company made in 
Hyderabad after the 1791 Mysore war were once again in danger of being lost after the 
battle of Kharda and Ali Jab's rebellion in 1795. The resident had warned Azim ul Umra, 
the leader of the pro-British faction in Hyderabad, not to take his provocations against 
Poona so far as to provoke a military encounter, and oblige him to call upon his allies for 
assistance. Calcutta's interest in the internal politics of Hyderabad was not independent of 
its wider strategic interests and policies in India as a whole. It might not be in a position 
to supply troops when the diwan asked for them. But Azam ul Umra had not restrained 
his provocations against Poona. He had consequently been obliged to make disastrous 
concessions, while the British stood by, and even gave himself up to Poona as hostage.108 
The British faction was now hard put to defend its former strong position in 
Hyderabad. British battalions serving in Hyderabad were ordered to leave. The Maratha 
vakil, Govind Kishen, on the other hand, openly exerted himself to secure the important 
offices of the Hyderabad darbar, including the diwani, for his own nominees. Another 
faction, headed by Rai Rayan, advocated a fresh alliance with Tipu Sultan. Timely 
developments saved the battalions from actual banishment, however, and also allowed the 
British to claw back the advantages they had gained in Hyderabad after 1792 but had 
been losing since 1794-95. Mir Alam's strong stand by the Nizam during Ali Jab's 
rebellion in 1795 brought Company troops back into service. The self-.destructive conflicts 
107 See references cited in the last footnote and also: IOLR, H.Misc, H/140, pp. 89-108; H/219, pp. 173-229. 
108 References as in the last footnote. 
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of the Marathas, meanwhile, sapped their strength and also allowed Azam ul Umra to 
return to Hyderabad to a hero's welcome in 1797. He had been able to exploit the 
internal divisions and tunnoils of Poona through some astute diplomacy, and had regained 
revenues and territories lost at Kharda. Calcutta's men were thus back in favour and 
influence at Hyderabad and helped revive flagging British fortunes dramatically. The 
position of British troops in Hyderabad was strengthened, and the French corps, of whom 
Calcutta disapproved strongly, was disbanded. These gains were further sealed in 1799, 
with the renewal of the combination against Tipu Sultan, which finally tenninated his 
regional challenge and ambitions. 109 
But whilst the twilight of Mysore and the Marathas gave ascendancy to the British 
connection in Hyderabad after 1795, its security and benefits would ultimately have to 
depend upon how much, and what kind of, political control the British were able to 
establish in Hyderabad and the countryside. The main challenges in this connection were 
from insubordinate intermediary elements, hostile zamindars and the absence of a coherent 
system of administrative control reaching down from the centre into the villages. 
2.7 Conclusion 
There were three kinds of factors that went into the making of 18th century 
Hyderabad 's pre-colonial political order: the local, the supra-local and the inter-regional. 
The last chapter suggested that the economically vibrant core areas of the Hyderabad 
countryside were organized as zamindari and nawabi domains with well articulated 
political and social 'communities'. The competitions between them for labour, resources 
and dominance resulted in a criss-cross pattern of alliances and conflicts. This chapter 
started with the assumption that supra-local intennediaries and inter-regional foreign 
powers were attracted to Hyderabad by the region's economic and strategic potential. The 
intennediaries farmed out revenue and military assignments from a weak centre and 
sought to exploit the local alliances and conflicts of the nawabs and zamindars for profit. 
Foreign powers also indulged in military fiscalism at the supra-local level. They exploited 
the factionalism of the intennediaries to pursue their own rival fiscal and strategic 
interests in Hyderabad. Nizams and would-be-Nizams were pawns in the hands of 
influential darbar -factions and the foreign powers associated with them. The long drawn 
struggle for succession after the death of the first Nizam, Nizam ul Mulk, was the most 
telling example of this process. 
The British had emerged supreme in South India by the end of the 18th century. There 
was a corresponding decline in Maratha . power. The Mysore sultanate was extinguished. 
This also meant that the British were now the supreme influence in the Asaf Jahi darbar. 
Control of the centre, however, did not imply control over all the intermediaries and 
!09 References as in the last but one footnote . 
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zamindars of Hyderabad. Centralization was espoused by British residents in Hyderabad 
in the next five or six decades, and it was inextricably linked with the emergence of a 
monopolistic brand of military fiscalism under British hegemony. The next three chapters 
examine the process and problems of centralization under the British regime. 
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I 
I 
3. UNDER THE BRITISH REGIME, 1798-1853 
3.1 Introduction 
Historians of 18th century Hyderabad have traditionally viewed foreign influence in it, 
as in other Indian 'states', as a sequential rather than a synchronic affair. That is to say, 
they have believed that only one power was predominantly influential at any one time.1 
And when one foreign power was influential in Hyderabad, its alliances with other foreign 
powers were suspended temporarily, or superceded altogether. Such a view arises from 
imagining Hyderabad as a unitary state: the head of the state, the Nizam, could either be 
dominated by one power (or set of powers), or by another. That he was dominated by 
foreign powers at all was related to the fact he was a weak head, or the head of a weak 
state. The last two chapters, however, have questioned the notion of a unitary state in 
Hyderabad, and suggested instead that the framework of its political order can be seen as 
a criss-cross pattern of local, supra-local and inter-regional alliances and conflicts. The 
emergence of the British as the supreme political power in South India at the end of the 
18th century did not imply, therefore, that Maratha, Mysorian and French influences in 
Hyderabad would now simply be substitued permanently by British influence. It implied 
also a change in the degree and quality of foreign intervention; and a significant change at 
any one level of Hyderabad's traditional political order was likely to affect its other levels 
as well, and perhaps change its overall shape and character. 
It was not just the absence of any effective foreign competitors that made British 
influence more powerful than before. The strength of British influence was also related to 
the nature of British expansion. The links between the nature of imperial expansion and 
the nature of imperial policy in Indian states have been the subject of renewed debate in 
recent years. 2 The view taken here is that though the two processes were related, their 
specific dynamics could still be different. Whether or not it was 'economic' or 'political', 
private trader and industrialist or mercantilist factors that motivated imperial expansion is 
not what is discussed here. It is simply assumed that imperial expansion did occur, and 
that it was sought to be consolidated throughout the period under review, c.1798-1853. 
What is examined· is the character and consolidation of British intervention in Hyderabad. 
Unlike in Awadh or Malabar, for example, it seems to have been dominated here by 
military fiscal interests. 
One of the central concerns of British policy in India in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries was to build up stable buffer states between British territory and foreign powers 
2 
See, for example: Regani, Nizam-British Relations. 
R. Jeffrey, People, Princes and Paramount Power: Society and Politics in the Indian Princely States, (Delhi, 1978). M .H. Fisher, 'Indirect Rule in the British Empire: The Foundations of the Residency System in India (1764-1858)', MAS, 18, 3(1984), pp. 393-428. 
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hostile to it, such as the Marathas. This inevitably influenced the kind of intervention that 
went on in the concerned states. A related concern was to quell 'banditti' on British 
frontiers, and this also influenced the nature of intervention in the buffer states. In 
Hyderabad, the British strengthened their military presence, above all, in order to cope 
with the Marathas and the Pindaris, on the northern border, and with 'banditti' on the 
eastern and southern borders. But an injection of foreign strength of this sort inevitably 
implied a significant disturbance in the traditional operation of the Hyderabad political 
order, for it implied an unprecedented degree of military and fiscal centralization. The 
latter processes could have an adverse impact on the traditional independence, powers and 
privileges of the intermediaries and small kings. The British had even hitherto used their 
military skills to invest profitably in Hyderabad's local and supra-local alliances and 
conflicts, just like other foreign powers, and had gained revenues and territory in return. 
But they had been restricted by their competitors. With those competitors effectively 
excluded or eliminated now, however, their military fiscalism intensified, becoming 
increasingly monopolistic. The presence of Maratha, French and Mysorian competitors, as 
well as Hyderabad's own intermediaries, had perhaps also led to a 'fair' price for British 
military services in the past. Now, however, they enjoyed a monopoly, which they used to 
put their only remaining competitors, Hyderabad's internal intermediaries, also out of 
business. 
They did this for a time in league with an English banking house, Palmer and 
Company. The income that British troops generated from Hyderabad was probably no 
trifling matter when we consider the financial exhaustion that Calcutta faced in the early 
19th century, from years of warfare and a deepening price depression in agriculture. The 
intervention of British residents into Hyderabad's military and fiscal policies brought them 
into confrontation with intermediaries, whose own stakes in military and revenue farming 
conflicted with the financial objectives of the British, and with zamindars, whose 
traditional kingly local domains resisted military and fiscal centralism. Relationships with 
bankers in military and revenue farming came under increasing strain from the 1830s. 
For, Hyderabad itself was no stranger to financial problems in the early decades of the 
19th century, and these ultimately operated as constraints upon how much it could 
accomodate its numerous creditors. 
3.2 Early Attempts at Centralization, c.1798-1805 
Various factors worked in favour of British expansion in India in Wellesley's, 
Bentinck's and Dalhousie's time, whether we attribute them to 'economic', 'political', 
mercantilist, free trader or industrialist interests. Among these were anxieties arising from 
the French revolution and the loss of Britian's American colonies; the related concern to 
make India politically safe and stable; the pressure from home to make the Indian 
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government pay for itself; and the quest for economic profits in India. Broadly, three 
strategies were used to achieve expansion in 'native states': outright annexation; assuming 
charge of their internal affairs, while leaving their 'princes' with royal titles and pensions; 
and giving native states subsidiary alliances in return for revenues, territory and varying 
degrees of control in their policies. Awadh, Hyderabad, Poona, Surat, Mysore, Tanjore 
and Carnatic were only some of the 'states' that were brought into the orbit of imperial 
rule in the opening years of the 19th century, in Wellesley's time. Nevertheless, achieving 
expansion was one thing and sustaining it profitably quite another. Within a few years of 
introducing the subsidiary alliance system, and the policy of pensioning off indigenous 
rulers, for example, the Indian government came under severe criticism in Britain for 
having caused political and economic decay in the states it had effectively acquired. The 
debates concerning the merits and demerits of intervention in Indian states would continue 
well into the 19th century. 3 
This section is concerned merely with the dynamics of imperial intervention in 
Hyderabad. It has already been noted that among the key objectives of intervention here 
was the need to counter the Marathas and Pindaris, and the frontier 'banditti', and that 
these objectives implied a stronger military presence and, related to that, greater 
centralization, and an intensification of military fiscalism. Any significant attacks on the 
traditional powers and privileges of Hyderabad's intermediaries and zamindars were likely 
to affect the overall shape and character of the region's political order. The earliest areas 
that felt the impact of a stronger British presence were the centre, Berar and border 
districts of the Telangana-Rayalseema sub-region. The concern in the latter districts was 
with 'bandit' zamindars, who were thought to be a bad influence on the zamindars of the 
neighbouring Madras districts. The early 19th century, it must be remembered, was still a 
period when experiments were taking place in land tenure systems. The chief aims of 
agrarian policy were of course to maximize revenues and make rural society obedient to 
British authority. Hyderabad's bandit zamindars were a bad influence on the British 
frontier precisely because they threatened to subvert the objectives of British agrarian 
policy in the Northern Circars in Madras. They carried on with their traditional criss-cross 
alliances and conflicts without respect to British boundaries, or reference to authorities. 
They also hurt the revenues, or the revenue producing potential, of British territory 
through warfare, cattle raiding, labour and resource attracting strategies. In Berar, where 
the need was felt for strengthening the frontier against th~ Marathas and Pindaris, the 
See for example: P.E. Roberts, History of British India under the Company and the Crown, (London, 1921); J.Roselli, Lord William Bentinck: the Making of a Liberal Imperialist, 1774-1839, (Berkeley, 1974); P. Nightingale, Trade and Empire in Western India, 1784-1806, (Cambridge, 1970); J.F.G. Ross-Of-Bladensberg, The Marquess Hastings, .(Oxford, 1893); A.I. Ritchie, Lord Amherst and the British Advance Eastwards to Burma, (Oxford, 1894); D.P. Sinha, Some Aspects of British Social and Administrative Policy in India during the Administration of Lord Auckland, (Calcutta, 1969); A.H. Law, Lord Ellenborough; A Biography of Edward Law, Earl of Ellenborough, Governor-General of India, (Cambridge, 1939); C.S. Hardinge, Viscount Hardinge, (Oxford, 1892); E. Arnold, Dalhousie's Administration of British India, 2 Vols, (London, 1862-5). 
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threat was again felt to come from an old order of things. Berar's leading intermediary 
was Mahipat Ram. He aspired to the diwani of the Asaf Jahi darbar in 18th century 
factional terms. His opponent was Mir Alam. Both candidates tried to win the resident's 
support. But Mahipat Ram failed and, in desperation, turned to some Maratha capitals and 
Hyderabad intermediaries for help. Even though the British were practically sole foreign 
masters in Hyderabad by now, Mahipat Ram's moves in Berar, Hyderabad and the 
Maratha capitals aroused their fears. Here, · they reasoned, was a potential threat to 
Britain's imperial ambitions, and it must be checked. 
3.2.1 The Case of Mahipat Ram: from Darbar to Berar 
Establishing control in Hyderabad meant consolidating a grip over the main darbar 
offices and exerting their authority on the military and revenue intermediaries, and 
zamindars. A grip over the main darbar offices traditionally implied the dominance of one 
foreign backed faction over the others. But in the changed context of the 1790s, when 
Mysore and the Marathas had declined and the British began to emerge as the only 
foreign power of any consequence in south India, control over the darbar offices became 
more than ever a question of subjecting the intermediaries to British domination. For, 
securing the centre was nothing if it was not linked to the penetration of traditional 
intermediary privileges and zamindari domains. The resident and the ministers made a 
simultaneous onslaught on the darbar and the countryside. This was a task of considerable 
magnitude, however, and they had to place priorities on which intermediaries and 
zamindars, and which areas, they wished to establish control over first. Their priorities 
were dictated to a large extent by Calcutta's strategic considerations vis-a-vis the 
Marathas, and Madras' administrative considerations on Hyderabad's borders. 
The ministers Azam u1 Umra and Mir Alam had both complained about Hyderabad's 
weak control over intermediaries from their first days in office. Mir Alam continued to 
impress upon the resident that 'the public accounts of this Govemment...are in a most 
disordered state ... ; and will require a strong remedy ... ; nothing less than a reduction in the 
jageers, ... from Raja Ragotim Rao downwards' after Azam ul Umra's death.4 He also wove 
into his proposals for increased control from Hyderabad, measures intended for private 
gain. Specifically, Mahipat Ram, who was governor of Berar, had begun to lobby for the 
post of diwan since returning from military service against the Marathas in the 1803-05 
war. His success with the Nizam was almost immediate. He played on Sikandar Jah's 
fears about the threat to the Nizam's position from Mir A.lam and his British friends; 
charmed the Nizam with extravagant flattery and bribes, and emphasised his own 
eligibility for the the office of diwan through the influential medium of the harem, with 
which he was well connected. Mahipat Ram also sought to win over the resident's 
4 NAI, For Sec, 9 Aug 1804, Letters, 76,92. 
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backing and he was enthusiastically supported by the Nizam in this project.5 But Mir 
Alam was himself interested in the diwani and viewed the initiatives of Mahipat Ram 
with growing alann. He too tried to win over the resident to his candidature. He had the 
advantage here of a long and continuing association with the residency. He reminded the 
resident of his unflinching loyalty to the British in the past and made out that Mahipat 
Ram could never match him in this respect. The governor of Berar was too devoted to the 
Nizam, Mir Alam said, and Sikandar Jah was privately no friend of the British either. 
Mahipat Ram would play on the Nizam's anti-British sentiments to such an extent if he 
was made diwan that the British alliance itself might be threatened. Henry Russell, the 
acting resident, was persuaded by Mir Alam 's arguments. He began to project Mahipat 
Ram as an enemy of the British alliance and, therefore, an unfit candidate for the diwani, 
in his letters to Calcutta.6 Russell's successor as resident, Sydneham, left Calcutta under 
the influence of these letters. His prejudice against Mahipat Ram was reinforced when a 
messenger from the man tried to bribe him and his secretary while they were on their 
way to Hyderabad. He was alienated still further when Mahipat Ram tried to bribe him 
personally upon his arrival in Hyderabad. The resident now decided to give undisguised 
support to Mir Alam's candidature. The two together pressurized Mahipat Ram into 
returning to Berar. The post of peshkar was also secured, meanwhile, for an British 
nominee, Chandu Lal.7 
Mahipat Ram returned to Berar in a resentful mood, though still harbouring hopes of 
winning the diwani. However, every step he now took was represented by the resident 
and his supporters as a conspiracy against both Hyderabad and the British. He was 
accused of being too big for his boots as governor of Berar. Meant to maintain 10,000 
troops from territory annually worth Rs. 60 lakhs, he maintained not two-thirds of that 
number. Those he did were in poor discipline and in considerable arrears of pay. 35% of 
their salary was regularly witheld and other deductions were made periodically on a 
variety of pretexts. Mahipat Ram's revenue accounts were few and far between and 
mostly fraudulent. He reserved 12 1/2% of the revenues as a private commission and still 
represented Hyderabad's demands for authentic accounts as evidence of tyranny and 
oppression against himself.8 
The resident and the ministers appointed two officers in order to exercise a 
surveillance on Mahipat Ram in Berar. Sheetal Das, a relation of Chandu Lal's, was 
asked to see that his troops were paid regularly and Mir Abu Torab was asked to muster 
6 
7 
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them. When Mahipat Ram tried to prevent the two men from interfering in his affairs, -
having first failed to forestall their appointment by lobbying the Nizam through friends, -
the resident and the ministers got the Nizam to pass orders dismissing him from the 
governorship of Berar. He became even more suspect in his opponents eyes when they 
intercepted some of his secret correspondence with the Nizam. He complained bitterly in 
it of unfair treatment, - not only of himself, but also of nobles like Rao Rambha and 
Nurul Umra, who had both been dismissed for stirring mutiny among British troops in 
Hyderabad, - at the hands of the ministers.9 He hinted at plans for obtaining support in 
lndore and other Maratha capitals for the expulsion of the British: 
'On this account they are carrying off and selling off their effects in many 
towns in Hindustan ... O Asylum of the World! Their expulsion is at hand ... 
there are other circumstances of great importance which cannot be 
committed to writing and which I am anxious that my nephew, Sreeput Ram, should be ordered to the presence for the purpose of 
representing ... You should not by any means suffer yourself to be prevailed 
upon by ... the agents of the hat-wearers to diminish either the troops or the 
allowances of any person whatever'. 10 
In yet other letters Mahipat Ram cautioned the Nizam that if he gave up demanding 
peshkash for the Northern Circars, he would encourage the British to ask for more 
territory later. If he agreed to cede new Berar districts to Nagpur, under pressure from the 
resident, he would be opening up the road to the complete loss of Berar. If he allowed 
the British to negotiate the question of chauth with the Peshwa on his behalf, he should 
be ready for an increased revenue burden. If he gave in to their proposals for reforming 
the Berar cavalry, he would witness a complete eclipse of the old jagirdari 
establishments.11 
It was not at all obvious to the Nizam why the resident and his principal collaborators, 
the ministers, should, as they claimed, be the best to know and safeguard Hyderabad's 
true interests. Mahipat Ram's arguments played on precisely such doubts. Furthermore, 
they offered Sikandar Jab a way out of the ignominy and humiliation he felt at the 
growing power of the resident. Mahipat Ram tried to win over Salabat Khan, the 
commander of the most efficient military establishment in Berar, as well as the Nizam. 
Though Salabat Kh_an rejected his overtures, the resident and the ministers were alarmed. 
Not only was Mahipat Ram a disobedient jagirdar, they protested, he was also a 
dangerous and crafty conspirator. This was used as the final excuse to order Mahipat Ram 
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out of the governorship of Berar.12 
Mahipat Ram's fall from the governorship, an intermediary position of some 
prominence, represented more than a personal setback for himself. It also represented the 
dying stand of an old style of factional politics in the Hyderabad court. Mahipat Ram had 
begun as an aspirant to the diwani by winning over the Nizam to his candidature and had 
then turned to the resident for further support. Rebuffed by the resident, he had tried to 
raise support among fellow intermediaries, particularly those in Berar, and also in lndore 
and other Maratha capitals. Yet, Mughal style factionalism had no place in the Hyderabad 
of 1805, where the only powerful party was necessarily the one which had British 
backing. Nur ul Umra, Rao Rambha and Ismail Yar Jang all fell in much the same way 
as Mahipat Ram did, trying to play faction where monopoly had become the rule. 13 
If the resident and the ministers put an alarmist construction on the activities of 
Mahipat Ram and his associates, they, too, did not fully appreciate that the days of old 
style factionalism were over in Hyderabad. Their alarms did help concentrate attention on 
the task of making intermediaries obedient to the centre's will, however. Nor was the 
particular focus on Berar purely fortuitous. Berar's importance derived from the 
experiences of British troops operating there in the 1803-05 war against the Marathas. 
They had found Berar to be terribly insecure. Wellesley had complained bitterly about the 
quality of the troops with which Hyderabad had supplied him. They were deficient in 
number, discipline, training, equipment and pay. Their commanders were factious and 
indifferent to British needs. They even looted the latter's baggage on one occasion while 
the latter were engaged in an encounter with Maratha troops. Difficulties were also 
presented by intermediaries charged with the responsibility for auxiliary support, such as 
medical aid, and supplies of fodder and provision. Raja Shukradhar, the brother of the 
governor of Berar, evaded the requirements of British troops passing through his districts. 
The qiladars of Dharur and Daulatabad refused aid and shelter even to wounded British 
soldiers on the grounds that they had no express orders from Hyderabad to that purpose. 
The garrison of Badnapur actually fired on a passing detachment of British troops. Such 
experiences added a tone of urgency to the British desire for a strong and secure frontier 
against the Marathas in Berar in the early 19th century.14 
3.2.2 Frontier Banditti 
The resident's drive for greater control in Berar was part also of a concern among 
Madras' officials to make Hyderabad a stable buffer between themselves and the 
Marathas. The absence in Hyderabad's border districts of what they regarded as regular 
government had haunted district officers in the Northern Circars and the Carnatic from 
12 H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 33-55; NAI, For Sec, 23 Oct 1806, I05A-114. 
13 H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 18-55; Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 187-213. 
14 NAI, For Sec, 9 Aug 1804, Russell's Letter, 76: H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 10-17. 
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their first days there. Local conflicts in the neighbouring Hyderabad districts, for example, 
offended against their conceptions of secure administrative control. 15 Raja Rao of 
Gunnapuram was one of numerous Telangana zamindars whose rusoom politics 
overflowed into the Northern Circars. He attacked some Masulipatnam villages contesting 
his rusoom claims several times in 1798-99. British officials in Masulipatnam were 
indignant. They protested to the resident in Hyderabad that zamindars possessed of such 
daring independence represented a threat to 'good government' in their districts. Their 
protest turned to outrage when their enquiries revealed that Raja Rao had had the support 
of the amil of Khammamett and the jamadar of Gunnapuram as well. The resident replied 
that most of Hyderabad's amils, naibs and jamadars were, in fact, subject to the centre 
only in name. In Khammamett, too, they served foremost the interests of the revenue 
farmer who employed them. The revenue farmer, of course, acted as his local interests 
deemed fit, now unleashing tyranny against zamindars, now making conciliatory bargains 
with them. He would, nevertheless, saddle the Hyderabad ministers with the responsibility 
for outrages committed by 'government officers' .16 The Masulipatnam authorities could 
even lend him a useful hand in this task: 
' ... any information tending to fix on the talookdar of Khummumait the 
charges of connivance with the refractory zamindars ... may materially 
conduce to the suppression of these disorders'. 17 
The Masulipatnam authorities felt encouraged by the resident's response and took the 
liberty of sending a detachment of British troops 'to the very village where it was 
represented ... the naib of Gunnapuram usually resided' in order to conduct further 
investigations.18 
Two other Khammamett zamindars, Timmannah and Sadashiva Reddy, were also 
under the surveillance of the Masulipatnam authorities at this time. They had temporarily 
joined up with Raja Rao, and the three were suspected of planning an attack on 
Jaggiahpet and other zamindari capitals in Masulipatnam. The collector of Masulipatnam 
wrote to the resident desiring Hyderabad's assistance for a British detachment he was 
preparing 'to terminate the devastating proceedings of the banditti'. 19 Hyderabad was only 
too willing to co-operate. Timmannah was taken by the British troops and handed over to 
the Khammamett naib for execution. The Masulipatnam collector also clamoured for the 
execution of an associate of Timmannah's, who was still in prison. He feared that this 
15 See, for example: IOLR, H.Misc, H/263, Member of Select Committee, Madras to Resident, Hyderabad, Letter, 26 Itu1e 1784; H/563, pp. 606-8; H/563/4, pp. 601-8; Board's Collections, F/4/5/692; F/4/76/1665; Political and Secret Department, L/P & S/20/F.8; Munro Collection, Mss Eur 151/10, Munro 's Instructions to William Thackeray, 31 Dec 1800; Elliot Collection, Mss Eur F 47, Munro to Madras Board of Revenue, Letter, 20 March 1802. 
16 NAI, For Pol, 11 Feb 1800, Kirkpatrick to Hamilton, Letter, 7, 3 Oct 1799. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., Hamilton to Kirkpatrick, Letter, 15 Oct 1799. 
19 Ibid., Hamilton to Kirkpatrick, Letter, 10 Nov 1799; see also: IOLR, Board's Collections, F/4/76/1665. 
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man, Maracula Alwarao, might get away if left too long in the custody of Zainulabiddin, 
a naib known for conferring liberal favours in return for bribes. Alwarao would almost 
certainly join up with his associates if he was released. The latter had been in a resentful 
mood since the execution of Timmannah, and might stir up considerable trouble. The 
resident was persuaded by the collector's arguments. He prevailed upon Azam ul Umra to 
pass orders for Alwarao's execution. He even took the precaution of posting witnesses 'of 
my own, who say they are acquainted with the person' to ensure that it was Alwarao, and 
none other, who was executed. The resident also promised Hyderabad's further co-
operation 'to effect the apprehension of the two brothers of Maracula ... , who 
are ... concerned in similar predatory practices' . 20 
The efforts of British troops and civilians to bring some sort of fear of centralizing 
authority among Khammamett naibs and zamindars might have gained weight from what 
the latter saw of British influence and authority in their own districts. A zamindar band 
from the British districts of Condapalli and Mungal raided the zamindari of Aswa Rao in 
Hyderabad in mid-1800, for example. The raiders had stolen a 'large number' of cattle 
from Singareni and were still at an intermediate station, Dacharum, within Hyderabad, 
when Aswa Rao's diwan, Venkat Rao Pandit, launched a counter attack and recovered 
some of the cattle. A few of the raiding party were also killed. Venkat Rao now proposed 
to march upon Mungal itself, in order to recover the remaining cattle and further to 
avenge the raid on Singareni. But the naib taluqdar of Khammamett, Dost Ali Khan, 
warned Venkat Rao that government authority was a real thing in British territory. It 
would be foolish and counterproductive to violate its authority. He would do much better 
to apply to the British resident in Hyderabad for justice.21 Dost Ali's words were not 
empty. Everyone had seen what had happened to Vasireddy of Guntur, for example, once 
one of the most defiant of zamindars in the whole of the Northern Circars. He had been 
repeatedly humiliated 
Dost Ali's were not empty words. Everyone had witnessed the recent chastening of 
Vasireddy of Guntur, once one of the most defiant of zamindars in the whole of the 
Northern Circars. Vasireddy had been humiliated repeatedly by British troops and now ate 
quietly out of the British authorities' hands. When they objected against his being allowed 
to farm some villages from Hyderabad, for instance, he accepted their decision with only 
20 Ibid.; NAI, For Pol, 5 Nov 1801 , Kirkpatrick to Read, Letter, 5; IOLR, Board's Collections, F/4/76/1665. 21 To Hyderabad the naib wrote pleading for expeditious justice: ' ... the raja in question can collect a considerable force .. .lf this matter be settled, it will be well; otherwise the raja's troops will take retaliation'. (NAI, For Pol, 27 March 1800) 
a mild remonstrance.22 The 'Madira Seema' had been held by his ancestors for a long 
time, he pleaded. He would like to be given the first preference to farm it if the British 
should decide ever again to let their zamindars farm out villages from Hyderabad.23 
The threat of coercion became constant for zamindars who tried to defy the resident or 
officials in the Northern Circars, as Timmannah's brothers and sympathizers discovered to 
their cost. They had maintained a hostile posture after Timmannah's execution, giving 
support to one of Masulipatnam's most wanted men, Comadannah Venkata Rao. The 
resident sent out two detachments into the Nalgonda and Khammamett districts to deal 
with the rebels. The commanders of the detachments, Woodhouse and Nail, were asked to 
be on the lookout for other fugitives as well, such as Mungapati Deo of Polavaram and 'a 
rebellious poligar of the ceded districts'. The naibs of Khammamett and Nalgonda, 
Dundar Khan and Zainulabiddin Khan respectively, were ordered to help the British 
detachments with one hundred horsemen each.'.1A 
Communications between the resident and the civil and military authorities in the 
Madras districts on Hyderabad's southern borders had also become frequent by the early 
19th century. The district authorities here, too, were often after hostile Hyderabad 
zamindars. After an initial concession to form, they quickly gave up any pretence about 
obtaining the Nizam' s permission if they wanted to pursue off ending zamindars into the 
Hyderabad countryside. A force was thus sent against Jagannath Rao of Jatpole in 1802 
without consulting him, and a similar attack contemplated against the zamindar of 
Sholapur some time later. The British officials' main concern was to co-ordinate their 
activities with the moves of the residency. They took the Nizam 's and the Hyderabad 
ministers' support for granted. Intermediaries on the Hyderabad side soon became 
accustomed to having British troops conducting operations against hostile zamindars. The 
latter, of course, could hardly have misrecognized their enemies.25 The resident himself 
showed an increasing awareness of the his position. He warned a naib accused of 
sheltering · fugitive poligars from British districts, Ahsan Mean, on one occasion not to 
tangle with him or the government he supported: 
' .. .it is a matter of infinite regret that you should in the first instance have 
offered them an asylum and that you afterwards advance frivolous 
22 Zamindars who straddled borders, the British authorities held, could easily deceive both the central governments to whom in theory they paid allegiance. If one of the governments was displeased with the zamindars, - most usually this was due evasion of revenue payments, - they could leave its jurisdiction quite easily and legitimately and live in the other's territory. By the time the first government had sought the permission of the second one to enter its territory and seize the fugitive by force, the offending zamindar might have fortified his local position already and set a bad example to others. Vasireddy had had some disastrous encounters with British troops in the past. A particularly bad one was when he had been forced out of his former capital, Chintapalli, and it had been garrisoned by British troops. He no longer had any apetite for getting embroiled with the British authorities or forces. 
23 Ibid.; NAl, For Pol, 23 July 1801, 22. 
'.1A NAl, For Pol, 5 Nov 1801, 5; 29 April 1802, 16. 
25 IOLR, Board's Collections, F/4/76/1665; NAl, For Pol, 19 March 1801, 20; 23 July 1801, 5; 29 April 1802, 16,17. 
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pretences in reply to demands which were made for their delivery ... You 
should consider the performance of this duty as inseparably connected 
with your own advantage and as a source of gratification to ... Azim ul Umra'.26 
On another occasion, he requested the Collector of Raidrug to remove a recalcitrant 
revenue farmer from a Hyderabad district.27 For revenue farmers who were loyal to the 
British dominated regime in Hyderabad he requested help from the British authorities. In 
the case of Cuddapah, for example, he urged Munro of the Ceded Districts 'to enable 
them to examine the accounts of the zamindars, poligars, deshpondia and other inferior 
revenue officers of that province', as the 'Rajah [Chandu Lal] will be exposed to 
considerable inconvenience, if not heavy expence', otherwise.28 British troops were active 
in northern Telangana, too, by the beginning of 1801: 
' ... certain zamindars have ... for a long time past been in a state of rebellion 
against the government and now require .. . a considerable force to reduce them to subjection ... [and] put a stop to their depredations'. 29 
The naib of Yelgundel, Ranga Rao, was ordered by Azam ul Umra to assist British troops 
and regard himself as a subordinate of their commander, Hall.30 The resident was pleased 
and hopeful at these developments: 
'[Subduing these zamindars] would not only be gratifying to this government but useful also to our own interests, these freebooters having 
more than once menaced the Rajamundry district, if their inroads have not 
actually extended further' .31 
Meena Rao and Kona Rao were the principal targets of British operations in Y elgundel. 
Kona Rao was based at Sirsilla, 'a small quadrangular ghurrie with four bastions' . He was 
reported to command a force of 1,200 troops and to rely, additionally, on the natural 
strength of his terrain for his defence. 32 His 'rebellious' activity consisted in the main of 
demanding rusoom from villages throughout Y elgundel, and from parts of the 
neighbouring districts of Ramgir and Warangal, too. Kona Rao's methods were reported 
to be feared by both the intermediaries and the zamindars: 
'If the zamindars comply with his requisitions; it is well; but if not they [Kona Rao and his men] send a proportionate force against the village 
and waste and bum it so that the inhabitants of the different districts in Yelgundel are in great distress and perturbation The talookdar ... , Lashkar 
26 NAI, For Pol, 23 Nov 1802, 7. 
27 The revenue farmer in question, Zainulabiddin Khan, had been resisting an unfair termination of his contract by the centre. (NAI, For Pol, 15 Jan 1801, Resident to Collector of Raidrug, Letter, 22 Dec 1800) 28 NAI, For Pol, 15 Jan 1801, Kirkpatrick to Munro, Letter, 36, 22 Dec 1800. 
29 NAI, For Pol, 19 March 1801, Kirkpatrick to Hall, Letter, 31 , 4 Feb 1801. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid.; see also: IOLR, Elliot Collection, Mss Eur F 48, Account of Ramgir and Yelgundel Circars, 1798. 
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Jang, has sought refuge in Keshoputtun, in the district of Ramgir'. 33 
Hall captured Sirsilla, Govindvaseema and Devikunda Gutt within a month: 'those zamindars [now] have neither strongholds nor posts of any strength [left] in their districts'. 34 
Containing the Marathas and suppressing 'banditti' were objectives that the resident in Hyderabad shared with other residents, as . well as with the governments of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. To realize these, he felt it necessary to secure control of the Asaf J ahi darbar, and to subject intermediaries and zamindars in the border areas to central 
control. It was not long before the latter process began to spill over inwards as well, and to affect other areas, as subsequent sections will suggest. 
The position of the resident grew increasingly more powerful from the late 1790s. As that happened, he pushed for more centralization, especially the greater alignment of intermediaries with the centre's purposes and priorities. Beneath the intermediary level, however, there was still little bureaucratic control. Coercion, on the contrary, was extended as the main technique of dealing with zamindars. Those intermediaries who would not sacrifice their traditional interests and privileges in the cause of Hyderabad's new drive for centralization also found themselves confronted with coercive tactics. Hyderabad's centralization drive not only conflicted against many of the traditional powers, interests and privileges of intermediaries, it also made new demands upon them. Above all, it expected them always to serve the centre's policies loyally. But such an expectation was not exactly compatible with the prevailing political culture of Hyderabad and nor did the British dominated centre always succeed in adjusting the interests of intermediaries and zamindars to its own priorities in the period 1800-30. 
3.3 The Origins of the Centre's Reforms 
The objectives of the subsidiary alliance, were not simply a matter of retaining the Northern Circars, charging Hyderabad a sum of Rs 2 Lakhs annually, and assuming charge of its 'external' affairs. Even the initial years, c.1798-1807, demonstrated that British residents were quite prepared to interfere in the internal affairs of the Asaf Jahi darbar and those of intermediaries and zamindars, if need be by taking recourse to coercive military measures. And the British dominated centre continued its attacks on intermediaries and zamindars throughout the first half of the 19th century. The motives behind such policies soon outstripped the limited objectives of the subsidiary alliance. They were provided, rather, by a steady intensification of military fiscalism, which was operated for a time in league with Palmer and Co, a private financial firm in which many British officers, including the governor-general of India himself and the resident in 
33 NAI, For Pol, 19th March 1801, Kirkpatrick to Hall, Letter, 31, $ Feb 1801. 34 NAI, For Pol, 16 April 1801, Hall to Kirkpatrick, Letter. 
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Hyderabad, had a personal stake. British policies in Hyderabad, in the first half of the 
19th century, boasted all the zeal of the 'Age of Reform' on the surface. Reform, though, 
was never seen even officially as being meant to 'educate' the subjects of British rule, or 
to bring the 'greatest good' to their 'greatest number'. Only one resident, Metcalfe, 
harboured grand visions, - bringing peace and prosperity to the Hyderabad countryside, 
and doing away as much as possible with intermediaries between the centre and the 
peasant. In practice, however, his vision came to nothing, and the talk of reform in 
Hyderabad was eventually a cloak for intensifying military fiscalism. 
The various stages leading up to the formation of the subsidiary alliances may 
themselves be regarded as early developments in military fiscalism. First, the British took 
revenues and territories for providing military services in the context of local and supra-
local rivalries.35 The only significant commercial treaty that they signed with Hyderabad in 
the early 19th century, on the other hand, that of 1802, remained a dead letter until it was 
revived in 1860, under rather different circumstances.36 In the period c.1807-50, a 
monopolistic brand of military fiscalism replaced the earlier competitive variety. The only 
competition that remained now, Hyderabad's own intermediaries, was suppressed by the 
coercive use of centralization. As centralization was extended, the military and revenue 
assignments of Hyderabad's traditional supra-local intermediaries were resumed and re-
assigned to the British and their partners, Palmer and Co. Only a small proportion of the 
former intermediaries were retained to help finance new British military assignments. As 
the number of British troops increased, - at a time, ironically, when a military build-up 
was unnecessary from the purely defensive or strategic point of view, - Hyderabad got 
caught up in a viscious system of revenue farming and indebtedness. Such developments 
unleashed severe pressures on the countryside. These were compounded by the 
agricultural depression of the early 19th century, as well as by occasional droughts and 
epidemics. Facing severe criticism at home for bad management, looking for means to 
offset falling revenues in the territories it administered, and sorely in need of funds to 
finance administrative expenditure and imperial warfare, the Indian government 
encouraged the resident in Hyderabad to intensify his military fiscal strategies. Yet, 
Hyderabad too was a victim of the agricultural depression, and the related fiscal and 
financial problems. The resident's demands only deepened its distress. The core areas of 
its countryside, which had hitherto been the keys to Hyderabad's vibrant economic 
activity, suffered contraction and decline. Hyderabad, in fact, began to acquire the 
characteristics of what it came to be labelled as in later years, a classic backwater. 
35 See Regani, Nizam-British Relations for a detailed discussion of British diplomacy in Hyderabad in the 18th 
century. For a discussion of the operation of the subsidiary alliance, see: Yazdani, Hyderabad During the Residency of Henry Russell, 1811 -20: A Case Study of the Subsidiary Alliance System, (Oxford, 1976). 
36 Military fiscalism gave way around this time to the industrial interest in developing Hyderabad as a primary producer and importer of British manufactured goods: see Chapter Four below. 
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3.3.1 Early Reforms: Berar 
Govind Baksh, the brother of the pro-British diwan, Chandu Lal, was sent to replace the disgraced Mahipat Ram as the governor of Berar in 1807. The new governor was 
expected to introduce respect for the centre's fiscal and military requirements among the intermediaries of this important border region. But Govind Baksh was confronted with a highly unpromising situation when he arrived in Berar and carried out his initial 
assessments. The intermediaries seemed to be carrying on with their older practice of intervening in the alliances and conflicts of local zamindars on an ad hoe basis for 
survival and profit. They seemed incapable of meeting the centre's military and fiscal demands either in full or on a regular basis. The new governor of Berar reported finding 
every civil and military department weaker than he could ever have imagined. Far from being in a position to defy Hyderabad's authority by force, the intermediaries presented 
the opposite danger of not being able to carry out the centre's commands for lack of 
strength. They seemed beleagured, cowardly and corrupt in the face of the two major 
threats they faced, the Pindaris and the zamindars, and were given to making temporary 
alliances of expediency with the latter, when not engaged in tyrannizing over them.37 Govind Baksh traced the weakness of the intermediaries primarily to their inability to 
raise satisfactory revenues or to maintain sufficient numbers of troops in good condition. They were expected to maintain eleven battalions of 850 troops each, in theory, at a total 
monthly expense of Rs 15 lakhs raised from the revenues of Berar. In practice, they 
maintained not two-thirds of that number. Those they did were in poor discipline and heavy arrears of pay. Berar, furthermore, seemed nowhere capable of yielding anything 
approaching the centre's estimates of its revenues.38 
Such was the context in which a reform of the intermediaries' establishments was deemed an urgent necessity in Berar. It was believed, Hyderabad's policies, would carry little meaning without this. Changes in the infantry would have to be 'scarcely short of dismissing and reforming the whole corps', as well as replacing corrupt mutsaddies in 
their financial management. The affairs of the cavalry were more messy still and 
reforming it would be nothing short of a monumental exercise.39 It seems doubtful, in the light of the state of affairs that Govind Baksh discovered in Berar, if Mahipat Ram was 
ever as powerful as he was made out to be in the days immediately prior to his dismissal. Nor could he have commanded such a strong base among Berar's intermediaries as was 
attributed to him. His only other sources of local power cquld have been firm alliances 
with the Pindaris or the zamindars. But such alliances, too, he never made. What is probable is that it was his very weakness which, paradoxically, made Mahipat Ram 
37 NAI, For Pol, 21 May 1807, Russell to Sydneham, Letter, 3, 5 March 1807; 28 Sept 1807, 35; 4 Jan 1808, 1,6,10,12. 
38 See references cited in the last footnote. 
39 NAI, For Pol, 21 May 1807, Russell to Sydneham, Letter, 3, 5 March 1807; also: For Pol, 28 Sept 1807, 35. 
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disobey Hyderabad's orders. If the resident and the ministers attributed his disobedience 
to his strength, they were the victims of their own ignorance and of his bluff.40 
Two main considerations dominated the attempts that were begun in 1807 to bring 
Berar's intermediary establishments closer to the purposes of the centre. The older 
methods of the intermediaries now stood condemned and their troops were expected to 
operate a credible system of defence along Berar's northern border. A commandant of the 
British subsidiary forces in Berar, Doveton, was assigned the task of 'reforming' Berar's 
'irregular' infantry . He was asked to take care that the troops were paid regularly. 
Europeans were recommended as new commandants, and pay and muster masters instead 
of the older mutsaddies.41 Doveton's attempts began on a small scale. He would 
'discipline' the 'irregular' troops in batches of fifty, drilling them alongside British troops. 
These batches were then expected to return to their original battalions and 'reform' their 
remaining colleagues. Europeans were placed as commandants, and pay and muster 
masters at the head of the 'reformed' battalions. Whilst Doveton thus transformed a 
proportion of Berar's 'irregulars' into a 'regular infantry', they were still more 
'thoroughly reformed' by Sydneham afterwards. 3000 regulars were in action in Berar by 
1811.42 1600 were assigned in two 800 strong battalions to the Jagirdar of Ellichpur, 
Salabat Khan, under an English commandant, Drew. The remaining regulars were 
assigned to other battalions, which were also commanded by European officers. Two new 
infantry regiments were also created in 1811.43 These again were officered, trained, 
40 
41 
42 
43 
If Mahipat Ram was a paper tiger, moreover, many other Hyderabad intermediaries must also have been the same. What was exposed in Berar, - weak intermediaries surviving through alliances with, or tyranny against, zamindars, - was also brought to light in Shorapur, where the resident and the ministers followed Mahipat Ram's trail. The Raja of Shorapur, Pid Naik, was a revenue farming zamindar trapped between the ambitions of his diwan, Inkappah Naik, and Hyderabad's demands for tribute. Pid Naik heard in 1807 that Hyderabad was about to despatch a force against him for evading revenue payments and for raiding the neighbouring districts of Gulbarga and Ferozabad. He was alarmed and sent urgent messages to the centre pleading he was not guilty. He claimed that he was a prisoner in the hands of his diwan, Inkappah Naik, who had forcibly ousted the previous diwan, Timmappah. Inkappah had achieved his object with the help of Mahipat Ram, Raza Ali Khan Sindhi and Nabbi Yar Jang, mercenaries who had come to Shorapur after being forced out of Berar. Though successful in deposing Timmappah and making Pid Naik prisoner, Inkappah had run out of means with which to pay the mercenaries. He, therefore, witheld the peshkash due to Hyderabad and also encouraged the mercenaries to raid villages in Gulbarga and Ferozabad upon false claims of rusoom. Fortunately for Pid Naik, it was the discredited Mahipat Ram and his associates who served Inkappah. Hyderabad sprang to the Shorapur zarnindar's aid. A negotiating party was first sent under Palmer to see if Inkappah Naik would come to terms peacefully. A detachment was sent on its heels under Gordon in case the negotiations failed -and it became necessary to decide the issue by force. The negotiations did in fact break down. But Gordon's forces were also unexpectedly routed by Inkappah Naik's mercenaries. He and another British officer were taken prisoners, moreover, and tortured to death in captivity. The resident was livid when he learnt the murderers' identity: Mahipat Ram and his nephew, Sripat Ram. He informed Calcutta that a new anti-British conspiracy was brewing in Hyderabad and despatched a strong British contingent to Shorapur by forced marches. Mahipat Ram and his companions took alarm at its approach and fled. They were pursued until they left Hyderabad on its north western border. They were never to return again. (NAI, HRMC, 30/1807, Resident to G-G, Letter, 22 Dec 1807; For Pol, 18 Jan 1808, 61-5; 29 Feb 1808, 57; 7 March 1808, 40; HRR, 345, Sydneham to Gordon, Letters, 4 Feb, 6 Feb 1808; Sydneham to Palmer, 6 Feb 1808; see also: IOLR, Board's Collections, F/41296, On Mahipat Ram's rebellion and Holkar's rebellious chiefs.) 
NAI, For Pol, 30 April 1807, 47; 21 May 1807, Russell to Sydneham, Letter, 3, 5 March 1807; 28 Sept 1807, 35. 
NAI, For Pol, 21 May 1807, Russell to Sydneham, Letter, 3, 5 March 1807; Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 215-36; B.R. George, History of the Hyderabad Contingent, (Calcutta, 1905). 
One of the regiments was commanded by a man named Fraser and the other by a man named Beckett. 
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mustered and paid by Europeans.44 The whole of Berar's regular infantry was supplied 
with arms and ammunition purchased from British stores in Madras. The Russell Brigade, 
consisting of 2081 troops divided into two battalions, was formed in 1813.45 The Brigade 
was not only commanded by British officers and supplied with British stores, it was also 
paid from the residency treasury.46 The sums required for its maintenance were deducted 
from the peshkash that the British in theory still paid for the Northern Circars to 
Hyderabad. 47 
Berar's 'irregular cavalry' was brought under the scope of the 'reforms' in 1816. 2000 
cavalry were reformed in the first instance. 1500 were assigned to Salabat Khan and the 
remaining to several other commandants, mostly British. 4000 more cavalry were 
reformed a short while afterwards and assigned to a British officer called Davies.48 
The whole of the Berar reformed troops, 7425 infantry and 6000 cavalry, were 
subjected to a single system of command in 1817. The resident was vested with the 
overall authority over them. Their operational responsibility lay with five military 
commanders. Pitman, Hom and Salabat Khan, assisted by Lyne, were appointed infantry 
commanders, with 3368, 2157 and 1900 troops, respectively. Each command was divided 
up into several battalions. Captain Davies, with 4000 men, and Salabat Khan, with 2000 
men were appointed the commanders of cavalry. Each of the five commanders of infantry 
and cavalry was assisted by a host of European commandants, who were in tum assisted by five European staff officers each. The entire body of the reformed troops was 
collectively referred to as the 'Hyderabad Contingent'. But the Hyderabad Contingent was Hyderabad's only in name.49 
3.4 The Implications of Reform, c.1807-21 
'Reforming' Berar's 'irregular' troops into 'regular' troops under British commandants 
was much more than merely an exercise in military discipline in order to improve 
Hyderabad's defences along the Maratha-Pindari frontier. In fact, reform was a means of 
making serious inroads into the traditional powers and privileges of Hyderabad 's 
intermediaries and, eventually, core areas. 'Irregular' troops were synonymous with the 
traditional military and revenue assignments of the intermediaries.50 When the British 
reformed the irregular troops into regulars, they took away military assignments from the 
44 See references in last footnote. 
45 See the last footnote. 
46 This was to ensure the regular payment of salaries. 
47 In reality, it paid very little peshk:ash; for many years it paid none at all. 48 NAI, For Sec, 27 July 1816, Sydneham's Letter, 5, 1 March 1813; 5 July 1817, Russell's Letter, 7, 14 June 1817; also: Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 215-36; George, Hyderabad Contingent. 49 NAI, For Sec, 5 July 1817, Russell's Letter, 7, 14 June 1817; Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 215-36; George, Hyderabad Contingent. see also: H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 62-72. 50 NAI, For Pol, 21 May 1807, Russell to Sydneham, Letter, 3, 5 March 1807; For Sec, 27 July 1816, 3-8. 
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intermediaries and added these to their own forces. The intermediaries' revenue 
assignments were also re-assigned to Palmer and Co, in the period c.1807-20. 51 Reform 
thus lay at the heart of a monopolistic trend in military fiscalism. British officers were 
appointed to train and command the reformed troops and the latter were also supplied 
with arms, ammunition and equipment purchased from British military stores in Bombay 
and Madras. Both British officers and British supplies were more expensive than what 
Hyderabad had been used to with the former intermediary assignees. Moreover, reformed 
troops were in one sense not as 'productive' as the traditional irregulars had been. 
Intermediaries had traditionally depended on intervening in the local alliances and 
conflicts between nawabs and zamindars for profit. They had kept the number of their 
irregular troops down to the essential minimum, - not bothering about officially stipulated 
quotas or frontier defence, - in order to make their fluctuating fiscal fortunes profitable. 
Their fiscal fortunes had fluctuated because the intermediaries had not exercised certain or 
lasting control over the core areas they were assigned. Another reason why intermediaries 
had been unable to collect the officially estimated revenues to their full extent was that 
'Mughal' assessments were deliberately overpitched by at least one third, and often 
more.52 Intermediaries had traditionally, in other words, never been able to pressurize or 
destroy a large number of core areas simultaneously.53 If one set of core areas was under 
seige from them, then others continued to attract investment, labour and resources under 
the patronage and protection of their small kings. The regional economy economy as a 
whole remained dynamic. It was in this sense that the traditional assignments of 
Hyderabad's intermediaries had been 'productive' when compared to the reformed troops 
under the British in the early 19th century.54 When the British took over the 
intermediaries' military assignments, they also maintained these at full strength, and in 
such superior discipline as to be able to exert potentially destructive pressure on a wide 
range of economically vibrant core areas simultaneously, a situation rarely witnessed 
earlier. Another dimension to the destructive potential of British troops lay in the manner 
in which they were financed . The revenue assignments that were taken away from 
intermediaries when they were deprived of their military assignments were re-assigned to 
the officially favoured Palmer and Co.55 The latter's advance payments, or 'loans', to 
Hyderabad against these assignments were underwritten by British fire power in actual 
practice. Palmer and Co could call in the reformed troops to squeeze out revenues from 
51 See discussion below. 
52 See, for example: IOLR, Mack Gen, 43, 44, Deccan Statistics; Nayeem, Mughal Administration of Deccan, pp. 97-207; NAI, HRMC, 31/1817-20, Resident to G-G, Letter, 22 Oct 1819. 
53 This must surely have been one important reason why, as Richards points out, the Mughals did not decline because of declining revenues in Golconda, but for other reasons, unlike other parts of India in the same period. 54 See also: Chapter One above. 
55 See, for example: Regani,Nizam-British Relations, pp. 215-36; Chaudhari, British Relations with Hyderabad; P. Wood, 'Vassal State in the Shadow of Empire: Palmer's Hyderabad, 1799-1867', (Wisconsin Univ. Ph.D. thesis, 1981). H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 73-86. 
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districts it was assigned if these did not match up to official estimates. Such occasions 
were hardly likely to be infrequent when neither the British nor Palmer and Co 
recognized that official revenue estimates were never meant to be taken at more than two 
thirds their face value, at the very most. The British maintained their reformed troops at 
full strength and also expected Palmer and Co to raise the officially assessed revenues in 
full. The Palmer firm rapidly increased the number of districts it was assigned, therefore, 
and the British began . to batter core areas on an unprecedented scale. The adverse 
consequences of monopolistic military fiscalism were intensified by a prolonged 
agricultural depression in the early 19th century. The core areas of the Hyderabad 
countryside began to suffer and decline. The British were sooner or later bound to realise, 
that their reforms were not working. When they did so, however, they blamed the 
intermediaries, not themselves. 
Berar's reformed troops gave a new meaning to the business of applying coercion 
against zamindars who could not pay up the revenues they were officially assessed for. 
But the centre failed to match its new ability to penetrate and destroy productive 
zamindari tracts with conciliatory terms to zamindars or ameliorative measures to 
agriculturists during years of depression. Intermediaries, too, had caused depopulation and 
decline through coercive measures in the past, but they had never commanded quite the 
same fire power as the British troops. They had always been obliged, therefore, to enter 
into expedient compromises with at least a few zamindars. The reformed troops, on the 
other hand, operated under a centre so committed to strengthening its defences against the 
Marathas and to military fiscalism that it did not dwell seriously on the destructive 
implications of its coercive power in the countryside. 
3.4.1 Palmer and Co. 
The Palmer house's dealings in Hyderabad can be divided into two phases, that of the 
'old firm' and that of the 'new'. The old firm did business between 1811 and 1814, when 
the resident and members of his staff were among its investors. The firm 's standard 
practice was to advance loans to Hyderabad at 25% annual interest against the security of 
revenue assignments. Collections from these assignments were deemed to be the 
resposibility of the concerned intermediaries. The latter were assisted or threatened by the 
reformed and British troops depending on how they responded to the firm 's demands. 
They were liable to be coerced if their revenue payments became slack, even if this was 
due to unrealistically high assessments in poor agricultural seasons. Depopulation and 
contraction of the cultivated area could occur in such circumstances. Indeed, the firm's 
methods became so notorious by 1814 that the residency felt obliged to distance itself 
from its activities. In particular, the resident advised Palmer to investigate two specific 
charges of extortion. But his suggestion was brushed aside. Henry Russell, therefore, felt 
compelled to ask Palmer and Co to remove its offices from the residency 's precincts. He 
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and his brother also withdrew their own private shares in the firm's stock.56 
However, Palmer had access to much higher patronage than the residency through his 
friend and partner, William Rumbold. He refused to be discouraged by Russell's rebuff. 
Rumbold used his personal influence with the governor-general to obtain a new licence 
for the firm in 1818. This was ostensibly to develop a timber trade between Berar and the 
Andhra coast down the Godavari. The licence made no reference to the old firm, or to its 
financial dealings, which were illegal by the British parliamentary legislation of 1788. Not 
only did the Palmer house get a new licence, the governor general also spoke of 
discouraging any potential competitors. The resident resumed his private and public 
connections with Palmer and Co when he saw where support for it was coming from. He 
also helped the firm extend its financial dealings with Hyderabad. 
Chandu Lal was encouraged to borrow more from the Palmer house. The old tyrannies 
of intermediaries were reinforced in the areas that came under the firm's grip as 
securities. To tracts declining from the operations of the reformed and British troops were 
added those that were made to bear the costs of the loans contracted from the firm in 
order to keep the reform programme going. As the reforms in Berar grew in size and 
scope, so too, paradoxically, did the centre's, and the firm's, reliance on the irregulars and 
their condemned methods. 6000 cavalry were reformed besides the existing 7000-odd 
regular infantry on the eve of the Maratha war in 1817. A crucial feature of the reform 
was regular pay for the troops. The governor of Berar, Govind Baksh, was given 
responsibility for the regular payment of about 80% of them. The remainder were paid by 
means of a recurring monthly loan of Rs. 52,000 from the firm. The latter added the 
weight of its powerful official patronage to the benefits of its apparently extensive capital. 
It also utilized the backing of the reformed and British troops to pressurize intermediaries 
if they fell behind in their revenue payments. If districts still did not yield the amounts 
they were assessed for, the difference between assessment and collection was supplied 
from the firm's stocks, and deemed as a further loan, for which Chandu Lal had to give 
fresh securities. Apart from an increasing number of European investors, Hyderabad 
Sahukars also found it preferable to lend to Palmer and Co at 12% interest, rather than 
directly to Chandu Lal at 25 %. 
Govind Baksh could not keep up regular payments for the reformed troops that were 
his responsibility during the 1817-18 war. Chandu Lal now appointed the Palmer firm as 
paymaster to all the reformed troops. The sums involved were _Rs. 2 lakhs per month, on 
the usual terms. The idea that the firm be given such a role originated with the British 
political agent in Berar, George Sydneham, who had earlier been one of the chief 
architects of the military reform there. The financial transactions of the new firm far 
exceeded the scope of its 1814 licence and also ran counter to existing British legislation 
56 This paragraph and the subsequent four paragraphs are based on the references cited in the last footnote. 
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on the subject of usurious moneylending by private European agencies to princely states 
in India. Rumbold's influence with the governor general took care of these transgressions, 
however. The new licence given to Palmer & Co awarded it special status vis-a-vis the ( legislation on financial transactions. Calcuuta approved a 6-year loan of Rs 60 Lakhs to 
Hyderabad by the firm at an annual interest rate of 18% against the security of districts 
worth Rs 17 Lakhs. The firm was forbidden from entering directly into revenue 
collections, however. In practice, the 60 Lakh loan involved no new payments to Chandu 
Lal. It was merely a device for restructuring the the firm's outstanding credit to 
Hyderabad, which was not recognized or underwritten by the terms of the new licence. 
Hyderabad's debts on the old accounts amounted to Rs 52 Lakhs. The firm added another 
8 lakhs to this figure as a 'bonus' for charging only 18% interest on the 'new' loan, as 
opposed to the customary 25%, and for risking making advances to Chandu Lal while the 
firm's application for a new licence was still pending. The Court of Directors in London 
decided in 1820 that they could not approve of Calcutta's 1818 licence to Palmer & Co. 
But they felt obliged to play along with it, as it had in practice been operational for two 
years now. 
The secret that the 60 Lakh loan by the new firm was merely a restatement of older 
loans was apparently a well kept one. The storm did not break until 1822, when Russell's 
successor in Hyderabad, Metcalfe, discovered the truth about it.57 The controversies 
following Metcalfe's revelations were long and bitter. But what they certainly confirmed 
was that the costs of military reform in Berar in 1807-19 helped the centre and Palmer 
and Co to consolidate their grip over irregulars and push them into intensifying their 
oppressive practices: 
'They [Palmer & Co.] have contrived also to identify themselves with the British name and when I am in districts the pillage of which goes to their 
shop, people always talk as if our Government were a party concerned. Their chaprasis range the country with the double power of the Nizam's 
and the British Government, and one source of their profits is buying up 
at heavy discount debts which the rent creditors cannot, but which they 
can by means of these authoritative messengers'. 58 
3.4.2 The Impact on Berar 
Berar was divided into two areas, Eastern and Western Berar, for the purposes of 
Russell's reforms. Eastern Berar was governed by a relation of Chandu Lal's, Raja Ram, 
and Western Berar by the minister's brother, Govind Baksh. The latter was also the 
governor for the whole of Berar. The districts under both Govind Baksh and Raja Ram 
went into absolute decline. Raja Ram's twenty two districts were described by Captain 
Hollis in 1820 as 'the most impoverished, depopulated ... and least productive ones in the 
57 He had suspected collusion between Palmer and Company and members of the residency staff, as well as the Calcutta government, since his first days in Hyderabad. 
5B Regani, Nizam-British Relations, p. 222. 
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dominions of ... the Nizam' .59 Three of them, in the vicinity of Kaligaon, had been entirely 
deserted and several others approached this condition, possessing now no more than 116th 
to 1/8th of their original population. The districts on the Wurdha had lost about 80% of 
their population, despite their high natural fertility. 60 Emigrations had become particularly 
rapid since c.1814. Among those who left were 'many of the deshmukhs, deshpandes and 
patels, the greater part of the cultivators and banias, with the whole of the respectable 
population'.61 Metcalfe's journey in 1821, - north to Nanded, Hingoli, Bassim, Karinja and 
Ellichpur; north west to Akola, Lakhanwadi, Jafirabad Aurangabad, and south to 
Mungipatan, Beed, Kullum, Ousa, Bhalki and Bidar, - left him with unhappy impressions. 
The whole country 'exhibited the most striking features of decay and depopulation'.62 His 
assistant, Wells' closer study of 50 districts in western Berar and northern Marathwada 
supported his findings, though Wells found a variability in the decline, and some rare 
pockets of prosperity. The naturally fertile Maiker taluq, - comprising the districts of 
Lonar, Maikar, Wakad, Ghat Bori, Malkapur, Pangarh, Shakkarkheda, Matergaon and 
Sindkhed, - produced only 113rd of its assessed revenue. Jafirabad taluq - comprising the 
parganas of Jafirabad, Chandole, Dhar, Dhawerah, Seonah, Amrapur, Saindurwada and 
Bokurdhan - also presented a grim spectacle of depopulation and falling revenues. The 
latter were at least 45% down on the assessed amount everywhere and still lower in some 
pockets. In the Rohangarh taluq, conditions were grim except in the small jagirs of Bande 
Ali and Nasir, whose expansive cultivation made the remainder of the taluq look 
'comparatively a waste'. Inhabited villages were few and far between in the Hirsool, 
Aurangabad, Satara, Takli, Larsangiri, Khandala and Saindurwada parganas. These were in 
a condition of 'the extremest poverty'. The parganas' contractor, a moneylending 
graintrader, advanced seed to the cultivators at 24% interest at sowing time and bought 
back grain from them at well below the prevailing market prices at the time of harvest.63 
If the intermediaries' extortions destroyed agriculture, they did not leave manufacture 
and trade untouched. Jalna and Patan declined during Govind Baksh's tenure as the 
taluqdar of Western Berar and northern Marathwada. Patan's famed exports, - gold 
brocades, silks and muslins, - were once reputed to have yielded 'several lakhs of rupees' 
annually in revenue. Most of its shroffs, dealers and manufactures were gone in 1821.64 
Eastern Berar was not in a much better condition than Western Berar or northern 
Marathwada. About two-thirds of the villages in the Manikgarh, Sirpur, Woon and Mahur 
districts bore the marks of recent desertion. Successive contractors between Fasli 1222 
59 NAI, HRR, 686, Captain Hollis's Report on Berar, April 1820. 
60 Those on the eastern bank on the river were very fertile and those on the western only marginally less so. 61 Ibid. 
62 NAI, For Pol, 8 Dec 1821, Metcalfe's Letter, 63, Nov 1821. 
63 NAI, HRR, 690, Wells to Metcalfe, Letter, 15 Nov 1821. 
64 NAI, For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, Wells's Review, 99, 1821-5. 
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and 1230, - Govind Baksh, Khairullah Khan, Raja Ram, Mani Lal, Jwala Pershad and 
Palmer and Co, - had ravaged the districts in order to meet the centre's demands. The 
revenue paying capacity of Balconda district had fallen by more than 30% in a space of 5 
years under Manik Ram, for example. When Hyderabad removed him for poor 
remittances, his replacement, Qarar Nawaz Khan, complained of extensive evidence of 
depopulation. As the enormity of the problem in Berar registered with the centre, Govind 
Baksh was recalled and Chandu Lal proposed to attend to the Western Berar districts 
himself with the aid of a new set of trustworthy taluqdars. Raja Ram was also recalled 
from Eastern Berar. Some of his districts were given to Salabat Khan, the jagirdar of 
Ellichpur, and others to Chandu Lal's son, Bala Pershad, who was to be assisted by an 
old and trusted favourite of the diwan's, Venkat Rao.65 
3.4.3 From Berar to Marathwada and Telangana 
Yet a change of personnel was hardly likely to sustain by itself regular payments for 
the reformed troops, while also servicing the diwan's mounting debts. Attempts were 
made, therefore, to extend the costs of the reformed troops, and the burden of the centre's 
debt, from Berar to districts adjacent to it. This was done under the guise of 'further 
reforms'. The main technique was to charge the intermediaries of the new districts with 
serious irregularities and proclaim a desire to 'reform' them. The first areas thus affected 
were northern Marathwada and Telangana. The initial casualties among the intermediaries 
subjected to the 'further reforms' were Rafat ul Mulk and Shams ul Umra. Both had 
enjoyed considerable influence in Hyderabad's supra-local politics in former days. Rafat 
ul Mulk was now accused of scandalous mismanagement. The supposed collaboration of 
his naibs with 'gangs of local robbers' was cited as evidence. His military and revenue 
assignments were resumed, and his personal jagir and property were also impounded. The 
latter, he was warned, would not be returned to him until he had answered the charges 
against himself satisfactorily. Nirmal from amongst his former districts was farmed out to 
a loyal risaladar of the reformed Berar cavalry, Bhuchar Mal, who had distinguished 
himself during the 1818 war. Manik Ram, already the taluqdar of Balconda and Medak, 
was given the Mudgal, Binola and Bhainsa districts. Shiv Pershad was appointed to the 
districts of Sarbar, Digbur, Warwal and Kaulass. Nanded went to Qarar Nawaz Khan, 'an 
officer of credit and respectability and of tried attachment to the British Government'. 
Rajaura, Polam, Ambaji and Dhokay were given to Ismail Yar Jang. 66 
Rafat ul Mulk had been the second most important jagirdar and taluqdar in Hyderabad 
until his removal, in terms of both family influence and the extent of his military and 
65 NAI, For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, Metcalfe's Report of a tour undertaken in 1821-22, 98; also: HRR, 690, Wells to Metcalfe, Letter, 15 Nov 1821. 
66 NAI, HRMC, 34/1819-20, Russell's Letter, 1 Sept 1820. 
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revenue assignments.67 The most important jagirdar, Shams ul Umra, was also given a taste of the 'further reforms'. He was accused of having left his irregular troops in heavy 
arrears of pay, and of seriously injuring the population and productivity of his districts 
since inheriting them from his father four years earlier.68 Chandu Lal himself was at first hesitant to touch Shams ul Umra. Not only was the latter's jagir specifically assigned for the upkeep of the Nizam 's household troops, the paigah, he was also married to a sister 
of the Nizam's. Besides, he owed Chandu Lal 'a large' sum of money on personal 
account. But Russell's open support for the measure gave Chandu Lal the courage to 
resume Shams ul Umra's jagir and to assimilate it to the centre's new strategy for financing the reformed troops in Berar and for servicing Hyderabad 's debt. The paigah districts were carved up into seven distinct charges. Chandu Lal appointed hand picked 
taluqdars to each one of them. 69 
Another influential jagirdari family who went the same way as Rafat ul Mulk and Shams ul Umra were the Lohanis. Shakir Khan and other Lohanis had commanded one of 
the largest bodies of irregulars in Hyderabad. They were now deprived of most of their 
assignments on the charge of assisting 'gangs of robbers'.70 Anand Rao and Muluk Chand, 
the amils of Sitoonda and Jafirabad, respectively, were also removed for such 
collaboration. Nur ul Umra was similarly replaced in Warangal and Manik Rao appointed in his stead.71 
Parts of Telangana also displayed the same symptoms of decline as Berar and northern Marathwada as a result of the pressure for increased revenues to service the military 
reforms and the debts connected with them. In Khammam taluq, the naib taluqdar himself led a band of Banjara cattle raiders, apart from causing depopulation through exorbitant demands and cruel methods. Warangal, too, suffered under similar pressures, until 1819 from Dhokal Singh and thereafter under Nanak Ram, who extended Dhokal Singh's 
methods. When some zamindars tried to petition Hyderabad's diwan against a 100% increase iri revenue assessments imposed by Nanak Ram, 'they were threatened with imprisonment, much abused ... and a sweeper was introduced to alarm them with the threat 
of personal indignity'. Nanak Ram placated Chandu Lal with a nazrana, on the other hand. Patwaris flying from Hannamkonda district complained that one of Nanak Ram's 
naibs, Ahmad Ali, had seized their grain forcibly. Some of them bore marks of brutal torture on their bodies. Not even 'the better classes' of rural society were left untouched by Nanak Ram, according to one of Metcalfe's assistants, Ralph, who was superintendent 
67 He had held territory estimated at Rs. 20 lak:hs annually. 
6S Shams ul Umra's districts were estimated at Rs 30 Lak:hs annually. 69 Ibid. 
70 The Lohanis had, indeed, collaborated with rebellious Bhil Nailcs. See Chapter Four below. 71 Ibid.; NAI, HRR, 686, Davies to Briggs, Letter, 9 Dec 1819; Davies to Plowden, Letter, 27 Dec 1819. 
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for eastern Telangana.72 The intermediary's agents pillaged their homes, sold their property and 'enforced [ revenue demands through] confinement, threats and by torture'. The famine of 1821 only added to the prevailing distress: 
'I have seen villagers with the slightest covering of rags digging into the woods to satisfy the cravings of hunger. Poorness of diet engenders loathsome and incurable diseases, and it destroys the younger children' .73 
The poorest inhabitants were 'tenfold' more vulnerable in these conditions. Large numbers 
were wiped out. Some survivors borrowed telling motifs from memory to describe their 
tragedy: 
'When the pindarrahs came they took our clothes and vessels which we could replace. They stayed two days and since that year have not returned. The amils are pindarrahs every day of the year, and take what the others could not remove. They take our cattle and corn! '74 
More exceptionally, an attempt was made in the name of the further reforms to 
conciliate one or two Telangana zamindars. Kona Rao of Yelgundel had been battered into submission in 1819,75 but his districts had remained unprofitable so long as he had been kept out of them forcibly. They had witnessed large scale desertion and the few pockets that had had remained inhabited had remained loyal to Kona Rao. The centre's 
revenue collections in Y elgundel had become more paltry than ever before in 
consequence. It had grudgingly come to admit that the subjection of Kona Rao, and his forcible exclusion from Yelgundel, had not been worth the candle. It proposed to 
withdraw its taluqdars and forces from the district if Kona Rao agreed to disband his forces and to take his zamindari back on contract. Kona Rao agreed. He reportedly gave 
each of his disbanding men a pair of bullocks and some seed to resume agriculture.76 
3.4.4 Intermediaries Blamed 
Hyderabad had begun to recognize even before Metcalfe's revelations from c.1820 
onwards that many areas that had borne the costs of the reforms in Berar had witnessed 
unprecedented decline. It had become deeply worried and had looked for explanations. But it did not recognize its own responsibility; that its pressure on the intermediaries, -
whether directly or through revenue assignments to its creditors, - was what had driven 
the latter to increased coercion. The unreformed intermediaries themselves were blamed 
72 NAI, HRR, 126, Ralph to Metcalfe, Letter, 29 Aug 1822; see also: For Pol, 19 July 1822, 8; 21 Oct 1825, 98. 73 NAI, HRR, 126, Ralph to Metcalfe, Letter, 29 Aug 1822. 74 Ibid .. 
75 It was a measure of the new coercive power at the disposal of the centre that Pitman achieved this object in a space of about thirty days, whereas Kona Rao had successfully held Hyderabad's authority at bay for thirty years previously. (NAI, HRMC, 31/1817-19, Resident to G-G, 5 April 1819) 76 Ibid.; NAI, For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 99; HRMC, 34/1819-20, Russell's Letter, 1 Sept 1820; Chaudhuri, British Relations with Hyderabad. 
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for having become too oppressive and rapacious. Russell advocated a change of personnel 
among the serishtadar-s and taluqdars as a remedy. 
The earliest British critics of Berar's irregulars had sought to explain their corruption 
and tyranny through curious tautologies. He had put down the unacceptable standards of 
the irregulars to poor pay, indiscipline and factious pride. Doveton complained that 
irregulars did not meet Govind Baksh's requisitions and would delay matters interminably. 
They even remained inactive while Pindaris plundered within attacking range. He 
attributed such misconduct to poor pay, training and discipline, as well as to jealousy and 
divisiveness: 
'[They] disclaim each other's authority and control; and seldom ... comply 
with the requisitions on the part of the manager of Govind Baksh, which 
they generally contrive to shift from one to the other' .77 
Govind Baksh was induced to undertake a tour of Northern Berar in order to gauge the 
extent of the malaise among the irregulars. He held that they were in such a bad state 
because they stood in need of reform.78 Russell had initially blamed the ills of the 
intermediaries, likewise, on 'the disorders of the Nizam's government, ... the inefficiency of 
the local establishments ... [and] the pernicious system of local government'. He reported 
no improvement when he reviewed the situation in 1811: 
' .. .it is against the disorders of the Nizam' s government and the 
inefficiency of his military establishments ... that our measures must be 
immediately directed' .79 
But he had also hinted at a different kind of analysis now, suggesting that it was the 
contract system in military and revenue affairs that perpetuated the older evils of the 
intermediaries. 80 
Sydneham developed this argument further in 1813, showing how the problems of the 
irregulars were really those of revenue farming as a whole. However, he, too, failed to 
understand why revenue farming should not only continue to prevail, but even become 
more exploitative in the very period when a reform was being attempted in some of 
Berar's intermediary establishments. Yet his indictment of 1813 was comprehensive and 
perceptive. He trie~ to understand why the irregulars were still prone to certain ills, rather 
than simply reiterating with disapproval how they had learnt nothing from their reformed 
colleagues. Berar's irregular cavalry was maintained in two kinds of establishment, 
sarkari and jagirdari. The sarkari establishments were farmed out by the centre to 
serishtadars, all of whom, except for the governor of Berar, Govind Baksh, usually 
77 NAI, For Pol, 4 Jan 1808, 1,6,10,12. 
78 Ibid .. 
79 Ibid .. 
80 Ibid .. 
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resided in Hyderabad. They ran their establishments indirectly from here, through 
peshkars posted at the principal stations of their troops. The peshkars, in tum, delegated 
responsibility for detachments serving away from the main bodies to mutsaddies. The 
mutsaddies were usually the same persons as the jamadars and sardars, or commandants, 
of the detachments. They entertained two kinds of horseman in their service, silladar-s 
and bargir-s. The silladars owned their horses while the bargirs were supplied theirs by 
the mutsaddies, though their equipment was their own. The mutsaddies were expected to 
employ only silladars. In practice, more than half their horsemen were bargirs who were 
usually drawn from among the ranks of their own servants and relations.81 
An important aspect of the chain of command in the sarkari cavalry was that it was 
co-equal with the chain of revenue contractors. The revenues of particular districts were 
earmarked for the payment of particular establishments of the sarkari cavalry. Serishtadars 
were taluqdars, peshkars naib taluqdars and jamadars jaidaddar-s in the districts thus 
earmarked. In theory, the horsemen of the sarkari establishments received regular monthly 
cash salaries from the revenues of these districts. In practice, they remained in arrears of 
pay for months and also perpetually indebted to their jamadars. The latter gave them 
loans at 48% annual interest, often in kind, instead of their regular salaries. Their salaries 
disappeared in paying for the various commissions and cuts charged by Hyderabad 's 
diwan and the whole chain of the military/revenue command. The minister took a 
fortnight's pay and the serishtadar a month's pay as routine annual commissions, for 
example. They also levied periodic nazranas. The serishtadar thus had to be propitiated 
when he attended darbar; when a child was born in his house; when he recovered from an 
illness; when he conducted a wedding feast or religious ceremony, or when he appointed 
a new peshkar or jamadar.82 
A muster master appointed by Hyderabad was supposed to check precisely such 
abuses. But, in practice, he and his assistants connived with the military and revenue 
contractors. Rather than carry out surprise checks on the intermediaries' establishments, 
they rarely moved out of their headquarters in Aurangabad, and helped play havoc with 
standards and statistics, in return for bribes, when mustering took place once every three 
to six months. The affairs of Berar's jagirdari cavalry found a close parallel in those of 
the sarkari cavalry, except perhaps in the establishment of Salabat Khan. But the next best 
establishment after Salabat Khan's, that of Subhan Khan, was maintained at only about 
50% of its stipulated strength. His horsemen were more than one year in arrears of pay, 
as well as being indebted and impoverished.83 Such factors, not surprisingly, made Berar's 
irregular cavalry quite incapable of defending Hyderabad's northern border against the 
81 NAI, For Sec, 27 July 1816, Sydneham's Letter, 5, 1 March 1813. 
82 Ibid .. 
83 Ibid .. 
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Maratha threat. Besides, the contractors and sub-contractors could ill afford to distract 
their troops from revenue collection duties. No firm consensus obtained between 
Hyderabad's zamindars and intermediaries on political authority or revenue appropriation. 
Their relationships consisted, rather, of temporary alliances of expediency, which were 
shaped by the particular configuration of local rivalries in a particular locality at any 
given point of time. The intermediaries could hardly be expected to take their troops away 
from their revenue assignments in such circumstances. Had they done so, this would have 
amounted to political and financial suicide. 
It was impossible to make enquiries into the condition of Berar's irregular cavalry, 
according to Sydneham, 'without creating jealousies and suspicions'. He felt obliged to 
conduct them, therefore, 'through indirect channels [and] with such caution and 
circumspection as to elude observation from the principal authorities of Berar' .84 Saddled 
with the responsibility of paying for the reforms, and financing the maintenance and the 
campaigns of the reformed troops, the unreformed intermediaries of Berar not only 
extended and intensified their condemned old methods, they also became averse to any 
suggestion of 'reform' in their own establishments. For, such reform would have 
threatened their ability to meet the increased demands upon them. They would have had 
to take their troops away from their revenue assignments, for one thing, in the interests of 
a system of frontier defence upon which their immediate survival did not tum. Their 
revenue collections, upon which their survival did tum, would have suffered seriously 
from a diminished coercive capability, on the other hand. Another drawback of reforms in 
their establishments would have been that stem European pay and muster masters would 
not have recognized that numbers and standards were a time honoured legal fiction in 
Hyderabad. The intermediaries would have found it impossible, in these circumstances, to 
meet the increased demands upon them. Resistance to the reforms was, not surprisingly, 
therefore, pervasive among those who bore the costs, of reforming and maintaining some 
of their colleagues. 
3.5 Village Settlements vs. Military Fiscalism, c.1821-38 
The centre resumed intermediary assignments and penetrated zamindari domains in the 
early 19th century. But as a combination of centralization, monopolistic military fiscalism 
and agricultural depression85 tore apart the old political order of Hyderabad, the core areas 
began to lose population and decline economically, and the centre became financially 
indebted. Intermediaries and zamindars were either assimilated to the new regime or 
became involved in political protest.86 Metcalfe, who was resident in the period 1820-29, 
84 Ibid .. 
85 S. Guha, 'The Agrarian Economy'; P.J. Thomas and B. Natarajan, 'Economic Depression in the Madras Presidency, 1825-54', EHR, 1, 2(1936-7), pp. 57-67. 
86 See Chapter Four below. 
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commented on these tendencies with perspicacity. He also hoped to be able to reverse 
them. The principal aims of his 'village settlements' were to restore peace and prosperity 
to the countryside, to weaken the hold of military fiscal intermediaries in it, and to boost 
the revenues and improve the finances of the centre.87 There was, however, in practice a 
contradiction between Metcalfe' s vision of reform and his continued adherence to military fiscalism. On the one hand, he criticized the manifestations of military fiscalism, - an 
overpressed countryside and a highly indebted centre, - and those whom he regarded as its chief agents, - Hyderabad's diwan and revenue farmers, - and, on the other, he 
continued to demand that British troops be paid regularly, and that the number of 
'irregulars' be decreased. Moreover, he gave top priority to making the Hyderabad 
countryside pay for the British military presence when it came to the crunch. The latter 
was by Metcalfe's time much more than a mere device for defending the Maratha border 
and suppressing frontier banditti: these threats had in any case receded in the 1820s and 1830s. The British military presence was in fact a tool for centralization and coercion, 
and a source of military fiscal profit.88 
Metcalfe made concerted efforts to disassociate the residency and Calcutta from the 
cruel legacies of Russell's reforms. In particular, he launched a crusade that would finally 
end Palmer & Co's financial transactions with Hyderabad and curtail its dealings with private parties as well.89 But paying off the Palmer debts still cost Hyderabad the permanent loss of the Northern Circars. The centre, moreover, still had to continue to find 
means for paying the reformed and British troops regularly, and for maintaining other priority establishments, such as the Nizam's household. Hyderabad continued to face a 
serious financial crisis, notwithstanding the scaling down and settlement of the Palmer debt through the intervention of Calcutta, which offered Hyderabad a low interest distress loan in return for the cession of the Northern Circars.90 
Metcalfe might well talk of agricultural expansion, protection for the ryot and peace in 
the country, but all this meant little to Chandu Lal as long as it did not solve the problem 
of how best to meet his short term financial needs. The resident himself admitted that Hyderabad might lose revenues if Chandu Lal instructed his taluqdars and zamindars to 
abide by the village settlements faithfully. Yet, on the other hand, Chandu Lal was held 
responsible for maintaining the Nizam's household, paying the British and the reformed 
troops, servicing the centre's debts, and running other priority establishments regularly. What measures he took to execute one responsibility seemed .to interfere with his other 
87 See, for example: NAI, For Pol, 8 Dec 1821, Resident to Gol, 63, Nov 1821; 19 July 1822, 8; Chaudhuri, British Relations with Hyderabad; Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 237-50. 88 See, for example: NAI, For Pol, 4 July 1823, 40; 21 Oct 1825, 83; 30 June 1825, 84; HRMC, 37/1823-24, Metcalfe's Letter, 20 Nov 1823; H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 108-18. 89 Wood, 'Vassal State'; Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 215-36; Chaudhuri, British Relations with Hyderabad. 90 Regani, Nizam-British Relations, p. 234; NAI, For Pol, 19 July 1822, 8; 4 July 1823, 40; 30 June 1825, 84; HRMC, 37/1823-24, Metcalfe's Letter, 20 Nov 1823. 
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priorities. When he reduced the ministers commission on revenue collections, for example, 
he felt forced to compensate for this by raising new public loans. Chandu Lal's di!J..ema 
was compounded by the fact that, in the first years of Metcalfe's tenure, the governor-
general himself listened more to Hyderabad's main creditor, Palmer and Co, than to the 
resident. Chandu Lal was thus forced, on the one hand, to press the short term methods 
that the Palmer house and its powerful friend favoured and, on the other, to attempt to 
satisfy Metcalfe, who advocated long term causes. Governor-general Hastings' invocation 
of legalistic minutiae in his directive to the resident to reduce unwarranted 'interference' 
in the 'internal affairs' of Hyderabad was, in fact, designed to give Chandu Lal more 
room to pursue his short term strategies.91 
Increasing financial pressures led Chandu Lal to intensify the only methods he knew in 
the situation: farming out more districts to intermediaries and raising new loans against 
further, even concurrent, revenue assignments. The removal of oppressive and corrupt 
taludars that Metcalfe sometimes forced upon him ironically gave Chandu Lal greater / 
room for manoeuvre in this respect. He strengthened his hold on the contractors by 
threatening them with the stick of British displeasure and manipulated them into offering 
him even higher bids and nazranas than before. Yet, there were limits to innovations 
within revenue farming. They could depress indebtedness, for example. Though Chandu 
Lal could not, on his own admission, offer anything like a comprehensive review of 
Hyderabad's financial assets and liabilities at any given point of time, he was certain that 
Hyderabad had suffered a budgetary deficit of Rs 7 Lakhs to Rs 10 Lakhs each year 
between 1807 and 1830. One result of this was that sahukars were no longer willing to 
give him loans at the usual rates of interest, unless these were guaranteed by the resident. 
But Metcalfe generally did not interest himself in Chandu Lal's quest for cheap loans 
after the Palmer and Co scandal. His successor, Martin, too, remained uninterested, except 
on the one or two rare occasions when he mediated between the minister and the 
sahukars.92 
Metcalfe and Wells had visited some areas of Berar, Marathwada and Telangana in 
1821 and had found nothing favourable to report on Russell's reforms.93 In 1823, after the 
village settlements had come into operation, Metcalfe told an even sorrier tale than before. 
Tracts 'once filled with flourishing villages, having become depopulated by the natural 
91 NAI, For Pol, 19 July 1822, 8; 21 Oct 1825, Metcalfe's Letter, 83, 24 Nov 1823; 30 June 1825, 84; HRMC, 37/1823-24, Metcalfe's Letter, 20 Nov 1823; Wood, 'Vassal State'; Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 215-50; Chaudhuri, British Relations with Hyderabad. 
92 NAI, For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 98,99; 19 July 1822, 8; 30 June 1825, 84; 12 Aug 1831, Stewart to Gol, Letter, 96, 20 July 1831; HRR, 690, Wells to Metcalfe, Letter, 15 Nov 1821; 129, Ralph to Metcalfe, 29 Aug 1822; HRMC, 40/1827-29, Martin's Letters, 26 Jan, 16 Feb 1827; 42/1830-31, Stewart's Letter, 20 July 1831; Imamuddin, Tarikh-i-Nirmal, pp. 77-112; Wood, 'Vassal State'; Chaudhuri, British Relations with Hyderabad; Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 215-36. 
93 NAI, HRR, 690, Wells to Metcalfe, Letter, 15 Nov 1821; For Pol, 8 Dec 1821, Resident to Gol, 63, Nov 1821. 
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operation of tyranny, have latterly been appropriated by wild beasts'.94 What worried the 
resident most was the way in which intennediaries and the centre used the reformed 
troops to extend their coercive measures: 
'the dissolution of this force would be, I conceive, a necessary preliminary, for otherwise we would give British science, skill and heroism for purposes of uncontrolled tyranny and oppression' . 95 
A good example of the new . source of tyranny was a risala of Sikh troops cherished by 
Chandu Lal.96 
Superintendents soon began to discover that their village settlements were at 
considerable variance with the needs and priorities of the intermediaries. This was mainly 
due to the nature of the centre's demands upon the latter. The British themselves had a 
considerable, if indirect, stake in these demands. Taluqdars in eastern and northern 
Telangana, - in the taluqs of Bhongir, Nalgonda, Deverkonda, Paluncha, Khammam, 
Ramgir, Medak, Nirmal and Balconda, among others, - for example, were widely 
observed to be unsympathetic to the village settlements. The revenue estimates of the 
settlements were invariably lower than those in the contracts which Chandu Lal had given 
to the zamindars of these areas and which he expected the taluqdars he had appointed to 
collect. Moreover, it was only anything extra, over and above the, estimates in the 
contracts, that constituted the taluqdars profits. Where the zamindari contracts did not 
restrain them, village settlements had even less meaning for taluqdars. Nizam Yar Jang of 
Khammam taluq, for example, showed such total disregard for both contracts and the 
village settlements that his districts soon began to show signs of the depopulation and a 
contraction in the cultivated area. In one district, Kannagiri, revenues fell by as much as 
70%. Yet Chandu Lal was reluctant to remove Nizam Yar Jang from his charge. The 
latter was the Nizam 's brother-in-law and enjoyed some influence in Hyderabad. It was 
only upon Metcalfe's insistence that the diwan agreed to deprive Nizam Yar Jang of his 
taluqdari. But he still appeased the taluqdar by allowing him to retain the most valuable 
of his districts, Kondapalli, as a jagir.97 
The taluqdar of Paluncha, too, was supposed to collect the revenues stipulated in 
Chandu Lal's contracts with the zamindars. In practice, he also pushed for more than 
what was stipulated. His extortions drove several zamindars into hill and jungle retreats, 
from where some, like Bhupati Naik, operated as rebels and bandits. Some Warangal 
taluqdars were farmed out their districts directly by the centre, unlike their counterparts in 
94 A patel had come back to obtain a fresh lease on the site of one former village when he learnt that the residency staff had shot six tigers there. The former villagers were now all dispersed, he said, but he would make attempts to bring them back together. (NAI, For Pol, 4 July 1823, 40.) 
95 NAI, For Pol, 4 July 1823, 40. 
96 The diwan repeatedly ignored the resident's advice to disband the risala. (NAI, For Pol, 4 July 1823, 40.) 97 NAI, HRR, 126, Ralph to Metcalfe, 29 Aug 1822; For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 98,99. 
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Khammam and Paluncha, who only made collections on contracts Chandu Lal signed 
directly with the zamindars. They reserved to themselves the right, therefore, of 
determining what individual zamindars or villages would pay as revenue. Such taluqdars 
tended to be more powerful than their counterparts and usually maintained more extensive 
establishments for revenue collection.98 
The Ramgir taluqdar was served by a force of Sikhs and Arabs, who succeeded in 
driving away most of the taluq's zamindars by their coercive methods. The reduced 
revenues they now collected in consequence were all consumed in their own upkeep. The 
Nirmal taluqdar, Rai Bhuchar Mai, was believed to respect the principle of the village 
settlements; nevertheless, in practice, his naib, Rukun Lal, caused widespread 
depopulation in the taluq. Manik Ram and Venkat Ram resumed qaul-s awarded by the 
residency's superintendent in the Medak district. Medak's revenue yielding capacity fell 
by Rs. 1 Lakh in the short time, no more than two seasons, that they served there. They 
were removed thereafter by Chandu Lal on Metcalfe's insistence. 
There was scarcely a village in the Bhongir, Deverkonda and Nalgonda taluqs where 
intermediaries had not disregarded the village settlements, Wells reported in 1824. 
Metcalfe extended this characterisation to all taluqs in 1825.99 
The 'only check' on the intermediaries were the superintendents. But they were too 
few and far between to be able 'to restrain the most outrageous misrule' by naibs, who 
were usually, it was held, ill paid men of 'lower degree'. The taluqdars offered high bids 
and nazranas to Chandu Lal for their contracts, but enjoyed no corresponding security of 
tenure in return. They sought to make as much as they could from their districts, 
therefore, in as short a time as possible. 100 If the taluqdars sabotaged the village 
settlements in the districts administered by the diwan, jagir holdings did not even come 
within the purview of the settlements. Extending agriculture, population, peace and 
conciliation in the countryside seemed remote from the jagirdars immediate objectives, 
except in rare cases.101 
Little cause was found for consolation or congratulation as late as 1825, when most of 
the three year settlements had expired and many five year ones had not much longer to 
run. Intermediaries continued to be out of sympathy with Metcalfe's vision of reform. 
98 Typically, a peshkar headed the military and revenue wings of their establishment. He was assisted by a havaldar for every five to six villages and, under him, a malisuldar for every one or two. The mahsuldar usually presented himself to villagers with a detachment of troops at harvest time. If the crops had suffered due to bad weather, or had already been mortgaged to the local moneylender or graintrader, 'he expected the cultivators to pay their rents by contracting a new loan if necessary. A bakshi disbursed the salaries of the taluqdar's establishment. These 
were paid every three or six months, or whenever the taluqdar felt his collections permitted them. A khazanchi, 
who was usually the principal moneylender and merchant of the taluqdari, conveyed the taluqdar's remittances to 
the centre through his shop. A fotedar, usually a locally prominent goldsmith or graindealer, assayed the coins 
collected by the taluqdar's agents. (NAI, For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 98) · 
99 NAI, For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 98, 99; HRR, 582, Wells's Report, 6 May 1824. 
100 Metcalfe found only two taluqdars in the whole of Hyderabad, Rai Chottari Lal and Qarar Nawaz Khan, both in the W estem districts, worthy of praise. 
101 NAI, For Pol, 30 June 1825, 84. 
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Manik Ram plundered his charge, Ramgir and Yelgundel, comprehensively, but Chandu 
Lal agreed to remove him only under the greatest pressure, for example. The 
superintendent for the Northern Division, Campbell, complained that Manik Ram's 
successor, Kona Rao, pushed his predecessor's extortions even further. The superintendent 
of eastern Berar, Sayer, likewise, reported heavy population losses in his districts. 
Revenue farmers promised to abide by the village settlements in the sowing season but 
broke their word when it came to harvest time. In Nalgonda, Gadwal, Gangawati, Kopal, 
Tawurugiri and other southern Telangana and Rayalseema districts, 'the population is 
manifestly greatly inferior to what it has been in all the districts; the appearance of houses 
abandoned and villages deserted is sure proof'. Manufactures were in a 'languishing state' 
as a result of agrarian misfortune. Weavers were heavily taxed and liable to have their 
goods seized on the slightest pretext, like all other artisans, and merchants as well. The 
taluqdar of Tawurugiri, Amir Beg, had to be removed forcibly when he imprisoned a 
desai, Swami Rao, and a nargauda, Shivashankar Rao. Both had been resisting his illegal 
demands for extra payments. Other taluqdars sabotaged village settlements by less overt 
means. They sub-rented their districts unofficially for sums higher than those mentioned 
in the village qauls, for example. Chandu Lal was usually willing to condone such 
practices provided he received suitable nazranas in return.102 
The Khammam and Warangal taluqdars compounded the effects of a severe drought 
by refusing rent remissions to cultivators. This seemed to follow directly from Chandu 
Lal's refusal to allow them any revenue remissions either. At least one taluqdar, Mirza 
Mohsin Khan, and several naibs, - Burhanuddin Khan of Warangal, Munnu Lal of 
Warangal, and Venkat Ram Pandit of Kutkur, Nizamabad and Vampalli, - were removed 
on the charge of exacerbating the effects of drought and famine. Kona Rao and other 
revenue farming zamindars of Yelgundel and Ramgir were also removed and imprisoned 
on similar charges. Yet others, like Jagga Rao, remained at large, however, either as 
fugitives or as men who had bought their freedom by paying large bribes to Chandu Lal. 
Rama Reddy of Pohunpet; Chandra Reddy and Bulliah of Deverkonda, and Vira Reddy 
and Narsaiah of Warangal figured among the latter category. They were all alleged to 
have murdered at least one deshmukh or deshpande each. Still other revenue farmers were 
reduced themselves to poverty or resistance.103 
Manik Ram, the amaldar of . Medak, and his naibs acquired a fearful reputation for 
placing boulders on the chests of cultivators; applying screws to their ears, noses and 
fingers; scalding them with hot oil; burning them with torches, and setting fire to their 
fingers after wrapping them up in oil-soaked cloths. Campbell was 'distinctly [able] to 
prove' that Manik Ram had collected at least Rs 80,000 in excess of the value of the 
102 NAI, For Pol, 30 June 1825, 84; 21 Oct 1825, 98, 99. 
100 NAI, 21 Oct 1825, 98, 99. 
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village qauls by such methods. That he shared his infamous gains with Chandu Lal he 
himself admitted. Medak, not surprisingly, witnessed widespread depopulation and decline 
outside the pockets where a fierce local resistance had been built up to Manik Ram. There 
were yet other ways of making contracts pay under conditions of financial squeeze. The 
intermediaries traditionally negotiated taqqavi with the centre during poor agricultural 
seasons. They were supposed to use it to help alleviate the distress of the cultivators. But, 
in practice, they used it now to advance loans to stricken cultivators at usurious rates of 
interest.104 Farmaish, or official grain procurement orders from Hyderabad, were also used 
by intermediaries to buy grain cheaply from the villages and sell at a profit to the centre. 
Manipulation of currencies, especially their intrinsic value and exchange rate, in league 
with grain dealers and sahukars, was another means by which intermediaries fleeced 
cultivators. Transit duties on raw materials and manufactures provided yet another means 
of extortion. These were applied more frequently and at higher rates than was officially 
sanctioned.105 
An example of the destruction of manufacture and trade through crippling taxes was 
presented by the decline of Homnabad, once a leading export centre of Marathwada.106 
Two rival groups of merchants had outbidded each other continually for the revenue 
contract of Hornnabad since the days of Azam ul Umra's diwani in the late 18th 
century. 107 Whichever group held the contract did its best to recover the large nazranas it 
had paid to the minister for obtaining it from the shops of its rivals. Chandu Lal actively 
encouraged this viscious cycle of high bids and exploitation when he was diwan. When 
the contracting party in 1828 complained that it was losing heavily on account of the 
increases in revenues and nazranas imposed by Chandu Lal,108 he told them they had only 
themselves to blame for their divisions and jealousies, which he was exploiting. Two of 
the twelve man contracting party went completely bankrupt. The remainder took to 
exacting heavy fines from their rivals' shops on the slightest pretexts. Homnabad began to 
witness large scale desertion and was soon in rapid decline.109 
The opposition that came to the village settlements from intermediaries was linked to 
the increasing pressure they faced from the centre. If they did not sympathize with 
Metcalfe's efforts, it was because these evaded entirely their most pressing problem: how 
to find cash for the official and unofficial demands of Chandu Lal. Chandu Lal himself 
felt unable to reconcile the short .term pressures of Hyderabad's mounting debts, and the 
high costs of running priority establishments like the reformed and British troops, with the 
104 The usual rate was 25% per annum. The cultivators often had no option but to borrow from the taluqdars at such rates, as they had pressing arrears to clear or needed to buy seed to sow in the coming agricultural season. 
10s NAI, 21 Oct 1825, 98, 99. 
106 For more on trading centres, see: Chapter One above. 
107 The origin of their rivalry was attributed to 'a quarrel arising from some jealousy regarding a point of caste'. 108 He demanded Rs 30,000 annually, whereas the going rate had been less than Rs 24,000 since c.1816. 109 NAI, HRR, 597, Colvin's Report, 27 April 1829. 
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necessarily long tenn objectives of Metcalfe's refonns - expanding agriculture and 
introducing peace and conciliation in the countryside. Metcalfe was himself, in fact, 
careful to reiterate after his first forays into the countryside that increasing Hyderabad's 
revenues or solving its financial problems had never been the top priorities of his village 
settlements. Chandu Lal was in practice confronted with the dillema of having to balance 
the pretence of implementing the village settlements with the search for real revenues. 
The solution he found was to try and work his short tenn needs through the settlements 
themselves, which he could not of course bypass without endangering his own position as 
diwan. 
Thus, while Metcalfe's team undertook their first round of survey and settlement in the 
Berar and Aurangabad region, Chandu Lal offered to emulate their principles in the 
Telangana districts on his own. But when Metcalfe's assistant, Wells, came to Telangana 
to review how Chandu Lal had gone about interpreting Metcalfe's principles, he was 
deeply dismayed. The diwan had concluded 10-year contracts with the zamindars, not 
three or five year settlements with village patels. The contracts made no mention of the 
specific sums individual villages were required to pay. The minister had, in fact, only 
marginally modified the older system of revenue farming. Chandu Lal clearly expected 
that the taluqdars whom he had appointed to supervize the contracts and collect revenue 
from the zamindars would collect in excess of the amounts mentioned in the contracts. 
For, there was no provision for their renumeration and profit otherwise. When challenged 
by the resident, the diwan professed he was averse to interfering in the details of district 
management so long as the taluqdars kept their tenns with him and that this was the 
traditionally accepted practice. 110 
Already by the end of the first year of his experiment, Metcalfe was beginning to 
adopt a weary and resigned tone with regard to how much co-operation he might expect 
from Chandu Lal. He urged Calcutta to consider extending the number and the powers of 
the British superintendents he had appointed in the Hyderabad countryside. He suggested 
that the old evils of revenue fanning would continue without their supervision and 
surveillance. It was in vain to hope for anything good from Chandu Lal, who would 
neither curb his demands nor make concessions for poor seasons or depressed prices 
unless pressurized heavily. Despite the most obvious signs of price depression, for 
example, he insisted that the real reason for non-payment of revenues was the formation 
of corrupt combinations between taluqdars and zamindars or patels. There were, besides, 
'still abundant symptoms of his preferring clandestine acquisitions to the acknowledged 
revenue'. It was, moreover, useless to persuade the diwan to keep regular accounts. The 
few that he kept were completely unreliable. Nor did he respond positively to the 
suggestion for creating . a regular treasury. The refonned troops would long since have 
uo NAI, For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 98, 99. 
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fallen into arrears of pay had it not been for the resident's ceaseless vigilance. He had 
been obliged, even so, to advance loans to Chandu Lal from the residency treasury and to 
negotiate more loans for him from Hyderabad sahukars on a few occasions. Yet, the 
prospects for timely repayment were grim. The minister would not listen to talk of 
retrenchment. For example, the advice to disband his notorious risala of Sikh troops had 
fallen on deaf ears. Such a mentality was difficult, if not impossible, to change. Nor was 
it suited to attaining the objectives of the village settlements. m 
The bitter and despairing tone in which the resident was writing by the end of 1823 
suggested to Calcutta that Metcalfe was perhaps proposing Chandu Lal's removal from 
the office of diwan. He reiterated his poor opinion of Chandu Lal when queried. But he 
also suggested that the alternatives to Chandu Lal were gloomier still. Metcalfe advised 
Calcutta, in fact, not to implicate the British in the mess that Hyderabad was in any 
further, but instead to write a strong letter to the Nizam urging him to put his house in 
order.112 
The letter was sent and Chandu Lal took warning. Yet, there was ultimately little room 
for a reconciliation between his own short term requirements and Metclafe's long term 
objectives. The resident was writing once again in a year's time about Chandu Lal's 
misdeeds. The diwan, he wrote, demanded a large nazrana and an advance payment of the 
contracted revenue whenever he appointed a new taluqdar, and if, after a while, he felt 
that the taluqdar had enriched himself sufficiently, he demanded another nazrana or, as 
was more usual, dismissed and replaced him. 'Without our interference', Metcalfe 
claimed, 'the country would be openly sold into the hands of the highest bidder'. In 
eastern and southern Telangana, where Chandu Lal dealt directly with zamindars and 
taluqdars, he was open to bribes from both parties. As far the taluqdars were concerned, 
the amounts allowed them as collection and policing charges were so small that, it was 
assumed they would raise extra revenues for their own profit. It was not surprising, 
therefore, that the taluqdars who pleased the minister most were those who were 
implicated in the most number of murders of deshmukhs and patels. 113 
Chandu Lal's short term methods did not, of course, resolve Hyderabad's long term 
financial problems. But they did ensure the regular maintenance of priority establishments, 
as well as his personal survival. They allowed him, for example, to meet the impulsive 
demands that the Nizam occasionally made. Nasir ud Daula had a passion for adding new 
recruits to his household troops from time to time. Though the new recruits added to the 
centre's already heavy financial burden, Chandu Lal feit it impolitic to oppose the 
Nizam's fancies on points 'relating to the splendour of his court and the regulation of his 
lll NAI, HRMC, 37/1823-24, Metcalfe's Letter, 20 Nov 1823; For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 83. 
112 NAI, For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 83. 
113 NAI, For Pol, 30 June 1825, 84. 
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personal establishments' .114 It was equally impolitic, of course, to let the British or the 
reformed troops to fall into arrears. 
3.5.1 British Preconceptions and Prejudices 
Some of Metcalfe' s own measures whilst resident also contributed to the undermining 
of the professed objectives of the village settlements. How his support for Chandu Lal 
against rapacious contractors strengthened the minister's ability to manipulate the latter 
has already been alluded to. His willingness to back the minister's, or the taluqdars' and 
naibs', coercive measures against zamindars, and his severe condemnation or outright 
rejection of any compromises with them, were also contributory factors. Chandu Lal had 
entered into direct contracts with zamindars, - leaving them to distribute their demands in 
the villages according to their own lights, - in most Telangana districts. This was in 
contrast to the practice in other parts of Hyderabad. When Metcalfe's men took a closer 
view of the situation, they complained of a deliberate subversion and distortion of 
ryotwari principles by the minister. Their criticism was voiced on the assumption that 
zamindars were the most dangerous, oppressive and corrupt class in the countryside, who 
ought not to be be pampered or indulged. Accordingly, they attempted to undo Chandu 
Lal's zamindari contracts. This exercise naturally met with resistance from those who 
were threatened or adversely affected. The zamindar of Bhongir, for example, at first 
refused to have anything to do with Wells' village settlements and later, when he was 
persuaded by threats to assemble all his patels so that Wells might be able to conduct 
settlements with them, 'by a concocted plan', none of the patels had brought his account 
books with him. 115 
There were sixty-five contractor zamindars in the Circars of Bhongir and Deverkonda. 
Each had a network of relations reaching down into the villages, where the zamindars 
almost invariably claimed sir and rusoom rights in the choicest bits of land. This was in 
addition to the 7.5% commission they were allowed on revenue collections. The 
zamindars, furthermore, exercised some freedom in the conferrment of agraharams on 
Brahmans and temples provided they paid suitable nazranas to Chandu Lal or the 
concerned taluqdar. The situation in Khammam was quite similar to that in Bhongir or 
Deverkonda. Resistance to the village settlements was pervasive and the zamindars' hold 
on their villages strong. At least two zamindars relied on their networks of 40 to 50 
relations each to extort grain and money from the villages. The office of patel had been 
assimilated to that of zamindar in many parts of Telangana, by purchase or by force. The 
zamindars usually settled their relatives or followers into the patelki-s they had acquired. 
This also helped them to undermine the authority of the only other village official of 
114 NAI, For Pol, 5 Feb 1830, Martin to Gol, 42, 16 Jan 1830. 
m NAI, For Pol, 8 Dec 1821, 63; 19 July 1822, 8; 4 July 1823, 40; 21 Oct 1825, 98, 99; HRR, 690, Wells to Metcalfe, Letter, 15 Nov 1821; 126, Ralph to Metcalfe, Letter, 29 Aug 1822; 582, Wells's Report, 6 May 1824. 
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some consequence, the karnam or the patwari. Not only did the Telangana zamindars 
reject the village settlements, Metcalfe discovered, even the village officials did not like 
them. Where the patels or patwaris did not belong to the zamindar's camp, the latter 
sometimes tried to win them over by the offer of rent free lands and other personal 
concessions.116 
Chandu Lal tried to align the traditional powers of the Telangana zamindars with his 
short term objectives as . practically as possible.117 The resident, on the other hand, did 
everything to undermine zamindari power. In particular, he backed the centre and the 
intermediaries when they clashed with zamindars, thus adding to the tensions and conflicts 
of the countryside. The ministers and taluqdars were 'government' in the eyes of the 
resident. Any opposition to 'government' was by definition 'rebellion'. Rebellion must, of 
course, always be crushed in the interests of government. The resident's reasoning had a 
practical side to it, too. It was the centre and a section of the intermediaries, not 
zamindars or patels, who were the direct collaborators of British rule in Hyderabad. The 
control and authority of the centre and the intermediaries vis-a-vis the zamindars was 
always sought to be extended and consolidated, therefore. Were it to weaken, it was 
feared, British rule itself might be threatened. And if this were allowed to happen in 
Hyderabad, might not British rule be shaken elsewhere in India? 118 
Wherever the initial forays of Metcalfe's men into the Hyderabad countryside revealed 
areas either only marginally touched by Hyderabad's authority, or completely innocent of 
it, the resident promised 'British guidance', usually a euphemism for the reformed or 
British troops. Such guidance had also preoccupied his predecessor, Russell. Its 
outstanding example during his time had been the war against Bhil, Gond and other naiks 
in 1819- 20. Metcalfe continued the war in 1820-21. He was also firmly on the side of 
'government' when taluqdars clashed with zamindars in northern Telangana in 1822-23. 
Detachments of the Hyderabad Contingent warred down and captured such influential 
zamindars as Kona Rao and Jagannath Rao, who were both committed to prison in 
Hyderabad, where they eventually died. In districts where the situation did not assume the 
same proportions as in parts of northern Telangana, Metcalfe, and later his successor, 
Martin, quite simply ignored the zamindars' claims in implementing the village 
settlements. 119 
Such refusal to recognize zamindari authority did not always yield happy results. 
Martin was aghast to find that village headmen supported zamindars who were in 
rebellion because the settlement makers had bypassed their claims: 
116 NAI, For Pol, 30 June 1825, 84; 21 Oct 1825, 98, 99; HRR, 126, Ralph to Metcalfe, Letter, 29 Aug 1822; 582, Wells's Report, 6 May 1824. 
· 
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118 NAI, For Pol, 19 July 1822, 8; 4 July 1823, 40; 30 June 1825, 84; 21 Oct 1825, 98, 99; H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 108-18; Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 237-50; George, Hyderabad Contingent. 
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'So extensive is the hereditary influence which they possess over the 
minds of the cultivators that the temporary alienation of his perquisites 
and even the suspension of his agency in the collection of Government 
dues, instead of weakening his ascendancy, seems only to strengthen the 
opinion of his right to the contribution of the ryots, whose earnings are 
proportionately taxed for his support' .120 
Martin, however, refused to learn the lesson suggested by such evidence. He continued 
instead to push for the further dispossession of zamindars. This inevitably led to an 
extension of conflict in the countryside, as well as to a contraction in the population, 
agriculture and revenues. Although Kona Rao was removed and imprisoned: 
'[The measure] has proved prejudicial to its [Hyderabad's] own authority, 
which has in consequence never been properly established, and the present 
system of shocking mismanagement which prevails in the district holds 
out but a poor prospect for the future' .121 
Kona Rao's supporters in the villages terrorized the taludars and naibs appointed in his 
place: 
'The district officers [zamindars] had for some time maintained a most 
determined opposition to the authority of the Government, extending even 
to the entertainment of a considerable force of foot expressly for the 
purpose of resisting all demands of revenue' .122 
The taluqdar of Ramgir was at length forced to give up his contest with the zamindars. 
On the one occasion that his forces routed the enemy, they consumed all they had raised 
by way of revenue and booty in their own upkeep. Superiority of arms was not always a 
guarantee of profit.123 
There was yet another dimension to the conflicts and pressures unleashed in the 
countryside under 'British guidance'. Plundered and exhausted zamindars sometimes 
turned upon their own villages. Chinnoor district was totally depopulated by such activity 
in 1822. Jagannath Rao's troops had fallen into heavy arrears, detached themselves from 
his control in some cases and wandered in search of subsistence. Whole villages were 
abandoned on their approach. Wells came across a family that had been horribly tortured 
by Jagannath Rao.124 
To Chandu Lal's and the intermediaries' ability to work their short term needs through 
Metcalfe's reforms, and to the resident's own support for some of their measures in the 
name of 'government', must be added another factor that compromised the village 
settlements: the misconceptions and failures of the settlement officers. The settlements 
120 NAI, HRMC, 40/1827-29, Martin to Gol, 26 Jan 1827. 
121 Ibid .. 
122 Ibid .. 
123 Ibid .. 
124 NAI, 21 Oct 1825, 98,99. 
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showed a complete inability to cope with price fluctuations and seasonal variations. They 
led to a rapid expansion of the cultivated area in some Marathwada districts in 1822-23, 
aided by an increase in the number of agriculturists125 and a sense of security on the part 
of the cultivators. But the expansion also coincided with good harvests in the adjoining 
Poona districts in the same season and a serious crisis of overproduction occurred. 
Transport costs in Hyderabad were still too high and tariffs on inland trade too frequent 
and arbitrary to allow for the profitable export of grain from areas of surplus to areas of 
scarcity, such as Berar and Hyderabad and its vicinity. Grain prices in the Western 
districts crashed, consequently, in some cases by as much as 66%. Yet, the village 
settlements were based on earlier, and much higher, price estimates and were, moreover, 
fixed for three to five year terms. They became extremely oppressive now. However, 
Chandu Lal would not hear of revenue remissions and Metcalfe found it too embarrassing 
to press him strongly on the point, as this would have involved making the galling 
admission that the settlements were fundamentally flawed. The governor general himself, 
besides, was still unsympathetic to the settlements.126 
What happened in the Western districts on account of overproduction happened in 
Berar for the opposite reason, extensive crop failures due to floods and blight. The 
situation became critical in 1823-25. Several northern and north eastern districts were 
almost completely deserted by 1824-25. The emigrants mostly went into the Nagpur 
country in search of more favourable conditions. Similar tendencies also operated in the 
Eastern and Southern, particularly trans-Krishna, districts: 
' ... many of the inhabitants, with their cattle, have left their villages in search of more favoured spots, where provisions were cheaper, and water and forage might be procured' .1Z7 
It was in such conditions that Metcalfe's team first began to represent, to save face, 
that increasing Hyderabad's revenues had never been a primary object of the village 
settlements. 
The problem of seasonal failures in the rice growing districts of Telangana was 
compounded by the fact that even the original settlements had been based on very 
erroneous estimates: 
'And indeed I think it is obvious that we have struck above the root of 
125 In consequence of the recent disbandment of Maratha armies, and a severe decline of manufacturing which attended the latter process. Former soldiers and artisans invested in agriculture taking advantage of the security that village qauls offered. (NAI, For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 98,99; 31/1817-18, Resident to G-G, 25 Sept 1818; IOLR, H.Misc, H/707/2, Jenkins's History of Berar, i826; M. Elphinstone, Report on the Territories Conquered from the Peshwa, [Calcutta, 1821].) 
126 NAI, For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 98,99; For a further account of the agricultural depression, see: Guba, 'The Agrarian Economy' ; Chaudhari, British Relations with Hyderabad; Thomas and Natarajan, 'Depression'; IOLR, H.Misc, H/707/2, Jenkins's History of Berar, 1826; For a further account of seasonal failures, see: Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, VII, 17-27; NAI, For Pol, 4 July 1823, 40; 21 Oct 1825, 99, 99. 
lZ7 NAI, For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 99, 99. 
127 
the evil in these districts and perhaps we shall never quite hit the root 
without either a better minister or more extended power of interference'.128 
The 25% remission that Chandu Lal agreed to grant under great pressure from the 
resident after two years of severe drought still did little to cushion the farmers' losses in 
Khammam, for example. Wells warned, alarmed by the grim conditions, that the 
settlements had been totally ill conceived in the rice growing districts of Telangana and to 
persist with them might result in more serious tragedy still. He condemned particularly 
the failure of the settlement officers to include the variability of the monsoons and of 
water levels in the reservoirs in their original calculations while making the settlements. 
The traditional method of assessment that indigenous surveyors had followed prior to the 
introduction of the village settlements took both factors into account, by contrast.129 
The further reforms of Russell in 1819-20 sought to redirect the legacies of his earlier 
reforms, agricultural decline and financial crises, to newer areas outside Berar. Russell's 
successor, Metcalfe, had a clear idea of the disastrous effects of his predecessor's reforms 
and further reforms, as well as a vision for wiping out their legacies. He was unable to 
win over either Chandu Lal or Hyderabad's intermediaries to his objectives and methods, 
however. For, the village settlements did not address themselves to their crucial problem, 
that of generating short term revenues for the reformed and British troops, for the 
Nizam's household and for paying off or servicing the centre's mounting debt. Revenue 
farming successfully infiltrated and transformed the village settlements. Metcalfe himself 
aided this process, in so far as he provided unstinting military support to the centre and to 
the intermediaries whenever they clashed with zamindars and patels, in the name of 
government. The failure to provide in the village settlements for the vagaries of the 
monsoon, variations in production and fluctuations in prices also worked against them, 
and a crisis of overproduction or scarcity could rapidly assume devastating proportions. 
The gains that the settlements made were largely initial, and these were limited to a 
handful of districts. Woon district on the Wardha was seen recovering from 'a state of 
almost entire waste' at the end of the first year of the settlements. The number of ploughs 
was thought to have trebled, as cultivators drifted back from the Nagpur country across 
the Wardha, where they had earlier fled. The best, and almost the only other, gains were 
made in some Aurangabad districts along the Godavari. Many hundreds of farmers who 
had deserted during the days of Rafat ul Mulk and Lakshmi Ram returned to the villages. 
In the Raichur doab too a few villages, including Kotadapalli and Palmari, witnessed the 
return of emigrants, though the general trend was still in the opposite direction. Growth 
128 Ibid .. 
129 NAI, HRR, Wells's Report, 6 May 1824; For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 99, 99. Two years later, in 1827, Martin would 
advocate consultation with patels, who knew how to adjust assessments to water levels in the tanks/reservoirs and 
would also provide for variations in rainfall even if patels be in many cases the collaborators much of distrusted 
zarnindars. (NAI, HRMC, 40/1827-29, Martin to Gol, 26 Jan 1827) 
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was also reported in the Kulupgur district north east of Hyderabad. But the euphoria that 
small pockets of success aroused at the end of the first year disappeared with the 
misfortunes of the subsequent seasons. The formal withdrawal of village settlements only 
served to underline the triumph of short term requirements and methods. These made 
progress through, and in spite of, the village settlements, and ultimately brought almost 
the whole of the Hyderabad countryside under their sway.130 
Though unable to restrain the growth of revenue farming, - in some areas even patels 
and zamindars were systematically absorbed into it in the period 1821-29 - Metcalfe and 
his men had, nevertheless, put checks on its open operation. This had necessitated the 
adoption of tediously covert methods on the part of Chandu Lal and the revenue farmers. 
Superintendents took a particularly dim view of the use of torture by contractors and their 
agents and insisted on the removal of those whom they could conclusively implicate. 
Though it is a moot point how many instances of torture British superintendents, 
necessarily far removed from the scene of the rural interior, could in fact detect, and 
though Chandu Lal more often than not used the superintendents' displeasure against 
revenue farmers further to tighten his grip over them, the superintendents' interventions 
did still embarrass the open functioning of revenue farming. After 1829, that 
embarrassment was largely over. 
An intensification of military fiscalism in the early 19th century in a context of 
agricultural depression unleashed severe pressures on the Hyderabad countryside. The 
military and revenue assignments of the intermediaries and the core areas of zamindars 
were penetrated . But whilst the old political order was tom apart and centralization 
emerged as the new organizing principle, both the centre and countryside faced serious 
economic crisis. The core areas began to lose population, production, investment and 
trade. The intermediaries and the zamindars that remained were usually either assimilated 
to the regime of military fiscalism, mainly as revenue farmers, or became the leaders of 
rural protest organized around rebel communal domains. 131 Forced to bear the costs of the 
reformed regular British troops and of increasing revenue assignments to Palmer and Co, 
the centre also became financially indebted. Resident Metcalfe laid bare the legacies of 
military fiscalism from the time of his predecessor, Russell. He also tried to alleviate 
some of its features and effects. Thus he aimed at restoring peace and prosperity to the 
Hyderabad countryside, curbing the power of revenue farmers and boosting the revenues 
of the centre. To this extent, Metcalfe was a 'reformist' in the 'Age of Reform'. 
However, he was also a man caught up in contradictions. ,While he advocated the 
abandonment of military fiscalism, in practice he also connived with Chandu Lal and the 
government of India in maintaining it. The latter policy won in the end. 
13o NAI, For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 98,99. 
13! See Chapter Four below. 
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3.5.2 After Metcalfe, c.1829-38 
There was less pretence about working the village settlements in both Hyderabad and 
Calcutta once Metcalfe left the residency in 1825. Martin, and later Stewart, usually did 
not renew settlements that had expired. Where they had been renewed already before his 
arrival, Martin instructed the superintendents to reduce their 'interference' to the bare 
minimum. They might, at best, press taluqdars to revise their practices through the agency 
of Chandu Lal. Martin's ill disguised lack of enthusiasm for the village settlements led 
him into acrimonious disagreements with some of the superintendents.132 
Thereafter, ex-superintendents who remained at their former posts to watch over the 
termination of village settlements theoretically not yet expired, and British military 
officers stationed at various posts in the countryside, noticed a return to the open 
operation of revenue farming. The taluqdar of Hingoli, Jagat Singh, remained in 
Hyderabad, for instance, whilst a whole chain of intermediaries operated freely on his 
farm. Many who had earlier fallen foul of British superintendents for extraordinary cruelty 
were again to be found amongst them, and 'no check to extortion prevails'. The situation 
in Berar was similar. Harbaji Pandit was rehabilitated as the naib of Umarkhed and 
Gomani Ram as that of Timbonia. Village qauls, though theoretically still in operation in 
some places, were openly set aside. Reports to similar effect also came from Nirmal, 
Hingoli, Ellichpur, Aurangabad, Mominabad, Bidar and Hannamkonda, or, in short, from 
the North, West and East alike. 133 
In the east, the familar methods of revenue farmers apparently held uninhibited sway 
once again, as Johnston observed in 1833: 
' ... all the zamindars of the Nalgondah and Deorcondah, talooqahs have been placed in confinement and kept in chains for upwards of a twelve 
month, I have every reason to believe, unjustly '.134 
Every one of the prisoners was reported to have paid the naib more than the full value of 
his contract and they all clamoured for release and justice. Chandu Lal would not, 
however, interfere in the affairs of taluqs as long as taluqdars paid him a 'fixed revenues'. 
A taluqdar, his naibs and the latter's establishment were 'deemed loyal or disloyal in 
proportion to their punctuality in paying the revenue' .135 
Outside of the taluqs of Harjivan Das, Ameen Nawaz Jang and Husain Dost Khan, the 
grim aspects of revenue farming continued to dominate. In Nizam Yar Jang's districts in 
the neighbourhood of Hingoli, including Nirmal, widespread coercion and depopulation 
132 NAI, HRMC, 40/1827-29, Martin to Gol, Letter, 26 Jan 1827; 42/1830-31, Martin to Chandu Lal, Letter, 3 Dec 1831; For Pol, 5 Feb 1830, Martin to Gol, Letter, 42, 16 Jan 1830; Chaudhari, British Relations with Hyderabad. 133 NAI, HRMC, 42/1830-31, Martin to Gol, Letter, 3 Nov 1830; For Pol, 19 March 1832, 66; 10 Oct 1832, 80; HRR, 71, Stewart's Review, 11 July 1834; 550, Reviews, 1834-38. 
134 NAI, HRR, 372, Johnston's Despatch, Aug 1833. 
135 Ibid .. 
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was observed. One of his smaller districts, Sirsilla, initially escaped such a fate under its 
benign naib, Shaikh Mohammad Ali, and registered a rise in revenue-paying capacity 
from Rs. 11,000 in 1830 to Rs. 16,500 in 1838. But its prosperity attracted Nizam Yar 
Jang's violent and devastating attentions once he had exhausted his other districts. 
Conditions in the neighbouring jagir of Rafat ul Mulk matched those in Nizam Yar Jang's 
districts. 136 
The taluqdar of Anantagiri in Telangana wasted large portions of his districts by 
similar rapacity. Two taluqs, comprising cis and trans-Krishna districts saw three changes 
of taluqdars and ten of naibs within a space of three years. Each man who left bequeathed 
to his successor a smaller population and cultivated area than what he had inherited 
himself, thanks chiefly to Chandu Lal's relentless drive for nazranas and revenues. Two 
particularly dreaded taluqdars were Gulab Singh of Narayanpet and Gurmutkal and Naga 
Rao of Maktal. Guiab Singh was in the habit of riding about his districts with a gun, 
which he used liberally on anyone who dared to refuse his demands. A 25% drop in 
population and 33% drop in cultivation was reported in both men's taluqs. When Guiab 
Singh was at length removed by the centre for poor remittances, his successor, Husain Ali 
Khan, was a long time persuading a small proportion of deserters to return. In another 
celebrated case, the diwan of the revenue farming zamindar of Shorapur caused the flight 
of 1100 farmers into neighbouring British districts on a single occasion. A common 
method for raising extra sums adopted by Doab revenue farmers was to levy heavy patti-
s, or special demands for special occasions. Bhiku Mean's patti, to raise Rs. 1 lakh for 
his son's marriage, called upon the landholders of Raichur, Gullug and Sindnur districts to 
pay an additional 10% on the usual assessment. Others were exhorted to contribute as 
much as possible. Another of Bhiku Mean's usual devices was to deprive poligars of sir 
and rusoom and f aqir-s, Gosains and other religious establishments of their customary 
allowances by force and threats. Raichur doab made a poor comparison with neighbouring 
British districts, where the population was a third and higher cultivation twice as great as 
in the doab. The contrast between Adoni and Raichur was symbolic. Adoni boomed into a 
prosperous town after passing from Hyderabad into British control, while Raichur, once a 
flourishing qasba, lost three-quarters of its population and almost all of its manufacture 
and trade under Hyderabad's jurisdiction. Nalgonda and Deverkonda witnessed a total 
breakdown of relations between the intermediate establishment and zamindars and patels 
in the early 1830s as a result of Zainulabiddin Khan's tyrannies. A detachment of British 
troops was attacked while passing through Narkalpalli, not fifty miles from Hyderabad. 
Upon enquiry it turned out that the assailants were farmers from the neighbourhood who 
were going in an armed body to recover grain from a depot in Narkalpalli. They had 
mistaken the British detachment for one of Zainulabiddin's, who, they alleged, had made 
136 NAI, HRR, 550, Reviews, 1834-38. 
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forced collections of grain from them.137 
An impressionistic survey by the residency in 1838 suggested that apart from the 
districts of Harjivan Das, none had made net gains in population and cultivation between 
1829 and 1838. Even the cotton and wheat growing districts of Azim Nawaz Jang and 
Husain Dost Khan had suffered severly from a down tum in prices in the mid-1830s. For 
the rest, it was status quo, slow decline or repaid decay, though conditions varied, 
sometimes considerably, from one part to another. 138 
3.6. The Price of Reform, c.1840-53 
Previous sections have explored the methods and implications of monopolistic military 
fiscalism and centralization under the British in the period c.1798-1838. The broadest 
result was that Hyderabad's old political economy was tom apart, and began to decline. 
This happened partly because of the demands of military fiscalism and centralization, and 
partly because they coincided with a period of agricultural depression, as well as seasons 
of epidemic and drought. The same trend continued in the period c.1840-53. But this was 
also a period when military fiscalism threatened to fall apart under the pressures it had 
itself in part generated. Tensions began to appear between its erstwhile partners, the 
British and some indigenous intermediaries and revenue farmers. The centre fell into 
heavier debt and the reformed troops were threatened with non-payment. 
3.6.1 The Centre under Financial Pressure 
Calcutta threatened in 1840, in the throes of financial crisis, to withdraw its small 
contribution towards the maintenance of British troops in Hyderabad and to raise that sum 
from Hyderabad itself. The resident reminded Calcutta that Hyderabad already gave Rs 38 
Lakhs to the British annually. The critical state of its finances would not permit any 
more: 
'The army is always four months in arrears; and even in this way they pay it with so much difficulty that any additional expense might be 
expected to become the subject of serious remonstrance, more especially 
when this .. .is merely to be incurred as a measure of relief to Company finances'. 139 
The resident proposed a long term plan for nursing Hyderabad's finances back to health. 
A loan of one million pounds sterling at 6% annual interest would clear Hyderabad's 
debts to its Arab and Rohilla military creditors, he suggested, and thus get rid of a 
recurring annual expenditure of Rs 10 Lakhs. But Calcutta dismissed his suggestion as 
137 NAI, HRR, 550, Reviews, 1834-38; For Pol, 11 May 1835, Resident to Gol, Letter, 52, 24 April 1835; 11 April 1838, Cameron to Gol, Letter, 61, 15 March 1838. 
138 NAI, For Pol, 5 Feb 1838, Stewart's Letter, 21; HRR, 550, Reviews, 1834-38. 
139 Regani, Nizam-British Relations, p. 261. 
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fanciful. 140 
The Arabs were in fact owed a sum of Rs 22 Lakhs over and above the annual sum of 
Rs 10 Lakhs. Other creditors claimed as much as the Arabs. Chandu Lal complained in 
1842 that Hyderabad's sahukars took advantage of the centre's financial distress to dictate 
terms to him whenever he approached them for loans now. They had formed a league, 
which was headed by the five principal bankers, the panj bhai. The head of the panj bhai, 
Puran Mai, claimed that Chandu Lal owed him Rs 61 lakhs. Chandu Lal, on the contrary, 
claimed that the Puran Mai owed him Rs 23 Lakhs. The two men eventually arrived at a 
settlement. Chandu Lal conceded that he owed the panj bhai Rs 31 Lakhs, and granted 
them the taluqs of Argaon and Akote in addition to their existing revenue assignments. 
When the resident expressed his strong disapproval, the minister pleaded that this was 
only a ploy to raise from the panj bhai the Rs. 1 crore that they in reality owed 
Hyderabad. A conciliated Puran Mai might help recover at least 50% of that sum. Fraser 
was not convinced and deplored Chandu Lal's practice 'regarding the employment 
generally of sahoocars as the Governors of Provinces, and the affairs of Sahoocar Puran 
Mai, in particular'. He was even more dismayed when the Nizam paid a personal visit to 
Puran Mai on 2 August 1842 to gain his favour and confidence.141 
Chandu Lal's tactics with Puran Mai and other sahukar's did not succeed, however, 
and an unprecedented financial crisis in the first half of 1843 led to his downfall. 142 The 
bankrupt minister had asked for a loan of Rs. 1 crore at 5% annual interest from Calcutta 
as a distress measure. He was willing to grant the British districts worth Rs. 17 lakhs 
annually in return. But even before Calcutta could respond to his proposal, he deemed his 
position untenable and resigned. His position would not have improved had he waited for 
Calcutta's reply. Calcutta wrote that it could offer the loan only on condition that the 
resident took over the administration of Hyderabad, until such time as the loan was repaid 
and the regular payment of British troops was guaranteed. The Nizam was frightened by 
the Government of India's reply. He fetched money, - a crore, it was said, - from his 
private treasury in Golconda to placate Calcutta and to meet the centre's immediate 
distress. But much of this money was snapped up by the sahukar combine led by Puran 
Mai before the inexperienced Nizam could find his feet. It was alleged that Chandu Lal 
was also now in league with Puran Mai. Fraser complained that no good had come to the 
British from the Nizam's overhasty and amateurish measures. Calcutta wrote a threatening 
letter to the Nizam again and advised Fraser also to give him a scare by refusing him 
military assistance against rebel zamindars. The Nizam raised another distress loan and 
agreed to serve the British first this time, and only then the other creditors. 
140 Regani, Nizam.British Relations, pp. 261-2; NAI, For Pol, 18 Nov 1843, Correspondence of April-May 1843, 73-6. 
141 NAI, HRMC, 54/1842, Resident to Gol, Letters, 3 June, 5 July, 26 July and 3 Aug 1842. 
142 Chandu Lal resigned on 6 Sept 1843. (HRMC, 55/1842-43, Resident to Gol, Letter, 6 Sept 1843) 
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That the costs of British troops far exceeded Hyderabad's means became more obvious 
than ever by 1848. 9000 British soldiers and 90 British officers consumed about Rs. 42 
lakhs annually. High placed British officials, including the assistant resident in Hyderabad, 
Low, themselves admitted that if British troops had to be maintained at Hyderab~-own 
expense, a much smaller body would easily meet its security and defence requirements: 
'In the course of 28 years, [c.1819-48], we have actually drawn from the 
Nizam's treaty (riot reckoning forty-two lakhs now due for advances to 
the contingent) the enormous sum of eleven crores and twenty lakhs of 
Hyderabad rupees, of which a large portion has gone out of the Nizam 's 
territory for ever ... so that this huge drain not only exhausts the Nizam 's 
treasury, but tends to impoverish his people by diminishing the amount of 
specie in his dominions ... Under all these circumstances ... a contingent 
costing twenty lakhs rupees per annum would be to the full as useful to 
the Nizam as the present one costing forty one lakhs ... And if I could get a 
cession of territory for the payment of the contingent, ... I would be quite 
satisfied with lands that yielded seventeen or eighteen lakhs only, making 
a contingent of corresponding strength. This would put an end to the 
continual pressure upon the Durbar for money ... " give, give and give 
more" is the word perpetually in the resident's mouth here .. .'.143 
The resident admitted that he was pressurizing the Nizam into taking short term 
measures which were ultimately hopeless. From 1843-53, diwans and peshkars were 
juggled about continually by the British, and the Nizam took heavy nazranas from various 
quarters, as well as borrowing from sahukars against revenue assignments Hyderabad 
could ill afford. The peshkar, Ram Baksh, asked for the help of British troops in 1849/50 
to remove the taluqdar of Narsi in Berar, Saleh Mohammed Khan, ostensibly for 
'opposing Government'. The resident, however, suggested that the real reason for his 
request was rather different. Saleh Mohammed Khan had four years previously given an 
advance of Rs 3,20,000 to the centre at 12% annual interest. The centre also owed him 
money on other accounts. The intermediary had paid a nazrana of Rs 30,000 to secure his 
military and revenue assignments. He now clamoured for the repayment of his loan. 
Meanwhile, he had unleashed a reign of terror in his district. Ram Baksh sought to use 
the latter fact as an excuse for removing Saleh Mohammed Khan. The resident was, 
likewise, hesitant about lending British troops to remove certain Arab taluqdars, against 
whom, too, Ram Baksh made serious charges. Much was owed to them by the centre and 
their forcible removal, without their accounts being settled, might lead to chaos and 
bloodshed. 144 
143 NAI, For Pol, 18 Nov 1843, Correspondence of April-May 1843, 73-6, Resident to Gol, Letter, 78, July 1843; 3 Feb 1844, Fraser to Gol, letter, 182, 24 Oct 1843, 186, 189; 25 Nov 1848, 41-3, 46-8; 3 Feb 1844, 182-5, 194-6; 0 Dec 1848, Resident to G-G, Letters, 48, 11 Nov 1848, 52, 20 Nov 1848, 54, 23 Nov 1848, 63, 2 Dec 1848; HRMC, 55/1842-43, Resident to Gol, Letter, Sept 1843; Regani, Nizam-British Relations, p. 274. 
144 NAI, For Pol, 18 Nov 1843, Resident to Gol, Letter, 78, July 1843; 3 Feb 1844, Letter, 182, 24 Oct 1843, 186, 189; 12 June 1847, 97, 99; 25 Nov 1848, 41-8; 30 Dec 1848, Resident to Gol, Letters, 48, 11 Nov 1848, 52, 20 Nov 1848, 63, 2 Dec 1848; HRMC, 60/1848-49, Resident's Letter, 16 Jan 1849; 61/1849, Letters, 21 May and 31 Sept 1849; 62/1850, Letters, Feb-March 1850; Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 259-99. 
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Ram Baksh also complained that the Nizam obstructed any measures he took for 
improving Hyderabad 's finances. A taluqdar he had removed, Rung Rao, was reinstated 
by the Nizam, 'who accompanied that act...by the most insulting and degrading 
expressions towards the peshkar' in full darbar. The Nizam was under the spell of two 
influential daftardar-s in the revenue department, Ghulam Hyder Khan and Balmukund, 
who together spearheaded a creditor lobby, whose interest clashed with the British 
financial interest in Hyderabad. It was rumoured that the daftardars had offered the Nizam 
a nazrana of Rs 40 Lakhs if he would elevate them to the offices of diwan and peshkar 
respectively. Ram Baksh pleaded he was as helpless as his predecessor, Shams ul Umra, 
in such circumstances: 'the Nizam is continuing the system of annoyance and exaction 
with which he has pursued that respectable nobleman, Shams ul Umra, ever since his 
removal from the office of diwan'. 145 The centre was desperate for funds, and the Nizam, 
the diwan, the daftardars and the British were divided as to which of the numerous 
competing creditor interests to serve first. 146 
3.6.2 Tensions between Rival Revenue Farmers and the British 
The British tried to exert greater pressure on the centre, on the one hand, and launched 
war on rival military creditors, on the other. But they were not uniformly successful. The 
resident's suggestion in 1840 that Chandu Lal investigate Puran Mal's complicated and 
controversial accounts thoroughly fell quite flat. Puran Mal was in fact given even more 
extensive revenue assignments than before. Chandu Lal pleaded that the Nizam had 
ordered him to give Puran Mal taluqs worth Rs 2 1/2 lakhs annually under the influence 
of creditors other than the British. Puran Mal was believed to be operating through the 
daftardars in the central revenue establishment, Ghulam Hyder Khan and Balmukund. He 
was said to have given the former a bribe of Rs 2 lakhs and a considerable sum to the 
Nizam as well. 147 The British also felt threatened by other groups of revenue farmers and 
creditors: the Arabs and the Pathans. Fraser protested at Calcutta's reluctance to sanction 
the destruction of all forts not in the hands of 'government' troops, and the expulsion of 
all Arab jamadars and troops from Hyderabad.148 He also complained that Chandu Lal's 
inability to clear off the Arabs' debts hampered his military plans for their removal: 
'The Arabs inay be considered to be in possession of the city of 
Hyderabad, and of the persons of the Nizam and the Minister, and besides 
this they have the administration of the districts to the amount of more 
than ten lacs of rupees per annum' .149 
145 Shams ul Umra and his sons were believed to be contemplating armed resistance to the threatened confiscation of their family jagir. 
146 See references cited in the last footnote. 
147 See, for example: NAI, HRMC, 54/1842, Resident to Gol, Letters, 3 June, 5 July, 26 July and 8 Aug 1842; Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 259-99. 
148 NAI, For Pol, 27 July 1842, Resident to Gol, Letter and Enclosures, 172-4, 25 June 1842. 
149 Ibid .. 
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Besides their claims on the centre, the Arabs had numerous and substantial claims on 
private parties. The resident thought that some of the latter claims were fictitious. He 
suspected that the Arabs' victims were too terrified by their creditors' violent methods and 
military strength to protest. Not only would all the Arab military creditors be thrown out 
on Fraser's plans, all Arab revenue farmers would also be removed, as they might offer 
dispossessed jamadars and irregulars employment otherwise. 150 
The first serious encounter of British troops with the Arabs took place in 1841.151 1844 
saw another encounter. A groom of the British cavalry's detachment in Gulbarga was 
seriously wounded by an Arab irregular serving at the same station. The resident insisted 
that the assailant be found and punished publicly. When the Arab party refused to give up 
the offender, they were collectively charged with conspiring against the state disbanded, 
and expelled from Hyderabad. 152 The British also began to put pressure on the centre to 
expel Rohilla military creditors after a minimal settlement of their claims. There was 
considerable discrepancy between official estimates and the claims of the chief Rohilla 
jamadar in Hyderabad, Hasanuddin Khan, regarding the number of Rohilla irregulars and 
the size of their debts and arrears. The centre claimed that there were 1800 Rohillas in 
Hyderabad city and its suburbs, Hasanuddin Khan asserted, on the contrary, that there 
were only about 300. He also asserted that he alone was owed Rs. 13,60,000 by the 
centre and by private parties. It was necessary to recover this sum, for he owed his Arab 
creditors Rs. 5 lakhs in tum. The resident suggested that Hasanuddin Khan's claims were 
grossly exaggerated and the latter himself agreed to the deletion of several items from his 
accounts. He had calculated interest at annual rates of between 40 and 60%, for example. 
These were brought down to a standard 12%. The resident also insisted that the Rohillas 
release all their debtors, whom they held in private prisons in Hyderabad. One debtor who 
owed the Rohillas Rs. 1,44,000 had been in 'strict and severe' confinement for 11 
months. Hasanuddin Khan agreed to release his private prisoners on condition that his 
Arab creditors were also made to release some of his own relatives from their prisons. 
1500 Rohillas were on their way out of Hyderabad by August 1846.153 
A battalion of irregulars, who were popularly called the 'linewalas ', mutinied in 
Hyderabad in April 1847, demanding action on heavy arrears of pay. The diwan, Siraj ul 
Mulk, turned to the -resident for help when the linewalas refused to take their discharge. 
Fraser called in British troops and forced the linewalas to lay down their arms. All the 
linewalas in the city - there were 10,000 - were then paid their arrears and discharged. 
Another 10,000 linewalas were distributed throughout the Hyderabad countryside. Fraser 
150 NAI, For Pol, 27 July 1842, Resident to Gol, Letter and Enclosures, 172-4, 25 June 1842; 31 Aug 1842, 117-21; 22 Feb 1843, 107, 112, 115; 16 May 1845, 91-4. 
151 NAI, For Pol, 13 Sept 1841, Fraser to Gol, Letter, 23, 27 Aug 1841; 25 Oct 1841, 119-25; H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 181-6. 
152 NAI, For Pol, 16 May 1845, 91-4. 
153 NAI, HRR, 82, Resident's Letters, July-August 1846; see also: HRR, 85, Resident's Letters, March-April 1849. 
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drew up plans for their discharge as well, arguing that all linewalas were inherently 
mutinuous and their dismissal would eliminate an 'unnecessary' item of expenditure from 
the centre's budget. Even Calcutta found the case Fraser made out against all linewalas in 
consequence of a mutiny by just one of their battalions, and that under heavy arrears, 
rather thin.154 
The British attack on rival military creditors in Hyderabad was, nevertheless, extended 
further. 'Several thousand' irregulars were discharged in 1847. This was believed to effect 
a reduction of about Rs. 41 lakhs in the centre's annual expenditure. Furthermore, taluqs 
worth Rs. 22 lakhs were resumed from Afghans and Arabs and plans were made for yet 
other resumptions. Proclamations were issued banning the employment of 'foreign 
mercenaries' by zamindars, intermediaries, revenue farmers and sahukars. A ban was also 
introduced on the assignment of revenue to sahukars. A loan of Rs. 50 lakhs that the 
centre raised from sahukars carried guarantees against the central treasury. They were not 
given revenue assignments. Proposals were also drawn up for the recall or release of all 
revenue farmers and their replacement by salaried taluqdars and naibs, who would be 
obliged to reside in the districts they were appointed to. 155 Yet, increasingly frank 
recognition that the British themselves were mainly responsible for Hyderabad's critical 
finances, sometimes led to the observation that the much belaboured rival military 
creditors were not always the villains: 
'The Rohillas who engage in these disturbances do not do so in the 
professed character of gang robbers or marauders, ... but usually, if not 
invariably, are taken into the service of talookdars, zamindars, jageerdars 
or other officers of the Nizam's Government itself, in support of their 
quarrels with each other' .156 
Of course, it did not follow from such perspicacity that the British military fiscal interest 
in Hyderabad would be sacrificed in the cause of justice for rival military creditors. The 
ternis in which Hyderabad issued a proclamation to taluqdars, zamindars and jamadars in 
1848/49 under the resident's pressure was suggestive: 
'In these times the tribes of Rohillas having banded themselves together 
have taken to plunder and rebellion, and in the districts of the Nizam's 
territories rob, plunder, commit highway robbery, rape of the women of 
the cultivators, and plunder the houses of merchants and the peasants, 
from which the whole of the taluqs are devastated' .157 
An Englishman, Dighton, who had once served as a superintendent of village settlements 
154 Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 259-99; NAI, For Pol, 12 June 1847, Resident to Gol, Letter, 97, 14 May 1847. 
155 Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 259-99; NAI, For Pol, 12 June 1847, 97, 99; 25 Nov 1848, 41-3; HRMC, 60/1848-48, Resident's Letter, 16 Jan 1849; 61/1849, Resident's Letter, 21 May 1849; HRR, 85, Resident' s 
Letters, April-May 1849; also: HRR, 82, Resident's Letters, July-Aug 1846. 
156 NAI, HRR, 85, Resident's Letters, March-May 1849. 
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drew up plans for their discharge as well, arguing that all linewalas were inherently 
mutinuous and their dismissal would eliminate an 'unnecessary' item of expenditure from 
the centre's budget. Even Calcutta found the case Fraser made out against all linewalas in 
consequence of a mutiny by just one of their battalions, and that under heavy arrears, 
rather thin.154 
The British attack on rival military creditors in Hyderabad was, nevertheless, extended 
further. 'Several thousand' irregulars were discharged in 1847. This was believed to effect 
a reduction of about Rs. 41 lakhs in the centre's annual expenditure. Furthermore, taluqs 
worth Rs. 22 lakhs were resumed from Afghans and Arabs and plans were made for yet 
other resumptions. Proclamations were issued banning the employment of 'foreign 
mercenaries' by zamindars, intermediaries, revenue farmers and sahukars. A ban was also 
introduced on the assignment of revenue to sahukars. A loan of Rs. 50 lakhs that the 
centre raised from sahukars carried guarantees against the central treasury. They were not 
given revenue assignments. Proposals were also drawn up for the recall or release of all 
revenue farmers and their replacement by salaried taluqdars and naibs, who would be 
obliged to reside in the districts they were appointed to. 155 Yet, increasingly frank 
recognition that the British themselves were mainly responsible for Hyderabad's critical 
finances, sometimes led to the observation that the much belaboured rival military 
creditors were not always the villains: 
'The Rohillas who engage in these disturbances do not do so in the professed character of gang robbers or marauders, ... but usually, if not invariably, are taken into the service of talookdars, zamindars, jageerdars or other officers of the Nizam's Government itself, in support of their quarrels with each other' .156 
Of course, it did not follow from such perspicacity that the British military fiscal interest 
in Hyderabad would be sacrificed in the cause of justice for rival military creditors. The 
terms in which Hyderabad issued a proclamation to taluqdars, zamindars and jamadars in 
1848/49 under the resident's pressure was suggestive: 
'In these times the tribes of Rohillas having banded themselves together have taken to plunder and rebellion, and in the districts of the Nizam' s territories rpb, plunder, commit highway robbery, rape of the women of the cultivators, and plunder the houses of merchants and the peasants, from which the whole of the taluqs are devastated' .157 
An Englishman, Dighton, who had once served as a superintendent of village settlements 
154 Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 259-99; NAI, For Pol, 12 June 1847, Resident to Gol, Letter, 97, 14 May 1847. 
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156 NAI, HRR, 85, Resident's Letters, March-May 1849. 
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under Metcalfe, persuaded some Hyderabad sahukars in the 1840s to join him in forming 
a bank to take advantage of the opportunity of a distress offer from the Nizam. The 
resident remained silent on this project in his correspondence with Calcutta. But when 
Calcutta eventually learnt of it, it was horrified. It was thought that rival creditors were 
ganging up against the British to capture the Nizam and to commandeer the centre's 
finances in their own private interests. Dalhousie threatened to prosecute Dighton and the 
bank under British legislation, and the project was abandoned.158 
There was, again, talk of appointing committees under British supervision to conduct a 
comprehensive investigation into Hyderabad's finances: 
'I propose the accounts to be investigated ... to as distant a date as possible .. .! consider it indispensably necessary that each committee be 
superintended by an European Officer. I do not anticipate that the ... investigations will occupy ... more than 2 or 3 years .. .' .159 
The pro-British minister complained that indigenous revenue farmers and military 
creditors claimed upto Rs 60 Lakh annually for irregular troops they did not maintain and 
Rs 40,60,000 for those they did, but kept in poor discipline and arrears of pay. Their 
accounts were in a 'state of falsified confusion'. He pleaded that such circumstances tied 
his hands as far as servicing British troops was concerned, and in particular he urged the 
removal of Arabs and Pathans who controlled territory worth Rs 70 Lakhs annually. 
The resident spoke in sympathetic tones about the minister's difficulties and laid the 
blame for a crisis in British military fiscal interests in Hyderabad at the door of the 
Nizam and the daftardars Ghulam Husain Khan and Balmukund. The latter were accused 
of doing little to tighten up the administration, of demanding nazranas unceasingly, and of 
giving revenue assignments to sahukars in return for crippling loans.1ro They were also 
accused of delivering up Hyderabad to Arab military creditors and seriously endangering 
British interests thus: 
' ... the Nizam is no longer ruler at Hyderabad, the Arab mercenaries are paramount in the State and His Highness completely under their control'. 161 
The hatred that the Arabs harboured against the British was well known, according to the 
resident. It would be a good thing, he suggested, if all persons of Arab descent, 
numbering about 17,000, could be banished from Hyderabad for ever. It was a great pity 
that Hyderabad's minister should have recruited a band of 300 Arabs into the Nizam's 
guard recently. One Arab jamadar alone held revenue assignments worth Rs 20 Lakhs. 
158 Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 259-99; also: K.I. Leonard, 'Banking Finns in Nineteenth-Century Hyderabad Politics ', MAS, 15, 2(1981), pp. 177-201. 
l59 Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 259-99. 
lro NAI, HRMC, 61/1 849, Resident's Letter, Sept 1849; 62/1850, Resident's Letter, Feb 1850. 161 NAI, HRR, 648, Resident's Letter, Sept 1853. 
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Other Arab jamadars controlled further territory, which was also worth Rs 20 Lakhs 
annually. It was tragic that the Arabs could not be expelled without an investigation into 
their accounts and a satisfactory settlement of their claims, even though most of their 
claims, on government as well as private parties, were fictitious. 162 
3.6.3 British Interests Threatened 
British troops remained . unpaid between January and June 1843, and the Nizam's 
allowance, too, was first staggered and then discontinued completely during that period. 
By the middle of 1850, British claims on Hyderabad for arrears and debts had mounted to 
Rs 60 Lakhs. Calcutta adopted a threatening posture. The diwan, Shams ul Umra had 
promised at the time of his appointment early in 1850 that he would pay Rs 17 Lakhs 
every quarter towards clearing the British claims. He began to plead now that the centre's 
bankruptcy and heavy indebtedness would not permit him to pay any more than Rs 5 
Lakhs annually. It would be eleven years at this rate before the arrears and the loans of 
the British were fully repaid. Even this proposal seemed doubtful of realization by the end 
of 1850. Calcutta therefore replaced Shams ul Umra with Ram Baksh as diwan. It warned 
the latter of serious consequences if the British debt was not serviced regularly and 
attempts were not made to repay the principal as soon as possible. 163 
Yet British pressure on the centre and war against rival creditors did not significantly 
enhance Hyderabad's ability to repay them. The amount the latter were owed increased to 
Rs 75 Lakhs by mid-1851. Calcutta despatched a letter to the Nizam loaded with warning 
and insult: 'the Government of India, whose power can make you as dust underfoot, and 
leave you neither .... name.... nor trace', would be compelled to adopt severe measures if 
Hyderabad's finances were not improved; British troops not paid regularly; and British 
loans not serviced and repaid. The Nizam felt obliged to send all the money he could 
raise, Rs. 38 lakhs, to the residency treasury and promise that he would repay the 
remaining debt, Rs 36 Lakhs, by the last quarter of 1851. But he could not redeem his 
promise, and Rs 30 Lakhs were still owed after the deadline. The Nizam now offered his 
jewels as security if the diwan would raise money against them from sahukars. 
Meanwhile, the resident instructed his commanding officers to raise loans from sahukars 
to pay the salaries _of British troops. Calcutta, however, was not pleased with what it 
thought were unsatisfactory expedients. Dalhousie also clamoured for territory. Payment 
for British troops was only one consideration behind the demand for Berar, cotton was 
another. Fraser sought to point out to Calcutta that its proposals smacked of expansionist 
motives. He was sacked for his pains. This was in 1853. The new resident, Low, set 
about giving effect to Calcutta's proposals. Both cotton and credit were secured by the 
162 Ibid.; also: NAI, HRR, 88, 91. 
163 NAI, For Pol, 18 Nov 1843, Resident's Letter, 78, Sept 1843; HRMC, 62/1850, Resident's Letters, Jan-March 1850; 61/1849, Resident's Letters, May-Dec, 1849; Regani, Nizam-British Relations. 
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cession of Berar. However, the centre's financial problems were not all resolved by any 
means yet; nor did political protest against its activities cease in the Hyderabad 
countryside.164 
3. 7. Conclusion 
British intervention in 18th-century Hyderabad had taken the form of competitive 
military fiscalism in the context of a political order characterized by an interplay of local, 
supra-local and inter-regional alliances and conflicts. But the British had emerged as the 
supreme political power in South India by the end of the 18th century and had put 
foreign competition to an end. Their intervention amounted to a steady intensification of a 
monopolistic brand of military fiscalism from now on. It co-incided at first with the 
objectives of the subsidiary alliance, - keeping the Marathas contained and suppressing 
frontier 'banditti ' , - but it was not long before military fiscalism outstripped purely 
military considerations. The British regime 's vast military overkill was used to perpetuate 
and intensify military fiscalism, which became as much a means as an end. But military 
fiscalism became oppressive in the context of the agricultural depression of the early 19th 
century. The traditional core domains of the Hyderabad countryside were ravaged and the 
centre fell into a debt trap. Centralization and military fiscalism also transformed 
Hyderabad's pre-colonial political order. What replaced it was still in a somewhat fluid 
state, but one or two of its features were already quite mature by the 1830s. These were, 
a powerful, coercive and revenue hungry British ruled centre, and, correspondingly, 
weaker zamindars and intermediaries. On the unstable side, however, there was still 
pervasive protest to centralization and military fiscalism. The next chapter deals with the 
protest in dealing with the indigenous responses to the latter processes. 
164 Regani, Nizam-British Relations. See Chapter Four below on protest. 
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4. COLLABORATION, PROTEST AND EPILOGUE, c.1807-65 
4.1 Introduction 
The last chapter suggested that centralization and military fiscalism in the context of 
agricultural depression and seasonal failures ravaged core areas; weakened or dispossessed 
intermediaries and zamindars; and finally recoiled on the centre itself in the first half of 
the 19th century. This chapter attempts, among other things, to gauge the effects of these 
developments on social and political relationships within indigenous society. Although the 
main beneficiaries of British policies in Hyderabad were the British themselves, they 
could hardly have been effective without some degree of local collaboration. It is 
suggested here that some intermediaries and zamindars were assimilated to military 
fiscalism. Although the collaborators were usually deprived of their military assignments, 
they continued to be farmed out revenues as revenue farmers. This was primarily to help 
raise money to maintain a burgeoning contingent of British troops. The revenue contracts 
were given out either directly by the centre or indirectly through Palmer and Co. The 
revenue farmers who collaborated with the centre were naturally perceived as oppressive 
elements in the core areas they destroyed. Perhaps the most telling evidence of this was 
the distress migration they caused as they pushed for more revenues. There is also 
evidence for new types and levels of coercion and cruelty in revenue collection methods 
from the 1830s.1 
Another dimension to the collaborators' activities was that they were confirmed as the 
holders of fixed hereditary and proprietary rights and other privileges in areas where there 
had traditionally been some flux and fluidity in these matters. This change was of great 
significance.2 When there had been flux and fluidity, and competition and contest, no local 
king or intermediary was fully secure, and incumbents were always aware that their 
opponents might tum the tables upon them by negotiating superior local and supra-local 
alliances. There had been constraints, therefore, on the nature of their local conduct: they 
could not afford to alienate all the powerful elements in their communities, or all their 
neighbours, simultaneously. They had to be friends with at least some at any given time, 
and also had to be careful not to compromise their image locally as divinely blessed royal 
patrons and protectors. This situation was altered when the British regime bestowed fixed 
rights, privileges and tenures on those it favoured, at the expen,se of their traditional local 
or supra-local rivals. The centre was also prepared to use its superior coercive powers in 
favour of its nominees, against any local or supra-local challengers. Where there had been 
flux in the control of land and resources before, the position now of some caste or 
2 
See discussion in subsection on the subject below. 
For the pre-colonial situation, see Chapter One above. 
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religious groupings was consolidated, and others were permanently marginalized or 
dispossessed. What were the social implications of such change? The evidence for some 
areas suggests that those groups whose position was undermined were no longer seen as 
'equal' or 'respectable' by those whose position was consolidated. The latter were backed 
by the centre's superior fire power and perhaps no longer feared their opponents as 
before. They were also prepared to take their traditional conflicts against their rivals 
beyond the traditional constraints. In this process lay to some extent the 'pre-history' or 
long term origins of the 'landlord-peasant conflicts', 'casteism' and 'communalism' so 
familiar to historians of a later period. The rival communities of zamindari and nawabi 
domains in the 18th century had been multi-caste and multi- sect/religion, and not fixed 
either in their social composition or in their control of resources. Although inter-
communal hostilities could coincide with caste or religious hostilities, these did not 
become fixed primarily as caste or religious conflicts. The community might, in other 
words, be dominated by one or another caste or religious grouping, but, in relation to the 
wider world, it was above a particular caste or religion. Indeed, its caste and religious 
composition could change over time, owing to the flux and flow of population and 
resources between core areas. However, the community seems to have become more and 
more fixed in tenns of caste, religion or sect from the early 19th century, at least as far 
as landholding and other proprietory rights and privileges were concerned. Those who 
were marginalized or dispossessed also became increasingly confirmed in their caste or 
religious identity. The hostilities between powerful and dispossessed, or marginal, 
communities not only transgressed old limits, they also became overtly 'casteist' or 
'communalist' in their character. 
The second theme in this chapter is about protest against the British regime and its 
collaborators, and what they stood for in indigenous society. Not all intennediaries and 
zamindars of the old order had turned into the centre's collaborators. The traditional, pre-
colonial communities of the core areas had been internally bound through the shared 
culture of legitimation rituals, consensus building devices and incorporating legends. 
Motifs and themes from this culture informed the articulation of 19th century resistance 
and protest. However, there was also a crucial new dimension to the protest. The old 
animosities between small kings and communal domains were submerged in some areas, 
and instead a common front was built up against a common enemy. The links between 
protest based on reconstituted rebel communal domains and the Mujahiddin movement of 
the 1830s, as well as with mutinies among British troops in the period c.1810-1859, fonn 
the third theme in this chapter. The shared quest for an alternative political order was an 
important factor here, apart from the sharing of a common enemy. 
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4.2 Collaboration 
4.2.1 Intermediaries 
One of the key concerns of the centre throughout the period c.1798-1853 was to 
reduce the traditional intermediaries of Hyderabad to its will. This involved dispossessing 
or downgrading the larger intermediaries and bringing them, in line with the centre's new 
policies. The centre's efforts seem to have . attracted the support of some smaller 
intermediaries who had in the past suffered at the hands of their bigger rivals. When 
British troops expelled Mahipat Ram, first from Berar and then from Hyderabad, for 
example, his rivals3 helped the resident. Later on, they tried to appropriate the position 
and assignments that Mahipat Ram had vacated. Chandu Lal managed to have his brother, 
Govind Baksh, appointed to the governorship of Berar, and Salabat Khan and Subhan 
Khan added to their existing military and revenue assignments.4 Nevertheless, the 
collaborators of the British were tied to a new kind of centralizing military fiscal regime 
and could not hope to match Mahipat Ram's former independence.5 
The resident observed in 1817 that: 
'The great families [of Hyderabad's intermediaries] ... are almost all extinct, 
and even the few that remain have dwindled into absolute insignificance. 
The only efficient authority that exists ... derives from office; and all offices 
are now conferred, if not directly by us, at least by the minister who is 
under our total and immediate control'. 6 
Some 'great families' of intermediaries still survived after 1817, however, and the centre 
continued its efforts to dispossess them. The assignments of Shams ul Umra, Rafat ul 
Mulk and the Lohani family were severely reduced in 1820, thus, and a further round of 
resumptions was carried out against the surviving large jagirdars in 1829.7 
A new breed of smaller revenue farmers was by now in the ascendant in Hyderabad, 
and had virtually replaced the larger ones as the new intermediary elite by the mid-1830s. 
If the latter were more amenable to control by the centre, they also operated a more 
oppressive regime than before, thanks to the centre's increased coercive power and 
revenue demands, in the context of agricultural depression and seasonal failures: 
4 
5 
6 
'Every talookdaree may justly be termed an independancy in its 
interior administration, without any dread or awe of the minister, as long 
as he [the taluqdar] pays the fixed revenue; and his naibs and his petty 
Darbar rivals included men like the pro-British ministers, Mir Alam and Chandu Lal, and local rivals included Berar intermediaries like Salabat Khan and Subhan Khan. (See Chapter Three above) 
See Chapter Three above. 
Govind Baksh spared no effort to make a fortune privately, however. He attempted .to maintain the same system 
of regular commissions and periodic nazranas that Mahipat Ram had successfully operated before him. (See, for 
example: NAI, For Pol, 30 Sept 1820, 46-50; 21 Oct 1825, 98-9; HRR, 690, Wells to Metcalfe, Letter, 15 Nov 1821; 304, pp. 361-70, 473-4. See also: Chapter Three above.) 
NAI, For Sec, 5 July 1817, Russell's Letter, 7, 14 June 1817. 
NAI, HRMC, 40/1827-29, Martin's Letter, 28 Oct 1829. 
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agents are equally without restraint and deemed loyal or disloyal in 
proportion to their punctuality in paying the revenue' .8 
There were a handful of taluqdars and jagirdars in the mid- l 830s who were not 
extortionist in their approach. The resident pointed towards men like Harjivan Das, the 
taluqdar of the Khammam, Warangal and Yelgundel districts, for example, whose 
population and cultivation had 'increased very considerably'. But these were exceptional 
cases.9 
4.2.2 Zamindars 
Unlike the new breed of taluqdars, British policies do not seem to have attracted the 
support of many zamindars, except in Telangana for a short period. Chandu Lal was able 
to assimilate the zamindars here to the centre's revenue farming system in the early 
1820s. But his arrangements had broken down by the late 1820s. Many of the bigger 
zamindars of the Hyderabad countryside had already been reduced or dispossessed by the 
centre in the last years of the 18th or the opening years of the 19th century. The 
remaining ones, relatively small, continued to feel the centre's coercive measures 
thereafter. The new taluqdars that the British 'reforms' created and troops supported were, 
from the zamindars' point of view, even more oppressive than their larger predecessors.10 
In such circumstances, any support from zamindars was enthusiastically welcomed by 
Hyderabad in the first half of the 19th century. When Capt. Davies discovered two patels 
who had attacked small parties of Bhils in the course of his operations against Bhil naiks 
in Berar in 1819-20, for example, his response was almost overgenerous: 
'For these services, and with a view to encourage the inhabitants to 
oppose the Bhils, I have deemed it necessary to present each of the patels 
with a khillat' .11 
4.2.3 Bankers 
Bankers had long been involved with revenue farming. With the decline of the 'great 
families' of intermediaries and the rise of a smaller class of revenue farmers, they found 
their clients easier to handle, provided that they themselves had the backing of the centre. 
Bankers increased their involvement in districts assigned to them as securities from the 
second decade of the- 19th century. They were now more willing to take direct charge of 
the districts if their clients, or those responsible for collecting revenues on the latter's 
behalf defaulted. Revenue farmers farmed their districts directly against loans from 
bankers by the 1830s.12 Revenue farming zamindars in Telangana became heavily 
NAI, HRR, 550, Reviews, 1834-38. 
NAI, HRR, 550, Reviews, 1834-38. See also: Chapter Three above. 
10 See Chapter Three above. 
11 NAI, HRR, 686, Captain Davies to Captain Plowden, 27 Dec 1819. 
12 NAI, For Pol, 11 April 1838, Cameron to Gol, Letter, 61, 15 March 1838; see also: Chapter Three above. 
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dependent on the advances of bankers and moneylending grain merchants. Many new 
families of Marwadis seem to have arrived and settled in Hyderabad in the late 1820s and 
in the 1830s.13 The entire process of increasing sahukari involvement in revenue farming 
was typified by the leading Hyderabad banker, Puran Mal, who negotiated directly with 
Hyderabad's diwan, Chandu Lal, on behalf of his clients, as well as his banker 
colleagues. 14 
4.3 Revenue Farming and the Communities of the Core Domains 
4.3.1 Constructive Revenue Farming 
Historians of late-Mughal and 18th century-India until recently tended to view revenue 
farming predominantly in negative terms. It was supposed to have occurred in areas 
where the state was at its weakest and was associated, therefore, with instability or 
rebellion. Revenue farmers themselves were regarded as a mercenary breed, whose chief 
concern was with short term profit. If the state entertained them at all, it was because 
they, nevertheless, managed to keep powerful zamindars at bay. The areas that came 
under revenue farming declined sooner or later. Such a starkly negative picture of revenue 
farming has been qualified for some areas in recent years. Some historians of western and 
central India, for example,15 distinguish between destructive and constructive revenue 
farming in the 18th century. At least some revenue farmers were actively interested in 
promoting economic expansion and political peace in their areas. 16 Such a characterization 
would also suit revenue farming in some parts of 18th century Hyderabad. The nawabs of 
Kurnool regularly employed revenue farmers to develop their core areas, for instance. 
Given the nawabs' interest in providing protection and patronage to their domains and 
communities, it is highly unlikely that they would have encouraged revenue farmers 
inimical to these basic concerns. There is also other evidence for the developmental 
activities of revenue farmers. 17 Indeed, all of Hyderabad's intermediaries were revenue 
farmers in one sense: they held their military assignments against revenue contracts. Yet, 
they never destroyed the core areas of the Hyderabad countryside in the same way as the 
13 Presumably to cash in on the opportunity of being able to advance loans to revenue farmers and cultivators, to the latter at 24% interest per annum. (NAI, For Pol, 5 Feb 1838, Stewart's Report, 21) 14 See, for example: NAI, HRMC, 54/1842, Resident's Letters, 3 June, 5. July, 26 July and 3 Aug 1842; 55/1842-43, Resident's Letters, 4-6 Sept 1843; For Pol, 3 Feb 1844, 182; Leonard, 'Bankers in Politics'; also: Chapter Three above. 
15 See, for example: D. Singh, 'Ijarah System in Eastern Rajasthan, 1750-1800', Proceedings of the Rajasthan History Congress, 6(1973), pp. 60-9; Wink, 'Maratha Revenue Farming'. 
16 Wink, 'Maratha Revenue Farming'. 
17 See Chapter One above; also: APSA, DDI, Rasaid wa Yaddasht, 14/11.718, Petition from Shah Mirza, Contractor of Nihal Kondapalli, Khammam, 22 Ramzan 1191 A.H.; 4/11.715, Petition from Lal Das Sahu, Rajah 1191 A.H.; Arzi, 5.500, Sita Ram's Petition; Wajib ul Arz, 11.229, Anand Ram Sahukars Petition, 19 Ramzan 1183 A.H.(c. A.D. 1769); 11.634, Ranoji Naik Benalkar's Petition, 1 Rabi us Sani 1198 A.H.; 11.1623, Raja Shanlcar Rao Bahadur Tej Wunt's Petition. 
145 
British and their collaborators did after superceding the former in the early 19th century.18 
Even in the 1820s and 1830 some revenue farmers resisted the destructive pressures of 
military fiscalism, agricultural depression and poor seasons. One Telangana revenue 
farmer saw the scarcity of 1832/33 coming, and bought up grain with which to subsist his 
cultivators during the ensuing famine. Even if the measure was out of self-interest, - to 
prevent distress migration or the total annihilation of a labour force, - it was in sharp 
contrast to what happened in neighbouring British districts in the same season. Cultivators 
here were unable to fend for themselves and lay dying in their thousands. Indeed, the 
fortunate ones were those who managed to seek refuge in Hyderabad under public or 
private charity. The deputy revenue farmer Warangal, Yelgundel and Khammamett, 
Mohammed Azim Ali, was also seen 'to be very active in moving about and relieving the 
distress and in giving kowls on low terms to the ryots'. Many cultivators who came 
seeking famine relief to Azim Ali's districts from Masulipatnam 'have remained'. Azim 
Ali was singled out for praise for other reasons as well. The resident at this time, Martin, 
felt there were some positive aspects to revenue farming if it were left to function 
according to local custom, and without coercive intervention by the centre. For example, 
the lands of zamindars, patels or cultivators under restraint for real or alleged arrears were 
rarely sold. Azim Ali had thus brought peace and conciliation to his charge, and 
cultivation and population in them had 'increased very considerably'. He apparently 
demanded no more than the value of their contracts from zamindars, and left intact the 
5% commission allowed to deshmukhs and 2 1/2% allowed to deshpandes. Also, he 
respected their sir and rusoom rights in the villages. Another revenue farmer who received 
praise like Azim Ali was Ameen Nawaz Jang, the revenue farmer of Beed, Mominabad, 
Kullum and the upper Manjira valley in Marathwada. His districts were reported to be in 
a high state of cultivation. In a similar state were the districts of Husain Dost Khan north 
of Bidar. The district of Sirsilla in northern Telangana, likewise, registered a rise in 
revenue-paying capacity from Rs. 11,000 in 1830 to Rs. 16,500 in 1838 under its benign 
deputy revenue farmer, Shaikh Mohammed Ali. 19 
4.3.2 Destructive Revenue Farming 
Nevertheless, most revenue farmers who collaborated with the centre's military fiscal 
policies in Hyderabad in the early 19th century began to display unprecedented levels of 
cruelty and destructiveness in their methods of revenue collection. These new levels of 
cruelty and coercion in revenue collection methods had two kinds of implications. They 
led to the destruction of core areas and to a deterioration in the traditional relationships in 
the communal domains. Official records and folklore from this period both, comment on 
18 See references cited in the last footnote and Chapters One and Three above. 
19 NAI, HRR, 71, Stewart's Letter, 11 July 1834; 550, Reviews, 1834-38; For Pol, 11 April 1838, Cameron to GoI, Letter, 61, 15 March 1838; 5 Feb 1838, Stewart's Report, 21, 1837-38. 
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these phenomena in their different ways. Kana Rao transferred the revenue burden to 
which he had opened himself by entering into a contract with the centre in 1819 onto 
rival and lesser zamindars with a vengeance in Yelgundel. If the zamindars attempted to 
seek redress by petitioning Hyderabad, Kana Rao 'will devise their ruin which he openly 
threatens to effect'. His revenue collections and levies for nazrana, which he claimed 
Chandu Lal demanded from him frequently, also became ruthless. In Berar, the severe 
effects of the drought of 1804 were compounded by the practices of Govind Baksh's 
deputies and sub-contractors, particularly men like Mokum Chand, the naib from 
c.1818/19 - 1828/29, whose 'name [was] remembered with horror by the cultivators in 
that part of the country'. The naib in Fasli 1228-29, Abdul Hasan Chisti, utilized the 
sums allowed him as revenue collection expenses to maintain a body of troops with 
which he plundered the districts openly. Chisti's successor, Bholanath, was free to raise as 
much revenue as he liked, and by whatever means he chose, provided he met the terms of 
his contract with Govind Baksh. Bholanath was locally regarded, as the khas naukar of 
Govind Baksh. The latter always maintained him on a monthly salary of Rs. 1000, 
whether or not he held a revenue contract then. Bholanath's style of operation was 
reflected in the endless 'complaints of helpless cultivators being confined, whipped, 
maimed, earlocked, pressed between stones, placed in a position in which boiling water 
was poured down their backs ... '20 
Govind Baksh not only winked at the tyrannies of the taluqdars and naibs of Berar 
and northern Marathwada, he even participated in these directly. If the districts he farmed 
out became a 'wilderness', those he administered himself were 'prostrate from the 
rapacious and atrocious government of Govind Baksh' . The local stories about him and 
his naibs were usually about their cruelty. It was related that when a woman once refused 
to give up her grain to one of his naibs, Gopal Harl of Patri, he ordered his agents to 
soak her sari in oil and set it on fire. But Govind Baksh's most notorious agent by far 
was Mulook Chand, and the Governor of Berar was himself accused of conniving at this 
man's sadistic tortures. When a patel once came to Govind Baksh to complain against 
Mulook Chand's excesses, which included forcing men to stand on red hot irons and 
burning their fingers, Govind Baksh threatened him with more of the same treatment. Nor 
was this exceptional,-apparently: 
'Govind Baksh ... was accustomed to sit by, smoking his hookah in 
complacency, while human life was made to ebb out after the slowest and 
most agonising inventions'. 21 
20 Phoolmari taluq, - comprising the districts of Phoolmari, Antoor, Seoli, Jantoor, Chartana and Dubhari, - was held by a banker called Raghunath Das. Complaints against him, - 'and some of them of a very horrid kind', -
were frequent. He was accused of excessive cruelty 'whether for the most important purposes, or to gain the 
merest trifle'. (NAI, HRR, Wells to Metcalfe, Letter, 15 Nov 1821; also: HRR, 126, Ralph to Metcalfe, 29 Aug 1822.) 
21 NAI, For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 98-9; also: HRR, 690, Wells to Metcalfe, Letter, 15 Nov 1821; For Pol, 30 June 1825, 84-92. 
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Where zamindars and patels were assimilated to the business of revenue farming, they 
were willing to compromise their role as protectors and patrons. Contractor zamindars 
presented a recognizable contrast to both contemporary naiks and the over idealized 
patrons of tradition. Once the zamindar of Yelgundel, Kona Rao, had accepted his own 
former districts on contract from the centre in 1819, for example; he was seen less and 
less by his community as the hero who had for decades defied the domain's enemies. His 
raiyyat in fact petitioned the British superintendent for their area, Ralph, for help when 
Kona Rao began to effect merciless revenue and nazrana collections in order to satisfy the 
centre. The Ramgir zamindar's story was similar. Not just zamindars, even karnams who 
had accepted their villages on contract, or assisted contractors in return for special 
favours, became alienated from their former communities, according to Wells writing in 
1822.22 
Where zamindars, patels and patwaris were not assimilated to revenue farming, they 
got embroiled in local wars with contractors: Metcalfe noticed in 1822 that the 
oppressions of zamindars in northern Telangana 'have no doubt been aggravated by recent 
misgovernment'. 23 His assistant wrote a year later that in Bhongir and Deverkonda 
zamindars terrorized and tortured village headmen with a hitherto unknown abandon and 
ferocity. Some of the most poignant instances of zamindars abandoning their traditional 
role of protector and patron for that of the ruthless contractor were to be found in Medak, 
Warangal, Khammam, Ramgir and Yelgundel during the severe drought of 1824/25.24 
Zamindars led, or commissioned, armed bands to plunder and murder in their own 
villages. Old men borrowed telling motifs from memory to describe the situation: 
'When the pindarrahs came they took our clothes and vessels which we could replace. They stayed two days and since that year have not returned. The amils are pindarrahs every day of the year, and take what the others could not remove. They take our cattle and corn! '25 
A serious consequence of a breakdown of relations within the core domains was the 
decay of reservoirs and irrigation networks. Such decay could lead to long term damage 
to agriculture, especially in rice growing areas.26 The increased rapacity of zamindars and 
patels that was noticed between 1822 and 1825 in Telangana was noticed elsewhere, too, 
particularly in Berar and parts of Marathwada. The villages of North Eastern Berar, Sayer 
noticed, were almost completely deserted, while less total emigrations were taking place 
from most other Berar districts into Nagpur or Bombay. 
22 NAI, HRR, 126, Ralph to Metcalfe, Letter, 29 Aug 1822; For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 98. 
23 NAI, For Pol, 19 July 1822, 8. 
. 24 NAI, HRR, 126, Ralph to Metcalfe, Letter, 29 Aug 1822; also: For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 98-9; HRR, 582, Wells 's Report, 6 May 1824. 
25 NAI, HRR, 126, Ralph to Metcalfe, Letter, 29 Aug 1822; HRR, 582, Wells 's Report, 6 May 1824. 26 NAI, For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 98-9. 
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24 NAI, HRR, 126, Ralph to Metcalfe, Letter, 29 Aug 1822; also: For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 98-9; HRR, 582, Wells's Report, 6 May 1824. 
25 NAI, HRR, 126, Ralph to Metcalfe, Letter, 29 Aug 1822; HRR, 582, Wells's Report, 6 May 1824. 
26 NAI, For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 98-9. 
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The surveyor of Warangal observed about the district's deshpandes in 1844 that: 
'These functionaries ... are, especially the Brahmins, object,; of much merited odium ... To squeeze out as much of the ryots as they can and to defraud the Government are the great end and aim of their existence'.27 
He also noted that the special levies that the zamindars of this region pressed fell 
'exclusively on the cultivators and artisans', and that 'when extracted by an unpopular 
zamindar are hateful'. He recorded a story of recent invention in this connection. The 
prototype of a cruel and oppressive revenue farming zamindar is clearly present in the 
story. A 'wicked raja' devised a patti of a new kind: 'The breasts of the women were to 
be measured and the measure was to be filled with coins'. The raja's collectors visited the 
house of a dhobi while he was away on business and proceeded to execute their orders on 
his wife. When the humiliated woman managed to struggle out of their grasp, she rushed 
to the dhobi 's washing stone, dashed out the brains of her infant child on it and then 
ended her own life in the same way. Before dying, however, she laid a curse on the 
wicked raja's house. His family was destroyed not long after and his capital became a 
wildemess.28 We do not know how much of the testimony of officialdom to take at face 
value, but their clear message of deteriorating relationships between contractor zamindars 
and their subjects does seem to accord with the economic realities of military fiscalism in 
a period of severe financial difficulties. In this process may also lie some of the long term 
origins of the 'landlord-peasant conflicts' that became so familiar in the area in the 20th 
century.29 
Yet another kind of social change can be associated with the activities of the revenue 
farming collaborators of the centre's military fiscal policies in the early 19th century. The 
domain of the small king had been traditionally sustained significantly by the notion of 
the 'community', which was elaborated through legitimation rituals, consensus building 
devices and incorporating legends. The emphasis on the 'community', rather than a 
particular caste, religion or sect, was of obvious practical value in a situation where the 
social composition of communities was rarely fixed. The communities were embedded in 
the political-economic realities of the Deccani landscape: post-Vijayanagara small kings 
competing for scarce labour and resources. Although the rhetoric of the community could 
sometimes sound suspiciously like the rhetoric of the dominant caste or sectarian grouping 
within the community, the community was still above a particular caste or sect by and 
large.30 
27 NAI, HRR, 394, Survey of Warangal, 1844-48. 
28 Ibid .. 
29 See, for example: D.N. Dhanagre, 'Social Origins of the Peasant Insurrection in Telangana (1946-51)', C/S, n.s., 8(1974), pp. 190-234; R.B. Goud et. al., Glorious Telangana, Armed Struggle, (Communist Party Publication, 8,, 1973); P. Sundarayya, Telangana People's Struggle and Its Lessons, (Calcutta, 1972). 30 See Chapter One above. 
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The military fiscal interventions of a powerful and coercive centre under British 
hegemony transformed the workings of the old order in fundamental and critically 
important ways, however, in areas such as Berar and Telangana. The granting of fixed 
proprietory and hereditary rights, tenures, offices and privileges to some at the expense of 
others, in the old core areas was buttressed by the centre's coercive power. Those who 
lost out from these developments did resist their marginalization or dispossession of 
course. But they were pitted against a far stronger enemy.31 As the 'community' lost its 
former flexibility, it also lost supra-caste or multi-caste or sect appeal, and tended to 
crystallize now around the dominant caste or sectarian grouping, on the one hand, and the 
marginal one, on the other. 'Communal' religious conflicts, also grew around some 
traditional core areas where the older flux and rivalries over rights and resources had been 
definitively 'settled' by the British regime. For example, a party of Arabs were confirmed 
in their revenue assignments in Nanded in 1830, whereas they had earlier been contesting 
these with a Sikh religious establishment for many years. Bloody conflict now errupted in 
Nanded, as the Sikhs responded to what they perceived to be a critical threat. The conflict 
was re-enacted on Hyderabad's streets in 1831, when armed parties of Sikhs and Arabs 
clashed, and 200 Sikhs and 100 Arabs were killed. In parts of Berar, too, such as Akola 
and Akote, intermediary assignments and land control had been disputed between Hindu 
and Muslim lineages for a long time past. When the British regime began to settle the 
rights of some lineages and dispossess other lineages in the 1830s, however, a new kind 
of 'communal' conflict began to develop between them.32 It is perhaps possible to see in 
such developments some of the long term origins of the 'communal' conflicts of the 
nineteenth and, more especially, twentieth centuries. 
4.4 Protest 
Alongside collaboration, and the new sorts of tensions that it began to generate in 
indigenous society, the early decades of the 19th century also witnessed the emergence of 
widespread protest against the British dominated centre in Hyderabad and its policies. The 
centre did not hesitate to unleash the full power of its superior coercive capability as the 
protest gained in scope, strength and momentum. It launched full scale military campaigns 
in 1818 against Bhil naiks in Berar, for example.33 The shared experience of a common 
enemy could only be the starting point of protest in the face of such reaction. Its 
organization and sustenance also required resources, piobilization, courage and 
commitment. The following sections explore some of the organizational and sustaining 
aspects of protest in Hyderabad in the period c.1805-59. They give primary importance to 
31 See discussion above and below within this chapter, and Chapter Three above. 
32 See, for example: NAI, HRR, 791, Commanding Officer, Ellichpur to Resident, Hyderabad, Letters, Illlle-July 1838; 776, Commanding Officer, Aurangabad to Resident, Hyderabad, Letter, 3 May 1845. 
33 NAI, HRR, 685, 686; H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 87-116. 
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the cultural legacies of the pre-colonial communal domains in the articulation and 
ideology of protest They also consider links between the protest of the 'rebel communal 
domains' that were formed and the Mujahiddin movement, as well as mutinies among 
British troops. 
4.4.1 Early Intermediary Protests 
The Freedom Struggle in Hyderabad series. represents the anti-British sentiments of the 
Nizam and some of his courtiers in the opening years of the nineteenth century as the 
beginnings of a 150-year long struggle for freedom. That they shared some common 
sentiments and aspirations is regarded as adequate evidence to unite a whole range of 
protests and their participants over a long period into a single 'connected' account of the 
freedom struggle.34 The analysis here finds it more plausible to locate the various protests 
in nineteenth century Hyderabad within the response of intermediaries, zamindars and 
other dislocated groups to military fiscalism and centralization, in the context of 
agricultural depression and poor seasons. 
Mahipat Ram typified the resistance of intermediaries in the earliest phase of 
centralization. Intermediaries had entered into alliances with each other, with foreign 
powers and with small kings in the pre-colonial order of Hyderabad in the quest for 
military and revenue assignments, and profit and influence in the Asaf Jahi darbar. The 
most prestigious office in the darbar was that of diwan, followed by that of the peshkar. 
Mahipat Ram launched a bid for the diwani 1805. His main opponents were Mir Alam 
and Chandu Lal and their supporters. Both factions tried to win over the British resident 
to their cause. When Mahipat Ram and his supporters failed in this endeavour, they 
looked for support to other quarters: neighbouring Maratha capitals and intermediaries in 
Berar. The resident perceived these moves as a threat to the British interest in Hyderabad, 
however, and his fears were reinforced by his collaborators at the centre, Mir Alam and 
Chandu Lal. The centre tried to investigate, supervize and control the activities of 
Mahipat Ram. When the latter resisted such treatment, he was represented as an enemy of 
the state and the subsidiary alliance.35 
The earliest hero figure of nationalist historians in Hyderabad is Mahipat Ram, the 
intermediary who was forced to give up his charge in Berar and then fly from Hyderabad 
in 1807. Mahipat Ram did not retire without an attempt to resist his expulsion. He tried 
to mobilize opinion against the resident and his supporters in the Hyderabad darbar and in 
Berar. The centre threatened Mahipat Ram by launching an investigation into his military 
and revenue accounts. Mahipat Ram perceived that such close scrutiny by the centre 
posed a threat not only to himself but also to many other intermediaries. Intermediaries in 
34 H.S.C., Freedom Struggle. 
35 See Chapters Two and Three above. 
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Hyderabad quite commonly did not maintain their full quota of troops or raise the official 
estimates of revenues to the full. Such men had much to fear from a British centre which 
equated shortfalls in revenues and troops with corruption. Mahipat Ram played on these 
fears . He wooed Salabat Khan, the most powerful intermediary in Berar next to himself, 
in the hope that his example would induce many smaller intermediaries also to lend him 
their support. But while he did not succeed with Salabat Khan, who had long been a local 
enemy, Mahipat Ram did manage to win over several others, who signed an iqrarnama, 
or deed of solidarity, with him.36 
Mahipat Ram and his supporters relied on being able to bring off a ministerial coup in 
the Hyderabad darbar. Once he was banished from Hyderabad, they hoped that friends 
there, such as Ismail Yar Jang and his associates, would be able to achieve this end. What 
gave the efforts of Ismail Yar Jang and his associates teeth was the support they were 
able to mobilize among British troops in Hyderabad.37 The sensitivity of Indian troops to 
any intrusion of their religious beliefs or practices through military regulations has long 
been commented upon by scholars. But an appeal to 'religious causes' for explaining 
mutinies can become so general as to become meaningless. What sorts of specific 
concerns were represented through the currency of religious issues and symbols? Why did 
religion surface prominently in relation to certain concerns and not others? Why did they 
bind different communities together at certain times and not at others? These are all 
difficult though important questions. The attempt to deal with them here is only tentative. 
When a soldier took offence at being asked not to wear a certain kind of beard or 
moustache, or to discard or modify other aspects of his traditional attire, in favour of a 
uniform, he was probably taking offence at the invasion of what one may describe as his 
traditional status or identity in the community. Such a crisis of status could also become a 
crisis of communal, personal, caste or religious identity.38 It is interesting that the 
foreigner's alienness was recognized with respect to with the uniformity of his attire: he 
was a wearer of hats and jackets; and with respect to his religion: he was Christian. But 
why did a soldier who felt his status threatened or violated tum to men like Ismail Yar 
Jang, Narsing Rao, Noor ul Umra, Digambar Rao and Rao Rambha in Hyderabad?39 
Perhaps he perceived that these men and their associates, too, were disturbed by the 
invasion of their status. For, Hyderabad 's policies under British domination did affect 
their status and privileges perceptibly; as well as their economic and political bases.40 
36 See Chapter Three above; also: H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 18-55. 
37 Ibid .. 
38 See discussion of communal domains in Chapter One and of the crisis of their invasion in the early 19th century in this chapter and in Chapter Three above. 
39 H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 18-55; IOLR, Mack Unbound, VII/37, On the Vellore Mutiny; see also: K. Rajayyan, South Indian Rebellion: The First War of Independence, 1800-01, (Mysore, 1971), pp. 58-9, 67-73, 120-2; IOLR, Board's Collections, F/4/52/1143, Guntur Mutiny, Sept-Oct 1797. 40 See discussion below within this chapter, and Chapter Three above; also: Rajayyan, South Indian Rebellion, pp. 42-73, 96, 120-2, 131; IOLR, Board's Collections, F/4/52/1143, Guntur Mutiny, Sept-Oct 1797. 
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Put together, the aspirations and efforts of soldiers and intermediaries appeared to the 
British as a religiously inspired military and diplomatic campaign to bring back an old 
order.41 Events of this nature occurred in Vellore, Hyderabad, Berar, Bellary, Bangalore, 
Nandidrug and several other places in 1806.42 Although the principal protagonists of 1806 
were identified and punished, not all rebels could be identified, and sporadic protests 
continued well into the following year, 1807. An impression was said to persist among 
many intermediaries in Berar, for example, that · Mahi pat Ram would return and capture 
the diwani yet.43 An infantry battalion which was being reformed mutinied in Aurangabad 
in July 1807. Its commandant, an Englishman called Charles Freeman, suggested one 
reason for the mutiny was that the troops had been left unpaid for two months.44 But 
financial distress was only one aspect of the soldiers' discontent. They also rejected 
British military forms and usages and reverted back to the French ones they had learnt 
from Raymond and Perron, the French commandants whom their original master, Mahipat 
Ram, had employed: 
'in the discipline etc. they carry on in French ... they do not like in their heart ... the English'. 
The troops also kept up contact with a mutsaddi, Asaram, in the nearby fort of 
Daulatabad. Asaram was related to Mahipat Ram by marriage and was in secret 
correspondence with him.45 Freeman complained, furthermore that the Aurangabad 
battalion's mutiny was the fifth occasion of 'their misbehaviour in this respect', and he 
now advised their disbandment. His suggestion was accepted.46 
The main weakness of the protests of 1806-7 was their limited reach. Although they 
covered long distances, from Berar to Vellore, the protestors communications were geared 
to propaganda in a small number of military centres. Also, participation in these protests 
was limited to intermediaries and troops affected adversely by centralization and military 
reform: While the crises of communal identity and personal status might have had a more 
widespread effect. the 1806-07 protests were still in the early days of the British regime 
and it would be a few years before the centre's new policies affected more areas and 
groups with equal intensity. The centre was able to suppress the mutinies through superior 
41 H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 18-55; NAI, For Sec, 23 Oct 1806, 105A-110; For Pol, 21 Sept 1807, 49; 18 Jan 1808, 61-5; 29 Feb 1808, 57; 7 March 1808, 40; HRR, 345, Letters, Feb 1808; IOLR, Board's Collections, F/4/296, Mahipat Ram's Rebellion and Holkar's Rebellious Chiefs; Mack Unbound, VII/37 ; also: Rajayyan, South Indian Rebellion, p. 131 ; Official Correspondence on 'Extirpation of Dhoondia Waugh, The Freebooter of Mysore', AAR(1800), pp. 133-5. 
42 H.S .C., Freedom Struggle, I, 18-55; NAI, HRR, 258. 
43 He would also, it was said, upon coming back punish those who had deserted him in the face of official persecution. (NAI, For Pol, 21 May 1807, Russell to Sydneham, Letter, 3, 5 March 1807, pp. 8-18) 
44 The mutinous troops themselves claimed that their pay had been held back for five months. (NAI, For Pol, Freeman to Doveton, 30 July 1807) 
45 The resident believed that Asaram was one among several men who propagated the belief that Mahipat Ram still retained the favour of the Nizam and would some day return to the exercise of his power. 
46 NAI, For Pol, 7 Dec 1807, 39. 
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fire power, in the event with the help of loyalists like Salabat Khan in Berar and Mir 
Alam and Chandu Lal in Hyderabad. 
4.5 The Expansion of Protest 
The period c.1807-50 saw the expansion of monopolistic military fiscalism and 
centralization. This co-incided to some extent with agricultural depression and poor 
seasons. An increasing number of intermediaries lost their traditional assignments, and 
more core areas were also ravaged.47 While the earliest protest against the centre had been 
confined to a limited number of intermediaries and troops, an ever increasing number of 
intermediaries and small kings were being affected now. There were several strands to 
their protest. One was the use of communal motifs in the style of the pre-colonial 
communal domains. Another was the incorporation of Mujahiddin propaganda, and a third 
was the further growth of links with mutinous discontent among British troops. 
As military fiscalism and centralization penetrated the small kingdoms of the 
Hyderabad countryside, in the context of agricultural depression and poor seasons, the 
economies of the core areas declined.48 Their communities were forced to migrate in 
distress. The migration occurred broadly in two directions. One was into neighbouring 
territories like Nagpur, Poona, Bombay and Madras.49 But these territories were 
themselves hit by the depression and could not absorb all of Hyderabad's distress 
migrants despite their relative political stability.50 The other direction of distress migration 
was towards rebel communal domains within Hyderabad itself.51 The latter migration 
faced a major constraint. The migrants had only a limited number of tracts to go to as 
long as the rebels could not defend themselves against the superior military power of the 
centre over a broader area. This induced an expansion of the core areas within the rebel 
communal domains, as from c.1810. 
Naik led rural protest was widely inclusive in character, involving groups like the 
Bhils and the Gonds, as well as agriculturists. All these groups had shared the adverse 
consequences of the centre's military fiscal policies, and sought to reconstitute their 
communities in rebel communal domains.52 The naiks were the leaders of the rebel 
domains; they had usually experienced 'oppression from the government': 'Every 
47 See Chapter Three above. 
48 
49 
See Chapter Three above. 
See, for example: NAI, For Pol, 8 Dec 1821, Metcalfe's Report, 63, Nov 1821; 19 July 1822, 8; 4 July 1823, 40; 21 Oct 1825, 98-9; HRR, 550, Reviews, 1834-38. 
50 See, for example: Guha, 'The Agrarian Economy'; Elphinstone, Report; IOLR, Hn07 /2, Jenkins' s History of Berar, 1826; Thomas and Natarajan, 'Depression'. 
51 See discussion within this chapter below. 
52 Berar was for strategic reasons the first area where the British dominated centre had tried to implement its new military and fiscal policies. It was here, too, that their severe effects were first felt. Protests occurred first among intermediaries and troops, in 1806-07. By c.1810, zamindars, peasants and other elements in the countryside also began to protest. 
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zamindar who ... has reason to complain of the Government becomes a Naik ... '53 In the 
early period of the protest, naiks were found throughout Berar, and in the Marathwada 
district adjoining it, Nanded. Their strongholds were most numerous in the districts of 
Mahur, Tamsa, Ninsee, Parbhani and those surrounding Bassim. These were all well 
fortified and usually located in naturally strong terrain. The inhabitants of the rebel 
communal domains were excellent agriculturists and soldiers: contemporaries remarked 
that their villages were 'the most flourishing in the province' and that 'all the inhabitants 
of them are soldiers'. But naik strongholds were constantly under pressure from British 
troops and revenue farmers, and had to be abandoned and reconstituted time and again: 
'The difficulty does not consist so much in destroying their power in the first instance, as in preventing them from recovering it afterwards'. 54 
Of the numerous naiks to be found throughout Berar and Nanded in mid-1811, about 
twenty five were particularly powerful. They were, Shivaram Naik of Esapur, with 2000 
men and territory worth Rs. 3 lakhs; Lakshman Naik of Wanhoo, with 1000 men and 
territory worth Rs. 2 lakhs; Baggaji Naik of Dangar Talab, with 500 men and territory 
worth Rs. 50 thousand; Jaswant Rao Naik of Jam; Nausaji Naik of Nausa, and twenty 
other naiks dispersed throughout Berar, each commanding between 200 and 400 men and 
territory worth Rs. 25 to 50 thousand. All the naiks attracted distress migrants: 
'any of the inhabitants who suffer oppression have an asylum held out to 
them, where they are sure to find protection, and where they probably live in greater affluence and security than under their lawful governors. '55 
The inhabitants of the rebel domains were thus mostly cultivator-soldiers who 'at different 
times had been driven from their habitations, or been tempted to abandon them by the 
same cause [as the naiks]. '56 
The rebel domains tended to be flexible in their social composition, thanks to the 
conditions in which they were created and maintained. Naiks, for example, were drawn 
from among erstwhile Maratha, Bhil and Gond zamindars, and the cultivator-soldiers from 
an even wider cross section of rural, pastoral and forest communities, as well as 
dislocated Arab and Pathan intermediaries.57 Whether settled in strongholds or on the 
move, naik led bands looked for increasing co-operation from villagers, zamindars and 
53 NAI, HRR, 44, Russell's Report, 10 July 1811. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid .. 
56 Ibid .. 
57 See, for example: NAI, HRR, 44, Russell's Report, 10 July 1811; 685, Pitman to ·sayer, Letter, 20 Jan 1819, Davies to Pitman, Letter, 13 Feb 1819, Pitman to Russell, Letter, 27 March 1819; 686, Letters, Sept 1819-Feb 1820; 801, Letters, Dec 1841-Jan 1842; HRMC, 31/1817-20, Resident to G-G, Letters, 25 Sept 1818, 17 Sept 1819; For Pol, 11 Feb 1813, 18-19; 17 Nov 1815, 10-12; 5 Oct 1810, 95-7; 13 Sept 1841, 23-4; IOLR, Board's Collections, F/4/335/7667; F/4/389/9934; F/4/521/1 2447; H.S .C., Freedom Struggle, I, 87-100; J. de L. Conry, Regimental History of the 2119th Hyderabad Regiment (Berar), (Aldershot, 1927), pp. 2-5. 
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intermediaries against the centre. Protests based on rebel communal domains had spread 
from Berar to Marathwada, Telangana and Rayalseema by 1818, as the latter areas also 
began to experience the severe effects of the centre's mlitary and revenue policies, which 
were heightened by agricultural depression and poor seasons.58 
A full scale campaign was launched by British troops against naik Dharmaji Pratap 
Rao of Beed district in Marathwada in July 1818.59 When his stronghold was captured,60 it 
was discovered that Dharmaji 's garrison was composed chiefly of Banjaras.61 A campaign 
was also launched against Nausaji Naik six months later. Judging from the length and 
breath of this campaign, Nausaji enjoyed extensive support. His own community, the 
Hatkars; Maratha peasant groups; and Arab intermediaries who had lost from the new 
revenue and military policies in Hyderabad, Poona and Madras were among the principal 
participants in Nausaji's rebel domain. He also enjoyed the support of other naiks, such as 
his brother, Hansaji; of neighbouring intermediaries; and of numerous villages throughout 
Nanded and south western Berar. The Hatkars had opposed the centre since the late 
eighteenth century. They were able to incorporate various other groups into their protest 
in the early nineteenth century. The creation of a rebel communal domain thus, together 
with Nausaji's links with other naiks, also meant that protest in the Hyderabad 
countryside now carried greater geographical reach and social depth than ever before. 
British troops campaigning against Nausaji confronted his camps, strongholds and 
sympathizers over a wide area, which was marked by centres as far apart as Wardha and 
Nanded north to south, and Hingoli and Parbhani east to west. To its north and west, 
furthermore, Nausaji 's area of influence overlapped with that of other naiks, whose 
protests at their farthest limits extended deep into Khandesh, Gujrat and Central India. To 
the east, Nausaji's area merged with that of Lakshmaji Naik's, which linked up in tum 
with the efforts of Kona Rao, Aswa Rao and others in northern and eastern Telangana. 
58 
59 
See Chapter Three above. 
NAI, HRMC, 31/1817-20, Resident to G-G, Letter, 12 Aug 1818; H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 87-9. 
60 The leading rebels, Dhannaji and his brother, were taken prisoner. 
61 The Banjaras were yet another group of people who had experienced considerable dislocation and marginalization in the early nineteenth century. In contrast, they had earlier occupied an important position in the political economy of the Deccan and enjoyed a corresponding status with zamindars, intermediaries, kings, traders and even European powers. They had played a decisive role as traders and transport agents. They had also enjoyed flattering recognition-from various powers wishing to penetrate the Deccan from Hindustan, or further south from the Deccan. They had, for example, been honoured by Aurangzeb in the late seventeenth century, and by Hyderabad, Poona and Madras in the late eighteenth. But the early nineteenth century disruption of zamindari capitals, which had served as centres of trade in quieter times, put capital to flight from these areas and sent the Banjaras' status giving clientele into decline. Another reason for their adversity lay in their displacement from military carriage by the British military establishment, which, unlike earlier, now serviced itself and its allies and dispensed with Banjara services. Besides making severe inroads into their traditional means of livelihood, a British dominated regime now viewed the Banjaras as thieves and vagabonds. In such a situation, the latter, not surprisigly, towards naiks like Dhannaji Pratap Rao much in the same manner as did zamindars, patels, peasants and intermediaries. (This brief review is based on: H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 87-9; IOLR, H.Misc, H/253, Nizam's Agreement with the Banjaras, 1791; Board's Collections, F/4/53/1201, Organizing Transport Bullocks during the War with Tipu Sultan, 1791-9; F/4/80/1771 , On the Banjaras as Agents of Transport and Traders from the Hyderabad and Central Indian Interior to the East Coast during the 18th Century; J. Briggs, 'Account of the Origin, History and Manners of the Race of Men called Bunjaras', Bombay Transactions, 1(1819), pp. 159-83; E. Balfour, 'On the Migratory Tribes of Natives in Central India' , ]RAS, 13, 1(1844), pp. 1-23; see also: Chapter One above). 
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The British campaign against Nausaji was conducted under the overall command of 
Major Robert Pitman. Among his detachment commandants were Captains Sayer and 
Davies. Captain Sayer met with naik strongholds or pro-naik villages throughout the 
Umarkhed region. He complained that the deshmukh of Umarkhed, Trimbak Rao, had 
given a band of 500 men led by Nausaji shelter and provisions while Sayer was pursuing 
it. Captain Davies also noticed village level support for Nausaji and his men. When he 
arrived at a village called Kirka in pursuit of a rebel party under a man named Ghulam 
Ali, the patel, offering to help him, 'conducted me into the jungle, where I lost all trace 
of them'. When Davies returned to Kirka realizing he had been tricked, he found the patel 
and the inhabitants of the village had already fled. 62 Heavy concentrations of British 
troops continued their campaign against Nausaji despite local set backs. Their principal 
engagement with him occurred at Nowah. Pitman besieged the fort in which Nausaji was 
quartered with 2000 cavalry and 2863 infantry and artillery. The fort was garrisoned by 
about 620 Arabs. When they refused to surrender, Pitman gave orders for the fort to be 
stormed. Being heavily outnumbered, the Arabs suffered serious losses: about 439 of them 
were killed and another 80 were seriously wounded. Some rebel posts in the vicinity of 
Nowah were demoralized by its capture and gave in quietly to Pitman.63 But the story of 
the seige and of the storming was re-worked into incoiporating legends and propaganda of 
rebel communal domains further afield as one of heroics and martyrdom on the part of 
Nausaji and his associates.64 Nausaji's legend occupied a central place, for instance, in the 
propaganda that prevailed in the domain of Lakshmaji Naik. The naik in fact received 
support in the name of Nausaji. The Gond naiks Goma and Pykoo were also similarly 
seen as N ausaji 's lieutnants by their supporters in districts on the Wardha in Berar. 65 
Lakshmaji's influence extended over parts of Berar and northern Marathwada. His 
extensive village level support became evident to those who conducted military operations 
62 NAI, For Pol, 1 May 1819, Resident's Letters, March-April 1819; 30 June 1825, 84; HRMC, 31/1817-20, Resident to G-G, Letters, 5 April, 17 Sept and 22 Nov 1819; HRR, 685, Pitman to Sayer, Letter, 20 Jan 1819, Davies to Pitman, Letter, 13 Feb 1819, Pitman to Russell, Letter, 27 March 1819; 686, Locker's Letter, 29 Dec 1819, Other Letters, Oct 1819-Feb 1820; IOLR, F/4/521/12447-8; H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 89-100; Conry, Regimental History, pp. 3-4; George, Hyderabad Contingent. 
63 H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 89-100; HRMC, 31/ 1817-20, 22 Nov 1819. 
64 Nausaji 's life story was celebrated as an account of constant opposition to Hyderabad. Nowah was said to have been taken by the Hatkar brothers, Nausaji and Hansaji, from the chief of a local enemy community, the Kachars, who had 'originally constructed ... [it] ... as a stronghold [after they had] amassed much wealth'. Thereafter, the brothers strengthened it and took into their service 400 Arab soldiers, with whose assistance they raided deep into Hyderabad and Nagpur country. 'People tolerated their high handedness in the hope that they may build a Hindu Raj'. But the Nizam was not happy and the tension between Hyderabad and the Hatkars' growing domain was constant. Yet, despite the tension, the old order did give honourable recognition to the small king: 'The legends bring out ... the story ... [that] ... situated to the north of the [Nowah] ghurry there lay buried a large treasure and he he was able to unearth it was to be rewarded with Nowah as a permanent jagir. This announcement was made by the then Asaf Jah. Nausaji and Hansaji succeeded in discovering this treasure and therefore Nowah was granted to them as jagir.'. The rise of British influence in Hyderabad put an end to the centre's recognition of the Hatkar brothers, however: 'On intimation from the Nizam, the British contingents 
65 
marched to Nowah .. .' .(H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 97-9). 
Captain Hollis, who conducted military operations against Goma and Pykoo in January 1820, noted that most of the W ardha districts had been deserted on account of oppressive revenue demands by revenue farmers and their agents. But where villages retained their inhabitants, they supplied Gonds, Dheds and Kunbis to the ranks of the naiks. (NAI, HRR, 686, Letters, Sept 1819-April 1820). 
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against him. Captain Sayer arrested the deshmukh of Hingoli, Raghuji, as well as an 
'influential' associate of his, Anandi Rao, in September 1819 on the charge of conducting 
suspiciously close dealings with Lakshmaji. Captain Locker arrested Reswaji, the patel of 
a village in Berar's Chartana pargana, Lohari, for supplying Lakshmaji 's party with 
provisions while they were being pursued by British troops. Frustrated commandants were 
complaining bitterly about widespread support for naiks throughout Berar, northern 
Marathwada and northern Telangana by early 1820. Sayer recommended to the resident in 
Hyderabad that he should get the diwan, Chandu Lal, to send express written warnings to 
all the patels, deshmukhs and deshpandes of the parganas of Seoli, Chartana, Jentoor, 
Bamuri, Narsi, Vakut, Amrapur, Maiker, Malkapur, Panjra and Shakkarkheda that anyone 
discovered supporting naiks ran the risk of incurring the maximum penalty for treason, 
death. He also recommended that the warning be accompanied by an offer of rewards for 
those who helped British troops. Letters giving effect to both of Sayer's recommendations 
were sent out, but they were largely ignored. Lakshmaji and his associates continued to 
gain support in Berar and Marathwada, and zamindars like Kona Rao and Aswa Rao 
began to organize resistance in northern Telangana. 66 
A campaign was launched against Kona Rao in the districts of Yelgundel and Ramgir 
in 1819. British troops captured most of the rebel's strongholds and forced Kona Rao to 
make terms with Hyderabad. He agreed to disband his troops and to take full 
responsibility for paying the revenues of his districts to the centre in future. In return, 
Hyderabad agreed to withdraw its own forces and revenue farmers. Hyderabad had been 
forced to negotiate with Kona Rao when it realised that military ascendancy alone was no 
guarantee of satisfactory revenue collections. Influential local collaborators were also a 
necessity.67 The agreement with Kona Rao failed quite soon, however, as Kona Rao found 
the centre's revenue demands becoming heavier in the context of agricultural depression, 
poor seasons, distress migration and declining core areas. British troops were sent out 
against him again, and this time he was brought prisoner to Hyderabad, where he 
eventually died in the dungeons of Golconda. But the removal of Kona Rao still did not 
dampen protest in Y elgundel and Ramgir: 
'as he has not been permitted to exercise his influence in the zamindaree 
which is always calculated to inflame the minds of the inhabitants against 
the government, it has proved prejudicial to its authority, which has in 
consequence never been properly established .. .'.68 
The patels of Yelgundel and Ramgir had been staunch partisans of Kona Rao. He had 
rewarded them with patelkis and watan-s for helping him carve out a small kingdom and 
66 NAI, HRR, 686, Letters, Sept 1819-April 1820. 
67 H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 99-100. 
68 NAI, HRMC, 40/1827-29, Martin to Gol, Letter, 26 Jan 1829. 
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communal domain from local and supra-local wars. They continued to be a 'turbulent set' 
after his removal and it was said to be within their power to paralyse the operations of 
any revenue farmer. 69 East of Yelgundel and Ramgir, in Bhadrachalam and Palunsha, too, 
the centre's revenue demands drove some of the most powerful zamindars, such as Aswa 
Rao, into determined resistance. Most of them retreated into the hills and jungles that 
were abundant in this region and from there carried out raids on revenue farmers whom 
the centre had appointed in their place.70 A force 'consisting of a battalion of the Russell 
Brigade, two 12-pounder and two 6-pounder guns, ... two howitzers, ... a party of 
pioneers, ... 500 Berar Infantry and 200 Reformed Horse' managed to capture the rebel 
strongholds of Sironcha and Mahadevpur in 1823. Newer naiks had emerged in Telangana 
by 1825, nevertheless, and continued to organise protest in districts such as Warangal, 
Khammam, Nalgonda and Deverkonda.71 
Parts of Rayalseema had also turned into seedbeds of protest by this time. One 
indication of this was the rise in crisis related migration: 
'The population is manifestly greatly inferior to what it has been in all the districts; the appearance of houses abandoned and villages deserted is sure proof' .72 
Opposition to revenue farmers was also widespread. Some zamindars and patels, such as 
Desai Swami Rao and Nargauda Shiva Shankar Rao of Tawurugiri, languished in the 
prisons of revenue farmers like Amir Baig of Kannagiri. Others fled across the 
Tungabhadra into Madras Presidency. But yet others attempted to create and defend rebel 
communal domains. The larger zamindars, such as those of Gadwal, Kopal and Raichur, 
were more visible in this respect. Some of them had already been in confrontations with 
British troops in earlier years. Virappa, the zamindar of Kopal, had reoccupied a fort that 
had been taken from him by the centre's troops in 1819, for example. But Hyderabad had 
sent out a strong force against him once again and had re-taken Kopal,73 and Virappa 
himself had been captured this time. The protest of the Doab spilled over into north 
western Rayalseema, south western Telangana and southern Marathwada in the 1820s.74 
Several naiks, - Shivalingappa Deshmukh, Tirumal Rao Deshmukh, Meghasham 
Deshmukh, Malji Kalkia and Lakshman Reddy Desai, - were active in Bidar for example. 
69 Ibid .. 
70 One of the rebel naiks, Bhupati, was barely out of his teens. He had been dispossessed of hereditary deshmukhi rights by the harsh regime of the early nineteenth century and looked to avenge his injury and to regain his status through bandit like activity. 
71 NAI, For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 98-9. 
72 NAI, For Pol, 21 Oct 1825, 98-9. 
73 The Hyderabad force consisted of 1100 cavalry, 2 companies and 5 battalions of infantry, four 6-pounder and two 12-pounder guns, and yet another detachment of cavalry; all to besiege a garrison that was only 500 strong and poorly supplied by comparison. 
74 NAI, For Pol, 12 June 1819, 100-16; 21 Oct 1825, 98-9; HRMC, 31/1817-20, Resident to G-G, Letter, 17 Sept 1819; HRR, 372, Johnston's and Stoddart's Despatches, 1833-5; 550, Reviews, 1834-38; H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 101-16. 
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British forces were sent against them and succeeded in reducing or destroying several of 
their forts.75 
Although broad based, inclusive protest was no longer confined to Berar and 
Marathwada after c. 1818, the most serious developments that the centre encountered in 
the 1820s were still in these regions. The domains of the Bhil naik:s, who were the chief 
worry, drew upon increasing support from distress migrants, peasants, zamindars and 
intermediaries. Bhil naiks · were also active farther afield, in Poona, Nagpur and Bombay. 
As far as Hyderabad was concerned, their main strongholds were in and around the 
Ajanta and Gaotala hills. At least thirty two naiks were believed to be active in 1819. The 
leading one was Chil Naik, who was eventually taken and hanged. Jhandula, Jakira and 
Hiria emerged as the leading Bhil naiks after him. The centre conducted campaigns 
against them throughout the period 1819-24. Jhandula, Jakira and 1200 other Bhils were 
forced to surrender to a British force, which drew a one hundred mile long cordon around 
the base of the Ajanta hills, in 1821. Yet, six new engagements were fought in the 
following year, at Kingaon, Kanhar, Kanam, Despur, Ajanta and Nandgaon. 1823 saw 
British troops campaigning in the districts of Byzapur, Kandalla, Kanam and Nagapur. At 
least one serious encounter took place in 1824. A cessation of hostilities occurred for 
about three years from 1824, as the British tried a policy of 'pacification'. But outright 
warfare errupted once again in 1827, and was to continue, on and off, until c.1860.76 
The commanders of detachments sent out against Bhil naiks noticed extensive support 
for them, in much the same way as those sent out against Lakshmaji had done earlier. 
Although their own strongholds were principally in and around the Ajanta and Gaotala 
hills, Bhil naiks commanded influence and respect over a much wider area, including 
Berar, northern Marathwada and northern Telangana in Hyderabad. The Gond naiks Goma 
and Pykoo of Berar; Lakshmaji of Marathwada; and numerous deshmukhs and patels of 
both these areas, as well as of northern Telangana, actively assisted Bhil naiks by 
providing them intelligence, provisions, shelter and fighting men against British forces. 
The geographical extent of the Bhil resistance was not the only thing about it that worried 
Hyderabad. The latter was also worried by the expanding support the Bhils seemed to be 
receiving from rebellious intermediaries and revenue farmers. 77 Captain Davies reported: 
'The connexion of the principal officers of the Nizam 's Government, of 
the jagirdars, and of the whole population of the country, with the Bhils is 
clearly established ... and no measures can be pursued against these robbers 
unless an immediate stop is put to the protection and assistance afforded 
75 Udgir, which had been seized and garrisoned by Shivalingappa and Malji Kalkia, . was taken and the latter was killed in the action. Gaujigaon, Meghasham's stronghhold, was destroyed, as were several other forts. Tirumal Rao was driven out of Krishnapur, from where he had 'for three years been committing depredations and ... 
refused to pay the revenues due to Government', and Lakshman Reddy from Bhawanipet. 
76 H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 111-15. 
77 NAI, HRR, 686, Letters, Sept 1819-April 1820. 
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them, from different motives, by all ranks of the inhabitants.' .78 
There were several aspects to the intermediaries' support for the Blills. Taluqdars or 
their naibs in districts at the base of the Ajanta hills permitted Bhils to take up positions 
in strategically located villages. This enabled them to gather intelligence about enemy 
troop movements, to collect provisions, and to market their plunder. In Sirsilla, the 
jagirdar's brother, Mir Nasir Ali, himself bought up the booty Bhils had gathered from 
the districts of taluqdars unsympathetic to their efforts and sent it off to distant markets to 
avoid suspicion. In Sitoonda, the amaldar, Anand Rao, claimed a share in whatever booty 
the Bhils raised from plundering in the neighbouring British administered Khandesh. 
Mulook Chand of Jaf:firabad laid similar claims on the Bhil naiks of his district.79 Both 
Anand Rao and Mulook Chand were eventually arrested, charged and convicted by the 
British authorities. But their conduct was not exceptional among the intermediaries of 
Berar. A captured Bhil claimed that all the amaldars of the Ajanta range connived at Bhil 
raids and took fifty per cent of their booty in return.80 
Collaboration between intermediaries and Bhil chiefs was by itself nothing new, but 
persistent alliances in the face of British opposition implied a new rebellious solidarity. 
Some traditional symbols of status were given a new emphasis in the alliances between 
the intermediaries and Bhil naiks. The amaldar of Ausa, Chatar Singh, for example, began 
ritually to honour Bhil naiks by presenting them with expensive and fine turbans, well 
known symbols of status.81 The extensive forging of bonds between the resistance of 
intermediaries and that of Bhil naiks distinguished the protests of the 1820s from earlier 
ones in one important respect. The protests of Mahipat Ram and his associates in 1806-07 
had been limited in their social and geographical reach and were easily overcome by the 
centre. Those of naiks like Nausaji, Lakshmaji, Kona Rao and Aswa Rao in the period 
1810-20 had been much more broad based and had enjoyed the support of intermediaries 
to some extent, but many revenue farmers had still remained indifferent or hostile to 
them, making them vulnerable to British forces. The Bhil protests of the 1820s, however, 
were based on much more widely dispersed and more firmly interlocking rebel communal 
domains than ever before. They also enjoyed more extensive and sustained support from 
intermediaries. 
It had been a common concern of rebels from Mahipat Ram to Lakshmaji and Aswa 
Rao to reject a foreign power that seemed to deprive them of their traditional bases, status 
privileges, and to disturb, dislocate and invade their communal. domains. The rejection had 
also implied a demand for the restoration or preservation of their status and domains. But 
78 NAI, HRR, 686, Davies to Briggs, Letter, 9 Dec 1819. 
79 Anand Rao had also sold the patelkis of three strategically located villages in the Sitoonda district to Bhil naiks. 80 NAI, HRR, 686, Letters, Sept 1819-April 1820; 690, Wells to Metcalfe, Letter, 15 Nov 1821. 81 NAI, HRR, 686, Davies to Plowden, Letter, 27 Dec 1819. 
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not before c.1818-19 had such a demand begun to acquire the character of a movement 
for an alternative political order. From this period one begins to encounter the rebels 
articulating an explicit demand for the restoration of such figures as the Peshwa of Poona 
and the Raja of Nagpur, and attempting to forge links with the Mujahiddin movement and 
mutinous British troops.82 
4.6 The Quest for an Alternative Order 
4.6.1 Background 
The period c.1810-19 began to see the growth and expansion of protest against the 
centre's policies beyond a limited number of intermediaries and troops into the Hyderabad 
countryside. The naik led protest was based on rebel communal domains, which supplied 
it with ideology, resources and organization. The rebel domains tried to re-create the 
sense of community that had lain at the heart of the small kingdom in the pre-colonial 
order. There was an important new dimension to it as well. One naik's community was 
no longer mobilized to fight against another naik's, but against the common enemies of 
both, the centre and its collaborators. The rebel communal domains were also socially 
more flexible and inclusive than the community of the 18th century small king. When one 
rebel community was forced to disband or to migrate under pressure from British troops, 
it was quickly reassmilated together with its naik, by another rebel community. The 
incorporating legend of Nausaji describes this process well. When Nausaji died, his 
leadership passed on to other naiks, who were now perceived as his lieutnants. The 
community of his rebel domain also migrated and rallied behind new naiks like 
Lakshmaji, Goma and Pykoo.83 
As the protest based on rebel communal domains grew, it also began to take on the 
coherence of a movement, thanks to the links between various rebel communities, naiks, 
intermediaries and, later on, the Mujahiddin and mutinous British troops. It began to 
project its overall aim, furthermore, as the creation of an alternative political order to the 
British regime. The alternative order that was envisaged essentially re-created the small 
kingdom of the 18th century, albeit on a larger scale, embracing not just more core areas, 
but the Hyderabad region as a whole, and perhaps an even wider territory. The Peshwa, 
the Raja of Nagpur, or Satara, and the Mughal Emperor were at different times in 
different places projected as the kings of the new order. The protest with an alternative 
order as its aim continued to gather momentum in the 1830s: Newer groups and areas 
82 The British had recently displaced Baji Rao in Poona, begun to administer directly there and had assumed all but direct control in Nagpur. The Bhil led demand for the restoration of either ruler amounted against such a background to an order changing demand. 
83 H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 97-9. For more incorporating legends of rebellion in early-nineteenth century Deccan, see: I.A. Fleet, 'A Selection of Kanarese Ballads', JA(l885), pp. 293-303; (1886), pp. 349-50; S.M. Edwardes, 'Umaji Naik. An Episode in the History of Western India', JA(May 1924), pp. 103-06; (June 1924), pp. 117-22. 
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became linked with it in this period. Among them were such revenue farmers, military 
creditors and bankers as had benefitted from being associated with the centre's military 
fiscal policies until recently, but were no longer favoured now, in the context of economic 
decline and creditor warfare. 
4 .6.2 Context 
The British gave greatest importance to their own interests when they found that 
Hyderabad could not accomodate their financial demands as well as those of other 
military creditors in the first half of the 19th century.84 When the Nizam asked Chandu 
Lal in 1834, for instance, if it would not be desirable to ask the British to withdraw their 
highly paid troops and officers from Hyderabad altogether, the .. ,xecognized the influence of 
rival creditor lobbies behind this demand. Failures in the last two agricultural seasons had 
generated famine conditions in many parts of Hyderabad and aggravated the centre's 
financial crisis.85 Hyderabad's debts were mounting, on the one hand, and its core areas 
declining, on the other.86 The expensive military overkill of the British was bound to be 
visible in such circumstances.87 The resident preferred to concentrate his attack on the 
'irregulars' still employed in Hyderabad, however, when Chandu Lal expressed doubts 
about the enormous cost of the British military establishment.88 Yet though Stewart might 
condemn irregular troops as 'worse than useless' and 'instruments of oppression [rather] 
than ... preservers of peace or protectors of the people', it was impossible for Chandu Lal 
to dismiss them without settling their enormous arrears first. 89 
The residency's condemnation of irregulars acquired a new urgency as nearly thirty 
years of military fiscalism began to turn into a scramble for repayments among 
Hyderabad 's creditors.90 Were not the renegade military creditors' and revenue farmers ' 
'conspiracies' in the country and 'civil strife' in the capital, preliminary signs, the resident 
reasoned?91 Chandu Lal's attempts to conceal the true extent of his debts, and claim that 
84 See Chapter Three above for the crisis in military fiscalism and the origins of creditor warfare. 
85 NAI, For Sec, 1 Feb 1834, 5. 
86 See Chapter Three above. 
87 In the resident's words:'Whether we look to the extent of His Highness ' dominions or to the amount of his 
revenues, the number of troops maintained must appear disproportionately great.' . (NAI, For Pol, 23 March 1835, 45-53.). . 
88 
'The regular troops alone' , he argued, 'with the aid of an effective body of sebundees are quite sufficient to 
maintain internal tranquility, and it is much to be regretted that the minister should persist in urging a reduction in the expense of the regular troops , instead of reducing a part of the host of irregulars that are maintained.' . (NAI, For Pol, 23 March 1835, 45-53 .). 
89 In a small number of cases, irregulars were retained because the Nizam fancied them as part of his darbar or household establishment. A risala of Arabs recently discharged from service in Shorapur, for example, was 
recommended by hinI for employment in his household establishment, as it had won his heart by offering him a graceful salute while he was on an excursion in the outskirts of Hyderabad in 1833. (NAI, For Pol, 23 March 1835, 45-53) 
90 See Chapter Three above. 
91 See, for example: NAI, HRMC, 40/1827-29, Martin to Gol, Letter, 17 Sept 1828, Letter, 24 Nov 1829; 41/1830-31, Martin to Gol, Letters, 13, 20 and 21 April 1830; 42/1830-31, Stewart to Gol, Letter, 13 May 1831; HRR, 82, Resident 's Letters, July-Aug 1842; For Pol, 11 April 1838, Cameron to Gol, Letter, 61 , 15 March 1838, Stewart's Letter, 21 , 5 Feb 1838; 27 July 1842, Fraser's Letters, 172-4; H.S .C., Freedom Struggle, I, 120-24. 
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he was unable to offer any accurate picture of Hyderabad's finances, were not reassuring 
either. At the same time, he continued, to rely on short term methods and ad hoe 
expedients. He protested that he saw no other altemative.92 When the Aurangabad adalat 
under Azim Khan attempted to expose the pervasive oppressiveness of revenue farming in 
the 1830s, for example, Chandu Lal used his discretionary powers as diwan to overturn 
its recommendations.93 Stewart was, by 1837, telling Calcutta that the regular maintenance 
of British troops in Hyderabad was threatened. Calcutta responded with the suggestion 
that he might explore the possibility of having Hyderabad reserve the revenues of a 
certain number of districts exclusively for the payment of the British military 
establishment. 94 
British criticism of Chandu Lal was mingled with sympathy for his difficulties, though 
Taluqdars charged at least eighteen per cent interest on their advances to an already 
overpressed minister, and he lost more revenue when forced to lower assessments on 
districts they had pillaged. In many instances, taluqdars were themselves indebted to 
sahukars, whose agents effectively controlled their assignments and also made a side 
business of advancing loans at twenty four per cent annual interest to distressed 
cultivators.95 Core areas were thus destroyed and the centre's finances also made critical.96 
No fundamental improvement could come about in this situation, the resident insisted in 
the late 1830s, until the minister curtailed the 'extravagant' expenses, which had 'almost 
thrown the government into the hands of 'sahukars'.97 Yet, from Chandu Lal's point of 
view, no retrenchments could be made until he was able to pay off their enormous 
arrears, an object which he felt he could not achieve in the prevailing circumstances 
except by contracting further loans. 
The British , therefore, began to explore a political way of effecting financial 
retrenchments, at least small ones, at the expense of their rivals. As conflicts developed at 
92 NAI, HRMC, 31/1817-20, Russell to G-G, Letter, 5 Oct 1819; 34/1819-20, Metcalfe to Russell, Letter, 20 Jan 1820; 37/1823-24, Metcalfe to Gol, Letter, 20 Nov 1823; 40/1827-29, Martin to Go!, Letter, 26 Jan 1827; 42/1830-31, Martin to Gol, Letter, 3 Nov 1830, Stewart to Gol, Letter, 18 July 1831, Letter, 22 Aug 1831; 54/1842, Fraser's Letters, June-Aug 1842; HRR, 57, Russell 's Report, 1819; For Pol, 19 July 1822, 8; 4 July 1823, 40; 21 Oct 1825, 83; 30 June 1825, 84; 5 Feb 1830, 42; 12 Aug 1831, 96; 11 April 1838, 61; 5 Feb 1838, 21; 27 July 1842, 172-4, 18 Nov 1843, 73-6. 
93 The resident felt that Chandu Lal accepted bribes from revenue farmers whom Azim Khan's findings had put 
under a cloud in order to overturn the latter's recommendations. Chandu Lal's usual arguments against the 
adalat's findings were that these were not based on sufficiently conclusive evidence and that they ignored the time honoured principle that a revenue farmer's doings were largely his own affair as long as he met his 
contractual obligations with the government. (NAI, HRR, 550, Reviews, 1834-38; also: HRMC, 40/1827-29, Martin to Gol, Letter, 26 Jan 1827; For Pol, 19 March 1832, Garstin's Letter, 66) 
94 Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 260-1; see also: NAI, HRMC, 62/1850, Correspondence, June 1852. 
95 NAI, HRR, 71, Stewart to GoI, Letter, 11 July 1834; For Pol, 11 April 1838, Cameron to Gol, Letter, 61 , 15 March 1838; 5 Feb 1838, 21. 
96 The 'very considerable taluqs' farmed out to Pestonjee upon the latter's arrival from Bombay in 1838 were formerly said to have been 'in the hands of the most wealthy and grasping sahukar ·here', a man called Puran Mai. (NAI, For Pol, 11 April 1838, Cameron to Gol, Letter, 61, 15 March 1838; see also: Tajalli Ali, Gulzar-i-
97 
Asafiya, pp. 624-5.). · 
'He is extremely lavish in money things, particularly in supporting a host of useless retainers. As he has ever been disliked by the Musselmen gentlemen about the court, immense sums were formerly expended to maintain popularity .. .'. (NAI, For Pol, 11 April 1838, Cameron to Gol, Letter, 61, 15 March 1838) 
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the heart of the revenue fanning system, some elements who had hitherto been integrated 
into the latter now began to be displaced. Amongst those who experienced severe 
dislocation were numerous bands of Hindustani, Sikh, Sindhi, Afghan, Rohilla, Pathan, 
Arab and other intermediaries: revenue farmers, military creditors and irregulars. Their 
numbers were augmented by the large scale disbandments of Maratha armies by the 
British after 1817.98 The latter came to Hyderabad looking for new opportunities, and 
were quite willing to lend money and muscle to zamindars and patels impoverished by 
the last season's extortions and desperate to find cover against the pressures of the 
coming season. The dislocated military creditors wished for their capital and skills to be 
gainfully employed, and their troops looked for means with which to repay their debts to 
their jamadars and make ends meet.99 The employment of military creditors in the 
Hyderabad countryside was not in itself a new phenomenon, but the context in which it 
was resorted to in the 1830s gave it a new direction and import. Numerous bands of 
Arabs and Rohillas, for example, began to get involved with the naiks, and their quest for 
an alternative political order. The naiks only gained further ground with the additional 
support that came from groups of Arabs and Pathans displaced from a revenue fanning 
system in crisis. 
4.6.3 Intermediaries Join Protest 
The fort and town of Badami in British territory across Hyderabad's southwestem 
border were taken in 1841 by a body of troops under Narsing Rao, the zamindar of 
Deodrug, and Koharan, an Arab jamadar from Hyderabad. Investigations after the 
recapture of Badami by British troops revealed that the force of Narsing Rao and Koharan 
had been made up of parties of military creditor jamadars and irregulars, whose clientele 
had included Kartippah Naik and Somappa Naik of Gurgunta, Yenkappah Naik of 
Deodrug and other zamindars and naibs in Sholapur, Badami, Shorapur and other districts. 
In some cases, Narsing Rao and Koheran's force had served for only a few days before 
moving on. Several of the jamadars taken at Badami were executed and most of the 
remaining were imprisoned along with their men on the charge of assisting anti-British 
activity among zamindars.100 
Their anti-British act!vity consisted of supporting the recently deposed step brother of 
the ruler of Satara, Pratap Singh, against the British backed ruler, through the fonner's 
partisans among the jagirdars of southern Maharashtra. The jagirdars had rejected the 
British backed Raja and were supported by several zamindars of neighbouring Hyderabad, 
who, too, wished to see the end of a British regime. The zamindars of Deodrug and 
Gurgunta were prominent among Hyderabad's rebel zamindars, and it was the former that 
98 See discussion above within this chapter and in Chapter Three above. 
99 See discussion below within this chapter. 
HJO NAI, For Pol, 13 Sept 1841, 23-4; H.S.C., Freedom Movement, I, 181-6. 
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Koheran and his troops had served in Badami.101 
Another 'conspiracy' was detected, this time in Berar, not long after Badami. It was 
located around the claims to the Nagpur gaddi of a man who styled himself as the 
deposed raja of Nagpur, Appa Saheb. Appa Saheb attracted the support of deshmukhs, 
deshpandes and patels in many Berar districts, - among them Mahur, Karinja, 
Manikegadh, Woon and Wardha, - and of Shujat Ali Khan and Narsing Rao, respectively 
the taluqdar and peshkar of Mahur and Woon. After British troops had forced him to fly 
from Hyderabad, Appa Saheb's military establishment, - his chief appeal in Berar was for 
soliders, - was discovered to have consisted mostly of bodies of Arab, Sikh and Rohilla 
soldiers. It seems the deshmukhs, deshpandes, patels and contractors who supported him 
supplied Appa Saheb with the services of their military creditors, partly in the hope of 
repaying the latter's loans. Certainly some captured jamadars made such claims in their 
defence. 102 
Yet another 'conspiracy' in Berar, that of Mukat Rao in 1841-42, bore a resemblance 
to Appa Saheb's endeavours, and one source suggests that the two names belonged to the 
same person. Mukat Rao had been active in Berar at least since 1839. His initial 
campaigns had suffered from a severe lack of funds. But he found increasing support 
among zamindars and patels in Mahur, Adilabad, Akote, Jalgaon and several other Berar 
districts. They gave him support, according to officials, partly on account of their 
'disaffection to the existing Government' and partly because of 'the frequent changes of 
talookdars' and 'the ruin of the country and ... want of confidence'. But there was still 
another reason why they supported Mukat Rao: 'there are numerous jamadars of 
Mohammadans and Rajpoots who when they cannot get employment under Government 
seek for it under any pretext'. Military creditors, in other words, were employed by 
zamindars and patels who wished to keep Hyderabad's revenue farmers and creditors at 
bay. The irregulars who served the military creditors were 'unemployed soldiers who took 
even two pice each to subsist on, in the hopes of receiving eventually either pay or 
plunder'. The zamindars and patels offered the services of their military creditors and 
irregulars to Mukat Rao in the hope of being able to raise funds to pay them. Sometimes 
the debtors pushed their creditors into Mukat Rao's camp and sometimes the creditors 
pulled zamindars -and patels in their train. Some weighty jamadars 'offered to join him 
[Mukat Rao] with three hundred men, engaging ... to place some of the thanas in this 
quarter in his possession', for example.103 
101 See references cited in the last footnote and NAI, For Pol, 27 July 1842, 172-4. For an account of the Southern Maratha Jagirdars, see: IOLR, Mack Gen, Memorandum on the Southern Maratha Rajas, Sardars and Jagirdars, 1802(3; Munro Collection, Mss Eur F 151/126, Memorandum on Kittoor, c.1818. 
102 NAI, For Pol, 27 July 1842, 95-102, 172-4; HRR, 801, Letters, Nov 1841-Jan 1842; H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 188-90. 
103 See references cited in the last footnote and NAI, For Pol, 17 Jan 1842, 45-7. 
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,[ , 
The Pathan jamadar Yusuf Khan claimed, when tried for rebellion, that he had been 
pushed into Mok.at Rao's camp by his purely mercenary association with the Burroda 
jagir:104 
'I lent to Gopeeka Bai 2,200 Rupees ... She wished me to take Burroda in pawn but I declined. But I engaged that if employment were given to 
some of my unemployed men and a mutsaddi, I would arrange 
matters ... When Raja Ram took the jageer in pawn he .. . gave me a sowcar's draft that the original sum and the pay ... should be paid in one month' .105 
Raja Ram was unable to keep his terms, according to Yusuf Khan, but saw some prospect 
of clearing his principal, interest and pay arrears by lending the services of the Pathan 
and his troops to Mukat Rao for a price. Raja Ram, however, claimed that the jamadar 
and his men had obtained a stranglehold over Burroda jagir and the real reason behind 
their support for Mok.at Rao lay elsewhere. They had hoped, like other 'mercenaries' 
operating in the region, to get to 'the wealth of the rich towns of Berar', and the 
possession of the strategic forts of Gawilgarh and N amala.106 
Similar controversy surrounded an incident that occurred in Marched, to the southwest 
of Hyderabad, in the same year, 1842. A band of Arabs shut themselves up in the 
Marched fort after an attack on Joolahidigi, a village farmed out by Hyderabad to the raja 
of Shorapur. The residency had been wont to represent any defiance of revenue fanners 
by 'mercenaries' as a conspiracy against Hyderabad and the British since the incident at 
Badami in 1841. The jamadar of the Arabs, Siddi Yaqut, was now asked to surrender and 
when he refused, was forced out of the fort by British troops. Siddi Yaqut pleaded not 
guilty to the charge of rebellion, arguing that he had only desired the repayment of a loan 
of Rs 13,000 he had advanced to the zamindar of Marched. Raghunath Rao's vakil, 
Shambhunath, had invited him to plunder the villages of the raja of Shorapur against his 
will. Siddi Yaqut's explanation was rejected and he was executed along with another 
Arab jamadar, as well as Shambhunath. Nine other Arabs were sentenced to seven years' 
rigorous imprisonment.1CY7 
The British commanding officer in Ellichpur wrote a threatening letter on another 
occassion to the naib of Amravati, Radha Kishan, for evading orders for the dismissal of 
15 Rohilla mercenari~s from the services of his jamadar, Sheikh Nunneh. Radha Kishen 
pleaded that Sheikh Nunneh was unable to dismiss them as he owed them Rs. 1300. He 
had borrowed the money from the Rohilla party to pay his troops, as the centre and the 
104 He had gone to Burroda in 1838/39 after being relieved as the naib of Kowtal in the Raichur Doab. The assignment for Kowtal had been resumed by the diwan in Hyderabad under pressure from the British resident. (NAI, HRR, Letters, Dec 1841-Jan 1842) 
· 
10s NAI, HRR, 801 , Letters, Dec 1841-Jan 1842 
106 Ibid .. 
lCYI NAI, For Pol, 27 July 1842, 1724; 31 Aug 1842, 117-21; 22 Feb 1843, 107-15; H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 188. 
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taluqdar had not made any salary disbursements for several months. The Rohillas were 
encouraged to recover their loan and their pay directly from villages. A Kunbi of Urgaon 
complained that they had seized his grain and put his brother in irons. Yet, these devices 
did not help Sheikh Nunneh clear his debt. He protested that the taluqdar, Jaswant Ram, 
still owed him Rs. 14,886 and it would be impossible for him to meet his financial 
obligations and dismiss the Rohillas until that sum was paid up. The Rohillas had earlier 
served with the deshmukhni of Amravati. They were on their way to Bhopal after the 
· termination of service, when the needy Nunneh had enlisted them. The naib of the 
deshmukhni of Amravati, Omar Daraz, had still other Rohillas in his service. They too 
were accused of serious misdeeds, including an attack on a village called Mandia where, 
' ... they committed great excesses, plundering the place and ravishing the wife of the 
deshmukh, Kowraji '.108 
When the naib of Malkapur was warned for not dismissing Rohilla troops from his 
taluq, he pleaded that it was not he but the muqaddam of Barkheda who employed them. 
His own troops were finding it difficult to dislodge the muqaddam 's men from his ghadi. 
When the muqaddam 's jamadar, Shah Khan, became aware that the commanding officer 
at Ellichpur was demanding his removal, he pleaded that the muqaddam owed him Rs. 
500 and interest on the sum. The sum included the balance on a loan he had made to the 
muqaddam, and arrears of pay. The muqaddam had recently been taken prisoner by the 
naib of Malkapur, however, for attacking a village to alleviate his financial distress: 
' ... although I have done all I could to make him pay the Rohillas, he has not a cowrie to 
do it with. Moreover, he has not werewithall to feed himself' .109 
The deshmukh of Karinja in Berar, Jaggu Meah, employed a band of about 300 
Rohillas and Arabs to defend himself from the extortions of the revenue farmer Narsing 
Rao, or to pass on the revenue farmer' s demands to the villages. His military creditors 
plundered three villages on one occasion and also carried away the muqaddam of Bhuree 
with them. On another occasion, the Arabs sender Jafar Sultan surrounded the katchahari 
of the revenue farmer and made naib their prisoner, while the Rohillas rounded up patels 
and patwaris in the villages of Dharva. Another Rohilla band served with the revenue 
farmer of Balapur. When the British commanding officer of Berar ordered them to leave, 
they pleaded that they were owed eight months' pay. The revenue farmer admitted the 
truth of their claim, but attempted to shift the responsibility of payment onto the 
deshmukh of Khemgarn, Rambaji. The deshmukh absconded from his village complaining 
that this was an attempt on the revenue farmer's part to win the sympathy of the 
commanding officer. When various Rohilla parties operating in Malkapur, Amravati and 
Karinja were finally expelled by British troops in 1847, not all their claims of outstanding 
108 NAI, HRR, 789, Letters, Oct 1846-Jan 1847. 
109 Ibid .. 
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loans and arrears of pay had been met: 
'Many of the Rohillas have scarcely rags to cover them, [and] I have issued them pieces of coarse cloth and cumblies, as I did to ... [a] ... former party•.110 
The involvement of Arab and Pathan irregulars in the protest gave the British a much 
needed lever against them. If they could be identified with rebel zamindars, they could be 
expelled from Hyderabad without being paid their dues. Thus the forcible removal from 
c.1836 onwards of Arabs and Pathans from Hyderabad was in part a financial problem 
solving exercise. m The use of cheap expulsions was fraught with dangers, however. It 
could lead to the collapse of credit and to increased creditor warfare. More commonly, 
the resident found opportunities of charging bands of Arabs and Pathans with supporting 
conspiracies hatched by rebellious zamindars and demanding an end to their stake in 
revenue farming. These opportunities were also used for not compensating them fully for 
their arrears or debts. It they protested at this, force was threatened. 112 
Severe measures against them by the centre diminished the numbers of Arabs and 
Pathans and also depleted their finances. But these measures still could not suppress their 
involvement with the protests of the naiks, which continued into the 1850s and 1860s. 
Expelled groups sometimes returned from neighbouring territories, and sometimes 
altogether new ones also came from here. For example, a 'heavy influx' of Rohillas was 
reported into Western Berar in January 1851. Their total number in the region was 
estimated at between 2000 and 3000 at this point. 1500 of them were reported to be 
serving the jagirdar of Ellichpur, Ghulam Husain Khan, to help him resist the demands of 
the centre. The elusiveness of the Rohillas was put down to their practice of retiring 
beyond the Hyderabad border for temporary periods after a raid upon learning that British 
troops were on their way to oppose them.113 
Ramoo Naik roamed the country between Dhulia and Karinja, and Nagpur and Poona 
in 1852. His force of more than 200 men comprised 'well armed men, chiefly landless 
and desperate Rajpoots, who in all probability have been ruined by the wolves who grind 
and devour the unhappy ryots '. Whilst the revenue farmer of Ellichpur, Mir Adil, applied 
for the support of British troops against Ramoo Naik, the revenue farmer of Amravati, 
Mir Mohd. Husain, gave him asylum, receiving and marketing his plunder and preventing 
110 Ibid .. 
m See, for example: NAI, For Pol, 5 Feb 1838, 21; 11 April 1838, 61; 13 Sept 1841, 23-4; 17 Jan 1842, 45-7; 27 July 1842, 95-102; 22 Feb 1843, 107, 112, 115; 12 June 1847, 97-100; 25 Nov 1848, 41-8; HRR, 801, Letters, Nov 1841-Jan 1842; 789, Letters, Oct 1846-Jan 1847; 85, Letters, March-May 1849; 87, Letters, Jan-Feb 1850; HRMC, 60/1848-49, Resident's Letter, 16 Jan 1849; 62/1850, Resident's Letters, Jan-March 1850. 112 NAI, For Pol, 22 Feb 1843, 107, 112, 115; 12 June 1847, 97-100; 25 Nov 1848, 41-8; HRR, 801, Letters, Nov 1841-Jan 1842; 82, Letters, July-Aug 1846; 789, Letters, Oct 1846-Jan 1847; 85, Letters, March-May 1849; 87, Letters, Jan-Feb 1850; HRMC, 60/1848-49, Resident's Letter, 16 Jan 1849; 62/1850, Resident's Letters, Jan-March 1850. 
113 NAI, HRR, 87, Resident's Letters, Jan 1851. 
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his discovery and arrest. Mir Mohd. Husain was earlier reported to have connived at 
Ramoo Naik's escape from Amravati fort, where he had been imprisoned on the only 
occasion that Hyderabad had managed to apprehend him.114 
British troops were fired upon in their rear from the ramparts of Aurangabad by a 
party of Arabs in September 1853. They were leaving that station to conduct operations 
against the neighbouring raja of Dewalgaon, where another encounter took place. 
Enquiries revealed that all the Arabs, excepting three, had belonged to a military creditor 
party serving the raja in question. The three who did not serve him, - Sabit Chaush, 
Shaikh Omar and Omar, - were their associates, however, and served with the zamindar 
of Jaswantpura in similar capacity.115 Rohillas were reported to be entering Berar in the 
service of Mukat Rao throughout the period December 1852 to mid-1853. Mukat Rao had 
been active in Berar once before in the cause of restoring the ex-Raja of Nagpur, Appa 
Saheb. Detachments of British troops were sent out on several occasions to counter this 
movement. Major operations were conducted against the combined forces of Rohillas, 
intermediaries and naiks in Nanded and Kaulass in November-December 1854, and in 
Indur-Bodhan in November 1855-January 1856.116 
4.6.4 The Mujahiddin Movement 
Protest based on the rebel communal domains of the naiks incorporated displaced 
revenue farmers, military creditors and their 'irregular' troops into its organization and 
aims throughout the period c.1820-56. The alternative political order that the rebels 
envisaged re-created some elements of the pre-colonial small kingdom on a larger scale. 
Their aims were symbolized in the call for the restoration of such figures as the Rajas of 
Satara or Nagpur, the Peshwa, or the Mughal emperor. Another type of protest also grew 
in Hyderabad alongside the rebel communal domains: the Mujahiddin movement.117 The 
naiks' rebel communal domains were able to establish some links with the political of the 
__,-
Mujahiddin leadership. Concerned with purifying and unifying Islam, the Mujahiddin 
inevitably debated the nature of their links with other religious communities. The concern 
here, however, is neither with the internal debates of the Mujahiddin on their links with 
other religions, nor with the extent to which they succeeded in reforming Islam. It is 
simply to explore_ the political protest that the Mujahiddin tried to organize against the 
British and their collaborators in Hyderabad in the late 1830s. 
114 NAI, HRR, 794. 
115 NAI, HRR, 648, Resident to Gol, Letter, Sept 1853; 91, Resident's Letters, March-May, 1854; For Pol, 2 Dec 1853, 292-335; H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, · I, 191-3. An incorporating legend of resistance grew out of the Aurangabad affair. It was commissioned originally by the Raja of Dewalgaon, and justified his military encounter with the British in terms of the injury and dislocation he and the Arabs had suffered at the hands of their regime. (IOLR, Mss Hindi D 1, Bhikari's ballad-poem on the Aurangabad encounter, 1853, fols . 414-17.). 
116 NAI, For Pol, 17 Feb 1854, 54-7; 5 Jan 1855, 94-110; 23 May 1856, 69-72. 
117 This paragraph and the remainder of this sub-section on the Mujahiddin movement are based on: NAI, HRR, 380; 385; 386; H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 125-80; Regani, Nizam-British Relations, ---
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If one element in the Mujahiddin leadership came from within the all-India Mujahiddin 
ulama, the other element came from among local Muslim elites. Centralization and 
monopolistic military fiscalism, in the context of agricultural depression and poor seasons, 
and then a collapsing revenue farming system, had led to the resumption of the military 
and revenue assignments of many Muslim intermediaries in Hyderabad, and had also 
ravaged the core domains of Muslim nawabs. It was from among these two groups that 
the political (or non-clerical) leadership of the Hyderabad Mujahiddin emerged. To this 
extent, the Mujahiddin movement in Hyderabad was sympathetic to the concerns of the 
naiks. Like the latter, the Mujahiddin aspired to create an alternative political order, which 
was symbolized by their call for the restoration of the Mughal emperor, as well as other 
pre-colonial kings whom the British had weakened or displaced. The leading political 
figures among the Hyderabad Mujahiddin, as identified in the 'Wahabi Trials' of 1838-39, 
were Mubariz ud Daula, the Nizam's brother, Ghulam Rasool Khan, the Nawab of 
Kumool; Abbas Ali Khan, the Jagirdar of Annammasamudram; Rahmatullah Khan, the 
kotwal of Husain Sagar and several others. Some of the principal political figures 
elsewhere in India with whom they communicated were the Nawabs of Rampur, Tonk 
and Bhopal; the Rajas of Jodhpur, Satara and Punjab; the Gaikwad of Baroda; princes in 
Madras and Bundelkhand, and the Shah of Iran. It appears from the evidence gathered by 
the commission set up to investigate and try Mujahiddin prisoners in Hyderabad that one 
of the Mujahiddin's objectives was to mobilize the forces of various Indian rulers enable 
them to launch a simultaneous onslaught against the British on several fronts, the effort so 
timed as to co-incide with the invasion of India by the Shah of Iran. It was envisaged that 
once the British power had been removed thus, various old order figures would be 
restored, and would in tum rehabilitate the local and supra-local elites whom the British 
had marginalized or displaced.118 
The efforts of Mubariz ud Daula and his associates drew upon the support of 
dislocated or threatened nawabs, intermediaries, revenue farmers, military creditors and 
irregulars. They also showed a capacity for assimilating to their ideological fabric the 
118 The correspondence, and the brother, of the jagirdar of Udaigiri in Telangana revealed that he had feared the British would prevent -his son's succession to the jagir, and believed that the Mujahiddin's success would ensure the continuance of the ·jagir. For, according to the Mujahiddin plan, which the jagirdar had actively supported, rebel troops would have attacked and captured Nellore and Hyderabad simultaneously, the two main centres of British power nearest Udaigiri. Abbas Ali Khan had agreed to let the Mujahiddin use Udaigiri fort as a military base, and had helped them build up stocks of grain, fodder, arms and ammunition. His efforts were paralleled by those of the Nawab of Kumool, who was also convicted by the British for supporting the 'Wahabi Conspiracy'. fuvestigations after the capture of Kumool by British troops in 1839 revealed that most of the Rohilla garrison there had been recruited by the Mujahiddin and had arrived there only recently. These men had earlier been military creditors and irregular troops, and had been disbanded because their employers had suffered financially as a result of the centre's policies. They sympathized with the Mujahiddin's efforts, which gave hope and employment. 
A Rohilla sardar, Shah W ali Khan, who died defending Kumool fort, had daringly written to Mubariz ud Daula upon hearing that the latter had been arrested and imprisoned in Hyderabad: ' ... 300 Rohillas, his personal followers, are with your slave .... A mansabdar came to this place [Kumool] and ... acquainted ... that your slave should come quickly with whatever Rohillas may be in readiness to the number of one or two thousand .. .If the orders of my lord are now issued, your slave will bring with him followers and attend on you .. .' (NAI, HRR, 385, pp. 13-25, 131-50, 393-425; 386, pp. 181-5, 278; H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 132-54, 158-80.). 
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concerns of the naiks, who were interested in acheiving an alternative political order as 
well through the restoration of such figures as the Rajas of Satara and Nagpur, the 
Peshwa of Poona, and the Mughal emperor.119 Nevertheless, Mujahiddin inspiration also 
came from the Mujahiddin ulama. If there was a willingness to analyse local political 
realities and suggest alternatives, there was also a heavy pan-Islamic content in the aims 
of the Hyderabad Mujahiddin. 
Mujahiddin propaganda made a direct connection between the dominance of the 
foreigner, the loss of power and status, and the experience of religious and moral crisis, 
for example. The head of the Mujahiddin in 1838/39, Maulvi Nasiruddin, was based in 
Sindh, from where he presided over an all-India network of pirs and khalifa-s, or leaders, 
and their murid-s, or followers and disciples. The khalifas were ranked according to the 
exemplary nature of their spiritual, moral and religious conduct. The most prominent 
among them were Maulvi Mushiruddin of Sindh and Maulvi Syed Mohammed Ali of 
Calcutta. Whilst the maulvi-s Nasiruddin, Mushiruddin and Syed Mohammed Ali may 
together be regarded as the central authority figures of the all-India Mujahiddin, regional 
khalifas were responsible for directing their followers in their particular areas. The chief 
pir in Hyderabad was Maulvi Salim. He and Maulvi Vilayat Ali had originally been sent 
there by the celebrated Syed Ahmed Barelwi himself. Maulvi Salim's principal murid, and 
patron, was Mubariz ud Daula, the Nizam's brother, in the madrasa of whose kotla he 
had his headquarters. Maulvi Salim had a direct influence not only on Mubariz ud Daula, 
but on several other leading political figures among the Hyderabad Mujahiddin as well, 
among them Husain Ali Khan, the kotwal of Hyderabad, Shams ul Umra and the sons of 
the leading nobles Munir ul Mulk and Ghasi Miyan. Maulvi Salim 's close circle also 
consisted of a number of spiritual associates and followers, such as the maulvis Abdul 
Haji, Faqir Saheb, Ahmad Saheb, Pir Mohammad, Abbas, Mir Qasim, Qazi Yusuf, Syed 
Abbas, Mohammad Asif, Elahi Baksh, Abd ur Razzaq, Faizullah, Imam Khan, Shaikh 
Abdullah, Mohammad Abdullah and Shujauddin. 
The Hyderabad group operat~d as a regional command and sought to organise sub-
regional centres of Mujahiddin activity in the qasbas and towns of the Deccan as well as 
in places further south, such as Madras. They also maintained contact with the all-India 
headquarters, Sindh, · and with other regional Mujahiddin centres, such as Peshawar, 
Lahore, Delhi, Banda, Gwalior and Calcutta. The principal sub-regional centres that the 
Hyderabad group established were, Nellore, Ongole, Udaigiri, Kumool and Sholapur. In 
Udaigiri , the jagirdar was won over by Maulvi Ahmed Saheb. In Nellore, Mujahiddin 
maulvis directed their efforts at the Muslim population in general, and in particular of 
119 A Sikh was arrested disguised as a faqir in Nellore in November 1838 for spreading anti-British propaganda. He 
revealed that he had been sent south by the Raja of Jodhpur, who wished to see all fudian rulers unite against the British. He claimed that several princes he had met were in favour of the plan, among them Mubariz ud Daula. Several letters, documents and other papers discovered on his person lent credence to the Sikh's claims. (H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 134-6; NAl, HRR, 386, pp. 77-135). 
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Muslim troops in British service. One of the members of the sub-regional group in 
Nellore was Mohammad Ali. He had attended Maulvi Salim's madrasa in Hyderabad from 
1836 to 1838 and had then decided to interrupt his studies in favour of a more active 
role. He went to Sindh with two dozen other Mujahiddin in 1838 and there found his 
inspiration growing stronger.120 He communicated this back to Nellore in his 
correspondence, before returning there himself. 121 One of the principal members of the 
Ongole group was Maulvi Ansur Khan, the elder brother of one of the closest spiritual 
companions of Maulvi Salim, Maulvi Abdul Haji. The latter kept up a regular 
correspondence with him, sending him material to read and advertise in his mosque. One 
of the important items they sent him was a poem called the Jihadnama, which was given 
wide currency by Mujahiddin activists wherever they went. On another occasion they 
wrote to him that Mubariz ud Daula was preparing a jihad and that whoever supported 
him would receive a high salary. When the correspondence was publicized in Ongole, 
some youths enrolled in Mubariz ud Daula's service in Hyderabad. Qazi Yusuf, a member 
of the Hyderabad group took credit for organising the Mujahiddin in Sholapur. He made 
his chief murid in Sholapur, Pangool Husain, the local khalifa and in time the two were 
able to win over several locally influential Muslims, such as Munshi Aminullah, a teacher 
in the British cavalry lines, Mohammed Husain, a qazi also in the lines, Mohammad 
Husain, the custodian of a mosque, the mufti of the Sholapur adalat and Qazi Yusuf's 
host in Sholapur, Ameen Khan Chauduri. The qazi also took up subscriptions on behalf of 
the Mujahiddin in Sholapur on at least two occasions, and announced happy results on 
both.122 He was also able to attract volunteer activists each time. 
Mubariz ud Daula's effort had extensive potential rather than the immediate strength 
for creating an alternative order, when the centre discovered and suppressed it. The 
Mujahiddin had not yet overcome doctrinal resistance from influential sections of the 
Deccani ulama, for example, despite the vigorous efforts of their pir-murid type 
networks.123 Maulvi Salim contrasted the situation in the Deccan with that in Bengal, 
120 He wrote to his cousin, Abdun Nabi, in Nellore from Sindh: 'It is contrary to the Faith to assist these infidels [the British and the Sikhs] in their wars ... I therefore abandoned my studies and I and Lal Khan have collected together twenty five persons and are going to the leader of the Musalmans [Maulvi Nasiruddin]'. (NAI, HRR, 380, pp. 473-8) . 
121 Mohammad Ali's letter to his cousin in Nellore was clearly intended to be more than a mere personal communication. It contained an account of the Mujahiddin movement, which it exhorted all Muslims to join. To reinforce the latter message, he sent another letter from his spiritual companion at the time, who was probably his pir as well and a man clearly of some celebrity, Maulvi Haji. The latter too voiced a strong plea on behalf of the Mujahiddin. These letters were read publicly in the local mosque, and the imam who read them commended Mohammad Ali's example and the Mujahiddin cause to everyone who came to pray. The Hyderabad group was quick to sense sympathy in Nellore and followed up Mohammad Ali's distant first effort with concerted activity on the ground. Within a year's time, almost every mosque and bazaar in Nellore buzzed with Mujahiddin propaganda. (NAI, HRR, 380, pp. 473-8; 385, pp. 155-61; 386, pp. 25-31; H.S.C., Freedom Struggle, I, 134-42, 161.). 
122 He was able to get together an impressive collection of money, arms and horses. (NAI, HRR, 380, pp. 411-56) 123 Maulvi Salim wrote to one of his associates in Sindh, Maulvi Nurul Khuda, sometime in 1838 that he experienced a great deal of doctrinal resistance in Hyderabad and the neighbouring territories. (NAI, HRR, 386, PP. 136-50) 
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Hindustan and the Northwest, where he felt, the Mujahiddin, had found more fertile 
ground. Maulvi Halim of Bombay gave detail to Maulvi Salim's picture by describing 
Mujahiddin maulvis in the south as 'persecuted fugitives'. Maulvi Syed Mohammad Ali 
of Calcutta, one of the two all-India khalifas, and holder of the distinguished title of 'Rais 
ul Muslimeen', supported this view. He could speak from the personal experience of 
hostile receptions, for him as well as his associates, in Madras and Hyderabad.124 Indeed, 
so persecuted did the Hyderabad group feel that at one stage they even contemplated 
retiring from there altogether and going to Sindh. The Mujahiddin had neither overcome 
Muslim resistance entirely nor made more than initial contact with the naiks when they 
were suppressed. 
4.6.5 The Mutiny 
The resistance led by Bhil naiks in the 1820s was the first move towards an alternative 
political order by dislocated local and supra-local elements in Hyderabad. Mubariz ud 
Daula's efforts of 1838-39 drew upon Mujahiddin propaganda and ideology, while also 
making contact with the naiks. The distinguishing feature of the 1857-59 Mutiny in 
Hyderabad was a firmer link between Mujahiddin-type propaganda and naik organization, 
more than ever before. There were three main phases in the 1857-59 protests. The first, 
June 1857, was marked by Mujahiddin-type efforts. The second, c.November 1857 - mid-
1858, saw heightened naik activity. The third, January-February 1859, wimessed a 
combination of Mujahiddin-type efforts and naik activity. The main centres of protest in 
June 1857 were Hyderabad itself, where the residency was attacked, and various military 
stations, where British troops mutinied.125 Mujahiddin-type activists played a role in the 
attack on the residency and in the mutinies. The mutiny of the 7th Madras Cavalry in 
Bowanpalli was typical of the Mujahiddin-type efforts. Activists spread their propaganda 
through cantonment mosques and bazar-s, and used meetings, khutba-s and hand-written 
circulars as their main media. The economic, social and political dislocation that so many 
groups had suffered under the British were represented as things that could be overcome. 
Soldiers and civilians were exhorted to conduct 'Jihad against the infidel' and to restore 
the authority of the Mughal badshah of Delhi. Examples of courageous conduct and 
success from Hindu~tan were offered as · inspiration to the people of the Deccan, and as 
evidence of what was possible. Those who collaborated with the enemy were taunted and 
mocked. In a proclamation accompanying one khutba, the Nizam, Asaf ud Daula, was 
124 One of his associates described the experiences angrily thus: 'Certain of the heretic hypocrites, under the influence of envy and jealousy, ... by slanderous accusations excited some of the Faithful so that disturbance arid riot was created. The respected Maulana [Syed Mohammad Ali]. .. retired from the persecution and returned to Calcutta ... The flame that was raised at Madras by degrees extended to Hyderabad · and burst into full blaze and excited many, both high and low, of our opponents, who spread rumors without end throughout the city - but by the aid of the All Powerfull we suffered nothing.' (NAI, HRR, 386, PP. 136-50; see also: HRR, 320; 380; IOLR, Hindustani Vernacular Tracts, 105, Rawaj al-Islam, (Madras, 1848) (Dakkani). 
125 Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 251-8. Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, III, 213-16; NAI, HRMC, 68/1854-57, Letters, June 1857; HRR, 651, pp. 78-98; For Sec, Letters and Telegrams, 12 June-23 Oct 1857. 
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urged to 'wear bangles and sit at home' if he could not support a cause that God and His 
Prophet themselves espoused. A maulvi who preached loyalty to the British, Sharfu Mian, 
was invited to 'become a Christain and go to Hell'. Pacifist pirs were treated with 
impatience. Abuse was accompanied with threats. Afzal ud Daula and Salar Jang, his 
diwan, were warned to expect ignominy once the rebels had won.126 Others who worked 
against the rebels were also threatened with divine retribution: on the Hindu, there would 
be the 'oath of the cow', and on the Muslim, the 'oath of the swine'. Maulvis who 
refused to give fatwa-s in the name of the Emperor of Delhi and to propagate jihad were 
told they would find themselves and their families 'cursed and repudiated for seven 
generations'. The 7th Madras Cavalry in Bowanpalli and the 1 st Hyderabad Contingent 
Cavalry in Aurangabad were receptive to such propaganda and mutinied. In Hyderabad, 
the residency was attacked by a crowd of between 1200 and 2000 men, and was led by a 
displaced Pathan irregular, Turra Baz Khan.121 
November 1857 saw the heightening of naik activity in Berar, Marathwada and 
Rayalseema. For example, Bheem Rao, Madan Gowda, Desai Saheb and a fourth 
unnamned man were identified by the centre as the principal naiks in Rayalseema and 
southern Marathwada. Bheem Rao had captured the forts of Kopal and Raichur and had 
to be dislodged by British troops.128 There was also support for restoring the Peshwa.129 
Arab and Pathan groups were seen joining their strength with naiks by early 1859. An 
Arab-Rohilla party spearheading an attack on British troops in Dharaseo received 
widespread local support, including that of a pirzada, the sajjda nashin of Jwala. Another 
party attacking Nelinga also received extensive local support. About 140 Rohillas were 
killed in two separate encounters with British troops at Risood and Chilkhamba in Berar. 
The most important rebel action outside Berar and Marathwada was an attack by a 
Rohilla force from Rayalseema on Dupad taluq in the British district of Kurnool in 
Madras. It occurred in January 1859 and received the support of several zamindars, patels 
and holy men of Rayalseema, as well as of the two leading Arab military creditors in 
Hyderabad, Omar bin Awad and Abdulla bin Ali. 130 
A plot against the Nizam, his minister and the resident was uncovered in Hyderabad in 
March-April 1862. Its leader was suspected to be a Maratha Brahman with several 
126 The Nizam's ' title will be cursed', went one warning, and the diwan's 'rank and pedigree will be repudiated' . Both men, furthermore, 'will have to work on the roads'. (NAI, HRMC, 6~/1854-57, Letters, June 1857) 
1Z1 Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 300-23; Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, III, 213-16; NAI, HRMC, 68/1854-57, Letters, June 1857; HRR, 651, pp. 78-98. 
128 NAI, For Pol, 6 Aug 1858, 132-9; 8 April 1859, 378-9; Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, III, 216-19; see also: NAI, For Pol, 4 June 1858, 32-6. 
129 One of the proclamations issued in the Peshwa's name, under the seal of 'Raja Pant ·Pradhan' announced the imminent arrival of his force and contained an exhortation for local co-operation and support. (NAI, HRMC, 73/1858-59). 
130 NAI, For Pol, 4 March 1859, 513; 6 May 1859, 15-19; HRR, 102, pp. 44-9; 98, pp. 128-33, 148-51; see also NAI, For Pol, 4 June 1858, 32-6; 14 Jan 1859, 120-38 and For, Sept 1864, 81-2, Genl-A on the circulation of symbolic arrows and chapati-s in Berar, and possibly Marathwada. 
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aliases131 who had escaped from Ujjain in 1857, with ten followers, when his rebel force 
of 5000 had been besieged by a larger British force. The Brahman was thought to have 
spent some time in Baroda, Poona and Sholapur, and it was from the latter place that he 
and his associates were now believed to have arrived in Hyderabad, in March 1861, 
disguised as mendicants. The plotters hoped to recruit a rebel force from among 
unemployed Arab, Rohilla and other irregular troops in Hyderabad and, when the party 
was large enough, to depose the Nizam, assasiriate his minister, attack the British 
residency and cantonment, and, finally, proclaim Nana Saheb as the Peshwa and ruler of 
Hyderabad. News of their activities got out, however, and the authorities launched an 
investigation into the matter. The leader fled, but thirty nine of his associates were 
arrested, tried and convicted. The resident believed that still more men could be charged. 
He suspected several sahukars, policemen, pujaris and at least one sajjda nashin of having 
connived with 'Rao Saheb'. The latter and his followers could not have lived publicly for 
as long as they did, according to the resident, without some degree of local knowledge 
and connivance.132 Salar Jang, the diwan, and the kotwal of Hyderabad, however, argued 
that the mere fact that the plotters had lived in certain localities could not be used as 
sufficient evidence against the men whom the resident suspected. The accused might 
indeed, argue that they had never suspected Rao Saheb and his companions of being 
anything other than mendicants precisely because they had lived so openly. Though the 
resident could not counter to Salar Jang's arguments, he wrote to Calcutta on several 
occasions that Hyderabad's populace were generally hostile to the British.133 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has suggested broadly two types of response to centralization and 
monopolistic military fiscalism in the context of agricultural depression, poor seasons and 
a collapsing revenue farming system: collaboration and protest. Only a minority of 
Hyderabad's intermediaries and zamindars appear to have collaborated with the centre's 
policies in the period c.1805-59, as the evidence of a declining economy and widespread 
political protest suggest. A declining economy could not have accomodated them all and 
the protest would not have been necessary if they had all been accomodated. 
Nevertheless, what collaboration did occur gave the centre's policies teeth. Not only were 
Hyderabad's core areas invaded and ravaged, but new types and levels of social tension 
and hostility were also introduced into some of them. One may see~ the long term origins 
of 20th century 'communal' and 'landlord-peasant' conflicts in these processes to some 
extent. One may also seek in them at least one . kind of catalyst for the consolidation of 
131 The three most common ones were thought to be 'Raghunath Rao', 'Rao Saheb' and 'Ram Rao'. 
132 The localities in question were Begum Bazar, Karwan, Lakshman Bagh, Seeta Ram Bagh and Husain Shah Wall's dargah. 
133 NAI, HRR, 106, pp. 26-30, 47-122, 149-63, 247-8. 
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'caste' or 'religious' identities as a basis for social conflict, instead of the more inclusive 
and flexible 'communities' of the pre-colonial period. The second and quite different type 
of response to the British regime was political and socio-cultural protest. It was initially 
limited to some some areas and particular groups. But it began to embrace a much 
broader base as distress migrants and naiks began to create rebel communal domains, and 
to aim at replacing the present regime with an alternative political order. The rebel 
domains received further support from the 1830s, as new groups of revenue farmers, 
military creditors and 'irregular' troops began to be squeezed out of a collapsing revenue 
farming system. They were also able to establish links with the Mujahiddin movement. If 
the latter was primarily concerned with · reforming Islam, it was also concerned with 
replacing the regime of the foreigner with an indigenous order, given the strong political 
element in its leadership in Hyderabad. The 'Mutiny' of 1857-59 represented the coming 
together of the propaganda and mobilization of the naiks, and Mujahiddin type elements, 
and, of course, discontented British troops. 
EPILOUGE 
However, the protest movements of c.1810-59 failed to dislodge the British regime and 
create an alternative political order. The British regime was still in a 'pre-pacification' 
stage in Hyderabad in the middle of the 19th century, whereas it had achieved pacification 
in Bengal and some other parts of India upto half a century earlier. Monopolistic military 
fiscalism had also become counter-productive. The centre fell deeper into debt as core 
areas were destroyed. Hyderabad threatened to cease to become a source of profit to the 
British empire. The boom in cotton, grain and other cash crops in the mid-nineteenth 
century, and in the wake of the civil war in America later, helped provide a bridge 
between a collapse of revenue farming and the growth of a new kind of economic policy 
in Hyderabad, however. Organizing Hyderabad as a producer of food grains and raw 
materials and a consumer of British manufactures also meant changes in its 
administration. The changes that occurred in the 1850s and 1860s gave the basic 
framework to the familiar 'Princely State' . 
4.8 Perspective 
The fortunes of 18th century Nizams turned on an interplay of local, supra-local and 
regional factors over which they themselves had little control. Local conflicts between 
zamindars and nawabs allowed supra-local intermediaries to maintain footholds in the 
countryside and to invest their military skills and capital profitably. But if the 
intermediaries exploited local rivalries, the internal divisions among them were 
exacerbated by their taking sides with mutually hostile zamindars or nawabs. The 
divisions were only reinforced by the rivalries of the foreign powers to whom the 
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intermediaries attached themselves. The Nizam was usually a creature of one or another 
of the intermediary factions and, through it, of one or another of the foreign powers. 
When the British emerged supreme from their contests in south India, their resident 
found himself in the driving seat in Hyderabad. But the profitability of the new 
acquisition depended on how successfully he could develop a powerful and stable central 
administration in Hyderabad. The mainspring of centralization in the period c.1798-1850 
was a heavy military superiority over intermediaries and zamindars. An unprecedented 
degree of centralization was achieved under British hegemony. But the centre's political 
and financial expectations were still not fulfilled at the end of the period. Intermediaries 
and zamindars in many areas had resisted its policies. 
This had been the result mainly of the emergence of a monopolistic brand of military 
fiscalism. Although the British had found some collaborators among the intermediaries, 
bankers and zamindars for their military fiscal policies, they had also alienated large 
numbers of them, as their policies were destructive in the context of depression poor 
seasons. Later, when the revenue farming system had begun to collapse, the centre's 
financial and political problems had intensified. The British had held fast in the face of 
such setbacks, but Hyderabad threatened to become an unprofitable territory. 
The period c.1850-65, however, witnessed some fundamental transformations taking 
place, which gave fresh direction and impetus to British interest in Hyderabad. Revenue 
farming was abandoned. It clearly did not serve British interests any more. On the one 
hand, it destroyed the core areas of Hyderabad's economy to such an extent that military 
fiscalism was no longer viable. On the other hand, it led to such widespread protest and, 
from the British-dominated centre's point of view, disorder that it was not even a handy 
tool for aligning Hyderabad with the emerging colonial policy of developing India as a 
supplier of food grains and raw materials, and an importer of manufactured goods. If the 
state could develop a bureaucratic framework for administering land, law and order, and 
economic policy, instead, Hyderabad might yet be developed as a supplier of primary 
goods and a consumer of British manufactures. The disaffected financiers and bankers of 
revenue farming would, at the same time, find new room for investment. Such change 
would succeed in fuelling an expansion in agriculture, and widespread rural protest would 
give way to a new agrarian-economic order and stable political economy. 
4.9. Recovery from Depression 
Guha points to a severe agricultural depression in the Western Deccan in the period 
c.1821-46. There were some stray years of high prices in between, but these were due to 
extensive crop failures. Recovery did not come about until the 1850s. The extension of 
agricultural between c.1850-70 was as much as 67%. Population also increased by about 
59% in the same period. The years 1861-73 were the years of the 'American civil war 
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boom' .137 The impressionistic evidence for Hyderabad also suggests that recovery here did 
not come about until the 1850s. The 1850s marked a turning point in the policy of 
military fiscalism and political protest as well. The centre gave up the revenue farming 
system and turned its attention to introducing administrative changes that would be 
compatible with organizing Hyderabad as an exporter of raw materials, food grains and 
cash crops, and an importer of British manufactures.138 At the same time, political protest 
dampened. 'Boom' bankers and merchants turned away from naiks and military creditors 
and collaborated with the centre's policies, this time not to extend military fiscalism but 
to develop Hyderabad as an export-import economy.139 The impact of the 1857-59 protests 
was not, in fact, as widespread in Hyderabad as it was in other parts of India, or, indeed, 
even as widespread as the earlier protests within Hyderabad itself, especially in the period 
c.1819-45. Merchants and bankers sided with the British regime during the 'Mutiny', 
especially in Berar, which had earlier been a key area of protest.140 
The origins of the cotton boom went back to the late 1830s and 1840s. According to 
Guha, while this was a period when the all-India trade surplus was falling, that of the 
Bombay region showed an opposite trend, with rising exports and bullion imports. 
Although Malwa opium was the most important factor here, cotton too played a part. One 
element in the cotton export was Berar cotton. In a 'good year' in the 1840s, Berar 
accounted for c.15% of the cotton exported from Bombay's ports. But the real boom can 
be dated only from the 1850s. Even when that happened, though it is worth bearing in 
mind a caution that Guha recommends: the 'boom' had its weaknesses. Land use was 
reaching its limits, the cattle population was declining, and rural indebtedness was 
increasing. The main beneficiaries of the 'boom' were the larger proprietor landlords, 
merchants, bankers and the state. For labour, the boom led to no increase in real wages 
and, in the context of an increasing population, even led to an increase in bonded labour. 
For small farmers and tenants, it meant severe and lasting indebtedness. The telling and 
tragic culmination of these various trends and factors was seen in the devastating famine 
of 1876-78.141 
Major dislocations were caused within the process of banker backed revenue farming 
in the 1840s and 1850s, as rival lobbies of creditors competed with each other to settle 
137 Guba, 'The Agrarian Economy'. 
138 See, for example: Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, II, 201, 697-729; Ill, 15(-84; IV, 372-3; Vlll, 1-30; Fraser, Our Faithful Ally, pp. 351-76; M. Taylor, 'Sketch of the Topography of East and West Berar, in reference to the Production of Cotton', JRAS, 20(1863), pp. 1-21; NAI, For Pol, 15 May 1857, 36-48; 14 Nov 1856, 47-92; HRMC, 82/1864-70, Resident to Gol, 10 Dec 1867. 
139 The firms of Pestonji, Hari Das Kishen Das and Surat Ram Govind Ram were examples of this process. (Leonard, 'Banking Firms in Hyderabad Politics'). 
140 See, for example: NAI, For Sec, 23 Oct 1857. 
141 Guha, 'The Agrarian Economy'; Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, I, 882-93; II, 697-729; IV, 372-3; VII , 'Famine Commission Report'; NAI, For Pol, 14 Nov 1856, 47-92; Fraser, Our Faithful Ally, pp. 351-76; Taylor, 
'Production of Cotton'; NAI, HRR, 829, pp. 329-89, Report on Peasant Indebtedness and the Alienation of Land to Capitalists and Usurers, 1874. 
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their claims with a financially distressed centre. 
Groups of Arab and Pathan financiers came worst off from these tussles. Alienated by 
the British domination of the centre, many of them began to serve zamindars involved in 
political protest, and became as such the targets of the centre's reprisals. Other financiers 
continued to deal with the centre, however, and tried to organize their own lobbies to 
counter the resident's influence. Residents complained about such lobbies throughout the 
1840s and early 1850s, especially when they saw that the diwan or the daftardars of the 
revenue department making concessions to them.142 
But some developments in Hyderabad's political economy from the late 1840s began 
to provide means for the resident and the sahukars to begin to see eye to eye again. 
While the sahukars were pressurized not to lend to revenue farmers, or to acquire stakes 
in revenue assignments, they were encouraged to make advances to landlords and 
cultivators growing export oriented crops, and to invest in the import of British 
manufactures. Hyderabad, in other words, was beginning to be organised as a primary 
producer for British industry and a potential market for British goods.143 The British tried 
to assimilate Hyderabadi cotton, grain and opium farmers; traders and bankers, and 
administrative elite all in to this process.144 One of the main priorities of the centre was to 
reform the administration to serve such needs. It is against this background that the 
celebrated mid-century 'reforms' of Salar Jang, and Hyderabad's subsequent investments 
in cash crops, railways and mining, can be best appreciated as efforts in a new direction; 
which would eventually make Hyderabad the familiar 'princely state' within Britain's 
Indian Empire. 
The resident had been able to persuade the centre to employ salaried taluqdars, called 
zilladar-s, instead of the older revenue farmers in some areas by the late 1840s. Later, he 
worked to effect a reform in the customs administration, so that it would favour the 
growth of an export-import trade through Bombay. 145 Yet other factors also drew 
Hyderabad's sahukars and merchants towards financing cash crops, and a trade in 
Hyderabad's primary produce and Britain's manufactures. The traditional demand for local 
goods and services in Hyderabad's zamindari capitals and among its intermediaries had 
decreased with the decline of the zamindars and the intermediaries.146 Merchants and 
capital were now re-directed towards a trade in British long cloth, and Hyderabadi cotton, 
142 See discussion above within this chapter and in Chapter lbree above; also: Leonard, 'Banking Firms in Politics'. 143 See discussion above within this chapter and in Chapter lbree above; also: Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, I, 882-93; NAI, HRR, 394, Survey Reports of the Daulatabad, Warangal and Nalgonda Circars, 1848. 
144 See discussion within this chapter below. 
145 NAI, For Pol, 12 June 1847, 97; 25 Nov 1848, 41-8; HRMC, 68/1854-57, Resident to GoI, Letter, 21 Sept 1854; 81/1862-64. 
146 See discussion above within this chapter and in Chapters lbree and One above. 
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opium and grain.147 
4.lo .The Direction of Change 
4.)11 Cotton 
We do not know of the early history of export oriented cotton cultivation in Berar, 
except that its origins lay somewhere in the late 1830s and 1840s.148 What we do know is 
that Berar was acquired under false pretences in Dalhousie's time in order to organize and 
expand such production.149 The British interest in Berar's cotton cultivation was so 
considerable by the mid-1850s that they now demanded Hyderabad co-operate with them 
in an attempt to open up the Godavari for navigation, which, if achieved, could enable the 
cheaper transportation of cotton to Britain. A navigable Godavari was also expected to 
help supply cheap timber for ship building in the Madras presidency. The chief engineer 
of Madras' Godavari Division, who led the navigation experiment on the river, was 
convinced 'that the cheap carriage of [Berar] cotton to Manchester is at the present time 
the greatest of commercial desiredata'. He was enthusiastic about the potential of the 
Godavari navigation project. Berar was capable of producing 200% more cotton than what 
it exported to Britain in 1854:150 'It may be said with safety that Manchester's 
independence of America depends upon our activity here ... ' 151 The British government in 
Madras and the resident in Hyderabad represented to Calcutta in 1859 that developing the 
Godavari for transport and trade would benefit from the acquisition from Hyderabad of a 
210-mile long and 12-mile broad stretch of land along the river's, and its tributary, the 
Pranhita's, northern banks. Calcutta authorized the resident to make a formal proposal to 
this effect in 1860.152 While ceding the northern banks of the rivers Hyderabad also 
appointed special officers on the southern banks to administer the areas adjacent to the 
navigation project's work sites. The goods that workmen at these sites received were 
147 The main trading centres of the Daulatabad region (such as Aurangabad), for example, had traditionally been known for an inter district and export trade in their famed cloth manufactures, besides dry grains, fruit and cattle. But cloth, fruit and cattle had declined as articles of export by 1848, and grain now occupied the prominent position in this respect. It was sent mainly to Bombay for export abroad. The principal imports into the Daulatabad region, on the other hand, now included cotton cloth, besides the traditional salt, and iron and copper vessels. In another region, W arangal, also formerly noted for its cloth and carpet manufactures, a surveyor noticed in the 1840s that most of the local cloth was now produced only for home consumption. British long cloth had replaced the local cloth in the bazars. It would not be long, the surveyor speculated, before the local sari-s were also replaced by Manchester ones: 'Indian manufactures are doomed'. (NAI, HRR, 394, Survey Report of the Daulatabad, Warangal and Nalgonda Circars, 1848.). 
148 Guha, 'The Agrarian Economy'; Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, I, 882-93. , 
149 Hyderabad ceded Berar under duress. It was facing bankruptcy at the time, and some of its intermediaries and bankers were beginning to join the ranks of zamindar led political protest. It felt it could not refuse the British demand without inviting dire consequences. (Regani, Nizam-British Relations, pp. 259-300; also: discussion within this chapter above). 
150 A rough estimate in Sept. 1854 suggested that the trade of Berar employed a capital of Rs 20 Lakhs annually and that about 75% of this was devoted to cotton. The latter element was expected to witness a 'vast increase' in the near future. 
151 NAI, HRR, 500, pp. 83-109. 
152 In exchange, the Nizam was offered back Dharaseo and some other districts which he earlier been required to cede to the British. (NAI, HRMC, 77/1860; Taylor, 'Production of Cotton' ). 
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exempted from import duties, furthermore, and Hyderabad also agreed to survey for 
feeder roads from its interior to the work sites.153 
A Hyderabad Exhibition was organised by the residency in 1856 to 'inaugurate, as it 
were, a revival of the industries of the country'. The main message of the exhibition's 
organizers to the government and merchants of Hyderabad was to develop the country as 
a raw material producing zone: 
'A country possessing great capabilities and resources, its mountains of iron ore [are] neglected, its fertile valleys uncultivated, its roads 
unrepaired .. .its encouragements few, its discouragements many .. .'.154 
The organizers offered a coast to coast blue print for the attainment of this objective.155 
Hyderabad's attention to projects connected with Berar's cotton trade fitted in with the 
blue print. 
4.112 Opium 
So, too, did its efforts to organise and develop an opium trade. Hyderabad had not been 
reckoned as a serious opium producer when India's opium production and exports had 
first begun to be organised as a British monopoly. But it was obvious by 1853 that 
Hyderabadi opium was also finding its way into ships from Bombay bound for China. 
Since the smuggling deprived the British of duties, efforts were made to gauge the extent 
of the opium produced in Hyderabad. Though the investigations led to no definitive 
quantitative estimates, 'much' opium was said to be grown in Berar and Marathwada. The 
chief investigator, Taylor, recommended that it would be best to recognize and develop 
Hyderabad's opium production and trade officially. Ineffective bans would only result in 
revenue losses through smuggling. The quality of Hyderabad's opium could also be 
controlled to suit the requirements of the China market. Official notifications inviting 
traders to tender for opium contracts were out in Taylor's districts in Marathwada by July 
1854. The terms of these contracts were similar to those offered in Malwa and Gujrat; a 
duty of Rs 400 was levied on every chest weighing 140 lbs. Marwari and Gujrati traders 
were soon involved in the opium trade and made advances to cultivators at the beginning 
of the agricultural season. Taylor's experiment in Marathwada was extended to opium 
producing districts in .Berar by 1868. The duties charged on Berar opium were 16-20% 
higher than those on Malwa or Gujrat opium, however. All the opium produced in 
153 The principal lines were Warangal to Mungapet, a distance of thirty five miles, and Yelgundel to Maliadeopet, a distance of fifty seven miles. (NAI, HRMC, 78/1860-61). 
154 NAI, For Pol, 15 May 1857, 36-48; See also: Report of the Akola Exhibition, 1868 (NAI, For, March 68, 34-36, Genl-A). 
155 It envisaged in a short time new roads from Berar to Bombay and from the Raichur Doab to the West coast, and a navigable route down the Godavari. These developments were welcomed as providing land locked Hyderabad with an opportunity to export its potentially valuable raw materials. The blue print also exhorted Hyderabad's administration to make life and property secure; to maintain peace, and law and order; to encourage irrigation and agriculture; to repair old roads; and to spread education. (NAI, For Pol, 15 May 1857, 36-48.). 
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Hyderabad was allowed access to the China market through Bombay by the mid-1870s. 
But it had to be weighed and packed under the residency's supezvision, and covered by 
passes issued by it, first. 156 
4.JQ3 Customs and Tariffs 
The British felt that Hyderabad's import-export trade through Bombay would also benefit 
from custom and tariff reforms. The first measure that the residency effected in this 
connection in mid-century was the abolition of internal transit duties on British goods and 
traders. The abolition had in fact been agreed to as long ago as 1802, but had never been 
implemented effectively. It was still not easy to implement in the 1850s. Duties charged 
by taluqdars and zamindars as part of their customary rights could not be eliminated 
without revamping the whole of the customs administration itself. 
A start was made where it was easiest to implement. Some sarf-i-khas lands, or 
personal estates of the Nizam, were locked within the Berar districts that Hyderabad had 
ceded to the British in 1853. When the authorities here abolished internal transit duties, 
replacing them with a single consolidated tariff collected at frontier posts, they abolished 
them in the sarf-i-khas lands as well. 157 
Another tract where frequent and arbitrary transit duties were felt to inhibit an increase 
in the import-export trade was the 210-mile stretch on the northern banks of the Godavari 
and the Pranhita which the British had acquired from Hyderabad in connection with the 
Godavari navigation project. Madras engineers engaged in exploring the tract complained 
of influential taluqdars and zamindars exacting heavy duties from river traffic. Their 
combined duties raised the prices of goods by at least 35%, it was alleged, in contrast to 
the 3 to 5% duties charged by the Madras government. Such duties had already killed off 
most of the small traffic on the river, in salt, fish, tobacco, cotton cloth, thread and 
coconuts. Timber traffic, the only substantial one that remained, - it could not abandon 
the river except at a very high cost, - was also threatened now. This situation was 
attributed to rivalries between various zamindars and taluqdars of the river front. For 
example, ongoing warfare was reported between the zamindar of Bhadrachalam and the 
taluqdar of Raipur. When the taluqdar had carried away 2000 heads of cattle from the 
zamindar's territory recently, the latter had retaliated by burning several Raipur villages. 
He had also responded similarly to a 'sword and fire' raid by the Cherla raja, joining 
forces with a friendly naib taluqdar and burning every Cherla village along a ten mile 
stretch of the river front. Local warfare of this nature put financial strain on the zamindars 
and taluqdars involved and they turned to the river traffic passing through their districts 
for compensation: agriculture of course was limited in this wooded and hilly country, and 
156 NAI, For Pol, 29 July 1853, 46; 11 Aug 1854, 42-55; For, Feb 1879, 4-7, Rev B; May 1868, 29-33, Rev A. 
157 NAI, HRMC, 68/1854-57, Resident to Gol, Letter, 21 Sept 1854. 
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contributed only a small proportion to its revenues. 
The British subjected the northern banks to their own administrators. Simultaneously, 
the resident pressed Salar Jang to reorganize Hyderabad's customs administration on the 
southern banks. A mansabdar was appointed to collect a single consolidated duty from 
river traffic at a single point on the Madras frontier. He was also expected to prevent 
taluqdars and zamindars on the river front from levying local transit duties. He was 
assisted by several specially appointed officers to meet the transport, labour, and provision 
requirements of Madras' Godavari navigation project at various points along the river. 158 
Customs reforms were also introduced by Hyderabad's diwan to cover the export trade 
in food grains and raw materials, such as oil seeds and cotton, from the early 1860s. This, 
once again, was under pressure from the resident. The Bombay government had been 
protesting against Hyderabad's internal transit duties and the delays that Bombay's traders 
and goods experienced, and in particular, launched a vigorous campaign against a ban on 
the export of grain that Hyderabad introduced in September 1862. Salar Jang defended the 
ban on the ground that Hyderabad was experiencing a severe grain scarcity at the time. 
The resident initially informed Bombay that he accepted Salar Jang's reasoning. But 
Bombay remained adamant, demanding that the logic of prices should remain the sole 
criterion for determining the flows of trade. It reiterated its call for the withdrawal of the 
ban, as well as for the removal of arbitrary impositions by Hyderabad's taluqdars and 
zamindars on internal transit. The resident now forced Hyderabad to lift its ban partially. 
Salar Jang was also instructed to launch an enquiry with a view to abolishing internal 
transit duties and establishing a single consolidated tariff at frontier posts instead.159 
The diwan spoke of clamping down on grain exports once again in 1863. Hyderabad 
was facing widespread rain failure for the second successive year and the possibility of 
grain riots. Grain traders found Bombay's export prices more lucrative, nevertheless, and 
threatened to advise the farmers to whom they had made cash advances to abandon grain 
cultivation in favour of commodities on which there was no export ban, such as cotton 
and oil seeds. The Bombay government also protested furiously at the news of Salar 
Jang's renewed embargo. Calcutta once again directed the resident to advise Salar Jang to 
lift the ban on grain exports completely. Salar Jang felt he had no choice but to 
acqueisce. He decided to increase his revenue demands on agricultural produce indirectly, 
however, as he saw no other short term method for making up the revenues lost by the 
abolition of internal transit duties. He instituted a new 5% ad valorem duty on agricultural 
produce, which was to be collected at source. The resident was not pleased, - he 
represented the ad valorem duty as a transit duty in disguise, - and had the duty 
158 NAI, HRR, 500, pp. 83-109; HRMC, 68/1854-57, Resident to Gol, Letters, 7 July 1854, 3 and 18 May 1855; 77/1860, Letters, Sept 1859-July 1860; 78/1860-61, Letter, 31 Oct 1860; For, March 1875, 148-9, Genl B. 
159 NAI, HRMC, 81/1862-64, Letters, April-Dec 1862; see also: HRR, 820, pp. 219-21 ; 655, pp. 62-71. 
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withdrawn.160 At the same time, he warned Salar Jang that the latter would do well to 
remember that Hyderabad, like the rest of India, had no future except as an exporter of 
food grains and raw materials to Britain: 
'Situated as His Highness' Dominions are in the middle of the British Dominions, he must either keep peace with the freedom of trade enjoyed in the British Provinces, or see his country continue to deteriorate' .161 
The resident condemned even low or nominal duties on grain as not being designed 'to 
remove the very strong feeling among all the influential classes against the permission to 
export grain'; and Hyderabad had 'little else to export' .162 
4 .1,4 Communications 
Another important item on the food grains and raw materials agenda, besides customs 
reorganization, was communications. Hyderabad was included in the Government of 
India's railway development plan in 1861. It was asked to invest in railway lines from 
Bombay to Madras passing through its districts. The Bombay government pressed 
Calcutta for the cession of land by Hyderabad along a proposed railway route between 
Bombay and Cuddapah via Sholapur, Gulbarga, Hyderabad and Kurnool. It also wanted 
magisterial powers within the railway fences, as well as duty free passage for goods in 
transit. The route via Hyderabad had been chosen in preference to another one, which was 
originally proposed, and also went from Bombay to Cuddapah, but through Mudgal and 
Bellary instead of Gulbarga and Hyderabad. One of the main reasons for the choice of the 
latter route had been the desire to consolidate a trade link with Hyderabad. The resident 
had felt that it would be useful to tap the trading potential of one of the largest cities and 
cantonments of India. 
His rough estimates suggested that the total value of imports into the twin cities of 
Hyderabad and Secunderabad was c. Rs 14 million annually. Imports from British 
territories, mainly Bombay, accounted for c. Rs 32 Lakhs, or 32% of this trade. The 
Nizam's court, which received and spent 'a large part of the revenues of the country', 
was expected to add to the purchasing power of a civilian population of 0.41 million, 
besides a 'large' military population. The Hyderabad countryside was also expected to 
hold great potential. As for exports, although these were 'trifling' from the city of 
Hyderabad itself, 'from the country they are very considerable, consisting of cotton, sugar, 
oilseeds etc., and when the crops are good grain'. Gulbarga, thr~ugh which the proposed 
railway would pass, had a population of c. 20,000 and was 'a place of considerable 
trade ' . It sent grain to Hyderabad, and cotton, . linseed, pepper, sugar, oil, ghee and a few 
160 NAI, HRMC, 81/1862-64, Letter, Dec 1863; 82/1864-70, Letter, Dec 1864. 
161 NAI, HRMC, 82/1864-70, Letter, Dec 1864. 
162 Ibid .. 
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other items of agricultural and dairy produce to Bombay via Sholapur. Tandur, a trading 
centre on the Hyderabad-Sholapur sector of the proposed railway, was similar to Gulbarga 
in character, though it had a smaller population, c.8000. There were several other trading 
centres, with upto 600 houses each, on the route. Only the Hyderabad-Kurnool sector of 
the proposed route could be said to be 'by no means so populous or cultivated as the 
other portion'. 163 
The Nizam's State Railway was established as a state owned company in 1872. The 
resident exercised final powers in it on behalf of the Government of India. The actual 
construction of the railway line was delegated to Bombay's Great Indian Peninsular 
Railway. As the initial surveys were completed and blue prints for the lines formulated, 
the Government of India advised the resident to urge upon Hyderabad that its budgetary 
allocations for expenditure in areas touched by the proposed railway 'cannot be better 
applied than by the formation of railway feeders'. Hyderabad 's first feeder road, between 
Sadashivpet and Nanapur, was completed in Jan. 1874, 'at [such] a heavy cost', though, 
that the resident himself was reluctant to press for more expenditure on feeders soon 
afterwards: '[A]t present the provision of funds for the construction of the main line of 
the Railway is pressing so heavily on the State ... ' Salar Jang raised an 'expensive' loan 
on the London stock exchange to finance the Hyderabad railway in 1875. When he 
needed to raise another loan in 1877, he looked for cheaper means. By his own 
admission, the Hyderabad railway had been constructed at an unnecessarily high cost, and 
with no real commercial benefit to Hyderabad itself. He wished to forestall any further 
criticism of his handling of the railway's finances, which were being openly construed as 
being deliberately favourable to British, rather than Hyderabadi or Indian, interests. The 
controversies that began to surround the Hyderabad government's measures to develop the 
state as a supplier of primary goods and importer of manufactures within the nexus of 
Britain's Empire in the 1870s would continue well into the next century. 164 
4.JU5 Trends 
Meanwhile, mid-century Hyderabad continued to be organized as a primary producer. 
The opportunities for indigenous merchants and bankers in this process seem to have 
helped diffuse the t~nsions and conflicts of revenue farming in the 1840s. Some 
Hyderabadi traders and bankers were already beginning to concentrate on an export 
oriented bulk trade in grain by the late 1840s. By the 1850s and 1860s, their involvement 
with cotton, opium, linseed and other export trades was also · considerable. During the 
period 1857-59, when political protest was pervasive in several parts of India, the resident 
163 NAI, HRMC, 81/1862-64, Letters, May 1862-June 1864; For, Feb 1865, 16-18, Genl A; Nov 69, 33, Gen! A. 
164 See references cited in the last footnote and also: NAI, HRPB, F.10/1873; For, June 1872, 18-20, Genl A; For Pol, Nov 1873, 7-8, Gen! A; Jan 1874, 6-8, Gen! A; For, Sept 1876, 7-13, Gen! A; Dec 1876, 9-11, Gen! A; Feb 1878, 18-21, Gen! A; Sept 1878, 1-10, Gen! A. 
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observed that the merchant classes of the Deccan had generally supported the British. 
When Delhi fell to British forces in Oct. 1857, for example, sahukars Ramraj and 
Ratanchand of Aurangabad, 'members of one of the most wealthy finns in the Deccan', 
gave an entertainment to the officers of the Deccan Field Force, which was stationed in 
Aurangabad at the time.165 Successive residents also spoke of heavy investments in the 
cotton and grain 'revolution' of Berar by merchants and bankers from Hyderabad, 
Bombay and elsewhere throughout the 1860s and 1870s. They also cited heavy pressure 
from the same elements behind the Government of Bombay's advocacy of customs and 
tariff refonns in Hyderabad, and its campaign against embargoes on grain exports. 
Bankers also invested in railway and mining projects, as well as in an import trade in 
British manufactures, in subsequent decades. 
4.11. Salar Jang's Reforms 
Hyderabad's administrators, traders and bankers gave its political economy a new 
direction in co-operation with the resident from the mid-19th century. Investments in the 
production and trade of commodities like cotton, grain and opium; the reorganization of 
tariff policies and the customs administration; and the launching of a road and railway 
development programme fonned the economic dimension of this process. Its political 
dimension consisted chiefly of a new approach to the administration of land revenue and 
law and order. 
4.11.1 The Legacies of the Assigned Districts 
The residency had developed certain attitudes as to how to make the administration in 
these areas compatible with the aim of organizing them as exporters of primary produce 
and importers of British manufactures in the course of administering the territories that 
Hyderabad had ceded to the British in 1853. The same attitudes were regarded as being 
relevant to the advice that the resident could give to Hyderabad in the context of the 
changes that were being demanded there in the mid-19th century. Since the resident's 
influence was quite great in practice, it seems worthwhile to dwell briefly on the British 
experience of administering the ceded districts of Berar and the Raichur Doab, which 
were together referred . to as the Assigned Districts. 
One of the top priorities in the administration of the Assigned Districts was land 
revenue. Not only was it the chief source of the government's income, but greater 
commercial investment in agriculture was also seen as a necessary part of developing the 
country as an exporter of food grains and raw materials. It was felt from the start that 
direct dealings with individual 'peasant proprietors' were preferable to village settlements, 
or reliance on zamindars or revenue farming, for revenue collection. At the heart of this 
165 NAI, For Sec, 23 Oct 1857, 294. 
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notion lay a conviction that private property in land could be authenticated with reference 
to ancient Hindu tradition; and that it was possible to implement this in practice. 
Conversely, there was a feeling that the rights, privileges, and shares that zamindars, 
jagirdars, and all manner of other intermediaries had acquired in land and revenue were 
dubious, and ought to be reduced or done away with altogether. 11'6 The Assigned Districts 
administration began to claim some success in its land revenue policy within three years 
of its inception.167 By the fourth and fifth years, · it had penetrated into the functions and 
powers of village level patels and patwaris. Patwaris were no longer allowed to collect 
money and were restricted to keeping accounts. The traditional rights of the patels to a 
share in the revenues were severely curtailed. The heads of khel-s were identified as the 
proprietors of land.168 
Patels and patwaris were deemed to be the heads of khels, or village communities. 
They were expected to help with the assessment of lands and the collection of rents. 169 
But although the patels and patwaris were identified as leaders of khels, many of their 
traditional privileges were reduced or done away with altogether, in order to obtain higher 
revenues and to exert more control than before. The former settlements of zamindars and 
revenue farmers with the patels and patwaris were felt to have left the latter officials with 
too much power in distributing the burden of rents within villages. They could exploit 
some cultivators and indulge others. The new administration aimed at assessing each khel 
directly, however, and reducing the traditional powers of patels and patwaris. The latter 
were also now appointed on fixed salaries paid by the revenue department. Each 
individual rent assessee was charged 6.25% of his produce on this account. The patels' 
and patwaris' traditional levies on villages, - whether to renumerate themselves, or to 
support village artisans, shrines or festivals, - were abolishedY0 
By 1857, even the remaining functions and powers of patwaris had come under attack. 
Their traditional training in survey methods was deemed unsuitable for the 'professional' 
and cost effective surveys that were now needed. Many patwaris were consequently laid 
off or pensioned off, and the salaries of others were reduced. Traditional allowances to 
deshmukhs and deshpandes also began to come under attack. The Assigned Districts 
166 NAI, For Pol, 16 Dec 1853, 64-7; W.H. Sykes,'Land Tenures in the Dukhun', JRAS, 3,(1836), pp. 350-73; H. Baden-Powell, 'The Origin of VillageLand-Tenures in India', ]RAS, 30(1898), pp. 605-16; W. Elliot, 'Ancient Tenures of Land in the Maratha Country', /A(Sept 1886), pp. 268-72. 
167 The resident in Hyderabad wrote to the governor-general in April 1856 that, although the administration of the Assigned Districts was in transition and information on land revenue and tenures was still incomplete, 1,40,789 proprietors were already paying their revenues directly to Government. (NAI, HRR, 506, pp. 256-61). 
168 NAI, For Pol, 14 Nov 1856, 47-92. 
169 The proprietor was taken to be identical with the head of a 'khel', or 'proprietory sub-division' of the land 
attached to a village. The principal 'khel' holder, or proprietor, was taken to be the village patel. Khels were 
thought to have been the original basis of landed lineages and kinship groups: the heads of all the khels in any particular area were also the heads of the branches of a single regionally dominant dimmant, or, roughly, sub-
caste or kinship group. (NAI, For, Feb 1868, 5-6, Poltl A; HRR, 822, pp. 37-42; For Pol, 14 Nov 1856, 47-92.). 
170 NAI, For Pol, 16 Dec 1853, 64-7; 14 Nov 1856, 47-92; 1 Oct 1858, 69-70; 31 Dec 1858, 427-8, 517, 529; 5 Aug 1859, 163; For, Feb 1868, 5-6, Poltl A; HRR, 506, pp. 256-61; 820, pp. 32-4; 821; 822, pp. 37-42; 831, pp. 147-60; Taylor, 'Production of Cotton'. 
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administration claimed that, whereas these various officials had siphoned off upto 51 per 
cent of the gross revenues in the past, they could now take no more than 16 per cent. 171 
Not surprisingly, heavy increases began to be reported in the revenues of the Assigned 
Districts from 1856.172 
If the administration viewed some of the traditional privileges of patels and patwaris 
with grave suspicion, it took an even less charitable view of zamindars, jagirdars and their 
privileges. The revenue department had assumed direct responsibility for assessing the 
khels and collecting revenues. It felt justified in abolishing the traditional benefits that 
zamindars and jagirdars had enjoyed, - such as fixed shares in the revenue collections and 
inam-s, - for the performance of the same functions. If they were allowed to retain any 
traditional privileges at all, it was for political, rather than administrative or economic, 
reasons. Even so, the burden of proof rested with the zamindars and jagirdars. Deshmukhs 
and deshpandes had to produce sanads or similar documents which proved that they had 
enjoyed their benefits continuously during the preceding thirty five to fifty years before 
their claims were considered. Many were unable to do this, - claiming that their rights 
had always been self-evident, - and were dispossessed. Those who could substantiate their 
claims were still not confirmed in all their traditional privileges, on the argument that they 
were no longer required to perform their traditional duties. 
A distinction was made between the right to a share in the revenue and a right to a 
share in the land in the case of jagirdars and they, too, were required to produce evidence 
for the prolonged enjoyment of their privileges before their claims were considered. Many 
fell by the wayside under such severe scrutiny, and a great proportion of the rights and 
rent free lands of others were resumed. So severe were the regulations of the Assigned 
Districts administration devised in 1864 on zamindars and the jagirdars that, on the 
administration's own reckoning in 1872, they 'were too favourable to the interests of the 
revenue of the province and too hard on those whom they immediately affected'. It was 
decided therefore to make the latter some concessions now, though only 'as a matter of 
grace ... and not as a matter of right on their part', to head off discontent and buy loyalty 
cheap. Zamindars and jagirdars were allowed small proportions of their former privileges 
as 'pensions'. Their children, furthermore, were recommended for favours 'through the 
educational and other ·channels' so that they might aspire to 'something like the good 
positions to which they and their ancestors attained - though often by very questionable 
means - under former orders of things' .173 
Retrenchments and reforms in the revenue administration were matched by similar 
changes in the other priority department of the Assigned Districts, the police and justice 
171 NAI, For Pol, 31 Dec 1858, 3381. 
172 NAI, For Pol, 14 Nov 1856, 47-92; 31 Dec 1858, 3381; 5 Aug 1859, 163. 
173 NAI, For Pol, 31 Dec 1858, 427-8, 517, 529; For, Feb 1865, 190-2, Rev A; Feb 1868, 5-6, Poltl A; HRR, 822, pp. 37-42; 829, pp. 149-72. 
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department. Traditional practices were condemned here, too. The lands and privileges of 
old 'law and order' officers, like the shetsundi-s, naikwari-s, kavilkar-s and maqtawala-s, 
were seen as corrupt and dubious accretions to the power of zamindars in the time of a 
weak central government. Traditional personnel and privileges were now revamped and 
centralized in the police and justice department as in the revenue department. The 
shetsundis of Raichur Doab were in theory supposed to help their patwaris keep the law; 
to assist them in land revenue collections; to keep an eye on the bunds and tanks; and to 
work sluices. In practice, their loyalties often lay with zamindars, who rewarded them 
with service lands in return for help with their local wars. Naikwaris acted as heads of 
groups of shetsundis and, like the latter, enjoyed rent free hereditary service lands from 
zamindars. They were particularly influential in the Bhunnur district of the Raichur Doab. 
Village level watchmen under them were styled talari-s here instead of the usual 
shetsundis. Kavilkar-s, a category of extra-village police, were also influential in the same 
way as the naikwaris. 174 
The commissioners of the Assigned Districts reduced the numbers of the various 
categories of police. Those who were discharged lost their service lands as well. Those 
who were assimilated to the centralized police and justice department had their powers 
curbed and duties redefined. Their service lands were also reduced and brought under 
asssessment. The lands, moreover, comprised only one part of their salary structure now. 
A cash wage and a local contribution in grain made up the rest of their salary. Such a 
system of renumeration was expected to keep the police loyal at once to the local 
community and the administration. The justice side of the law and order department was 
also reformed. Clear cut powers of trial in civil cases were vested in a magisterial 
hierarchy comprising the commissioner, deputy assistant commissioner, extra assistant 
commissioner, tahsildar and police patel, from top to bottom. A parallel hierarchy of 
courts was established to deal with the more serious civil cases and all but the pettiest of 
Criminal CaSeS.175 
While the administration of the Assigned Districts was not entirely happy with its 
record on law and order, - which it attributed to poor budget allocations, -176 it did 
succeed in boosting up revenues177 and, except in the period c.1853-59, presiding over a 
period of relative · J:>Olitical control and calm. Taking such factors together with 
achievements in tariff reforms, road and railway building projects, and agricultural 
expansion, the administration congratulated itself on preparing the districts for a 'cotton 
114 NAI, HRR, 649, pp. 122-32. 
175 NAI, For Pol, 14 Nov 1856, 47-92; 31 Dec 1858, 331/3381; 5 Aug 1859, 163; For, Feb 1868, 5-6, Poltl A. 
176 NAI, For Pol, 30 Dec 1859, 182-3; For, April 1862, 17-18, Finl A; Aug 1864, 30-32, Genl A; Sept 1864, 1-4, Judcl A; HRR, 820, pp. 259-88, 340-59. 
177 See, for example: NAI, For Pol, 14 Nov 1856, 47-92; 28 March 1856, 490-2; 5 Aug 1859, 163; 30 Dec 1859, 182-3; For, April 1862, 17-18, Finl A; Aug 1864, 30-2, Genl A; Feb 1868, 5-6, Poltl A; HRR, 821, 1864-66; Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, II, 201 ; Fraser, Our Faithful Ally, pp. 351-76. 
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and grain revolution'. 
4.11.2 The Lessons for Hyderabad 
Even as the resident pressed Salar Jang to introduce tariff reforms and invest in roads 
and railways in Hyderabad, he also recommended comprehensive administrative 
reorganization.178 Hyderabad's recently formed fourteen zillas were parcelled into five 
regional circles. Each circle was headed by a sadr taluqdar. 179 The zillas accounted for 
about three-quarters of Hyderabad's territory. The remaining consisted of the sarf i khas 
and paigah estates, which were managed separately. The privileges and functions of the 
deshmukhs, deshpandes, inamdars, jagirdars, patels and patwaris were investigated and 
reorganized in the zillas under the resident's supervision. The chief concern, - as in the 
Assigned Districts, - was to achieve greater control by the centre and higher revenues. 180 
Changes were also introduced into the administration of law and order. The zilla 
taluqdars were vested with standardized legal and policing powers. They were supervized 
by a central court, which was established in Hyderabad. In the districts, they were assisted 
by superintendents. The principal targets of Hyderabad's reformed law and order agencies 
initially were groups of Arabs and Pathans who had fallen foul of the British dominated 
centre during the financial crises of the 1840s and 1850s, and had subsequently become 
involved in the political protest of naiks. The campaign against the Arabs and Pathans 
was indirect at first, appearing only as a reform with general applicability. The executive 
order of July 1868, for instance, restricted the carrying of weapons to government 
servants and warned 'unemployed persons and tradesmen' not to flout the order. However, 
the proclamation of Aug. 1872 was more direct. It withdrew from the Arabs the right to 
opt for trial by their own jamadars or panchayats, instead of the usual criminal courts, in 
cases of crime. It also extended the scope of criminal offences to cover, among other 
things, the use of force in transactions with debtors and the illegal acquisition of their 
property. The latter clauses were, as the resident observed in private, designed specially to 
curb the influence and activities of Arab and Pathan creditors.181 
Changes in the civil and criminal regulations were reinforced by a clearer definition of 
the duties and reponsibilities of the entire administrative hierarchy. The old central 
departments were reconstituted as four new departments. These were presided over by a 
178 See, for example: NAI, For Pol, 16 Nov 1855, 68. 
179 The five circle capitals were Aurangabad, Yelgundel, Khammam, Bidar and Sholapur/Raichur. (NAI, HRMC, 82/1864-70, Resident to Gol, Letter, 10 Dec 1867). 
180 NAI, HRMC, 82/1864-70, Resident to Gol, Letter, 10 Dec 1867; see also: For Dept, March 1868, 151-2, Poltl A; Gribble, History of the Deccan, IT, 245-69; Mahdi Ai, Hyderabad Affairs, Ill, 157-84; IV, 372-3, 495-7, 501-6; Vlll, 1-30; Bilgrami and Wilhnott, Historical and Descriptive Sketches, IT, 110-250; IOLR, Pol & Sec, L/P & S/18/D.13, Saunders's Report on Hyderabad, 1872-74. 
· 
181 NAI, HRMC, 82/1864-70, Resident to Gol, 10 Dec 1867; For, Sept 1868, 100-4, Poltl A; Dec 1879, 323-60, Secret; Jan 1873, 88-90, Poltl A; April 1876, 1-17, Poltl A; HRR, 825, pp. 267-75; APSA, Persian/Urdu Manuscripts, 111, Urdu Manuscript of the Taluqdari Admirristration in the Zilla of Aurangabad, Late 19th Century. See also: Grible, History of the Deccan, IT, 245-69; Mahdi Ali, Hyderabad Affairs, Ill, 157-84; Bilgrami 
and Wilhnott, Historical and Descriptive Sketches, IT, 110-20. 
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central board with four members. Each departmental head was chosen by the resident and 
the diwan together. The opportunity provided by the need for appointing a regent to the 
minor Nizam upon the death of his father in 1869, was used further to tighten the central 
administration. A co-regency was established. Although it wielded sweeping powers, it 
drew 'its authority entirely from the British Government'. [Emphasis original]. Salar 
Jang's favourite nephew, Mukarram ud Daula, was groomed for higher office. Mukarram 
ud Daula was already the head of a central department and a member of the central 
board. Although it was Salar Jang's co-regent, Shams ul Umra, and temporary 
replacement, Bashir ud Daula, who were nominally the men in charge, Mukarram ud 
Daula effectively handled the administration under the resident's supervision when Salar 
Jang himself was away on a 15-week tour of Europe in 1876. As for the minor Nizam, he 
was being tutored meanwhile to grow up as a loyal 'Prince' of the British Empire.182 
4.12. Conclusion 
The changes that occurred in Hyderabad in the period c.1850-65 were to give it the 
framework that it retained until the final collapse of the Princely State in the middle of 
the 20th century. Two sorts of factors brought about these changes. The first was the 
'boom' in agriculture, which despite its 'weaknesses' contributed to the collapse of 
political protest in the countryside, the abandonment of revenue farming, and the 
expansion of population and agriculture. The context for the creation of naiks and distress 
migrants was, as it were, removed. Military creditors were also marginalized, and the 
bankers of protest were transformed into the financiers of boom. Distress migrants and 
naiks were also re-absorbed into an expanding agriculture. 'Pacification' was achieved at 
last. The second sort of factor related to the way in which the boom was harnessed to 
changes in the priorities of imperial intervention and policy. Military fiscalism clearly 
took a back seat now. Developing Hyderabad as an import-export economy within the 
nexus of the imperial system became the top priority. This meant that political uncertainty 
and conflict in the countryside had to be put to an end. Boom conditions were used to 
advantage in this connection. As revenue farming was abandoned, some erstwhile 
taluqdars were appointed to administrative and magisterial duties on fixed salaries. The 
central government was also restructured. The bankers behind revenue farming were 
provided with opportunities to invest in the production and trade of food grains and raw 
materials. The customs administration was reorganized to s,uit the new priorities. 
Railways, roads and communications were also developed to similar purpose. The 
administration of land revenue and law and order also received attention. Zamindars, 
jagirdars, patels and patwaris were appointed as the salaried functionaries of centralized 
government departments when they were not removed altogether or pensioned off. What 
182 See references cited in the last footnote 
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remained of their traditional rights and privileges was scrutinized and resumed, or brought 
under revenue assessment. Hyderabad acquired the contours of the familiar princely state 
and was to retain that basic structure until the end of imperial rule in the mid-20th 
century. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has attempted to fill in a gap in the historiography of India in the transition 
from the pre-colonial to the colonial period. The Hyderabad region was chosen for two 
main reasons. It had long been regarded as an important frontier region between north and 
south India, for colonial and pre-colonial powers, but little research had been conducted 
into it in modem historiography. Even the preliminary forays of this enquiry suggested 
that the region defied characterization in terms of the two prevailing paradigms for the 
18th century. It was not a 'successor state', on the one hand, and, on the other, it was not 
a region of political and social disorder, or economic decline, despite evidence of 
pervasive conflict. This thesis provides an alternative conception of transition for the 
region. Although its focus is on Hyderabad, it might also provide a starting point for the 
analysis of other areas which have in the past usually been consigned to the category of 
the conflictive, chaotic and declining. 
The Hyderabad region could be divided into four sub-regions in the pre-colonial 
period: Telangana-Rayalseema, Andhra, Marathwada and Berar. They were distinguished 
principally by the differential dispersal within them of economically and ecologically 
favourable core areas. The differential embodied different levels of population and 
resources, and agricultural, manufacturing and trading activity. Hyderabad's core areas 
were ruled by small kings, who tried to project themselves as benevolent patrons and 
capable protectors. Kingship was also articulated with reference to the nature of the 
community that the king ruled. Legitimation rituals, consensus building devices and 
incorporating legends were all an integral part of this process. The manner in which they 
were used, however, precipitated rivalries between various small kings, which were 
reinforced by competition over scarce labour and resources. Such a situation led to the 
concentration of labour and resources in core areas of vibrant economic activity, and to a 
criss cross pattern of alliances and conflicts among the small kings. Such a pattern also 
reproduced scarcity in the economy and inhibited potential for further growth and 
development. 
Hyderabad's fiscal potential attracted a number of foreign elements to the region in the 
18th century. These included the Asaf Jahis, a variety of supra-local intermediaries, 
traders and bankers. The Asaf Jahis and the intermediaries soon _built up what looked like 
a Mughal style state on the surface. But beneath the surface, the reality was still different: 
supra-local intermediaries were drawn into alliances and conflicts with local small kings 
and inter-regional foreign powers, who too were attracted to Hyderabad by its fiscal and 
strategic potential. The modus operandi of the supra-local intermediaries and the inter-
regional foreign powers was military fiscalism: providing their clients with military 
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services in return for revenues or territories. The Marathas had thus succeeded in taking 
parts of Marathwada and Berar, and the French and the British in taking Andhra, by the 
end of the 18th century. The Nizams were ultimately pawns in the hands of dominant 
combinations of foreign powers and intermediaries. 
The pre-colonial order began to be effected in significant ways with the emergence of 
the British as the only inter-regional power of any consequence by the end of the 18th 
century. Their most effective military fiscal competitors disappeared with the annihilation, 
or decline, of the Mysore Sultans, the French and the Marathas. They now proceeded to 
launch a programme of centralization. This process can be explained only partially with 
reference to the imperatives of the subsidiary alliance, the concern to pen the Marathas, or 
the need for suppressing frontier banditti. Its mainspring lay in the deliberate 
monopolization and intensification of military fiscalism. Military fiscalism under the 
British not only encroached upon the traditional independence, powers and privileges of 
the intermediaries and zamindars during the first half of the 19th century; in the context 
of agricultural depression and poor seasons, it also began to destroy the core areas of the 
Hyderabad countryside. Matters reached a crisis point when military fiscalism itself began 
to fall apart against the backdrop of rising central indebtedness, open creditor conflict and 
widespread political protest, by the 1830s and 40s. In these processes also lay the seeds 
of the latter-day 'communalism', 'casteism' and 'landlord-peasant conflict' of the 
Hyderabad region. 
Protest took the form of marginalized or dispossessed local and supra-local groups, 
and discontented troops, led by naiks and the Mujahiddin attempting to restore figures like 
the Mughal Emperor and the Peshwa, and to create an alternative political order. The 
protest against British domination did not succeed, however. But nor did the fortunes of 
imperial military fiscalism look good by the mid-19th century. The way out was found by 
harnessing Hyderabad to industrial Britain's imperial economy. Developing Hyderabad as 
an exporter of food grains and raw materials, and an importer of British manufactures was 
matched by parallel efforts at administrative reorganization. These processes together 
helped establish the basic framework of the Princely State. 
There are one or two general sets of considerations which also arise from this thesis. 
There has been a tendency in Indian historiography to think of the 'state' as the basic 
framework for social co-operation, political stability and economic growth. Conversely, 
evidence of pervasive political conflict has been taken to indica~e decline. The Hyderabad 
case, however, raises doubts about such notions. It seems wiser in cases such as these to 
give primacy to the interplay of forces of collaboration and conflict at various levels, 
rather than to think only of a state or its negation. Another tendency in the .historiography 
has been to give overriding importance to the power of regional centres, as opposed to 
the power of small kings and neighbouring foreign powers. Here again the Hyderabad 
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case raises questions about the traditional wisdom. The criss cross pattern of alliances and 
conflicts between Hyderabad's small kings crucially affected the fortunes of its supra-local 
intermediaries and centre. The latter were also affected by the inter-regional rivalries of 
foreign powers, which point raises another issue. European powers did not always 
penetrate into the interior of the Indian sub-continent as commercial, mercantile or trading 
powers, as is generally thought. They could also do so, like their Indian counterparts in 
the 18th century, the Marathas for example, as military fiscal powers. 
Another kind of consideration that arises from the Hyderabad case relates to the 
conventional use of certain socio-political and socio-cultural categories in the 
historiography. The term 'zamindar', for example, lays a misplaced emphasis on 
bureaucratic functions and does not capture the full reality of the 'small king'. On the 
other hand, terms like 'jagirdar', 'mansabdar' and ' the nobility' overstate the bureaucratic 
power, settled character and internal cohesiveness of 'supra-local intermediaries'. 
Furthermore, the use of caste and religious terms as the basic categories of social or 
political identity and co-operation does not do justice to the importance of the 
'community' in many situations. TIµs thesis has tried to trace the changing character of 
the community over time, and also to reinterpret the changing relevance of caste and sect. 
Finally, some older notions about the periodization of Indian history may stand in need 
of revision for at least some parts of the sub-continent. For Hyderabad, the period c.1600-
1800 seems to display some common underlying pre-colonial themes, - a vibrant 
economy, and a criss cross pattern of alliances and conflicts at several levels, - and seems 
more suitable, therefore, than the Mughal dates 1526-1707. Thereafter, the period c.1800-
50 may be regarded as a period of transition, rather than the conventional c.1707-57. The 
period from the middle of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th century 
corresponded with the time of the Princely State, and the high period of colonial rule. To 
describe this last period as 'modem' in comparison to the pre-transition period in anything 
other than a simple chronological sense is to overlook the dynamism of the pre-colonial 
order and the stagnation and decline of the colonial period. 
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